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Abstract 
Nominal exchange rate stability has long been considered as a policy choice for many oil-
exporting economies, including the GCC countries. The main motives for such policy choices 
include the desire to import credibility to domestic currencies, stabilize oil revenues and in 
turn government revenues (given their role in fiscal budget of these oil-based economies) and 
to avoid Dutch disease, particularly for those countries which have been trying to promote 
their non-oil exports. Recently however, with respect to the GCC countries, the advantages of 
exchange  rate  stability/peg  have  been  overshadowed  by  adverse  domestic  and  global 
developments.  The  recent  surge  in  the  GCC  countries’  inflation  rates  that  coincided  with 
depreciation of the currencies of these countries due to the depreciation of the US dollar, has 
led to increasing public pressure for an upward revaluation or even a de-peg from the US 
dollar to an exchange rate regime that will ensure higher price stability. 
Accordingly, this thesis was put forth to provide a scientific opinion of the viability of the  
existing US dollar peg in the GCC countries, by focusing on the link between changes in 
exchange rate and inflation. To this end, the study attempted to assess the risk to the domestic 
inflation rates of the GCC countries arising from fluctuations of the US dollar against the 
currencies of the major trading partners of these economies. Based on a thorough review of the 
relevant  literature,  some  empirical  estimations  were  carried  out  using  some  econometric 
methods, and it was discovered that the amount of pass-through or impact from changes in 
exchange rates to inflation rates in the GCC economies is incomplete and moderate, with an 
average of around 23% in the long-run. Furthermore, an average long-run pass-through of 
around 23% does not signify a high risk from fluctuations in the foreign exchange market for 
domestic prices in the GCC countries. In other words, the volatility of exchange rates of the 
currencies of the GCC countries does not necessitate the adjustment of the money supply in 
these economies. These findings lent further support to the relevancy of the existing fixed 
exchange rate regime for maintaining stable inflation in the economies of the GCC countries.   
The findings were also supported by the performance of the GCC economies over the past two 
decades, despite some periods of dollar fluctuations. A retrospective analysis indicates that on 
average, inflation has been stable in the region over the past two decades. 
The study provided evidence for the important role of the fiscal policies of the GCC countries 
in affecting the recent impact from exchange rate to inflation rate in these economies, which P a g e  | 3 
 
suggests that these policies form a key macroeconomic tool in these countries, particularly 
given the lost independence of the monetary policy under the existing pegged exchange rate 
regimes. Moreover, the study suggests lowering the influence of fiscal policies on the link 
between exchange rate and domestic prices, or inflation in general, in the GCC countries by 
pursuing gradual steps toward domestic development in the economy, particularly given the 
limited absorptive capacity of these economies due to the shortage in supply bottleneck.  
The study was also extended to identify the potential alternative exchange rate regime if the 
GCC  changed  their  focus  from  inflation  to  other,  evolving,  national  objectives  like 
international  competitiveness.  Based  on  the  existing  literature  and  the  optimum  currency 
theory, the study suggests that the GCC countries should consider moving gradually from their 
current single peg toward a more flexible exchange rate in order to avoid abrupt change that 
would  disturb  the  existing  market  credibility.    As  an  initial  step,  the  study  recommends 
moving  toward  a  basket  peg  of  two  currencies,  namely  the  US  dollar  and  the  Euro,  that 
account for a large share of the GCC economies’ international trade and non-trade financial 
transactions.  
Finally,  the  study  also  concluded  that  an  upward  revaluation  as  a  remedy  for  the  recent 
inflationary  development  is  an  unsatisfactory  solution,  particularly  if  the  same  set  of 
circumstances continued into the future. If this was the case, then the process would have to be 
repeated again, thus triggering the possibility of speculation attack.  
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Chapter One 
 
General Thesis Introduction 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the core matter of this thesis, which is the relevancy of 
the current US dollar peg to the economies of the GCC countries, initially focusing on the 
importance of exchange rate policy in general to the economic environment.  
The exchange rate regime represents the mechanism by which a country manages its currency 
in respect to other currencies.  It is has recently been argued that exchange rate policy has had 
a significant  role  in shaping  many  macroeconomic  outcomes  during  the  past  few  decades 
(Frenkel and Rapetti, 2010). Furthermore, the choice of exchange rate regime is assumed to 
have  some  implications  for  the  behaviour  of  the  nominal  exchange  rate  (NER)
1,  a  key 
macroeconomic variable that influences the behaviour of several other relevant, nominal and 
real variables such as the inflation rate, the balance of payments, output and employment, and 
the rate of economic growth. For example, with respect to inflation rate, movements in NER 
are assumed to directly affect the price level through the share of traded goods in the consumer 
basket, and to indirectly affect the level through expectations and aggregate demand. With 
respect to the expectation channel, the behaviour of NER is assumed to play an important role 
in affecting inflation expectations and firms’ price-setting mechanism, particularly in countries 
with relatively high inflation (Taylor, 2000).  
NER is also regarded as an asset price and is therefore assumed to influence the expectations 
and behaviour of economic agents in financial markets. Moreover, it has been common to use 
foreign currency (dollarization) in setting nominal contracts, particularly in nations plagued 
with high inflation, such as many Latin American countries where myriad financial assets and 
real  estate  prices  are  dominated  in  US  dollars  (Savastano,  1992).  As  a  result,  when 
                                                           
1 The nominal exchange rate (NER) is normally defined as the domestic price of foreign currency. An increase in 
NER reflects a nominal depreciation and a decrease reflects a nominal appreciation. Furthermore,  spot exchange 
rate means  current exchange rate and forward exchange rate  means exchange rate that is quoted and traded 
today but for delivery and payment on future. Further discussion is provided in MacDonald (2007). P a g e  | 15 
 
dollarization is prevalent, the stability and the robustness of the financial and payment system 
becomes prone to variations in NER.  
 Movement in NER is assumed to influence the real sectors through its affect on real exchange 
rate (RER). RER is normally defined as the nominal exchange rate adjusted for the difference 
in the price level or, alternatively, as the relative price between traded and non-traded goods 
(Edwardo,  1989).  It  has  been  systematically  documented  that  movements  in  RER  follow 
movements in NER relatively closely over the short and medium-run (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 
1995, Taylor and Taylor, 2004, MacDonald, 2007). Additionally, RER is viewed as a key 
variable in determining the external and internal equilibrium in the economy, as it affects 
resource allocation and level of activity. It is also assumed to affect the trade balance through 
its influence on exports and imports, while its influence on net exports is also important in 
determining output and employment level.  
It has been recognized that maintaining a competitive RER is a key development strategy 
(Williamson, 2008). This notion of a competitive RER has received more relevance in recent 
years, particularly in development economics. The rapid recent economic growth in emerging 
nations such as China, which has been trying to maintain a competitive trade position by 
continuing to suppress the appreciation of its currency, has contributed in this regard.  This 
view has also been supported by a number of empirical studies (e.g. Hausmann et al, 2005, 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2008, and Razmi et al. 2009) that have documented significant 
associations  between  competitive  RERs and higher economic  growth.  That  has led  to  the 
assumption  that  the  choice  of  exchange  rate  policy  is  not  neutral  for  economic  growth, 
particularly if  it  is  steered  towards  maintaining  a  stable  and  competitive  RER,  or at least 
avoiding overvaluations (Commission on Growth and Development, 2008). Accordingly, the 
exchange rate regime can have a significant influence on some key economic policy objectives 
including  price  stability,  domestic  financial  stability  and  robustness,  external  and  internal 
balances, and economic growth and development (Frenkel and Rapetti, 2010).   
The choice of exchange rate regime gained greater attention in international finance following 
the  collapse  of  the  Bretton  Wood  system  in  the  early  1970s  (Kato  and  Uctum,  2007). 
Moreover,  exchange  rate  regimes  are  classified  by  the  rules  followed  by  the  monetary 
authorities regarding the degree of intervention in the foreign exchange market, and therefore 
by  the  degree  of  official  commitment  in  the  determination  of  NER  (Frenkel  and  Rapetti, P a g e  | 16 
 
2010). They have been traditionally divided into two categories fixed, and floating, exchange 
rate  regimes.  Fixed  exchange  rate  regimes  are  normally  defined  as  the  commitment  of 
monetary authority to intervene in the foreign exchange market to maintain a certain fixed 
parity for the currency  against another single currency or a basket of currencies. Floating 
exchange rate regimes are normally defined as the commitment of the monetary authority to 
entirely leave the determination of the NER to be set by the market forces through supply and 
demand. 
Furthermore,  between  the  fixed  and  floating  exchange  rate  regimes,  there  exist  other, 
alternative, systems that maintain limited flexibility. These are known as intermediate or soft 
regimes. They include crawling peg, basket peg, adjustable peg, and exchange rate bands
2. 
However, there is still no consensus over the optimal exchange rate regime or over the factors 
that  make  a  country  choose  a  particular  exchange  rate  regime  (Kato  and  Uctum,  2008). 
According to Frankel (1999, 2003), no single exchange rate regime is right for all countries, or 
at  all  times,  and  the  choice  of  a  right  exchange  rate  regime  depends  primarily  on  the 
circumstances of the country in question, as well as on the time.  
However,  based  on  the  traditional  theoretical  literature,  the  most  common  criteria  for 
determining the optimal exchange rate regime is macroeconomic and financial stability in the 
face of nominal or real shocks (Mundell, 1963). The conventional view is that fixed exchange 
rates  are  more  useful  in  achieving  macroeconomic  and  financial  stability  in  reaction  to 
domestic  nominal  shocks  such  as  shifts  in  money  demand
3.  On  the  other  hand,  flexible 
exchange rates are traditionally preferred to isolate the economy from real shocks, such as 
changes in the demand for exports or in the terms of trade (Friedman, 1953)
4. The traditional 
literature was generally set in an era that was broadly characterized by strict capital controls, 
relatively stable exchange rate, low inflation rates, and economic growth.  
                                                           
2 Further details on the intermediate regimes is provided in Frankel (2003), Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), and 
MacDonald (2007). 
3 The idea here is that there is no need for interest rate changes or price level changes as the money supplies can 
automatically adjust to changes in money demand (Fleming, 1962, Mundell, 1963). 
4 Under floating exchange regime, exchange rate can adjust quickly and help to restore the equilibrium in the 
economy, without any need to changes in the price level. For example, a fall in the world ‘s demand for a 
country’s exports will be encountered automatically by a depreciation in the country’s currency and a fall in 
terms of trade, thereby leading to offsetting stimulus in aggregate demand (MacDonald, 2007).    P a g e  | 17 
 
In the context of increasing capital flows due mainly to financial deregulation and reductions 
of barriers to financial flows, and large external shocks, the modern debate on exchange rate 
choice has focused on the trade-off between low inflation (credibility) and economic growth 
(flexibility).  Based on the literature, fixed exchange rate regimes help to impart credibility of 
low inflation polices from a foreign central bank and ensure a low inflationary environment 
(Dornbusch,  2001).    Due  to  inflationary  bias,  in  the  case  of  a  monetary  policy  with  full 
discretion, the anti-inflationary central bank can provide more commitment to its intention by 
fixing the exchange rate to hard currency with stronger monetary discipline. In such cases, 
economic  agents  (e.g.  workers,  managers)  would  set  prices  on  the  basis  of  low  inflation 
expectations since it is believed that currency pegging will prevent the central bank from 
pursuing expansionary polices by increasing money supply. Accordingly, the result will be 
lower levels of inflation rate at any given level of output
5.  
The credibility view was mainly raised in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The literature in this 
regard was mainly built on Barro and Gordon’s theory (1983) on monetary policy credibility. 
Almost  simultaneously,  and  in  contrast  to  the  credibility  view  that  argued  for  the  fixed 
exchange rate regime, the consistency view that was originally introduced through the writings 
of Kyndland and Prescott (1977), called for retaining the flexible exchange rate regime when 
the potential inflation bias is stronger. According to this view, government restraints need to 
be established through a set of domestic institutions in order to guarantee that discretion is not 
misused,  and  economic  policies  are  consistent  and  sustainable  to  maintain  low  inflation 
(Svensson 2000). For example, central bank independence was suggested as an approach to 
solve the time inconsistency problem associated with full discretion for monetary policy under 
floating regimes (Larrain and Velasco, 2001).  
Furthermore, studies have shown that a flexible exchange rate regime can help promote higher 
economic  growth  as  it  enables  the  economy  to  have  an  independent  monetary  policy, 
                                                           
5 Domestic inflationary can also originate on account of excessive government budget deficits (Obstfeld and 
Rogoff, 1995). Because of that, the credibility of the fixed regime is also justified on the ground of some political 
factors. It is argued that pegged regime is an instrument for governments to address credibility-deficits and 
dynamic inconsistency problems.  Based on the credibility view, the fixed regime ties the hands of the policy 
makers to specific policy course (Carmignani et al., 2008). In contrast, other studies have showed the viability of 
flexible exchange rate regime when political cots are taken into account. E.g. Poirson (2002) and Carmignani et 
al.,  (2008), among many others. P a g e  | 18 
 
providing the flexibility to accommodate foreign and domestic disturbance. Similarly, other 
studies have  argued that fixed exchange rate regimes are associated with higher economic 
growth by reducing exchange rate uncertainty, thus promoting trade and investment and the 
better  allocation  of  resources
6,  preventing  competitive  depreciation  or  competitive 
appreciation
7, import financial stability
8, and allowing for more efficient adjustments when 
shocks are of a nominal nature (Corbo, 2003). 
Within the context of the choice of exchange rate regime, this research aims to comment on 
the relevancy of the existing pegged exchange rate systems of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
countries (GCC)
9 with a special focus on the link between changes in the effective exchange 
rates of these countries' currencies and their domestic inflation. In particular, we investigate 
whether there had been some large significant inflationary effect from the recent depreciation 
of the GCC countries' currencies by quantifying the pass-through from changes in exchange 
rates into domestic consumer prices’ inflation of the GCC economies which is missing in the 
literature. For the measurement of the extent of the pass-through, we relied on two different 
and commonly used econometric methods, namely the ordinary least square (OLS) and vector 
error correction methods (VECM).  
Fiscal  policies  in  developing nations  are  generally  considered  the  main  source  for  money 
growth  and  are  believed  to  lead  directly  to  an  increase  in  the  money  supply  due  to  less 
developed financial markets (Keran and Malik, 1979). In the case of the GCC economies, 
government spending forms the major stimulator for private sector. Accordingly, another part 
in  this  research attempts  to  analyze  the  influence  of  the  fiscal  policy  actions  in the  GCC 
countries on the effect of changes in exchange rate on inflation.  
                                                           
6 This issue is particularly emphasized in the case of developing countries that are featured with incomplete 
forward markets. Also some recent studies that have focused on developing countries were able to find some 
relationship between exchange rate volatility on trade and investment (Parsley and Rose 2001, Frankel and Rose 
2002).  
7 Frankel (2003) has updated the interpretation of this advantage by the currency crises that took place in 1990s, 
where the strategy of improving trade balance through devaluation was viewed ineffective as such strategy spread 
between the neighbouring economies because they felt at a competitive disadvantage. 
8 One form of that can be through preventing speculative bubbles. 
9 The GCC countries are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates (UAE). P a g e  | 19 
 
Along  a  somewhat  different  line,  we  also  attempt  to  further  analyze  the  viability  of  the 
existing exchange rate regimes of the GCC countries by considering an alternative pegging in 
the form of a dollar-euro basket peg instead of the current single US dollar peg.  The choice 
for the currencies of the basket is based on the Optimum Criteria Area (OCA) theory that 
suggests adopting the anchor currency that minimizes the sum of the bilateral exchange rate 
fluctuations, weighted by the importance of each trade partner (Meissner and Oomes, 2009). 
The tests are twofold; the use of a Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) to investigate the 
significance of external shocks emanating from Europe and US on the GCC economies, and 
the  use  of  the  Johansen  co-integration  approach  to  test  for  the  synchronous  long-term 
movements between the business cycles of the individual GCC countries and their trading 
partners,  the US and EU. 
The following section provides a brief background on the fixed exchange rate regime of the 
GCC countries. Section three illustrates the mechanism by which the US dollar peg affects the 
inflationary environment in the GCC countries. Section four presents a brief about the role of 
fiscal  policies in  the  GCC  countries.  An  overview  of  the  subsequent  chapters  is  given  in 
section five. 
2. Exchange rate systems in the GCC countries 
The US dollar has been the de facto anchor for all the GCC countries' currencies, with the 
exception of the Kuwaiti Dinar, for almost three decades. Except for a short period when it 
was exclusively pegged to the US dollar (May, 2003-May, 2007) pursuant to an agreement in 
the context of the GCC’s monetary integration process, the Kuwaiti Dinar has been linked to 
an undisclosed weighted basket of currencies, in which the US dollar forms the major part 
given that most of the Kuwaiti's exports (oil) are priced in US dollar and the fluctuations vis-à-
vis US dollar are rather limited
10. Oman adopted the US dollar as its de jure and de facto 
anchor for its currency, the riyal, in 1973, while the individual currencies of Bahrain, Qatar, 
UAE, and Saudi Arabia were de jure tied to the SDR and de facto tied to the US dollar from 
the 1980s until 2003, after which these countries formally  adopted the US dollar as their 
monetary anchor in a first step toward full monetary union.     
                                                           
10 The Kuwaiti decision to retain to a basket peg was made on the ground of rising inflationary pressure from 
imports (IMF Staff Report,2009) . P a g e  | 20 
 
The choice of the dollar as an anchor currency had been based primarily on the account of the 
dominance of this currency in the international oil trade.  Continuing with the dollar has been 
due to a number of reasons, including the large share of stabilizing exports and fiscal revenues 
(since  oil  revenue  constitutes  the  major  part  of  the  government  budget),  credibility  of 
monetary policy under the peg
11, and to shield the value of the financial wealth which is 
mainly dollar-dominated, from fluctuation in exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar
12.   
Pegging to the US dollar looks to have met the expectations of the GCC economies for a 
significant time. The existing dollar peg, along with the absence of significant capital controls, 
has set common narrow limits for the scope of local monetary authority interventions, as well 
as for the policies of interest rates and foreign reserves (Abed et al. 2003). The dollar peg has 
proven stable in front of large fluctuations in oil prices. It has helped in eliminating or at least 
reducing  exchange  rate  risks  and  served  to  stabilize  fluctuations  in  the  GCC  countries' 
financial wealth, which is largely dollar-dominated. It has also reduced trade and financial 
transaction  costs  and  encouraged  investment  activities.    Furthermore,  in  terms  of  internal 
stability, the peg looks to have maintained the purchasing power of the currencies of the GCC 
country members, as the average annual inflation rate during the period 1990-2002 ranged 
between a minimum of -0.23 (Bahrain) and a maximum of 3.3 (UAE)
13.  
Furthermore, fixing with the US dollar has helped the GCC countries avoid nominal shocks 
from geopolitical risks feeding into the economy (Khan, 2009). It has also helped to maintain 
the international competitiveness of the GCC economies despite recent real term trade shocks 
relating  to  oil  prices  (Kumah,  2009).  Moreover,  the  abundant  international  reserves  have 
further  underpinned  the  credibility  of  the  peg  and  discouraged  speculation  against  the 
currencies of the GCC countries. 
                                                           
11 Given the delay in the development of various financial, economic, and institutional sides, fixing the currencies 
of the GCC countries to the currency of a nation with strong institutions and traditions of stability ensures 
credibility and confidence to the economies of the GCC countries (Sturm et al, 2008).  
12 On average revenue from hydrocarbon, based on 2008 data account for around 80% of government revenue, 
around 70% of export, and around 50% of GDP in the GCC economies.  
13 Other factors that are believed to have contributed to low inflation rates during the past two decades include 
open trade regime, flexible labor market, prudent fiscal policy (e.g. the introduction of oil funds to sterilize the 
effect of oil revenue), and benign global inflationary conditions (Iqbal, 2010). P a g e  | 21 
 
However,  some  very  recent  economic  developments  in  the  region  have,  in  some  views, 
necessitated a shift in the overall macroeconomic policy framework of the GCC countries, 
including their exchange rate regime policy. Since the beginning of the current decade, and 
following  the  rapid  economic  growth  facilitated  by  higher  oil  revenues,  some  inflation 
pressure has emerged in all the GCC countries, with average inflation measured by consumer 
price index increasing from around 0.2% between 1998 and 2002 to around 10% in 2008, and 
with some individual countries running at higher rates. Despite the presence of some debate 
regarding the potential causes of inflation in the GCC economies (e. g. cost push emanating 
from rising prices of different goods like foods and raw materials in the housing sector versus 
demand push  due to rapidly rising public expenditure and the private sector) it is generally 
believed  that  the  exchange  rate  regime  adopted  by  the  GCC  countries  has  played  a 
fundamental role. 
The recent persistent depreciation of the US dollar against the currencies of the major trading 
partners  (e.g.  EU  and  Japan)  of  the  GCC  economies  has  apparently  resulted  in  some 
significant cost effect by raising the prices in domestic currencies for a wide range of imported 
goods. The increase in domestic prices of imported goods has in turn suggested some further 
significant repercussions on the cost of domestic production, living and wage trends.  
 Furthermore, the inflationary pressure of the US dollar peg is believed to have been further 
accentuated  through  the  volatility  of  international  oil  prices  and  the  US  dollar  that  has 
illustrated a clear divergence in the business cycles between the United States and the GCC 
countries (liquidity effect). For example, the recent high oil prices and depreciating US dollar 
called  for  the  use  in  GCC  countries  of  stringent  monetary  policy  in  order  to  contain  the 
inflation  response  to  monetary  circulation.  However,  given  the  pegged  system,  the  GCC 
economies were forced to follow the current expansionary policy of the US, which lowered its 
policy interest rates to resist recessionary tendencies as a result of the September 11 attack and 
the recent sub-prime  market (MacDonald, 2010).  Indeed the current situation of the GCC 
economies reflects the well-known ‘trilemma’ of a fixed exchange regime, an open capital 
market, and a lack of independent monetary policy. 
 The current scenario of rising oil prices also calls for an adjustment in the real exchange rate 
of the GCC countries. However, under the dollar peg such adjustment is only expected to take 
place via domestic inflation of the local currency, which is experienced by most of the GCC P a g e  | 22 
 
countries. The disadvantage of such a channel is that it is slow and can create inflationary 
expectations, which can result in further misalignment in the real exchange rate in the form of 
real  overvaluation  and,  eventually,  undermining  competitiveness  and  long-term  growth 
(MacDonald, 2010). 
Also  relevant  to  the  issue  of  the  real  exchange  rates  in  the  GCC  countries  is  the  recent 
changing priorities of the local governments of these countries, who have begun to invest 
heavily    in  promoting  internationally  the  competitiveness  of  their  non-oil  exports  and  in 
reducing reliance on the oil and gas sectors. The development of non-oil activities in the GCC 
countries has become more marked in the last few years as a significant share of oil revenues 
that characterized the recent period were employed to accelerate the diversification process in 
these economies. However, the effect of rising inflation on real effective exchange rate and, 
therefore, the competitiveness of non-hydrocarbon products is viewed as being of particular 
importance to the GCC economies.  
In addition to the recent inflationary development in the region, recent global integration of 
the  GCC  economies  into  the  international  markets  and  the  increasing  integration  of  the 
financial sectors of these countries with global economies highlights the vulnerability of these 
economies  to  the  effects  of  inflation  pressures  and  underlines  the  need  for 
evaluating/reviewing  the  existing  macroeconomic  policies,  including  the  pegged  exchange 
rate.  
3. The US dollar peg and the structure of the GCC economies 
Based on the existing structure of the GCC economies, one can further understand the impact 
of  the  pegged  exchange  rate  regime  on  their  economic  fundamentals,  and  particularly 
domestic prices.  The economies of the GCC countries heavily depend on the exports of the 
hydrocarbon  products  that  form  approximately,  based  on  2008  data,  80%  of  government 
revenue, 70% of exports, and 50% of the GDP. The strong reliance of the GCC countries on 
the demand and price trends of oil makes their economic growth vulnerable to the vicissitudes 
of  the  oil  market.  Sudden  decreases  in  oil  prices  may  cause  recessionary  impacts,  while 
increases  may  trigger  appreciation  in  real  effective  exchange  rate,  similar  to  the  current 
scenario, which could threaten the market competitiveness of the non-hydrocarbon products 
and discourage the diversification efforts.  The latter effect, which is also known as the Dutch 
Disease, can be magnified via the pegged exchange rate regime with the US dollar. Similar to P a g e  | 23 
 
the  current  scenario,  the  rapid  and  large  increases  in  oil  prices  are  reflected  into  higher 
revenues  from  exports  that  the  dollar  peg  can  turn  into  higher  monetary  circulation, 
particularly given the pro-cyclicality of  fiscal policies in the GCC countries, amplifying the 
inflationary impacts of increases in international prices of oil (Fasano and Wang 2002).  
Furthermore, the inflationary process in the GCC economies becomes more intricate when 
considering  the  structure  of  their  labor  markets.  The GCC  economies  strongly  depend  on 
foreign workers, who normally migrate from neighboring countries such as India, Pakistan, 
Iran, Bangladesh, Egypt and Indonesia (Willett et al., 2009). On average, around 60% to 90% 
of the work force in the private sector is composed of expatriates, and most of the nationals are 
occupying the public sector
14. The fact that the economic growth and the promotion of the 
non-hydrocarbon sectors are partly resting on the availability of a flexible global labor market 
makes the inflationary impact of the dollar peg of particular relevance for the GCC economies. 
In  addition  to  creating  a  climate  of  tension  and  intolerance,  the  predominance  of  foreign 
laborers in the GCC markets highlights the risk of higher price instability through demands for 
wage increases due to factors including changes in exchange rates.  For example, depreciation 
of the US dollar may drive up prices in domestic currency and worsen the living conditions of 
the working classes, particularly for foreign workers, fueling demands for wages increases and 
social tensions (Marzovilla et al. 2010). 
The  interaction  between  the  exchange  rate  and  inflation  can  also  be  seen  from  the  trade 
patterns of the GCC economies. The GCC economies are characterized as being small, open to 
trade, highly specialized in the production of hydrocarbon products, with segmented labor 
markets  dominated  by  foreign  workers,  having  limited  agricultural  and  manufacturing 
                                                           
14 In addition to the fact that most of the nationals are absorbed by the public sector, the nature of working 
opportunities offered by the  private sector forms another reason for the presence of high number of foreign labor 
in the work force of the GCC markets. The working opportunities that are available in the private sector can 
generally be classified as  either too humble, or very specialized to be compatible with an essentially humanistic 
cultural education. Furthermore, despite the fact that generally the employment opportunities available in the 
public sector offer higher pay, the priority in recruitment is given to nationals. Other features that encourage the 
recruitment of foreign laborers is their willingness to accept low wages and the greater ease to discharge them 
(Marzovilla et. al 2010). 
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production,  and  depending  heavily  on  imports  for  their  consumer  goods,  raw  materials, 
intermediate inputs, and capital goods. Such characteristics make the choice of exchange rate 
regime very relevant for the GCC countries (Marzovilla et al. 2010). The high dependency on 
imports, which formed on average around 40% of nominal GDP as of 2008, suggests that the 
pass-through from exchange rate can be burdensome for the GCC economies, resulting in 
increased costs of production and domestic consumer prices. Furthermore, a significant share 
of the imports comes from Europe (around 30% in 2008) which normally adopts the euro as 
the currency of payment for their exports. Due to the dollar peg, the recent depreciation of the 
US dollar compared to the euro implied a lower value of the currencies of the GCC countries 
and has led to rising prices in domestic currencies for imports
15.   
4. Fiscal Policy in the GCC countries: role, structure and challenges 
Like the case in many oil producing countries, particularly developing ones, fiscal policy in 
the GCC economies forms a key macroeconomic tool to sustain internal and external growth. 
The  important  role  assumed  by  the  fiscal  policy  in  the  GCC  stems  primarily  from  the 
economic  characteristics  of  these  countries.  Given  the  fixed  exchange  rate  regimes, 
unrestricted cross-border movement of capital, and the dominant role played by governments, 
fiscal policy represents the main instrument of demand management in the GCC countries (Al 
Faris, 2002).  
Moreover, the significant role of the governments in the GCC countries is mainly attributed to 
the large share of hydrocarbon products like oil and gas in their economies.  Revenue from 
hydrocarbon products forms on average around 70% of exports, and 60% of GDP in the GCC 
countries, hence, making government spending, and in turn fiscal policy, the main stimulator 
of  real  demand  in  these  economies.  Additionally,  the  less  developed  nature  of  these 
economies’  financial  system  reflect  higher  role  for  the  fiscal  policy  in  these  countries, 
particularly, with regard to money growth (Keran and Malik, 1979).  
Similar to other oil producing developing countries, fiscal balances of the GCC countries are 
primarily influenced by cyclical development in the oil prices. Revenues from hydrocarbon 
                                                           
15 The recent significant depreciation of the US dollar has, in addition to triggering inflationary impacts, caused 
further monetary losses to the economies of the GCC countries by reducing the monetary value of the these 
countries' external financial wealth, which is mainly dollar dominated.   P a g e  | 25 
 
products constitute by far the largest source of budgetary income, with an average of around 
80%. Furthermore, the positive trade shocks in the form of higher oil prices over the recent 
years  have  further  increased  the  weight  of  hydrocarbon  revenue  in  the  budget  of  these 
economies. In contrast, the contribution of non-hydrocarbon sources (e.g. direct tax, indirect 
tax, customs duties, etc) is comparatively low, reflecting enter alia, the difficulty of raising 
taxes with currently underdeveloped tax and customs systems and the lack of a need for higher 
tax revenues in view of oil wealth (Sturm and Gurtner 2007).  
Expenditure side of the budget, on the other hand, is pro-cyclical to the prices in oil markets 
(Fasano and Wang, 2002). Fiscal policies in the GCC economies are very active during the 
periods  of  buoyant  oil  revenues.  In  periods  of  low  oil  prices  (like  those  during  1990s) 
government spending in GCC countries is cut back rather than expanded, as one might expect 
if an active fiscal policy were being pursued. Also, similar to other oil producing developing 
countries, capital expenditure share have gained higher weight recently, following the recent 
increases  in  oil  revenues,  due  to  the  urgency  to  build  and  expand  physical  and  social 
infrastructure, keeping in mind that the GCC countries are still not fully developed in many 
areas. As of 2010, government revenue and expenditure formed on average around 45% and 
32% of nominal GDP, respectively
16. 
Further, despite the recent favourable fiscal stance, due to development in oil markets, the 
budget structure of the GCC countries reflect some key fiscal policy challenges, which are as 
well common to most oil-dependent economies (Sturm et al, 2008).  The high dependency of 
the GCC countries on oil makes their fiscal policy highly vulnerable to external shocks due 
mainly  to  the  fact  that  oil  revenues  are  exhaustible,  unpredictable,  volatile,  and  largely 
originate from abroad (Barnett and Ossowski, 2002).  Some of these challenges include how to 
avoid pro-cyclical policies that have characterized the conduct of fiscal policy in most oil 
exporting  nations,  particularly  developing,  and  have  led  in  many  cases  to  inflationary 
conditions in economies facing supply bottlenecks and limited absorptive capacity like the 
GCC countries. Relevant to that is also the volatility of oil prices that disturb government 
spending  and  may  translate  into  macroeconomic  volatility  and  reduced  growth  prospect. 
                                                           
16 Public dept is not an issue to the economies of the GCC countries. Similar to other oil producing nations, the 
GCC countries have utilized part of the recent windfall from the oil revenues to pay off significant share of their 
public debt. As of 2010, government debt stood on average around 19% of GDP. P a g e  | 26 
 
Additionally, large volatility in oil revenue may lead to high volatility in real exchange rate 
and the increase in these revenues may lead to “Dutch disease”. Another challenge is the 
problem  of  intergenerational  distribution  of  state-owned  resources  and  how  to  avoid 
adjustment costs in expenditure when the price of oil has fallen, or the oil reserves has been 
exhausted, or both. There is also the challenge of how to ensure the quality of public spending 
in view of the limited administrative capacity to supervise spending and project development. 
A final challenge, which is mainly of long-run perspective, is how to reduce dependency on 
oil (Engel and Valdes 2000, Davis et al. 2001, Barnett and Ossowski 2002, Sturm et al, 2008). 
Against the above challenges, number of optimal fiscal policy rules has been proposed as 
guidelines for countries that are dependent on the export of oil, like the GCC countries, and 
other non-renewable resources. Among the suggested solutions: i) to set up stabilization and 
savings funds to help achieve long-run fiscal sustainability, and for intergenerational equity
17; 
ii)  including  the  non-oil  balance/non-oil  GDP  ratio,  which  is  often  seen  as  much  better 
indicator of fiscal stance than the overall balance, in the formulation of fiscal policy; and iii) 
reducing the reliance in hydrocarbon sectors by promoting other trade and financial sectors 
and developing other revenue resources like tax and custom systems (Engel and Valdes 2000, 
Davis et al. 2001, Barnett and Ossowski 2002).   
5. Overview on chapter two; Literature review on the causes of inflation and the pass-
through of exchange rate 
It is worthwhile to mention at the outset that with the exception of chapters three and four, the 
rest of the chapters are drafted in an independent format, so the reader need not go back and 
forth in the thesis. Accordingly, overlapping/duplication in information between the chapters 
should be expected. 
Chapter  two  comes  in  two parts.    The  first part  attempts  to survey  the  broad theories  of 
inflation  by  focusing  on  the  debates  between  various  competing  schools  of  thoughts  in 
economics. It also presents a further survey on a number of empirical studies examining the 
                                                           
17  The  GCC  countries  are  owners  of  the  world’s  largest  sovereign  wealth  funds  (SWFs).  Early  SWF  was 
established in Kuwait during 1950s, however, they are found now in all of the GCC countries, with the exception 
of Saudi Arabia, where the monetary agency continues to manage the entire foreign wealth on behalf of the 
government (Sturm et al, 2008). 
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importance of different determinants of inflation. In the second part, the research is narrowed 
down by focusing on the link between exchange rate and inflation, or the pass-through of 
exchange rate (ERPT). This section also includes some theoretical background on the link 
between exchange rate and domestic prices, the discussion of a host of factors that influence 
the pass-through of exchange rate, a deeper focus on the transmission from exchange rate into 
domestic inflation consumer price index as well as some other related and recent issues in the 
relevant literature. Similar to part one, part two also includes some empirical surveys on the 
extent  of  pass-through  from  exchange  rate  into  inflation.  Finally,  in  part  two  we  have 
attempted to identify some potential caveats in the literature for future research. 
Based on the literature, inflation is generally defined as a sustained increase in the general 
price  level  for  goods  and  services  in  the  economy,  as  expressed  in  a  given  price  index. 
Identifying the determinants of inflation has long been a concern for macroeconomists as is 
known that controlling inflation is an important element of a stable and sustained growth. 
Furthermore,  despite  the  extremely  rich  literature  on  the  causes  of  inflation,  the  basic 
determinants of inflation continue to be disputed by economists. 
Inflation is found to be a net result of the interaction of various factors in the economy and 
cannot be easily decomposed or attributed into/to specific kinds of factors. However, these 
determinants can be summarized into four major factors; demand-side factors, supply-side 
factors (cost-push), inertial factors (built-in inflation), and political/institutional-side factors. 
The first three sources together are close to what Gordon (1997) called the 'triangle model of 
inflation'.  The  presence  of  these  different  kinds  of  factors  in  explaining  the  dynamics  of 
inflation  lends  support  to  those  studies  that  view  inflation  as  a  macroeconomic  and 
institutional phenomenon. 
Demand sources of inflation may include nominal factors like money supply or real factors in 
the form of high demand on goods and low unemployment. These two sources of demand-pull 
inflation  generally  represent  the  view  of  the  two  mainstream  schools  of  economics; 
monetarists and Keynesians. Moreover, persisting government  deficits has been  commonly 
viewed, particularly among monetarists and new classical economists, as a major demand side 
cause for inflation. This fiscal view of inflation is more relevant in the context of developing 
countries, where less efficient tax systems, political instability, and limited access to external 
borrowing make it easier for a government to rely on inflation tax. P a g e  | 28 
 
On the other hand, supply or real shock factors of inflation include inter alia, sudden increases 
in oil prices, crop failures, extraordinary weather changes, exchange rate movements, import 
cost  variations,  and  negative  productivity  shocks.  These  supply  side  factors  of  inflation 
generally represent the cost-push theory of the non-mainstream economists. It should be noted 
however, that both Keynesians and non-mainstream economists generally maintain a similar 
propagation mechanism, which implies changes in relative price levels that in turn induce 
continuous increases in the aggregate price level. The third source of inflation, the inertial 
factors, is induced by elements like expectations, stickiness of wages, and indexations. These 
factors are often linked to the price/wage spiral that involves continuous attempts by labor to 
maintain their real income and employers passing increases in wages onto consumers through 
higher prices as part of a "vicious cycle". 
Politics can also be held responsible for at least partly causing inflationary effects, particularly 
in  certain  countries,  where  political  institutions  are  granted  discretionary  power  over  the 
economic  decision  process.  The  inflationary  process  in  a  number  of  developing  countries 
represents  this  case  to  a significant  extent,  where  circumstances  like inequality  in  income 
distribution,  political  instability,  sustained  government  deficits,  partisan  politics,  and  the 
absence of an independent central bank are common.  
 Furthermore, the empirical literature on the causes and dynamics of inflation is vast and rich. 
Some very important elements that have contributed considerably in the growing empirical 
field of inflation include developments in the mathematical methods (econometrics and time 
series techniques) since the late 1970s, dramatic improvements in computing technology, and 
the availability of long data for most countries all over the world. 
 It was revealed that the findings of the empirical studies have confirmed to some extent most 
of the determinants of inflation as proposed by the theoretical literature. More specifically, the 
results of the empirical studies have shown that inflation is generally influenced by a mixture 
of  variables  stemming  from  the  four  categories  of  inflation  determinants  identified  in  the 
theoretical literature. Such results suggest that any study that attempts to empirically analyze 
the causes of inflation should consider including variables that represent factors from the four 
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the real inflation process
18. Finally, the results of the empirical studies also suggest that, in 
reality, the inflation process is dynamic and shocks to prices can be precipitated by different 
types of factors. In other words, inflation can be caused simultaneously by more than one 
factor stemming from the four categories of determinants of inflation identified above.  
The second part of the chapter begins by presenting the theoretical basis for the link between 
exchange rate and domestic  prices. According  to Menon  (1995),  ERPT is defined  as  "the 
degree  to  which  exchange  rate  changes  are  reflected  in  the  destination  currency  prices  of 
traded goods". Furthermore, the pass-through relationship draws its theoretical underpinning 
from the purchasing power parity (PPP) theory that assumes a full impact from changes in 
exchange rate to domestic prices. In other words, the PPP theory argues that any changes in 
exchange rates will translate into proportional movements in domestic prices. 
Interest in analyzing the pass-through relationship began to grow following the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system, and was further enhanced by the muted response of the US import 
prices to large swings in the US dollar during the 1980s, and the failure of inflation rates in 
industrial countries to accelerate after a major devaluation in the currencies of these countries 
in 1992 (Bache, 2006). More recently, the low responses of inflation rates in many East Asian 
countries after the financial crises of 1997-98 and in other developing economies (e.g. Mexico 
and Argentina) have sparked further research that aims to understand the adjustment puzzle or 
the incomplete pass-through. 
Early literature on the exchange rate pass-through was based on microeconomic foundation 
that evolved mainly during the 1980s (Bache, 2006). The large subset of the early literature 
has focused on the analyses of the ERPT at disaggregated micro level (industry level) as it is 
more appropriate to precisely isolate the effect of the exchange rate on prices of the products 
(Ghosh and Rajan, 2007). Nonetheless, ERPT is also more often analysed at the aggregated 
macro level. such as analysing the effect of ERPT on the consumer price index, which is more 
relevant to monetary policy makers. It is this later effect that is the focus of this part of the 
chapter.  
                                                           
18 Nonetheless, the selection of the independent variables should not be arbitrary. In other word, the independent 
variables  from the four  categories  of  inflation  determinants should  be  based on the structure  and  economic 
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Exchange rate can influence inflation directly and indirectly. The direct channel is through the 
prices  of  traded  final  goods  and  the  prices  of  imported  intermediate  goods.  The  indirect 
channel is through the competitiveness of goods in the international markets and inflation 
expectations.  Both  channels  become  more  important  with  an  increase  in  the  degree  of 
openness in the economy. 
Most of the analytical frameworks that underlie the empirical estimation of the influence of 
exchange  rate  on  aggregate  consumer  prices  were  generally  based  on  microeconomic 
foundations.  The  reduced  form  for  the  pass-through  equation  defines  the  price  level  as  a 
function of exchange rate plus other hypothesised determinants of prices. For example: 
  P = ƒ(St, P
*, Y)   
where Pt is the domestic CPI, St is the exchange rate, 
*
t P   is the trading partner CPI, andU is 
the output gap. Furthermore, the most two common estimation techniques for the ERPT are 
the single equation method and the structural vector auto regressions (VARs). 
As  per  the  empirical  findings,  the  pass-through  from  exchange  rate  to  inflation  rate  is 
incomplete even in the long run, and the exchange rate elasticity of inflation is less than the 
exchange rate elasticity of import prices. Generally, the size and the speed of adjustments 
decline along the different price stages; the impact of exchange rate changes is highest on 
import prices, then producer prices, and lowest on consumer prices. 
Various  micro-  as well  as macroeconomic  causes have been proposed  by the literature to 
explain the incomplete pass-through from exchange rate to domestic prices. The most popular 
microeconomic explanation is the strategy of PTM by imperfectly competitive firms. Other 
suggested causes include trade distortions (e.g. tariff, non-trade barriers), transportation costs, 
domestic  content  in  the  distribution  of  traded  products  and  price  stickiness  in  the  local 
currency. Conversely, macroeconomic causes include persistence of changes in inflation and 
exchange rates, volatility of inflation and exchange rate, and the business cycle. 
Some  additional  factors  were  advanced  in  the  literature  to  explain  the  lower  response  of 
inflation  rate  relative  to  other  prices  in  the  distribution  chain  with  respect  to  changes  in 
exchange rate. The majority of these factors are primarily microeconomic-based, such as the 
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substitutes, and the optimal pricing strategies of firms. Other factors include demand policies 
(monetary and fiscal policies) and institutional factors like price regulations, foreign exchange 
rate controls, and enhanced global competition. 
Furthermore,  the  extent  of  pass-through  is  found  to  be  asymmetric  and  depends  on  the 
direction of the change (depreciation or appreciation) as well as on the size of the change. The 
economic  theories  have  identified  various  circumstances  that  could  generate  asymmetric 
exchange rate pass-through such as capacity constraint, market share, production switching, 
and menu costs. 
It  has  also  been  revealed  that  the  extent  of  ERPT  to  inflation  rate  is  generally  larger  in 
developing  countries  compared  to  more  developed  ones.  Such  a  difference  is  more  often 
attributed to factors like the Baumol and Balassa-Samuelson effect, a high share of traded 
goods,  high  import  content,  and  limited  domestic  substitutes  which  generally  reflect  the 
characteristics  of  small  and  more  open  economies.  From  a  policy  perspective,  given  the 
relatively high ERPT into inflation rate in developing countries the implication is that the 
monetary authorities in these countries should take into account the underlying relationship 
between exchange rate and inflation rate and the factors determining such relationship when 
designing the monetary and exchange rate policies for their economies. 
The recent literature of ERPT is relatively focused on analysing the declining trend in the 
extent  of  pass-through  from  exchange  rate  to  inflation  rate.  This  decline  has  been  a 
characteristic  of  both  developed  and  less  developed  economies.  Several    plausible 
explanations have been presented in the literature for this potential decline including changes 
in monetary environment (a shift to a low-inflation regime), changes in the composition of 
import goods towards sectors that have lower rates of exchange rate pass-through, substitution 
between  goods  (from  high-end  selection  of  imports  to  lower  quality  substitutes)  and  the 
increasing importance of non-traded goods in consumption and structural reforms (particularly 
in  developing  countries).  However,  there  is  no  consensus  in  the  literature  and  the  debate 
remains ongoing regarding the causes of the changed behaviour of the pass-through relation.  
The  analysis  of  ERPT  in  general  and  in  particular  the  aggregate  level  for  small  open 
economies, especially developing ones, have had  a smaller share compared to the larger and 
more  developed  countries.  Studies  on  developing  economies  were  spurred  recently,  as 
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and other emerging countries between 1994 and 2001. Nevertheless, the majority of these 
studies have focused on episodes of sudden large devaluations (e.g. currency crises) with less 
attention given to analysing the pass-through relation in economies that generally stable but 
are experiencing a sustained depreciation. Furthermore, studies of pass-through on developing 
economies have concentrated on particular regions like South East Asia and Latin America, 
while other economic regions like Africa and the Middle East have been mostly neglected. 
Accordingly, future studies of ERPT could further contribute to the literature by trying to 
redress this imbalance in country study coverage. Future studies on developing countries could 
also contribute by giving more attention to episodes of sustained depreciation over time, in 
addition to the analysed episodes of sudden large devolutions. Moreover, the diversity of the 
exchange rate regimes among the developing countries relative to the developed countries also 
offers other fertile grounds for empirical research to analyse effect of exchange rate regimes 
on the pass-through relationship. 
5.1 Overview of chapter three; Exchange rate pass-through into inflation rate: a case study on 
the GCC countries using single equation method  
The next three chapters; three, four and five, form three out of the four empirical chapters of 
this thesis. They attempt to comprehend and analyse the nature of exchange rate pass-through 
into domestic inflation in the GCC  countries. The primary  motivation for the  work is, as 
discussed earlier, the recent inflationary pressures in the region that coincided with sustained 
significant depreciation of US.  Such developments have led the public in most of the GCC 
countries to demand a de-pegging from the US dollar on the pretext that depreciation of the 
US dollar against the currencies of the major trading partners of the GCC countries has been 
the main cause for the dramatic rise in the inflation rates. The calls for an alternative exchange 
rate regime were further reinforced following the recent abandonment of the dollar peg by 
Kuwait in May 2007, toward a weighted basket of currencies. The decision of the Kuwaiti 
authorities was primarily motivated by the need to control inflationary pressures emanating 
from persistent depreciation of the US dollar against the major currencies.  
Accordingly,  the  empirical  work  in  the  next  three  chapters  is  intended  to  evaluate  the 
relevancy of the existing dollar peg of the currencies of the GGC countries by focusing on 
assessing the risk to domestic CPI inflation arising from fluctuations of the US dollar against 
the  currencies  of  the  major  trading  partners  of  the  GCC  countries.  More  specifically,  an P a g e  | 33 
 
attempt will be made to try to quantify the extent of pass-through from changes in the nominal 
effective exchange  rate  of the individual GCC countries to their domestic consumer price 
index  (CPI)  inflation.  Based  on  the  estimated amount  of  ERPT  into  inflation rates  of  the 
individual GCC countries, conclusions will be drawn and policy implications suggested on the 
existing exchange rate policies of the region. 
 In  addition,  the  choice  of  exchange  rate  regime  by  the  GCC  nations  and  the  subsequent 
economic  implications  are  critical  topics  that  necessitate  additional  examination  and  in 
particular provide potential ramifications to the incipient GCC monetary union. Moreover, this 
work is assumed to further enrich the latest discussions on whether the individual members of 
the  GCC  countries  need  to  consider  their  fixed  exchange  rate  regimes  following  recent 
economic developments including evolving national objectives and deeper integration with 
global trade and financial markets. Accordingly, analyzing the ERPT into the regional member 
countries inflation rates, as in this study, would undoubtedly add value to the body of studies 
on the regional block as a whole.  
Aside from its importance to the macroeconomic policies of the GCC countries, this study 
attempts to cover some of the caveats in the literature of ERPT.  For example, by focusing our 
analysis  on  the  GCC  countries,  which  are  small  and  less  developed  countries,  we  are 
redressing the imbalance in country study coverage regarding the analysis of ERPT (Menon, 
1995). Furthermore, given the inconclusive evidence on the prediction of full pass-through 
from exchange rate to domestic prices of small less developed economies, this paper tries to 
further test such hypotheses in the context of the GCC countries. Unlike most earlier available 
studies, that focused on episodes of large sudden depreciations (De Grauwe and Tullio 1994, 
Amirtano et al 1997, Goldfajn and Werlang 2000, Ito et al. 2005), the focus of this study is 
economies that have experienced sustained depreciations in their currencies over a period of 
time. Moreover, we contribute further to the literature by employing monthly macrodata as 
opposed to most other studies that were faced with data availability and consequently used 
lower frequency data including quarterly times series. According to Choudhri et al. (2005) and 
MacCarthy  (2007) using monthly frequency is considered more preferable in studying the 
pass-through. 
 We started  our  estimation  in  chapter  three  by  employing  an  ordinary  least  square (OLS) 
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the individual GCC countries to their domestic CPI inflation. Single equation models are the 
most widely used in the literature and they are amenable to comparison with other recent 
empirical  analyses of  pass-through  to  domestic  prices since  most  have  been  based  on  the 
estimates of single equation models (Amato et al, 2005).  
Furthermore, for our econometric estimation we followed the literature and used the following 
pass-through relation: 
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Where Pt is the domestic CPI, St is the nominal effective exchange rate, 
*
t P   is the trading 
partner CPI, 
oil
t P is the oil price, and  t e  is the error term. The lagged price variable of home 
index  indicates  an  adaptive  inflation  expectation  approach  and  allows  us  to  distinguish 
between short term and long term pass-through. Our hypotheses took the following form: 
1) Short-run ERPT: 
H0: ∑ i 2 a  = 0 (No Pass-through) 
H1: ∑ i 2 a  ≠ 0 (Pass-through exists) 
2) Long-run ERPT: 
H0: ∑ ) 1 /( 1 2 ∑ - a a k = -1 (Complete ERPT) 
H1: ∑ ) 1 /( 1 2 ∑ - a a i < -1 (Incomplete ERPT) 
Our null hypothesis for complete pass-through in the long-run is based on the proposition of 
the PPP theory and other additional findings in the existing literature of ERPT. For example, 
the ERPT into domestic prices is generally greater in small open economies like the GCC 
countries,  with  a  relatively  high  share  of  traded  goods,  high  imports,  and  limited  local 
substitutes.  There  is  also  a  view  that  pricing  to  market  strategy  (PTM)  is  less  likely  by 
importers in developing economies that are assumed to be price takers. Moreover, based on 
the monetary theory, a decline in the exchange rates can lead to an increase in the domestic 
prices only if it is being accommodated by the monetary authority, which lowered interest rate 
and increased aggregate demand and output. In fact, by considering the recent scenario of the 
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countries have been accommodative to the decline in the effective exchange rates of these 
countries' currencies vis-à-vis the currencies of their other non-US trading partners. 
The estimation was based on monthly data to comply with a sampling that is more relevant to 
exchange rate variability and covered the period from January 2000 to December 2008. The 
rational for such a period is primarily due to the US dollar, to which the currencies of the GCC 
countries are pegged, showing some significant persistent fluctuations during that period, and 
therefore providing a fertile atmosphere to test the ERPT in the economies of these countries. 
Furthermore, due to lack of data for Qatar and UAE, the test was confined to only four GCC 
members; Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. However, given the similarity in the 
structure  and  conditions  of  the  economies  of  the  GCC  state  members-large  share  of  oil 
production in total, dependency on oil exports, highly import-dependent, and similar trading 
partners’ weights, the inferred implications from the estimated results of the examined country 
members can be applied to the entire GCC area.  
The main findings of the estimated model reflected a rejection of both the null hypotheses. 
The pass-through in the short-run was found statistically significant in number of cases for all 
the four countries. However, the magnitude of the coefficients turned out to be very modest, 
with  maximum  significant  short-run  pass-through  of  around  16%  in  the  case  of  Oman. 
Accordingly,  a  10%  depreciation  in  exchange  rate  increased  inflation  rates  (measured  by 
changes in consumer price index) in the GCC region by a maximum of 1.6% in the short-run. 
On the other hand, long-run pass-through ranged between a minimum of 10% (Saudi Arabia) 
and a maximum of 69% (Oman), with an average of around 27%,  thus clearly indicating the 
failure  of  the  PPP  theory  in  the  context  of  the  GCC  economies,  as  the  pass-through  is 
incomplete in all the cases. 
We have further stretched our estimation by using the import price index and producer price 
index as the independent variables in order to compare the ERPT on inflation with ERPT on 
other aggregate domestic prices
19. Producer price index in all the four countries was found to 
be significant and more elastic then consumer price index, with an average extent of pass-
through of less than one, and equal to around 21% in the short-run. However, the estimated 
                                                           
19 Data for import price index is not available for any of the GCC countries, so alternatively we used the import 
unit values for emerging and developing economies, which is provided by the IFS of the IMF. Similarly, due to 
limited data, the producer price index for Kuwait was used as a proxy variable for the  other three countries.  P a g e  | 36 
 
extent  of  pass-through  into  import  prices  is  considerably  higher  than  in  producer  and 
consumer prices, with an average magnitude of around 70% in the short-run. Of the aggregate 
price indices, import indices in all the countries of our sample are the most elastic and highest 
in reaction to changes in exchange rates. This can, of course, be explained by the fact that 
import price indices include the largest share of tradable goods compared to producer and 
consumer indices.  
5.2 Overview of chapter four: Exchange rate pass-through into inflation rate: a case study of 
the GCC countries using Vector Error Correction Method  
In this chapter we re-estimated the pass-through from changes in exchange rate to inflation 
rates of the GCC countries by applying a different method; a vector error correction method 
(VECM). This method differs from the previously estimated OLS method in that it   focuses 
on the long-run or steady state relationship in the level of the variables (Bandt and Banrjee, 
2008).  Also,  unlike  the  OLS  method  that  a  priori  assumes  the  dependant  variable  as 
endogenous  to  movements  in  the  independent  variables,  it  allows  for  the  endogenous 
determination of the variables.  
Conventional theory in the literature of exchange rate pass-through (ERPT) states that the 
level of our variables is linked in the long-term
20. According to Engel and Granger (1987), if a 
linear combination of two or more non-stationary variables is stationary, then these variables 
are said to be co-integrated, with the co-integrating equation interpreted to represent a long-
run equilibrium relationship among the variables. The existence of co-integration implies the 
presence of a vector error correction representation showing the short run adjustment to the 
long-run  equilibrium  among  the  variables.  The  strength  of  the  VECM  is  its  ability  to 
incorporate short-run dynamics with long-run equilibrium relations among the variables (Kim, 
1998)
21.  
The estimation in this chapter is carried out by using a co-integrating analysis with a Vector 
Error  Correction  Model  (VECM).  In  our  model,  inflation  is  explained  in  terms  of  past 
                                                           
20 According to the PPP theory, there should be a co-integrating relation between the exchange rate, the foreign 
price index, and the home price index, with a co-integrating vector of (1,1,-1) (Choudhri and Hakura, 2006). 
21 A VECM is a restricted version of vector autoregressive (VAR) model in first differences of variables with an 
additional  error  correction  term,  with  the  VAR  equation  being  a  priori  restricted  by  the  presence  of  a  co-
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inflation, exchange rate, trading partner CPI, and oil prices (the same variables as in chapter 
three): 
 
  P = ƒ(St, P
*, P
oil)                (2) 
 
Where Pt is the domestic CPI, St is the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER), 
*
t P   is the 
trading partner CPI, and
oil
t P is the oil price. The Johansen approach was used to establish the 
co-integration link between the variables. Our error-correction equation for the price level 
took the following form:  
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The first line in equation (3) shows the long-run dynamics of inflation and the second line 
shows the short-run dynamics of inflation. The coefficient d represents the speed by which the 
inflation rate converges to its equilibrium.  
Furthermore, this chapter also utilized the results of the impulse response functions and the 
variance decompositions to further assess the link between exchange rate and inflation rates in 
the sampled countries. The impulse response functions illustrate the effect of a temporary 
shock  emanating  from  an  endogenous  variable  to  other  variables  through  the  dynamic 
structure  of  the  vector  autoregressive  (VAR)  model.  On  the  other  hand,  the  variance 
decomposition indicates the amount of forecast variance in prices that can be attributed to 
exchange rate. 
The estimates of the long-run pass-through from exchange rate to domestic prices in the GCC 
countries are significant in each of the four sampled countries. Moreover, the coefficients of 
the exchange rates in the four estimated models are less than one, which indicates that the PPP 
theory  does  not  hold  in  the  GCC  countries,  thus  confirming  earlier  results  of  the  OLS 
estimation. Nonetheless, the estimated individual long-run elasticity of prices to changes in 
exchange rate are significantly higher than those  estimated using the earlier OLS technique, P a g e  | 38 
 
with an average of  around 57%. A 10% depreciation of exchange rate in the GCC countries 
will increase inflation in the long-run by 5.7%.  
The  estimated  pass-through  using  the  VECM  is  found  to  be  broadly  similar  to  earlier 
estimates,  regardless  of  the  applied  method,  for  other  economies  including  industrial  and 
emerging countries. For example, Gagnon and Ihrig (2004), who estimated the pass-through 
for 20 industrialised countries for the period 1971 to 2003, reported a pass-through coefficient 
that ranged between 0.02 (Sweden) to 0.53 (Greece). Other similar results were reported by 
Mihaljek and Klau (2001), who used OLS with quarterly data from 1981 through 2001 to 
analyse  ERPT  in  13  emerging  economies.  Their  estimated  pass-through  for  countries 
including  Mexico,  Hungary  and  Turkey  ranged  from  0.36  to  0.56.  Choudhri  and  Hakura 
(2006), who estimated ERPT for different economic regions, reported an average pass-through 
for low and moderate inflation countries including industrial nations (inflation less than 10% 
and from 10% to 30%, respectively) that ranged from 0.16 to 0.35. However, in the moderate 
category, the majority of the estimates were from 0.3 to 0.60, an estimate which is similar in 
magnitude to our results. Other similar findings include those reported by Dobrynskaya and 
Levando (2005), who estimated a long-run pass-through into aggregate consumer price index 
of around 40% for Russia during the period 1995 to 2002. 
Furthermore,  the  analysis  of  the  impulse  response  functions  illustrated  low  persistent 
inflationary effects from changes in the nominal exchange rates of these countries. In response 
to one standard deviation shock to the exchange rate (in the form of appreciation), the price 
level index exhibited sustained decline, albeit very modestly,  for at least one year in  every 
countries with exception of Bahrain, where the price level index took opposite path in the form 
of  a  persistent  increase.  On  the  other  hand,  the  analysis  of  the  variance  decompositions 
showed that the variations in the consumer price index were predominantly explained by its 
own innovations, in all the four countries, followed by changes in exchange rates that explain 
around one quarter during the first year and increase to around one third percent in two year 
time
22.  
                                                           
22  This  results  are rather  comparable to the  one  reported by  McCarthy  (1999),  who used  a  VAR  model in 
investigating  the  pass-through  of  exchange  rate  in  a  set  of  nine  industrial  countries.  From  his  variance 
decomposition analysis, McCarthy found changes in exchange rate to account for about 5 to 30 percent of the 
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Following the estimation and analysis of the results from the VECM model, we attempted to 
present some explanation for the significant ERPT as well as the incomplete pass-through in 
the  economies  of  the  GCC  countries.  The  increasing  long-run  pass-through  in  the  GCC 
countries during the period of examination can be attributed to many factors including the 
degree of openness of the GCC economies, the recent persistent depreciation of the US dollar 
against the currencies of the trading partners of the GCC countries, the rapidly increasing 
domestic demand, and the expected potential ramifications to the incipient GCC monetary 
union. Moreover, the generally incomplete pass-through to consumer price inflation of the 
GCC countries can also be attributed to various other factors. For example the low share of 
traded goods in the CPI baskets of the GCC economies, the presence of PTM strategy by 
many firms dealing in the GCC economies, the presence of modern financial markets that 
facilitate  hedging  contracts,  the  composition  of  the  import  of  the  GCC  economies,  the 
credibility of the monetary environment, and some institutional factors like price regulations 
of some essential goods.  
5.3 Overview of chapter five: Demand policies and pass-through of exchange rate: a case 
study of the GCC countries. 
The work of this chapter represents a third attempt to estimate the ERPT into inflation rate of 
the GCC countries using the VECM of chapter five. However, the theoretical framework has 
been  extended  by  including  the  role  of  demand  policies  in  general  and  fiscal  policy 
particularly in affecting the extent of pass-through following changes in exchange rate.  
Furthermore, the link between demand policies and the extent of ERPT into domestic CPI 
inflation  in  this  chapter  is  based  on  the  work  of  Parsley  and  Popper  (1998),  who  have 
theoretically argued that the estimates of the responsiveness of domestic prices to changes in 
exchange rates may reflect, in addition to other factors, the policies of the central bank during 
the  period  examined.  Based  on  the  proposition  of  Parsley  and  Popper  (1998),  the  recent 
inflationary effect of exchange rate depreciation in the GCC countries during the period of our 
review (2000-2008) is believed to have been reinforced or sustained through higher money 
growth that in turn was triggered by expansionary fiscal policies because of higher oil wealth 
and, to some extent, by the pegged exchange rate system.  
Furthermore, the contribution in this chapter stems from the fact that the study of Parsley and 
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applies  the  model  to  fixed  exchange  rate  regimes  and  to  hydrocarbon  based  economies. 
Accordingly extending the model of Parsley and Popper (1998) to include fiscal policy has 
enriched the model. 
The recent expansionary fiscal policies of the GCC countries are believed to have helped to 
both  directly  and  indirectly  influence  the  extent  of  pass-through  from  exchange  rate  to 
inflation in these countries. The direct influence is through higher government spending that 
leads to higher demand for goods and services, and eventually reinforces the spill over from 
depreciation of  exchange  rate  to inflation  in  the GCC  countries.  The  indirect influence is 
through  its  effect  on  wages.  For  example,  if  domestic  prices  begin  to  adjust  following 
depreciation  in  the  currency,  wage  adjustment  would  be  expected  to  follow.  However, 
adjustments in wages are assumed to depend on a number of factors such as the slack in the 
labour market and the state of aggregate demand (Ghars El-Din and Mohammed, 2005)
23. If 
the economy is in a recession, wage adjustments will be weak, thus reducing the overall pass-
through of the currency depreciation. Therefore, if the fiscal authorities in the GCC countries 
choose a restrictive fiscal policy following currency depreciation, this will weaken/moderate 
any chance of a wage-price spiral, thereby reducing the inflationary effects of depreciation.  
Furthermore, given the fixed regimes with the US dollar, the monetary authorities in the GCC 
countries have been tracking the monetary changes in the US by similarly lowering their short 
term interest rates, thus accommodating the demand for higher nominal money balances due to 
lower  real  money  balances  because  of  the  depreciation.  Further  downward  pressures  on 
domestic interest rates in the GCC economies during the period of our sample were stirred up 
through  higher  injunction  of  liquidity  into  the  monetary  system  on  account  of  higher  oil 
revenues that facilitated credit and aggregate spending. Accordingly, given the active stance of 
both demand policies in the GCC countries during the period of significant depreciation in the 
exchange rate of the currencies of these economies, one would expect some influence of the 
                                                           
23The  relatively  high  dependency  on  foreign  labour  makes  inflation  pressures  in  the  GCC  economies  more 
sensitive to external factors like exchange rates. For example, depreciation in the exchange rates of the GCC 
countries' currencies will lower the purchasing power of the foreign labourers' remittances and hence the amount 
of wages required to attract them or to retain them in the GCC markets (Hasan and Alogeel 2008). It is worth 
noting  that  government  expenditure  in  the  GCC  countries  is  the  main  exogenous  factor  that  causes  wage 
adjustment as the role of trade unions is negligible in these countries (Ghars El-Din and Mohammed, 2005). 
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action of these policies on the extent of pass-through from exchange rate to inflation rates in 
the GCC countries, at least according to Parsley and Popper (1998). 
With respect to estimation, the error correction model of chapter four was re-estimated with 
additional variables representing fiscal and monetary policies. After taking into account the 
action of the fiscal and monetary policies, the  estimated  coefficients of exchange  rate  are 
significantly lower, in all the four countries, than those estimated in chapter five. Average 
ERPT in the log-run is around 23%, which is similar to the average amount (27%) that we 
estimated in chapter three based on the OLS method. Moreover, the variance decomposition 
analysis indicated that variations in the price level index are explained by its owned lags, 
followed by variables representing demand policies respectively with a negligible role for 
changes in exchange rates. 
The above results confirm the arguments of Parsley and Popper (1998) on the importance of 
economic policies on the pass-through elasticity from the exchange rate to prices, or generally 
on the relationship between economic variables of interest. It also further confirms that the 
domestic CPI inflation in the GCC countries is significantly influenced by changes in their 
exchange rate. However, the impact from exchange rate to inflation is also partly determined 
by the actions of demand policies in these countries. 
5.4 Overview of chapter six and chapter seven: Literature review on the choice of exchange 
rate regime; a case study of the GCC countries 
This  chapter  and  the  next  attempt  to  complement  our  analysis  and  tests  regarding  the 
relevancy  of  the  existing  pegged  exchange  rate  regime  to  the  GCC  economies.  More 
specifically, in these two chapters we have attempted firstly to  give a brief on the recent 
literature of the exchange rate regime in general, as in chapter six, and secondly to view the 
various alternative potential choices that are available to the GCC countries with regard to 
their exchange rate regimes. The second objective is carried out in chapter seven, which also 
attempts to empirically test the possibility of pegging the currencies of the GCC countries to a 
dollar-euro basket against the current single US-dollar peg. 
As an overview of the recent literature of exchange rate regimes has been included in the 
introduction to this chapter, and in order to avoid unnecessary overlapping, this chapter will 
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The essence of the work of chapter seven is to empirically analyse the feasibility of a dollar-
euro  basket  peg  as  an  alternative  exchange  rate  regime  for  the  currencies  of  the  GCC 
countries. The chapter begins by discussing the circumstances that have cast doubt on the 
viability of the current single US dollar peg and led to the recent increasing public pressure to 
de-peg  from  the  US  dollar.  Section  two  of  this  chapter  includes  an  overview  of  these 
circumstances.  
The chapter also includes a discussion of various factors that make the analysis of exchange 
rate regime of the economies GCC countries of great importance, regionally and worldwide. It 
was revealed that the importance of analysing the economies of the GCC countries stems in 
general from their recently increasing role as global investors and trade partners,  and their 
crucial  role  in  the  global  energy  markets.  Furthermore,  together  with  other  oil-exporting 
nations, they have become part of the international policy debate on global imbalances. 
Chapter seven also included a comprehensive survey on studies that have attempted to discuss 
the  alternative  exchange  rate  regimes  for  the  GCC  countries.  According  to  the  surveyed 
literature, the most widely analysed exchange rate choice for the GCC economies is a corner 
solution in the form of currency union, particularly in empirical literature. Most of the studies 
in  this  regard  have  been  motivated  by  the  political  and  economical  willingness  and 
commitment of the state members to form a single currency for the entire region. In fact the 
commitment to form a single currency originally dates back to the foundation of the union 
between the six state members in early 1980s.  
In  general,  the  assessment  of  the  surveyed  studies  regarding  the  possibility  for  the  GCC 
countries to form a single currency was based on analysing the applicability of the traditional 
OCA criteria to these economies, as well as on the monetary and fiscal convergence. All in all, 
these  studies  found  the  GCC  countries  unready  to  form  a  single  currency  as  they  lacked 
significance in inter-regional trade and capital mobility, and showed asymmetry in shocks and 
business cycles. Other factors included delays in meeting the convergence criteria and a delay 
in  establishing  harmonised  systems  and  institution  building;  namely  the  harmonization  of 
monetary  policy  framework,  payment  and  settlement  systems,  regulatory  and  supervisory 
structures and macroeconomic statistics.  
Conversely, other studies have suggested more flexible exchange rate regimes in order for oil 
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fall along with the price of oil, to better pursue domestic goals of inflation and output through 
monetary policy independence, to easily absorb adverse real shock, and to dampen oil- related 
swings in government revenue. However, pure floating, and even managed floating, regimes 
are viewed as being not applicable or suitable at this stage to the economies of the GCC 
countries. This has been attributed to a number of factors including the lack of sensitivity of  
the market interest rates to the interest rate policy, issues regarding the choice of nominal 
anchor under floating exchange rate. Also, large oil swings under float may results into higher 
fluctuation in non-oil sectors and higher and more volatile inflation, and the absence of well-
functioning financial markets purporting to facilitate hedging at low transaction costs so as to 
minimize the additional risks that economic agents in the GCC economies would face under a 
floating regime. 
Furthermore,  some  studies,  that  viewed  more  flexibility  as  necessary  given  the  recent 
economic development in the region, have stressed gradualism by suggesting an initial shift to 
a currency basket peg that would allow flexibility. The weight of the different currencies in the 
basket could reflect the currencies most often used in financial and commercial transactions. It 
could  also  reflect  the  country’s  direction  of  trade  or  the  currency  weight  of  the  SDR. 
Commencing with a basket peg, although less transparent than a single peg, would be simple 
to manage and a useful way to introduce flexibility in the exchange rate in a gradual manner 
that would also allow economic agents to learn to manage and live with foreign exchange 
risks.    
 Under the basket peg, the local authority is allowed more space to use monetary policy for 
supporting  fiscal  policy to  sustain  internal  stability and  growth.  Lower  fluctuations  in  the 
effective  nominal  exchange  rate  under  the  basket  peg  are  expected  to  support  the 
diversification  effort  in  the  GCC  economies  and  to  result  in  a  higher  external  trade  and 
balance stability. Furthermore, it was also argued that with increasing international capital 
flow,  the  real  shocks  would  be  more  efficiently  addressed  under  the  basket  arrangement 
because of higher flexibility compared to the single peg, while reducing the level of foreign 
reserves needed to support the fixed exchange rate. 
However, empirical studies, such as the one in this chapter on the feasibility of basket peg to 
the currencies of the GCC countries are very rare. Accordingly, in chapter seven an attempt 
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based on two tests drawn from the relevant literature.  Furthermore, the choice of the euro and 
the US dollar for the basket peg has been based on the OCA theory that suggests adopting the 
anchor currency that minimizes the sum of the bilateral exchange rate fluctuations, weighted 
by the importance of each trading partner. Accordingly, basket of the euro and the US dollar 
was suggested, as these two currencies account for  a large share of the GCC economies’ 
international trade and non-trade financial transactions. 
 In the first tests a structured VAR model was used to investigate the influence of external 
shocks like the business cycles in the US and Europe on the economies of the GCC countries. 
In the second test the likelihood for a long-run business cycle synchronization between the 
economies of the GCC countries and the US and Europe was examined. The test included 
quarterly data spanning from Q1, 1991 to Q4, 2009. Moreover, the empirical work in this 
chapter included all six estate members of the Gulf Cooperation Council compared to the first 
three  empirical  works  in  chapters  three,  four,  and  five  which  were  confined,  due  to  data 
availability, to data from only four GCC countries. 
With regard to the first test, the analysis of the results of the impulse response functions and 
the variance decompositions from the estimated structured VAR model indicated that output in 
the GCC countries is predominantly influenced by the terms of trade shocks, which reflect the 
large weight of the hydrocarbon exports in the GDP of the GCC countries. The results also 
showed that the GCC countries’ output is significantly influenced by shocks from US and 
Europe. However, the changes in the output of Europe were found to have a higher impact on 
the GCC economies than the impact from changes in the output of the US. This reflects the 
growing trade link between the GCC countries and the European countries, and the geographic 
proximity between the GCC region and Europe as compared to US. 
The tests for the synchronization of the business cycles presented some evidence for long-run 
association between economies of the GCC countries and those of the US and Europe. Real 
GDPs and inflation rates in the GCC countries were found to share some significant long-term 
trend with their counterparts in the US and Europe, indicating that the macro economies of the 
individual GCC countries and US and Europe are linked over the long-run, hence, lending 
further support to the proposition of using a dollar-euro basket peg for the currencies of the 
GCC countries. 
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5.5 Overview of chapter eight: Summery and Conclusions 
 Chapter eight summarises the work, results, and the implications of the empirical sections in 
chapters  three,  four,  five,  and  seven.  It  also  presents  the  author’s  conclusions  and 
recommendations with respect to the exchange rate regime policies of the GCC countries. The 
final section of chapter eight discusses the limitations of the research and offers further areas 
for future research within the context of the GCC economies. 
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review on the Causes of Inflation and the Pass-through of Exchange Rate 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part it presents a brief survey of the main theories of 
inflation. This survey covers opinions on the inflationary process from various competing schools of 
thoughts within economics. It also includes an empirical survey on studies that have attempted to 
comprehensively analyze a great number of determinants of inflation that have been advanced in the 
theoretical literature
24.  
In the second part the study focuses on understanding the link between inflation and movements in the 
exchange rate; the pass-through of exchange rate into domestic consumer price index. The survey in 
this part includes some theoretical background on the link between exchange rates and domestic prices, 
the discussion of a host of factors that influence the pass-through of exchange rate, a deeper focus on 
the transmission from exchange rate into domestic inflation consumer price index as well as some 
other related and recent issues in the relevant literature. Similar to part one, part two also includes 
some empirical surveys on the extent of pass-through from exchange rate into inflation. Furthermore, 
part  two  also  attempts  to  identify  some  potential  caveats  in  the  literature  for  future  research.  A 
Summary and conclusions are provided independently at the end of each part. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
24 Note: this part is only focused to study the causes/determinants of inflation, so costs, solutions and other 
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2. Causes of Inflation in Theories 
Inflation is generally defined as a persistent increase in the general price level, for goods and services 
in an economy, as expressed in a given price index (Lipsey and Chrystal, 2007). It has been a central 
concern for macroeconomists and policy makers for a considerable time due primarily to its economic 
and social costs
25.  Many theories have been advanced to explain the different causes of inflation. In 
most  of  those  theories,  the  causes  of  inflation  have  been  condensed  into  smaller  number  of 
determinants in order to better understand the inflation process. A brief write up on the opinion of the 
different theories on the dynamics of inflation is provided in the following subsections
26.    
2.1 Classical Approach 
The  classical    (e.g.  Adam  Smith,  David  Hume,  David  Ricardo,  and  John  Stuart  Mill)    and  the 
neoclassical schools (e.g. Alfrad Marshall, A. C. Pigou, Irving Fisher ) state that inflation is a monetary 
phenomena (Snowdon and Vane, 2005). In other words, excess in the supply of money results, other 
things being equal, in a general price increase. Such a statement was confirmed more recently by the 
monetarists, particularly through the work of Milton Friedman (1968), one of the most influential 
economists in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Their proposition was based on two major 
elements; quantity equation of the quantity theory of money, and market clearing in the real sector. 
With regard to the latter element, the classical economists consider the real sector to (markets of goods 
and labors) operate competitively and efficiently so that supply and demand are clear in the long run to 
yield equilibrium in output and/or full-employment. As such, full employment was the normal state of 
the affairs according to the classical economists. Such an assumption of continuous market clearing 
implies a vertical aggregate supply curve. 
                                                           
25 Costs of inflation include, enter alia, shoe leather costs, menu costs, tax distortions, distortions to income and 
wealth distribution, distortions to the price mechanism, and increased uncertainty which lower investment and 
reduces economic growth (Fischer 1984, 1996). High Inflation is also found to be associated with less rapid 
growth of average income and lower equality (Romer and Romer, 1999).    
 
26In order to be able to follow the development over time in explaining inflation I have tried to follow more or 
less a chronological order in comparing the opinions of the different theories of inflation instead of adopting 
other general criteria such as demand –pull theories vs. supply-pull theories, long-term vs. short-term theories, 
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There were two highly influential versions of the quantity theory of money; the Cambridge cash-
balance approach
27 and the income version of Fisher's equation of exchange. The identity of both 
versions is more or less identical and both lead to the same results in explaining the quantity theory 
approach on inflation process. Using Fisher's version (1911), the quantity identity is given by the 
following relationship:  
 
PY MV =                     (1)  
 
Where M is the money stock and it is supplied by the authority, so it is exogenous. V is the velocity of 
money  and  represents  the  average  number  of  times  a  unit  of  money  is  used  to  finance/conduct 
transactions.  As the frequency of transactions carried out by agents is determined by institutional 
factors/arrangements that change slowly and in a predictable manner, the velocity V is assumed to be 
constant. P represents the general price level and Y is the real aggregate income in the economy. 
Furthermore, as Y is assumed to be predetermined at its full employment level by the equilibrium in 
the  real  sector  market,  and  as  V  is  constant,  then  we  are  left  with  the  fundamental  monetarist 
proposition that the quantity of money supplied determines the price level (P) in equation one is 
determined only by M). In other words, the price level (P) is an increasing function of money supply 
(M). The disequilibrium in the money market is restored by an increase or decrease in the price level.  
When there is an excess of money supply in the market, the individuals, firms and households, will try 
to remove undesired amounts of money by going to the market and increasing the demand of goods 
and services. As the supply of output is assumed to be fixed (vertical position of aggregate supply 
curve) sellers will try to meet the excess demand by increasing the price level. Hence, the general price 
level will rise in proportion to the initial increase in the money supply. Therefore, as per the classical 
school, money contraction policy should be used primarily as a tool to fight against inflation (Handa, 
2000). 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
27 Famous exponents of this version include among others Alfred Marshall, early writings of J. M. Keynes, and A. 
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2.2 Traditional Keynesian 
 Keynes accepted the classical idea that money supply will result in 'true inflation', only in one case; 
when the aggregate volume of output corresponding to full employment is reached. In other words, 
when the aggregate supply curve is vertical. In his pamphlet 'How to Pay for the War' in 1940, Keynes 
developed a demand side model for the inflation process with temporarily rigid prices in the labor 
market. His initial concern was to provide space for the necessary increase in production during the 
war within already a fully employed economy. Keynes defined the inflation gab as " the amount of 
purchasing power which has to be withdrawn either by taxation or primary saving… in order that the 
remaining purchasing power should be equal to the available supplies on the market at the existing 
level of prices" (Skidelsky 2000, 84). Essentially, inflation gab is equivalent to unexpected increases in 
demand within an economy operating at full employment. Initially therefore, such a shock in demand 
will result in higher prices and in unanticipated profit for firms, due primarily to the assumption of 
rigidity in normal wages (Aykut, 2002). Firms' action to meet the excess demand will create pressure 
on the labor market, which is already operating at full capacity. This will cause a competition between 
firms for employed workers, which will bid up normal wages and subsequently the real wages, which 
in turn will induce a new demand in the goods market leading to another increase in prices. If normal 
wages continue to lag in response to any excess in demand, an inflation spiral is expected to occur. 
Keynes suggested fiscal restraint (forced saving) in the form of increased tax or cuts in government 
spending in order to eliminate the inflation gap. The upshot here is that, in contrast to the classical 
proponents, who emphasized the monetary, demand side approach to inflation, Keynes emphasized the 
non-monetary, demand side approach to inflation that was prevalent with the cost-push argument for 
inflation. 
2.3 Postwar Keynesians (The neo-Keynesians) 
The IS-LM model, which provided a very useful framework for analyzing short run aggregate supply 
curve of the neo-Keynesians (e.g., Hicks, Modigliani, Klein, Samuelson, and Hansen) dominated the 
majority  of  intellectual  thinking  during  the  1950s  and  1960s.  With  the  so-called  'neoclassical 
synthesis', a consensus emerged that resulted in the General Theory being seen as "a special case of a 
more general classical theory (that is, the case where downward money wage rigidity prevents the 
classical automatic adjustment to full employment), while the need was recognized for Keynesian 
interventionist policies to ensure a more rapid return to full employment" (Snowdon and Vane 2005: 
122-123).  
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Conversely,  the  neo-Keynesians  believed  that  under  the  state  of  full  employment,  an  increase  in 
demand will lead to nominal response (wages/prices) and not to real response (output). In other word, 
as the economy becomes closer to full employment (resources are fully utilized) price increases would 
become more and more common. However, without an explicit relationship that could picture such 
links between demand and prices in the context of their existing framework of output and employment 
determination, the neo-Keynesians’ analysis would still be incomplete. Accordingly, in their search for 
a complete macroeconomic model, the neo-Keynesians found the relationship between the change in 
the rate of money wages and unemployment, which was empirically tested by A.W. Phillips (1958) for 
the UK, to give a solid foundation for their approach to inflation or price determination. 
Accordingly,  the  neo-Keynesians  used  the  relationship  between  normal  wage  inflation  and 
unemployment, as depicted by the Phillips curve, to establish their theory of wage and price inflation. 
It is worth noting at the  onset that the contribution of  A.W. Phillips was providing an  empirical 
observation that there had been a significant and stable negative relationship between wage inflation 
and unemployment rate. Phillips did not aim to put forward a theory of inflation process or price 
determination. Phillips’ approach used the normal wage inflation, but the neo-Keynesians were more 
interested in the price inflation. However, both approaches were considered largely interchangeable. 
Following Lipsey (1978), in a Phillips curve the relationship between normal wage and unemployment 
is as follows: 
am w =                     (2) 
Where ω represents the normal wage inflation, α represents a parameter that should be less than zero in 
order to reflect the negative correlation between wage inflation and unemployment, and   represents 
the unemployment rate. By applying the mark-up pricing hypothesis that suggests that price inflation 
depends on money wage inflation minus productivity growth as follows: 
r w p - =                      (3) 
Where π represents the inflation rate and ρ represents the productivity growth per worker. Substituting 
equation (3) into (2) and producing the results in terms of inflation rate: 
am r p - =                     (4) 
Equation (4) relates the inflation rate to the unemployment rate, which measures demand pressure in 
the labor market and the product market. Following the contribution of Samuelson and Solow in the 
early 1960s, the neo-Keynesians viewed the relationship in the Phillips curve as implying a long run 
stable tradeoff between unemployment and inflation. In other word, Phillips’ curve was seen to offer 
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(Snowdon  and  Vane  2005).  This  meant  that  an  expansionary  policy  would  lead  to  lower 
unemployment and higher inflation rate, and vice versa. Moreover, a decrease in unemployment rate 
was viewed as an increasing demand for labor in the labor market and therefore a subsequent increase 
in the good market too.  This suggested a real demand-side pull inflation, which was consistent with 
Keynes' view (1940) in his aforementioned pamphlet 'How to Pay for the War'. The experience of 
many countries during the 1950s and until at least the mid 1960s warranted the idea of a Phillips curve 
trade-off strong support. As a result, that gave the neo-Keynesian's framework of macroeconomics 
dominance in terms of both theorizing and policy prescriptions (Snowdon and Vane 2005). 
2.4  Monetarists'  critique  of  the  Neo-Keynesians'  Phillips  Curve  Trade-Off  and  the  Expectation-
Augmented Phillips Curve 
In the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, Phillips’ relationship as interpreted by the neo-Keynesians 
failed to explain the stagflation and the recession experienced by many countries, particularly during 
the dramatic oil shocks by the OPEC cartel in the 1970s. The obvious and straightforward explanation 
for the inflation phenomenon, might have been that presented by the structuralists on the basis of cost 
push inflation, which is discussed below in section 2.9. At the same time, while many other economists 
were struggling with attempts to look for other influential variables which might have been missed in 
understanding the inflation process, some monetarists economists, including Milton Friedman and 
Edmund Phelps, were able to provide the economic world with a convincing argument for the 'Great 
Peacetime Inflation' of the 1970s (Aykut, 2002). 
Friedman and Phelps denied the notion of a stable long trade-off between unemployment and inflation 
rates as proposed by the neo-Keynesians. According to Friedman, the Phillips curve was misspecified. 
Friedman had argued that the Phillips curve relationship should be modified to include the rate of 
change of real wages instead of nominal money wages. According to Friedman, the economic agents 
(firms and labors) who set prices are interested in the real, not money, wages. The negotiated real 
wages between the economic agents are assumed to be also affected by the inflation rate expected to 
prevail during the lifetime of the contract. In other words, the negotiations for price setting between the 
agents are  influenced  by  two  major factors;  the  supply  and  demand conditions  in  the markets  as 
measured by the unemployment rate and the rate of inflation that the agents expect to exist throughout 
the period of the contract. Therefore, if more inflation is expected, the agents are likely to strike the 
contract at higher prices (nominal money wages) even if the supply and demand conditions in the 
market remain unchanged. Therefore, Friedman augmented the basic Phillips curve relationship by 
including the expected rate of inflation as another variable in determining the rate of change in money 
wages. Such addition resulted in a new form of Phillips curve model called the expectation-augmented 
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e bp am r p + - =                   (5) 
Where 
e p represents the inflation expectations variable, and b  is a parameter that measures the size of 
impact of expectations on inflation rate.  For simplicity constant change in productivityr is assumed.  
Any value of b of less than one and greater than zero implies a long run tradeoff between inflation rate 
and unemployment rate. However, the long run tradeoff is assumed to be less favorable than in the 
short run due to the inflation expectations. When  b takes the value of unity, then actual inflation will 
be equal to the anticipated inflation; 
e p p = . Following this, there would be no long run trade-off 
between  unemployment  and  inflation.  This  would  mean  that  the  agents  were  able  to  completely 
anticipate the actual rate of inflation and that labor is no longer suffering from money illusion (Handa 
2000, Snowdon and Vane 2005). This is the case where the Phillips curve is vertical and the economy 
is operating at its natural level of unemployment. At this level, the rate of change in money wages will 
be exactly equal to the rate of change in prices. 
In the expectation- augmented Phillips model, monetarists had argued that the impact on the real sector 
(reducing unemployment below its natural level) from monetary expansion is present only in the short 
run, when the inflation is unanticipated. However, in the long run, such an increase of inflation will be 
fully anticipated and incorporated in wage bargains and the unemployment will return to its natural rate 
(Aykut, 2002). According to the monetarists, the economic agents make errors in their expectations of 
inflation and hence allow the deviation of unemployment from its natural rate. The main reasons for 
these  errors  are  because  the  economic  agents  form  their  expectations  on  the  light  of  past  actual 
inflation rates and not all information is available to them during their formations of price expectations. 
The lag in the adjustment from the expected inflation rate to the actual inflation rate permits the 
temporarily deviation of unemployment from its equilibrium. With the lagged or gradual adjustment of 
expectations of inflation, the economic agents are assumed to work with adaptive or error-learning 
expectations model (Aykut, 2002).  
e
t t
e
t 1 1 ) 1 ( - - - + = p l lp p                 (6) 
Equation (6) represents the mathematical form of the adaptive expectations or the so-called 'backward-
looking' expectations. The parameter λ is the coefficient of adaptation, where 0 < λ < 1. Equation (6) 
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inflation  rates  at  time  t-1(previous  period)
28.  From  equation  (6),  it  can  be  seen  that  expectations 
respond quickly to the actual inflation rate when λ gets larger. As λ gets closer to unit, the more 
expected inflation at time t will depend on previous actual inflation rate and less on the previous 
expected inflation rate. Large values of λ also imply that expectations change/adjust very quickly to 
reduce the gap between the actual and expected inflation rates. This rapid adjustment can be used to 
explain the acceleration in the inflation rates in the 1970s. Furthermore, the adaptive model assumes 
that agents are less informed and do not have full access to the same information as the authority. The 
only information available that is used to formulate expectations of inflation is from the past, so there 
is no knowledge of current information that might have some influence on future inflation.  
2.5 New Classical Approach (Rational Expectation vs. Adaptive Expectations) 
The  new  classical  school,  which  initially  evolved  out  of  the  monetarists'  macroeconomics  and 
incorporated  certain  elements  of  their  approach,  formulated  an  alternative  method  of  forming 
expectations. It was assumed that economic agents used rational expectation hypothesis (forward-
looking approach) when setting prices. The rational expectation hypothesis was originally introduced 
in 1961 by John Muth and started to influence the macroeconomics in the seminal work of Robert Luca 
in  the  early  1970s  (Snowdon  and  Vane  2005).  Unlike  the  monetarists'  assumption  of  imperfect 
information  under  the  adaptive  expectations,  the  new  classical  school  argued  that  under  rational 
expectations hypothesis the economic agents are assumed to have knowledge of all past and current 
relevant information as well as a full understanding on how the economy works. It follows that no 
systematic  errors  will  occur  in  the  process  of  forming  inflation  expectations  as  all  known  and 
systematic determinants will be taken into consideration when expectations are formed. Therefore, 
only nonsystematic errors or random shocks will affect the inflation rate and result in a gap between 
the actual and expected inflation rates. Accordingly, the Phillips curve is vertical in the short and the 
long run. The mathematical definition of the expected inflation rate as per the rational expectation 
hypothesis: 
h p p + = t
e
t                     (7) 
 
                                                           
28 By  repeated  substitution,  adaptive  expectations  implies  that  expected    inflation  can  be  shown  to  be  a 
weighted average of past actual inflation with greater weight assigned to more recent experience of inflation: 
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Where  η  represents  a  random  error  with  an  average  of  zero.  Under  the  rational  hypothesis,  the 
adjustment  parameter  β  in  equation  (5)  should  be  equal  to  unity  (full  impact  of  expectation  on 
inflation).  Substituting equation  (7)  in  equation  (5)  and  producing  the  results  in  terms  of 
unemployment rate: 
a h m a h r m / / ) ( + = + =
n                 (8) 
Equation  (8)  is  the  Phillips  curve  with  rational  expectation.  Unemployment  rate  is  equal  to  its 
natural/equilibrium  rate  ) (
n m   plus  a  random  error ) / ( a h .  There  is  no  trade-off  between 
unemployment and inflation either  in the short run  or the long run.  In its extreme interpretation, 
equation  (8)  means  that  only  random  errors  or  unanticipated policy  will  lead  to  deviation  of  the 
inflation rate from its expected rate and hence the unemployment from its natural rate. Moreover, such 
a deviation will only last for the short term (current time) as the error/surprise will be in incorporated 
by the economic agents in the next period’s information set. The assumption of a vertical Phillips curve 
in the short and long run means that the economy is always in an equilibrium status achieved through a 
continuous market clearing within a framework of competitive markets. According to Hoover (1992), 
the assumption of market clearing represents the classical elements in their thinking (new classical 
theorists). Moreover, the assumption that the inflation can only deviate from its expected rate by 
random shocks is often coupled with the quantity theory of money to imply that inflation is a monetary 
phenomenon in the short run as well as in the long run because rationality precludes any systematic 
difference between the two (Wachtel, 1989).  
With respect to policy implication under rational expectations, the authority will not be able to affect 
output and  unemployment  unless  it  can  find  a  way  to  create  a  surprise.    As  the  macroeconomic 
framework of the authority is well known to the economic agents, any announced monetary stimulus 
will only lead to inflation and will not affect the real sector even in the short run as assumed by the 
monetarists. It therefore follows that for a policy to be effective it should be unanticipated, as the full 
knowledge of the economic agents of the economic structure makes it impossible to affect the real 
sector  by  an  announced  policy.  This  leads  to  the  'policy  ineffectiveness  proposition'  of  the  new 
classical school under the hypothesis of rational expectations. As a result, the only way for the central 
bank to create an effect on the real sector is through a surprise to the public. Such a surprise or 
unanticipated policy will lead to a short term error in the inflation expectation and hence to a deviation 
of employment from its natural rate (Snowdon and Vane 2005).  
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Conversely, when the authority announces a disinflation policy or a low inflation target, according to 
the  new  classical  school  the  success  of  such  policy  is  subject  to  the  time  consistency  and  the 
credibility/reputation of the central bank. The dynamic inconsistency theories pioneered by Kydland 
and Prescott ( 1977) and developed by Barro and Gordon (1983) have explained that what appears 
initially to be an optimal policy can turn out to be suboptimal in subsequent periods if the government 
sees  an  incentive  to  renege/cheat  on  its  previously  announced  optimal  policy.  Given  such  an 
anticipated action/surprise by the authority to reduce unemployment below its natural rate through 
monetary stimulus, the future announced policies will lack validation by the economic agents, who will 
continue to sign contracts for high wage increases. As a result, authority is ought to carefully consider 
the intertemporal trade-off between current gains from reneging (lower unemployment and higher 
output) and the future costs (lower credibility and higher inflation expectations). 
Generally, the emphasis on credibility and reputation issues gained higher importance in the aftermath 
of the rational expectation revolution as rational economic agents know that, due to low credibility of 
the  government,  the  announced/promised  policy  of  low  inflation,  particularly  during  the  election 
cycles, is time-inconsistent, in the sense that it will not be materialized after the election (King and Ma, 
2001,    Snowdon  and  Vane, 2005).  Accordingly,  based on  the  credibility and  time  inconsistency 
arguments, in order for the announced policies to be credible and time consistent, the policy makers or 
the governments need to establish a commitment device that will tie their hands around specific policy 
course (Drazen and Masson 1994, Velasco and Neut 2004, Carmignani et al., 2008). Some of the 
suggested arrangements include the independence of the central bank, fixed exchange rate regime, and 
receiving a seal of approval on the announced policy from an external institution like the IMF. With 
these kind of  strategies, it is argued that governments will be able to address the credibility-deficit and 
dynamic inconsistency problems
29.  
 
 
 
                                                           
29 For example, the Labor Party led by Toney Blair in the UK  announced, during the 1997 election, to be counter 
inflation and to achieve lower unemployment rate at the same time. Such announcement was clearly time-
inconsistent as the party was expected to follow the ideology of lower unemployment on the cost of higher 
inflation post to the election. However, in order to give credibility to its announcement of low inflation, the 
party immediately on winning the 1997 election granted operational independence to the Bank of England 
(Snowdon, 1997).   
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2.6 New Keynesians  
The New Keynesians’ economy (e.g. G. Mankiw, L. Summers, O. Blanchard, S. Fischer, E. Phelps, G. 
Akerlof, J. Stiglitz, and D. Romer) was developed in the aftermath of the theoretical crisis of the neo-
Keynesians  in  the  1970s.  Their  work  was  primarily  devoted  toward  developing  rigorous  and 
convincing microeconomics foundations to explain the phenomena of fixed wages and prices in the 
short run. In other words, to a great extent, their work was mainly to patch up the theoretical flaws of 
their 'cousins', the neo-Keynesians. Their models had incorporated propositions such as price-making 
monopolistic firms, a rational expectations-augmented Phillips curve, both supply and demand shocks 
as potential sources of instability, and imperfect competition and asymmetric information (Snowdon 
and Vane 2005).  
 Their  critique  on  the  new  classical  macroeconomic  was  strongly  focused  on  the  assumption  of 
continuous  market  clearing,  the  absence  of  which  represented  the  hallmark  of  the  Keynesians’ 
economics. Despite their agreement that in the long run inflation is a monetary phenomenon, the new 
Keynesians argued that within the context of their modified microfoundation, wage and price stickiness 
in the short run (failure of prices to change quickly to clear the markets) can be justified on grounds 
like staggered wage and price changes, and small menu costs. The staggering of the wages to quickly 
adjust, due to factors like long term contracts, may slow the process of general price changes and thus 
hurdle the process of market clearing. Moreover, the modified microfoundation of the normal price 
rigidity was one of the recognized contributions of the new Keynesians that was behind the idea of 
imperfect competition. In imperfectly competitive markets, the presence of small menu costs to price 
adjustment can generate potential aggregate nominal price rigidity.  They are deemed to be barriers or 
frictions to price adjustments as firms (assumed to be profit maximizers), particularly those operating 
under low inflation environment, may consider it costly to reset their price continuously in response to 
each demand shock. On the contrary, under imperfect competition in high inflation conditions, wages 
and price rigidity as a cause of inertia generating mechanism is assumed to weaken as under such 
conditions  the  length  of  wage  contracts  significantly  shrinks  and  menu  costs  do  not  matter.  
"Nonetheless, rigidity arguments related to factors such as the overlapping degree of wages contracts 
may contribute to understanding the short-run dynamics of inflation even in these type of economies, 
particularly taken together with the notions that expectations may be formed economy-wide, may be 
forward or backwards-looking, and may be accompanied by a lack of policy credibility" (Aykut K. 
2002: P 55). 
2.7 Cost-Push vs. Demand-Pull Approaches to Inflation 
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Costs-push theorists generally attribute inflation and disinflation to some nonmonetary, supply-side 
elements that influence the unit cost and profit markup component of the prices of individual goods 
(Humphrey, 1998). According to Humphrey (1998), cost-push theorists date back to the writings of Sir 
James Steuart (1767) in the eighteenth century, Thomas Tooke (of the Banking school in the mid 
nineteenth  century  (1844)),  and  Laurence  Laughlin  (1896),  the  first  Chairman  of  the  Economics 
Department of the University of Chicago in the first decade of the last century.  
According to Humphrey (1998), Steuart’s argument in the context of price level determinations was 
mainly threefold. Firstly, he suggested that the price level is a non-monetary phenomenon determined 
by the same forces that determine the individual prices of specific good. These forces are real, and 
include costs and competition. According to Steuart, increased competition forces firms to reduce their 
prices just as falling costs lower them. The second proposition of Steuart stated a dichotomy between 
movements in the money market and the general price level. Steuart had denied any role of money on 
the determination of the price level, which could mean that prices are real phenomena and totally 
independent  of  money  balances.  His  third  proposition,  which  clearly  follows  from  his  first  two 
propositions,  assumed  a  causation  that  runs  from  prices  to  money,  which  is  the  opposite  of  the 
monetarists’ argument. With causation running in the opposite direction, Steuart meant to argue that 
the volume of money adjusts to accommodate/support the real activities at the existing prices. In other 
word, changes in the stock of money/coins are merely to validate the price changes produced by other 
means, hence money must be the consequence rather than the cause of these price changes. 
David Ricardo, one of the very early classical economists, tried to defy Steuart's view as presented by 
the antibullionists, particularly when the Bank of England opted for the inconvertible paper currency 
after the Napoleonic War (Humphrey 1998). Ricardo argued on the grounds that cost-push argument 
for inflation is misleading as it creates confusion between relative and absolute prices. According to 
Ricardo's argument, with total output assumed to be fixed, an increase in the relative price of specific 
goods that requires workers to spend more on such goods would eventually leave them with fewer 
balances to spend on other goods, whose prices would accordingly fall. Hence, the rise in the relative 
price of particular goods would be offset by a decrease in the prices of other goods in the market, 
which in turn would leave the general price level unchanged.  
Thomas Tooke, who was one of the prominent leaders of the Banking school in the nineteenth century, 
was a major advocate for cost-push inflation (Humphrey 1998). He believed in supply shocks and 
factor cost theories of price determinations. Examples of supply shocks in Tooke's list included harvest 
failures,  changes  in  tariff  rates,  import  cost  variations,  and  cost  reducing  technological  progress 
embodied in machines. Examples of cost factors included rents, salaries, wages, and profit. Tooke's 
theory on the causes of inflation is very much reminiscent of recent theories discussed below that P a g e  | 58 
 
attributed  the  high  and  low  inflation  in  the  1970s  and  1990s,  respectively,  to  a  number  of  non-
monetary, supply-side elements. In his explanation of how cost factors derive product prices, Tooke 
focused on falling and rising interest rates. He simply argued that falling interest rates deflate prices by 
lowering capital costs and conversely, rising rates inflate prices by boosting business costs. Such an 
impact of interest rates on the prices through costs of production is assumed to be independent of the 
behavior of money. However, Tooke's theory on interest rate and inflation was countered- by Wicksell 
(1898) in the early decades of the twentieth century. Wicksell stated that by reducing interest rate, the 
cost of capital-intensive goods would fall and in turn more would be spent on other goods (non-
intensive capital goods), the increasing demand of which would eventually produce a compensating 
rise in their prices leaving the general price level unchanged. 
The list of supply shocks that was advanced by Tooke in explaining inflation has been reiterated by the 
theorists of the Real Business Cycle (RBC) in the early 1980s. The work of the modern new classical 
theorists (E. Prescott, F. Kydland, C. Plosser, J. Long, A. Stockman, R. Barro) was mainly focused on 
analyzing the effect of real supply shocks (e.g. productivity shocks, discovery of new source of raw 
materials, war and labor unrest, changes in the relative prices of food and energy, and natural disasters 
that could have adverse effects on agricultural output) on aggregate output and it was not explicitly 
directed to explain changes in the price level or inflation. However, their influential contribution – 
presenting supply shocks as the main source of aggregate instability - can be implicitly applied to 
explaining the inflation process. For example, a favorable supply shock in the form of technological 
progress  will  enhance  productivity,  thereby  reducing  inflationary  pressures.  By  using  such  a 
propagation mechanism, one can easily argue that the RBC school gives an implicit support to the 
supply-side phenomena of inflation as advanced by some theorists of the costs-push school like Tooke.  
The third-cited famous proponent of the cost-push inflation, Laurence Laughlin (1896), presented a 
similar version of his predecessors’ ideas in explaining the link between the increase in the relative 
prices and change in the general price level with extra emphasis on structural factors like trade unions 
and cartels. Laughlin identified three mechanisms through which costs could raise relative prices and 
causes inflation. One mechanism was wage-push prices,  where he emphasized the role of  ratchet 
effects  and  unilateral  wage-setting  by  trade  unions.  The  second  mechanism  was  monopoly-
administrated pricing that aimed to control prices and prevent active competition. The third mechanism 
was supply shocks in the form of commodity shortage (e.g. raw materials and crop failures). He argued 
that commodity shortage can directly increase prices through lower supply and indirectly via their 
feedback into wage demand, where lower purchasing power because of increased food prices causes 
workers to demand higher pay, thus leading to higher production costs (Humphrey, 1998).  
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Laughlin's propositions came under attack in the first quarter of the twentieth century through the 
writings  of  Irving  Fisher,  who  aimed  to  criticize  costs-push  theories  in  general.  According  to 
Humphrey (1998), Fisher criticized the costs-push theorists on four grounds. First, Fisher argued that 
these theories confuse changes in relative prices with changes in absolute prices, an argument similar 
to the one presented earlier by David Ricardo. Fisher’s second contention was based on the quantity 
identity, where he argued that effects on the price level must be through changes in money stock, 
velocity of money, or the physical volume of trade. If these variables remain constant in magnitude for 
a substantial length of time, the general price level will not change. In his third criticism, Fisher 
analysed the tendency of the costs-push theorists to refer to some 'ad hoc explanations' emphasizing 
random events and temporary shocks. According to Humphery (1998), Fisher termed such practice 
"the error of selecting special cases" as in his view those cases/events are short lived and their impact is 
confined to range of commodities, meaning that they are unable to create a sustained influence on the 
general price level. The fourth argument of Fisher revealed his reservation/opposition to the costs-push 
theories' proposed remedies to inflation, such as price and wage controls or income policies. In Fisher's 
view, a permanent solution to inflation cannot be delivered by income policies if there is an excessive 
growth of money stock. 
Recently, great parts of the arguments of the cost-push theories were implicitly and explicitly cited in 
number of cases to explain the low and stable inflation during the 1990s. In its annual report of 2006, 
the Bank of International Settlement (BIS) suggested the direct and indirect effects of globalization as 
the main causes for the disinflation process during the 1990s. A number of mechanisms were presented 
by the BIS to explain how globalization lowered inflation. One such mechanism was that opening 
international markets in factor of productions, goods and services, cheap imports and larger cross-
border investment has led to a reduction in the costs of taming inflation rates and keeping them in 
check,  without  necessitating  contractionary  polices  and  rising  unemployment.  Similarly,  the  IMF 
(World Economic Outlook, 2006) concurred with the view of the BIS by offering further explanation 
on the mechanism through which globalization could have led to low inflation. As per their view, 
globalization  brought  about  higher  incentives  to  enhance  productivity  through  technology 
progress/innovation  along  with  greater  price  and  non-price  competition  that  have  resulted  in  an 
increase in world aggregate supply and hence reduced pressures on international prices.  Another 
supporting argument for cost-push theories in the context of low inflation in the 1990s was further 
presented  by  Rogoff  (2006).  According  to  Rogoff,  by  increased  competition,  globalization  has 
weakened the power of domestic monopolies and labor, hence 'flattening the long run Phillips curve'. 
Another further factor in the explanations list stressed the lower import costs stemming from the Asian 
Financial  crisis  in  1997-98  that  was  accompanied  by  the  distress  sale  of  Asian  goods  and  the 
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As a matter of fact, those recently presented factors presented as causes of the low and stable inflation 
during the last decade of the twentieth century can be viewed to be an updating of Tooke's list of 
supply shocks factors mentioned above. However, for the theorists of modern quantity theory, those 
costs-push arguments can at best explain changes in relative prices; they cannot explain changes in the 
general price level unless they show how increased costs in one sector of the economy can induce 
material change in at least one of the determinants of the price level, such as the stock of money, its 
velocity, and aggregate income (Fisher, 1911). For modern monetarists, obvious explanations for the 
low inflation of the 1990s may include faster growth of output over lagging money stock and lower 
expectations of higher future rates of money growth and inflation by the public which in turn might be 
due to increased credibility of many central banks that had announced a solemn commitment to low 
inflation targets during the 1990s (Snowdon and Vane, 2005). For monetarists, causation always runs 
from  money  to  inflation  so  the  latter  is  'always  and  everywhere'  a  monetary  and  demand-side 
phenomenon (Friedman, 1968). 
2.8 Some Variants of the Cost-Push Theories (Structuralists, Neo-Marxian, and Post-Keynesians) 
A major version of the cost-push theories is the structuralists' theory of inflation, which has competed 
with the monetarists' theory since 1940s. The structuralists essentially relate the inflation process to a 
special set of structural constraints faced by each economy/country (e.g. equal and unequal income 
distributions, the relative importance of certain sectors in the economy like the agriculture sector, and 
balance of payment disequilibrium). In their distributional mechanism, the structuralists assumed that 
changes in economic structure induce changes in relative prices, which in turn lead to changes in the 
general price level  (Aykut, 2002). According  to A. Canavese  (1982), the structuralists’  theory  of 
inflation is based generally on three important factors:  relative prices that change when economic 
structure changes, downward inflexibility of (some) money prices, and passive money supply. So with 
the  presence  of  downward  inflexibility  of  some  money  prices  (e.g.  wages)  and  a  passive  money 
environment, changes in the relative prices due to changes in the economic structure will result in an 
inflationary process.  
Famous early studies of the structuralists’ approach to inflation include those developed by P. Steeten 
(1962)  and  W.  Baumol  (1967)  for  industrialized  economies,  and  J.  Oliver  (1964)  for  the  Latin 
American countries. Moreover, studies have shown that despite similarities in their basic fundamentals 
and the propagation mechanism, the structuralists’ schools in Europe and Latin America differed on 
the source of the structural change in the economy. While the former school restricts its analysis to 
structural changes coming from supply shifts, the latter considers structural changes stemming from 
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In  their  analysis  of  inflation  in  developing  countries,  particularly  those  in  Latin  America,  the 
structuralists have maintained that certain aspects of the structures of these economies cause aggregate 
supply to lag chronically behind aggregate demand. For example, in their analysis of Latin American 
inflation, they argued that the agriculture sector, in which the supply is assumed to be fixed and not 
particularly price  elastic,  responds to  the  monetary  and  aggregate  demand  shocks  with  a  lag.  An 
increase on the demand for the nonagricultural (industrial) products will raise wages, thereby leading 
to an increased demand for agricultural outputs. Due to the rigidity of output (fixed supply or price 
inelasticity) in the agricultural sector, the incipient demand increase will be forced to increase prices in 
order to meet the excess demand. The increase in the relative prices of the agricultural sector will lead 
to higher wage demands in this sector. Increased wages will be passed along into higher prices for 
nonagricultural products and a cumulative inflationary process is set up. It was the inefficiency of the 
agricultural sector that originally sparked relative price changes in other sectors and eventually led to 
inflation (Taylor, 1983). 
Another version of the cost-push theories includes that presented by some non-mainstream economists 
including Marxists, Post Keynesians, and neo-structuralists (Lavoie, 2009). Inflation theories of these 
groups are broadly based on a similar proposition, in which inflation is considered a supply side 
phenomena caused by conflicting claims in income distribution. As a result, they generally maintain a 
similar propagation mechanism that implies changes in relative prices, which in turn set off a persistent 
inflationary process.  
2.9 Fiscalists' Approach to Inflation 
The fiscalists’ theory (e.g. M. Woodoford, C. Sims, J. Cochrane, and E. Leeper) of the determination 
of the general price level was developed during the 1990s. In their literature, they argued that the 
general price level is essentially a fiscal, rather than monetary phenomenon (McCallum 2003). They 
consider the sequences of the primary government deficits and surpluses to be the main determinant of 
the general price level. In their opinion, fiscal shocks affect aggregate demand through the intrusion of 
the former upon private sector budget constraints. Accordingly, they had viewed the commitment of 
the monetary authority (central bank) to conduct a rule-based monetary policy as insufficient to ensure 
a stable and low equilibrium rate of inflation. 
According to Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000), the attack of the fiscal theory on the traditional approach 
(monetary approach) was divided into two forms; the weak-form fiscal theory and the strong-form 
fiscal theory. The weak-form was originally initiated by Sargent and Wallace (1981) in their celebrated 
study,  'Some  Unpleased  Monetarists  Arithmetic'.  In  this  form  the  fiscal  policy  was  assumed  to 
dominate so that it moves first to independently set its budget and announce all current and future 
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through  seignorage  (creation  of  money)  as  the  government  is  assumed  to  facing  an  upper  limit 
constraint on the real stock of government bonds relative to the size of the economy. The monetary 
policy is then expected to move accordingly by maintaining the necessarily solvency solely through 
seignorage  financing.  Therefore,  by  being  forced  to  create  money  to  avoid  any  default  by  the 
government  when  any  new  bonds  cannot  be  issued  (and  with  no  help  from  budget  surplus),  the 
monetary policy is left with no option but to tolerate additional inflation.  However, although it is very 
obvious that inflation was tolerated to increase by the growth in money, fiscal policy is considered the 
ultimate driver for such growth. Hence, the weak form implies the exogenity of fiscal policy and the 
endogenity of money supply (Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2000). It also implies that commitment to an anti-
inflationary monetary policy is sufficient to ensure price stability (Woodford 2001).  
The weak form is assumed to be applicable to all non-Ricardian economies, in which the monetary 
policy is under the pressure of budget deficit and fiscal policy shocks. It is very common to see the 
presence  of  non-Ricardian  scenario  in  less  developed  market  compared  with  their  developed 
counterparts, where it is less likely to obtain seigniorage revenues (Woodford 1998, Bildirici and Ersin, 
2005)
30.  
However, in developed economies with sophisticated financial markets and an independent central 
bank, which commit to a specific inflation path and need not accept seigniorage targets imposed by the 
treasury, the strong form of the fiscal policy is suggested as being the dominant form. The strong-form 
of the fiscal policy, for which the development is primarily attributed to the fiscalists of the 1990s, 
assumes the ability of the fiscal policy to induce changes in prices independently of monetary policy. 
In this form, both the fiscal policy and the monetary policy are assumed to be exogenous and that 
prices will have to adjust to a level satisfying the government's budget constraint, which link the real 
value of the debt to the present value of primary surpluses the government will run in the future. 
Proponents of the fiscal theory view this link as an equilibrium condition. It follows that any imbalance 
between the real value of the debt and the surpluses would trigger price adjustment in the form of 
increasing or reducing the nominal debt (Bassetto, 2002). 
 
0 0 / ) ( P B S D = + p                          (11) 
 
                                                           
30 Ricardian regimes is basically those economies where fiscal budget constraint does not influence aggregate 
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Equation (11) represent a government budget constraint; where  ) (p S  represents the present value of 
seignorage,  D is the present  value of future primary budget surplus (deficits is represented  with 
negative sign),  0 B  is the accumulated government debt at time zero, and  0 P  is the corresponding 
nominal price level
31. By assuming fixed money growth (fixed money supply), there would be no 
future seignorage revenues (the monetary policy is committed to a seignorage path) and subsequently, 
equation (11) will be reduced to the form given by equation (12): 
D B P / 0 0 =                            (12) 
Equation (12) implies that the fiscal policy determines the current price level and the path of prices. A 
change in the fiscal policy  ) (D changes current prices  ) (P  by changing the path of future inflation. 
For instance, a  rise  in  the discounted  value of  future  surpluses  reduces  current  prices  and  future 
inflation, therefore, the strong-form of the fiscal theory, in which the fiscal policy can affect the price 
level and the path of inflation independent of any movement in the money stock. A major implication 
of the strong form is that anti-inflationary monetary policy rules with a low implicit inflation target are 
not  sufficient  to  ensure  price  stability  as  disturbances  from  fiscal  expectations,  by  the  rational 
economic agents regarding government budget constraint, may prevent such stability from occurring. 
Accordingly, it is suggested that for the achievement of longer term price stability, monetary policy 
should be coordinated with fiscal policy (government budget constraint). 
2.10 The New Political Macroeconomic to Inflation 
In traditional economists' approaches, particularly the Keynesians, the policy maker who represents the 
government had been assumed to act to maximize social welfare. The government was thought, at least 
generally, to be the 'benevolent social planner', who would always try to pursue economic policies that 
were in the interests of society.  In other words, the government was viewed as  being exogenous to the 
economy, its only interest being steering the economy toward the best possible outcome (Snowdon and 
Vane,  2005).  Killick  (1976)  clearly  summarized  in  his  paper  "The  Possibilities  of  Development 
Planning" such policy making processes of the traditional approach: 
“Economists have adopted a rational actor model of politics. This would have us see governments as 
composed of publicly-spirited, knowledgeable, and role-oriented politicians: clear and united in their 
objectives; choosing those policies which will achieve optimal results for the national interest; willing 
and  able  to  go  beyond  a  short-term  society  point  of  view.  Governments  are  stable,  in  largely 
                                                           
31 Please note that I have purposely opted to use very simplified and non-technical analysis to bring very closely 
the idea of the strong form fiscal theory. However, more comprehensive and technical form can be found in 
Bassetto, (2002), Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000), McCallum (2003), or Woodford (2000). P a g e  | 64 
 
undifferentiated societies; wielding a centralized concentration of power and a relatively unquestioned 
authority; generally capable of achieving the results they desire from a given policy decision.” (Killick, 
1976, p: 171). 
Further,  as  per  the  traditional  approach,  the  relationship  between  the  economist  and  the 
politician/policy maker was assumed to be such that the former is expected to offer economic advice 
based on well structured analysis to the latter, who is expected to follow the unbiased and well-
informed advice provided by the former in maximizing societal welfare. However, in reality, studies 
(e.g. Alesina, 1988,  Alesina and Roubini, 1997, Drazen, 2000) have shown that different roles are 
usually taken by the governing politician, particularly in societies that feature the presence of different 
classes, interest groups, political parties, and voters. In such heterogeneous societies, the policy maker 
is assumed to be mainly influenced by the forces of those different divisions and the unbiased insights, 
which should represent the public interest, of his economic advisor will be regarded as secondary. For 
example, the elected politician will try to take economic decisions that mainly pour into the current and 
future  interests  of  his/her  ruling  party.  Such  an  election's  opportunity  or  partisan/ideology  based-
economic decisions are assumed to contribute toward economic instability through non-optimal use of 
monetary and fiscal policies (monetary growth, government spending, and taxes). For example, the 
incumbent government will try to exploit the short run Phillips curve (lowering unemployment on 
account  of  higher  inflation)  in  order  to  win  the  election,  thereby  causing  a  potentially  damaging 
distortion to the economy before and after the election period. Even in the case of a rationally behaving 
voter,  who  is  assumed  to  evaluate  based  on  observing  outcomes  as  he  lacks  information  on  the 
competence of the politician, can be persuaded through intended signaling processes by the incumbent 
government.  Another  example  of  politically-generated  instability  is  the  attempts  of  incumbent 
governments to pursue short sighted policies as reputational considerations are no longer important due 
to the low probability of being re-elected. 
Given these considerations, macroeconomic studies in the last quarter of the twentieth century were 
further developed to incorporate the influence of the political system into the economy thereby giving 
rise to the  so called 'new political macroeconomics', which is based on some insights of the game 
theory  and  the  theory  of  public  choice
32.  Particular  interests  in  those  studies  included, inter  alia, 
understanding  the  impact  of  the  interaction  between  the  economic  and  political  systems  on 
macroeconomic variables such as inflation, unemployment, and output.  
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It is pertinent to discuss one final theoretical issue related to the causes of inflation; the role of non-
economic, political and institutional factors in the creation or acceleration process of inflation. The new 
literature of political economy has advanced a number of factors in determining the inflation process 
including political instability, political cycles (e.g. election periods and performance of policy makers), 
budgetary politics, credibility and reputation, central bank independence, and inequality in income 
distribution.  
It is generally argued that governments in countries with higher political instability (riots, repressions, 
coups, frequency in transfer of power, etc) tend to face highly inefficient tax systems and rely heavily 
on inflationary financing (seignorage and trade tax) as compared to democratic systems (Cukierman et 
al.    1992).  Similarly,  politically-induced  economic  cycles  during  the  electoral  competition  may 
stimulate an inflationary process. According to the political business cycle model of W. Nordhaus 
(1975) the incumbent politician, who is concerned about his re-election prospect, will try to exploit the 
Phillips curve by manipulating monetary or fiscal policy, to create a favorable economic outcome 
around the election period. As a result, money growth and inflation will go up (lower unemployment 
and higher GDP growth) in the run up to the election and will come down (rising unemployment and 
lower GDP) after the election period in order to prepare for the next pre-election stimulation. Such an 
opportunistic behavioral cycle is assumed to be identical for different governments (the partisan's 
ideology does not matter), particularly when the chances of being re-elected are perceived to be low. 
The political system can also affect the inflation process through fiscal disturbance. It is strongly 
argued that non-monetary expansionary policy in the form of government spending can also induce 
monetary ease under a number of circumstances. For example, indirect political pressure on the central 
bank to service government bonds that were issued to finance government expansionary policy (e.g. for 
pre-election economic boom), through monetization (printing of money). Increases in taxes to finance 
government spending can also induce indirect monetary ease by the central bank. Such increases in 
taxes are assumed to have a reallocation effect in resources between private and public sectors that will 
create pressure on the central bank to pursue a monetary expansion in order to reduce unemployment 
(Flemming, 1976).  
In the new political economy theory, government and economic agents are seen to be engaged in a 
complicated dynamic game, under which any monetary or fiscal policy announcement for low inflation 
is subject to the credibility and reputation of the government (King and Ma, 2001,   Snowdon and 
Vane, 2005). Such emphasis on  credibility and reputation issues  gained higher importance in  the 
aftermath of the rational expectation revolution  as rational economic agents know that, due to low 
credibility of the government, the announced/promised pre-election policy of low inflation is time-
inconsistent, in the sense that it will not be materialized after the election.  In the run-up to the election, P a g e  | 66 
 
all parties are assumed to consider it important to announce convergent policies that will appeal to the 
median voter. As a result, during such periods the party's ideology will be given secondary priority in 
order to maximize the election prospects. As there is no such mechanism for the voter to hold the 
elected  party  to  its  promises,  the  party  will  re-optimize  by  giving  the  ideological  consideration 
predominance.  Due to such time-inconsistent issues, the rational voter highly values the credibility and 
reputation of the candidate during the election process. Studies have advanced various courses of 
actions/arrangement  in  order  to  establish  credibility  or  reputation  among  voters.  Some  of  these 
arrangements include the independence of the central bank, fixed exchange rate regime, and receiving 
a seal of approval on the announced policy from an external institution like the IMF
33. 
Central bank independence is consistent with the view that inflation is a monetary phenomenon.  The 
presence of such institutional factors is assumed to restrain any inflationary attempts by politicians who 
are always tempted, if given discretion over monetary policy, to ease money for political ends (e.g. to 
win  election  tournament,  budgetary  payoff  through  extra  tax  revenue).  Studies  had  showed  that 
discretionary monetary authority has, in many instances, produced a higher then desirable inflation rate 
due to reasons such as political pressures to lower unemployment to influence the election process, the 
partisan effect and motivations related to the financing of deficits. Accordingly, an effective way to 
control  inflation  is  the  assignation  of  the  monetary  policy  to  an  independent  central  bank  with 
autonomous monetary authority that fully respects the value of money.  Alesina (1988 and 1989) has 
found, in an empirical study for industrial countries, a negative relationship between average long term 
inflation rate and the degree of central bank independence.  It should be noted, however, that the 
presence of an independent central bank does not render an equal influence on inflation across all 
countries. For example, central bank independence in countries with undeveloped financial markets 
and unsustainable budget deficits is unlikely to result in an effective counterweight to inflation (Mas 
1995).  
In recent years, inequality in income distribution had been suggested as  being  another political factor 
for  inflation.    There  are  a  significant  number  of  direct  and  indirect  mechanisms  through  which 
inequalities in income distribution can affect inflation. Sachs (1989) attributed the economic situation 
in  Latin  American  countries  (LACs)  to  the  inequality  income  distribution  that  creates  political 
                                                           
33 For example, the Labor Party led by Tonay Balir in the UK  announced, during the 1997 election, to be counter 
inflation and to achieve lower unemployment rate at the same time. Such announcement was clearly time-
inconsistent as the party was expected to follow the ideology of lower unemployment on the cost of higher 
inflation post to the election. However, in order to give credibility to its announcement of low inflation, the 
party immediately on winning the 1997 election granted operational independence to the Bank of England 
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pressures on macroeconomic policies to increase the income of lower groups, thereby rendering weak 
economic performance due to poor policy decisions. In a similar mechanism, Beetsma and Ploeg 
(1996) used a median voter model to explain the link between inequality and inflation. They argued 
that when assets are unequally distributed in a democratic society, the public are more likely to elect a 
party that represents the interest of the poor people. Such a party is less likely to commit to policies of 
low inflation as they have more incentives to levy inflation taxes and erode the real value of debt 
services. Income inequality can also affect inflation through political instability. It is believed that 
inequality in income distribution can be a major factor for political instability (Alesina 1996), which in 
turn can lead to higher inflation as confirmed by empirical studies (discussed below). 
2.11 Summarizing Remarks 
Different  hypotheses  have  been  advanced  by  different  theories  over  the  last  two  centuries,  as 
demonstrated above, concerning the creation and acceleration of inflation. Such tremendous efforts 
reflect  how  inflation  has  been  a  central  concern  to  macroeconomists.  However,  despite  this  rich 
theoretical  literature  on  inflation,  the  basic  determinants  of  inflation  continue  to  be  disputed  by 
economists of different schools. 
From the brief survey of the various theories of inflation in the preceding sections, it can be inferred 
that the theoretical causes of inflation generally fall into four major groups; demand-side factors, 
supply-side factors (cost-push), inertial factors (built-in inflation), and political-side factors. The first 
three sources are close to Gordon’s theory (1997) of the 'triangle model of inflation'. The presence of 
these different factors in explaining the process of inflation lends support to those studies that view 
inflation as a macroeconomic and institutional phenomenon. 
Demand sources of inflation may include nominal factors like money supply or real factors in the form 
of  high  demand  on  goods  and  low  unemployment.  These  two  sources  of  demand-pull  inflation 
generally represent the view of the two mainstream groups ofeconomists, namely monetarists and 
Keynesians.  Moreover,  persisting  government  deficits  have  been  commonly  viewed,  particularly 
among monetarists and new classical economists, as a major demand side cause for inflation. This 
fiscal view of inflation is more relevant in the context of developing countries, where less efficient tax 
systems, political instability, and limited access to external borrowing make it easier for government to 
rely on inflation tax (Cukierman et al. 1992). 
Conversely, supply or real shock factors of inflation include inter alia, sudden increase in oil prices, 
crop failures, extraordinary weather changes, exchange rate movements, import cost variations, and 
negative productivity shocks. These supply side factors of inflation generally represent the cost-push 
theory of the non-mainstream economics. It should be noted, however, that both Keynesian and non-P a g e  | 68 
 
mainstream economists generally maintain a similar propagation mechanism, which implies changes in 
relative price levels that in turn induce continuous increases in the aggregate price level. The third 
source of inflation, the inertial factors, are induced by elements such as expectations, stickiness of 
wages, and indexations. These factors are often linked to the price/wage spiral that involves continuous 
attempts by labor to maintain their real income, followed by employers passing increases in wages to 
consumers into higher prices as part of a "vicious cycle". 
Finally, politics can also, as explained above, be responsible at least in part for inflationary effects, 
particularly in countries where political institutions are granted discretionary power over the economic 
decision process. The inflationary process in a number of developing countries represents to great 
extent  this  case,  where  circumstances  like  inequality  in  income  distribution,  political  instability, 
sustained government deficits, partisan politics, and the absence of an independent central bank are 
common.   
 
3. Empirical Survey on Causes of Inflation 
The  empirical  literature  about  the  causes  and  dynamics  of  inflation  is  vast  and  rich.  Some  very 
important  elements  that  have  contributed  considerably  to  the  growing  empirical  field  of  inflation 
include the development in the mathematical methods (econometrics and time series techniques) since 
late 1970s, dramatic improvements in computing technology, and the availability of long data for most 
countries all over the world. In this section an attempt is made to survey the vast empirical literature on 
the determinants of inflation. However, the survey will not be focused on one or few determinants of 
inflation, but will try to selectively cite examples of the empirical studies that have collectively covered 
in their tests most of the theoretically identified factors of inflation. Moreover, given the nature of the 
institutional, political, and cultural factors of the developing countries, the survey will be divided into 
two  subsections;  the  macroeconomic  determinants  and  political  and  institutional  determinants  of 
inflation. Summarizing remarks will form the third subsection.  
3.1 Macroeconomic determinants of inflation 
Most studies have generally tested the effect of one or few explanatory variables of inflation, while 
only a few studies have examined the influence/effect of larger set of variables. Furthermore, among 
the theories that have been examined extensively, are the proposition of the modern quantity theory or 
the role of money in domestic price level. 
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For  example,  Darrat  and  Arize  (1990)  have  used  a  money  demand  augmented  model  to 
empirically identify the determinants of inflation in 25 countries for the period 1950-1984. 
From the results of their statistical tests, the authors found that their model was powerful 
enough to explain the inflation process across all the examined countries. The inflation process 
was found to be significantly associated with changes in monetary base, real income growth, 
expected  inflation,  and  expected  rate  of  currency  depreciation.  From  a  policy  perspective, 
Darrat and Arize have emphasized that a major implication of their results is a restrictive 
monetary policy, though facing some difficulties due to long lags, is an important ingredient in 
any  anti-inflation  policy.  Other  earlier  cross  country                                                                                
studies that have found dominant role for money in influencing domestic price level include 
McCandless  and  Weber  (1995),  Onafowora  (1996),  and  Dwyer  and  Hafar  (1999),  among 
others
34.  
 
Recently, Grauwe and Polan (2005) used cross section and panel analysis to test the propositions of the 
modern quantity theory of money in 116 countries over the period 1969-1999. They found a strong 
positive association between inflation and money growth in high inflation countries. However, such a 
relationship in low inflation countries was found to be weak. According to Grauwe and Polan, their 
finding implies the usefulness of money stock as a guide in steering policies for price stability in high 
inflation countries, although not in low-inflation countries. Similarly, Moroney (2002) tested the ability 
of the modern quantity theory to explain the differences in inflation among 81 countries. Moroney 
found the quantity theory to offer a complete explanation (coefficient of money is almost one) of 
inflation in high inflation countries. However, in low inflation nations, the money was reported to 
explain about only 70 percent of changes in inflation.  These findings imply the usefulness of money 
stock as a guide in steering policies for price stability in high inflation countriesbut not in low inflation 
countries. 
Other studies have found that money forms a secondary role in influencing the domestic price level, 
and that there are other factors dominating the inflationary process. For example, D. Dhakal and M. 
Kandil (1993) examined the major determinants of inflation in six developing Asian countries using a 
quarterly  data  for  the  period    1970-1988.  They  employed  a  monetarist  model  adjusted  for  some 
external factors, namely the foreign nominal interest rate and the import prices. The authors found that 
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inflationary pressures in these countries do not stem primarily from the growth of money stock, as the 
empirical results showed zero impact of changes in the variable of monetary growth on inflation rate in 
half of the examined countries. Even the sum of the lagged impact of such variables was less than one 
in the other half of the sample, where the variable was significant.  
Moreover, they found that during the examined period, various variables that influence the public's 
willingness to hold money were behind the inflationary pressures across the sampled countries. Among 
these were the foreign nominal interest rates and import prices that were found to have a significant, 
long-lasting  impact  on  the  inflation  rates  in  some  of  the  countries  under  examination.  In  their 
conclusion, they viewed that the kinds and effectiveness of the domestic anti-inflation policies will 
highly depend on the unique inflationary experience of each country. For example, they emphasized 
the implementation of effective development plans that expand real income growth in those countries, 
where real income growth was found to exert a significant dampening impact on inflation. In contrast, 
they emphasized the use of contractionary monetary policy in those countries, where the growth of 
money stock exerts a significant positive on inflation.  
Furthermore, the role of external factors like import prices and exchange rates on influencing the 
domestic price level were also reported by many earlier, as well as recent, studies. For example, 
Hanson (1985) found the local cost of imports in LACs, which are highly dependent on imported 
inputs, to have significant affect on the inflation in these countries. Similarly, Agenor and Hoffmaister 
(1997), who used generalized vector techniques in an attempt to identify the inflationary impact of 
nominal  wages  in  some  middle-income  countries  for  the  period  1979-1995,  found  that  shocks 
associated with exchange rate depreciation and money growth play a substantial role in explaining the 
inflationary pressures across the examined countries. Other studies that reported significant impact 
from exchange rate to inflation include Goldfajn and Werlang (2000), Mihaljek and Klau (2001), 
Choudhri and Hakura (2006), and Williams and Adedeji (2007). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
In a recent study, Loungani and Swagel (2001) investigated the sources of inflation in 53 countries 
using the VAR technique with annual data from 1964 to 1998. The authors found that inertial factors 
play  the  major  role  in  explaining  inflation  process  in  countries  with  fixed  exchange  rate  regime. 
However,  changes  in  money  growth  and  exchange  rate  changes  were  found  to  dominate  the 
inflationary  process  in  countries  with  floating  exchange  rate  regimes.  From  a  policy  perspective, 
Loungani and Swagel suggested that anti-inflationary policy in  countries with fixed exchange rate 
regimes should focus on structural issues such as labor market rigidities and indexation schemes that 
affect the expectation relationship between past and future inflation. Similarly, countries with floating 
exchange  rate  regimes  should  give  higher  attention  to  fiscal  imbalances  that  may  lead  to  higher P a g e  | 71 
 
inflation by triggering higher money growth or a balance of payment crisis forcing exchange rate 
depreciation. 
Very recently, Hassan and Alogeel (2008), based on an error correction method, found foreign prices 
to be the main factors that drive inflation in the long-run in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
countries, which are highly import dependant, followed by changes in exchange rate. Excess in money 
supply  in  these  economies  was  found  to  influence  inflation  only  in  the  short–run,  and  tended  to 
dissipate very quickly. In a contemporaneous study, Guerrieri et al (2008) estimated a structural Philips 
curve using data on US traded goods. The study’s main finding was that the relative price of imports is 
an important determinant of inflation for traded goods. Specifically, they found that movements in 
relative import prices associated with changes in foreign competition accounted for over one third of 
the volatility of goods’ price inflation over their sample period (1983-2006). 
Relevant to the issue of traditional external factors is the global dimension of inflation. The idea of 
viewing global factors as significant determinants to domestic prices has developed recently in the 
literature
35.  In such studies, the inflation process has been found to be partly influenced by some 
global factors, the role of which is thought to have been increasing since early 1990. 
Morimoto et al (2003), investigated the effect of global supply shock on the global disinflationary trend 
that prevailed since mid 1990s. The authors applied the structural VAR model for seven industrialized, 
as well as emerging, economies. They found that global supply shocks have put some significant 
downward pressures on domestic prices in major industrial economies since mid 1990s. According to 
the authors, global supply shocks were caused by expansion of supply capacity in emerging nations. 
Moreover, the  authors  have  emphasized direct  trade  channels  from  emerging  market  countries  to 
industrialized markets in explaining the global disinflationary pressure.  
In another study by Borio and Filardo (2006), who estimated Phillips curve models for 16 advanced 
economies, global specific factors were found to be more relevant in explain domestic prices compared 
to other country specific measures. Specifically, the authors found proxies (e.g. global output gap) for 
global economic slack play very significant role in determining domestic inflation rates.  
More  recently,  Ciccarelli  and  Mojan  (2007)  have  attempted  to  show  that  historically  inflation  in 
industrialized  economies  is  global  phenomena.  In  their  estimation  for  22  OECD  countries,  they 
reported that inflation of 22 OECD economies have a common factor that alone accounts for about 
70% of their variance. In contrast, very recently and based on a disaggregated study, Monacelli and 
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Sala (2009), found that one international common factor explains around 15% to 30% of the variance 
of the consumer product inflation rates.        
Further, the literature also includes studies that have empirically attempted to investigate the influence 
of fiscal factors on domestic prices. For example, based on a panel of 133 countries by Fisher et al 
(2002) found short and long run positive associations between fiscal deficits and inflation in high 
inflation countries. Similarly, in an earlier study by Cottarelli et al (1998) in a sample of 47 industrial 
and  transition  economies  during  1993-96,  fiscal  deficits  were  found  to  have  significant  effect  on 
inflation, particularly in countries where the government securities market is not well developed.  
Catao and Terrones (2005) investigated the inflation-deficit relationship using a dynamic panel data 
technique  for  107  countries  during  the  period  1960-2001.  Unlike  other  studies,  the  authors  had 
modeled inflation as non-linearly related to fiscal deficits, which they scaled using the narrow money 
rather than GDP. In their results, Catao and Terrones found a strong positive association between 
deficits and inflation among high inflation and developing countries, but not among low inflation or 
advanced economies. Their results, indeed, is in contrast with a previous study of  Click (1998), who 
found  insignificant  role  for  government  budget  constraint  in  determining  inflation  tax  while 
investigating  the  determinants  of  seigniorage    in  a  cross-section  study  that  included  around  90 
countries, including developing. Other studies that have reported significant fiscal effect on inflation 
include Alfaro (2005),  Hammermann and Flanagan (2007),  and Staehr (2008), among many others. 
Finally, some evidence have been reported for the significant effect of structural changes on inflation. 
For example. Staehr (2008), in  an attempt to investigate the main drivers of inflation in Central and 
Eastern Europe, found that capital deepening and high productivity growth in the traded sector formed 
partly significant drivers of inflation in these countries during 1998-2007. Other studies that have 
reported significant association between relative productivity differences  in traded and non-traded 
sector and inflation include Lein-Rupprecht et al. (2007), Egert & Podpiera, (2008), and Belke et al. 
(2009).  
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3.2 Political and Institutional determinants of Inflation 
 Edwardo and Tabellini (1990) and Cukierman et al. (1992) have equally emphasized, in cross-section 
studies,  the  role  of  political  instability  and  polarization  in  explaining  inflation,  particularly  in 
developing  counries.  Both  studies  found  that  inflation  tax  have  a  significant  positive  long  term 
relationship with political variables, and in particular to different measure of political instability. The 
main implication of these findings is that establishing   political institutions that would reduce political 
instability and promote democracy should be at the forefront in the agenda of policy reform of the 
developing countries. 
Recently,  Aisen  and  Jose  Veiga  (2005)  had  confirmed  the  positive  link  between  political 
instability and inflation . The authors have employed a modern estimation technique in the 
form of dynamic panel-data estimation on about 100 countries and over relatively a very long 
period,  1960-1999.  Compared  with  previous  studies,  the  authors  have  also  introduced 
alternative and more direct measure of political instability affecting seigniorage and inflation 
as well as additional explanatory variables accounting for inflation inertia. From the estimated 
regressions,  the  authors  found  that  higher  degree  of  political  instability  generate  higher 
inflation rates and seigniorage. In their conclusions, the authors have suggested that policy 
makers should be aware that it is essential to reform institutions and create viable mechanisms 
conducive  to  long-run  price  stability.  They  have  also  suggested  that  inflation-stabilization 
effort should be combined with serious fiscal and political reforms. 
 
Further, other institutional arrangements like central bank independence, exchange rate regime and the 
degree of openness of the economy have been identified to be significant factors of domestic inflation. 
For example, Alesina and Summer (1993), found in sample of some developed countries that inflation 
variability is  associated  negatively with central  bank  independence
36. More recently, Ghosh  et  al. 
(1997), in their study for the link between inflation and exchange rate regime, included a proxy for 
central bank independence in their model and found a significant negative coefficient for such variable. 
Thus, indicating that higher central bank independence should lead to lower inflation rate.  
 
                                                           
36 Similar earlier studies that have found negative association between central bank independence and inflation 
include Bade and Parkin (1982), Grilli et al (1991), and Cukierman et al (1992). 
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Similarly, in a very recent study, Carmingnani et al (2008), in their study on the effect of the economic 
and  socio-political  environment  on  the  de  jure  policies,  reported  very  significant  and  negative 
association between inflation and central bank independence. Similar to Cukierman et al. (1992), the 
authors found two ways Granger causality between inflation and central bank independence as proxied 
by  government’s  turnover.  Lower  central  bank  independence  leads                                                                                        
to higher inflation and at the same time higher inflation encourages processes that make it easier for the 
incumbent government to influence central bank policies resulting in a quicker central bank turnover. 
However, Sturm and Haan (2001) found insignificant association between central bank independence 
and inflation when other various control variables are included. They also concluded that in those 
regressions, in which central bank independence is significant, the coefficient of the turnover rate 
becomes significant only after high inflation countries are added to the sample. Similar results was 
reported in an earlier study by Campillo and Miron (1996), who investigated the difference in inflation 
performance across 62 nations during 1973-1994 using OLS
37. Instead, Campillo and Miron (1996) 
found more significant role for the degree of openness of an economy and political instability. 
The  degree  of  openness  of an  economy  had  been  propagated  in  some  earlier  studies like 
Romer  (1993).    Romer  (1993)  tested  the  long  run  commitment  of  effect  of  openness  on 
                                                           
37This finding is totally in contrast to that of Temple (1998). Temple had argued that the findings of earlier cross-
section studies of CBI and inflation might have been influenced by limited number of observations in  the 
sample. In a recursive estimation (adding high inflation countries in ascending order) using 49 country sample 
considered by Campillo and Miron (1998), Temple found the negative association between CBI and Inflation 
disappear and becomes unclear when high inflation countries are added to the sample. Temple had attributed 
such results to either bad measures of CBI, particularly those of developing world, or that the relationship 
between CBI and inflation is non-linear. The former reason had been confirmed recently in studies by Brumm 
(2002) and Brumm (2006), where a significant negative association between CBI and inflation had been found. 
Brumm (2002) had as well suggested that the proxies of CBI used by earlier studies (e.g. Campillo and Miron, 
1997) might have been measured with error thereby rendering spurious results. Accordingly, Brumm (2002) 
used an alternative econometric method that took account of such error and found after applying it to the same 
sample of Campillo and Miron (1997) significant negative relationship between CBI and inflation. In Brumm 
(2006), Brumm had further tried to prove that such relationship also holds among developing countries. He 
used a sample of 24 developing countries that were originally used by Cukierman et al. (1992) over the period 
1973-1994. By employing covariance structure analysis and using alternative proxies for CBI, Brumm found the 
theoretical proposition of negative association between CBI and inflation to strongly hold even in a sample 
confined to developing countries. 
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inflation  using  cross-section  analyses  for  114  countries  over  the  period  1973-1990.  He 
reported negative significant association between inflation and openness, suggesting that in the 
absence of pre-commitment in monetary policy more open economies will tend to have lower 
inflation. According to Romer (1993), monetary authority in open economies finds currency 
fluctuations caused by surprises more painful therefore pursue more restraint than its closed 
economy  counterparts.  In  a  later  study,  Arellano  and  Bover  (1995),  confirmed  Romer’s 
argument by reporting that causality runs from openness to lower inflation. 
Similarly, in a recent study, Gruben and Mcleod (2004), based on cross country estimation for 
a panel of five-year averages for inflation and import share during 1971-2000, reported that 
economies more open to trade tend to have less variable inflation, albeit only in 1990. In 
contemporaneous study and based on micro data, Chen et al (2004) had further confirmed the 
link between the degree of trade openness and inflation. They showed, using disaggregated 
data  for  EU  manufacturing  during  1988-2000,  that  increased  openness  put  downward 
pressures  on  sectoral  prices  by  both  lowering  markups  and  raising  productivity.  Further 
similar results were reported by Lein-Rupprecht et. al (2007) for central and eastern Europe 
countries. 
 
Very  recently,  Carmgnani  et  al.  (2008),  have  reported  based  on  cross  country  study  the 
negative  association  between  openness  and  inflation.  However,  in  contrast  to  Romer’s 
mechanism for restraining the discretionary of the authority, Carmgnani et al. (2008) argued 
that openness effect inflation through the exchange rate regime channel. Open economies that 
attempt  to  attract  international  capital  flow  use  the  pegged  exchange  regime  in  order  to 
stabilize expectations.  
 
Further,  the  effect  of  the  choice  of  exchange  rate  regime  on  the  inflation  rate  has  been 
confirmed by number of other empirical works. For example, Ghosh et al. (1997), found a 
significant negative association between exchange rate regime in a panel of countries during 
1960-1990. Similarly, in a recent study, Alfaro (2005) used a panel of 130 countries from 
1973  to  1998  and  found  fixed  exchange  rate  regime  to  play  significant  role  in  reducing 
inflation in the short-run. Alfaro (2005) found his finding robust even after controlling for 
other  determinants  of  inflation  and  using  a  de  facto  exchange  regime  classification  (e.g. 
Rogoff  and  Reinhart,  2004).  Very  recent,  De  Grauwe  &  Schnabl  (2008)  reported  similar 
results  in  South-Eastern  and  Central  European  countries  even  after  controlling  for  other P a g e  | 76 
 
determinants of inflation.Other studies that have reported significant link between the choice 
of exchange rate regime and inflation rate include Edwards and Magendzo (2003), Husain et 
al (2005), and Bleaney and Francisco (2007). 
 
Furthermore, corruption has been identified by some studies to play a significant role in determining 
inflation rates. For example, in a cross section study on 41 from Asia and Latin America, Al-Marhubi 
(1999) found significant association between corruption and inflation, even when controlling for other 
institutional and political factors
38. Al Marhubi used four proxies of corruption and they were all 
significant and bearing the expected sign, suggesting that, other things given, countries with highly 
corrupted  systems  experience  high  inflation.  From  a  broad  policy  perspective,  Al-Marhubi  had 
concluded that a major implication of his finding is that reforming economic and political institutions 
to strengthen the rule of law and reduce corruption should be part of the agenda for any meaningful 
policy reform.  
In a more recent study, Braun and Di Tella (2004) tested the link between inflation variability 
and  corruption  using  yearly  data  of  75  countries  over  the  period  1982-1994.  They  found 
positive  significant  link  between  inflation  variability  and  corruption.  In  their  analyses  the 
authors  had  showed  that  higher  inflation  variability  leads  to  higher  corruption  and  lower 
investment.  The  authors  had  suggested  indirect  effect  of  inflation  on  growth  through 
corruption. However, a full causality test between inflation variability and corruption was not 
part of the authors' work in this paper. 
 
 Desai, Olofsgard, and Yousef (2003) found that democracy affects inflation through inequality in 
income distribution. In a variety of panel-data estimation techniques with more than 100 countries 
(including developing) over the period 1960-1999, they found that democracy is associated with lower 
inflation in lower inequality countries but with higher inflation in higher inequality countries. From 
policy  perspective,  the  authors  had  suggested  that  non  inflationary  redistributive  programs  (e.g. 
                                                           
38 According to Al Marhubi (1999), there are number of mechanisms through which corruption may induce 
inflationary pressures. For example, in an environment with higher corruption, tax evasion and tax collection 
costs are more likely to rise thereby increasing government reliance on inflation tax.   Corruption can also lead 
to higher inflation tax by encouraging businesses to go underground and by leading to capital flight, which 
reduces taxable assets and income of those  most able to meet government revenue requirements. 
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progressive taxation) in democratic societies with high inequality should reduce political pressures on 
inflation.  
Similarly, in an early study, Beetsma and Ploeg (1996) found in cross section analysis on 56 
countries and over less number of period (1960-1985) similar positive links between inflation 
and  inequality  in  democratic  countries.  But,  they  found  such  link  to  disappear  in 
corresponding regressions for non-democratic countries. However, in similar study but with an 
updated  period  (1975-1995),  Al  Marhubi  (2000)  found  that  inequality  matters  for  both 
democratic  and  non-democratic  societies.    In  his  cross  section  regressions,  Al  Marhubi 
included  an  interaction  term  of  inequality  and  dummy  variable  for  democratic  countries. 
However,  this  variable  turned  out  to  be  statistically  insignificant,  suggesting  that  the 
inequality-inflation link holds for democracies and non-democracies. 
 
3.3 Summarizing Remarks 
The empirical studies in the two preceding subsections have generally confirmed to some extent most 
of the determinants of inflation as proposed by the theoretical literature in section two of this chapter. 
More specifically, the results of the empirical studies had showed that inflation is generally influenced 
by a mixture of variables that stem from the four categories of inflation determinants identified in the 
theoretical literature
39. Such results suggests that any study that attempts an empirical analyzes of the 
causes of inflation should consider to include variables that represent factors from the four categories 
of determinants of inflation in order for the estimated model to adequately represent the real inflation 
process
40. Finally, the results of the empirical studies also suggest that in reality, the inflation process is 
dynamic and shocks to prices can be precipitated by different types of factors. In other word, inflation 
can  be  caused  simultaneously  by  more  than  one  factor  stemming  from  the  above  identified  four 
categories of determinants of inflation.  
                                                           
39 The  contrasting  results  between  some  of  the  empirical  studies  with  the  regard  to  the  significance  and 
direction of relationship between inflation and other macroeconomic, political, and institutional variables are 
primarily  attributed  to  some  econometric  issues;  e.g.  choice  of  estimation  method,  specification  of  the 
independent variables in the model, the potential bias due to the joint endogeneity of some variables, etc 
(Staehr, 2008).   
40 Nonetheless,  the  selection  of  the  independent  variables  should  not  be  arbitrary.  In  other  word,  the 
independent variables from the four categories of inflation determinants should be based on the structure and 
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4. Pass-through of exchange rate 
Exchange  rate  pass  through  (hereafter  ERPT)  represents  a  link  between  exchange  rates  and 
internationally traded goods. It is defined as “the degree to which exchange rate changes are reflected 
in the destination currency prices of traded goods” (Menon, 1995, p: 197)
4142. The interests to study 
and measure the ERPT began to grow following the move from fixed to floating exchange rates. As a 
matter  of  fact,  some  early  studies  (Friedman,  1953  and  Johnson,  1969)  have  argued  that  flexible 
exchange rate are useful for international price adjustments. In these studies, flexible exchange rates 
were  assumed  to  have  the  ability  to  improve  trade  balances  by  simply  delivering  relative  price 
adjustment between foreign and domestically produced goods. Accordingly, after the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system, trading nations switched to the option of flexible exchange rates on the hope to 
bring their currencies back to equilibrium and to eventually improve their trade balances (Engel, 2002).  
However, as trade balances in major trading nations began to show some resilience to changes in 
exchange rates, the initial confidence on flexible exchange rates for external adjustment started to 
decrease (Menon, 1995). Many studies started to take place in order to understand the adjustment 
puzzle. Great number of these studies looked at the slow or incomplete pass through from exchange 
rates to prices since it is believed that if there is no effect from exchange rates on prices that are paid 
by demanders of goods, then the use of any exchange rate based adjustments to improve the trade 
balance may be rendered less effective. In fact, the argument for flexible exchange rate is based on one 
very important premise that assumes a complete or substantial pass through of exchange rate to the 
buyers of the goods (Engel 2002, Bache 2006). So if ERPT is partial or incomplete then depreciation 
(appreciation) in the destination market currency would not imply much increase (decrease) in the 
prices of imported goods paid for by consumers. As a result, that would also imply a weak case for 
flexible exchange rate and a fixed exchange rate might be optimal (Devereux and Engel, 2003)
43.  
                                                           
41 Studies with comprehensive discussions in ERPT include Kahn (1987), Dornbusch (1987), Menon (1995), and 
Goldberg and Knetter (1996). 
42 Exchange rate pass-through is also generally used to refer to the effects of changes in exchange rate on 
import and export prices, consumer prices, investment, and trade volume. However, the primary focus in the 
literature has been on the effects on import and export prices because on one hand, this is a natural ground for 
studying  the  pricing practices  of  firms,  and  on  the  other,  a  reaction  by  import-export  prices  to  change  in 
exchange rate is normally a pre-requisite before there is any effects on consumer prices, investment, or trade 
volumes (Darvas, 2001). 
43 Devereux and Engel (2003) has provided a case for fixed exchange rates by exhibiting a model in which 
changes in nominal exchange rates do not, in the short run, have any effects in consumer prices (nominal or 
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The research in the pass-through relationship have been enhanced particularly after the muted response 
of the US import prises to the large swings in the US dollar during 1980s and the failure of inflation 
rates in industrial countries to accelerate after a major devaluation in the currencies of these countries 
in 1992 (Bache 2006, Frankel et al. 2005). More recently, the low response of inflation rates in many 
of the East Asian countries after the financial crises in 1997-98 and in other developing countries such 
as Mexico (1994) and Argentina (2001) have further led to additional contribution in the literature of 
pass-through
44. In fact, the theoretical literature based on the small open economy models has predicted 
complete, or close to complete, pass-through of exchange rate on domestic prices of less developed 
countries. However, the low responses of consumer price indices of the developing countries that 
experienced large devaluations during the 1990s was a totally a surprise to most observers (Frankel et 
al, 2005).  That has sparked number of studies, especially empirical ones, to shift part of the attention 
in the analysis of the pass-through relationship to less developed countries, as the great part of the 
earlier studies were focused on industrial countries. 
Furthermore,  early  literature  on  the  exchange  rate  pass-through  was  based  on  microeconomic 
foundation that evolved mainly during the 1980s (Bache, 2006). The large subset of the early literature 
have focused on the analyses of the ERPT at disaggregated micro level (industry level) as it is more 
appropriate to precisely isolate the effect of exchange rate on prices of the products (Ghosh and Rajan, 
2007). Nonetheless, ERPT is also more often analysed at the aggregated macro level like analysing the 
effect of ERPT into consumer price index, which is more relevant to monetary policy makers. It is this 
later effect that is the focus of the following sections of this chapter.  
4.1 Theoretical Background on the Link between Exchange Rates and Domestic Prices 
The link between exchange rate and prices, more generally, is dated back to the studies of scholars of 
the Salamanca School in Spain in the fifteens and sixteenth centuries. However, in the first quarter of 
the last century, particularly after World War one, the relationship between exchange rates and relative 
price levels was resurrected and promoted by  the influential writings of Gustav Cassel (1921,1922) in 
the form of the so called purchasing power parity  (hereafter PPP) theory (Rogoff, (1996), Taylor 
(2003), Taylor and Taylor (2004)). Cassel had proposed the PPP as a guide for the industrial countries 
to reset their gold parity when the war ended
45.  
 
                                                           
44With regard the East Asian financial crises, an exceptional case was Indonesia, for which the inflation rate had 
showed relatively very significant response to the depreciation of its currency, the Rupiah (Ito et al. 2005). 
45 For historical as well as comprehensive literature survey: Dornbusch (1987), Rogoff (1996), A. Taylor and M. 
Taylor (2004), and MacDonald (2007).  P a g e  | 80 
 
In its simplest form, the PPP theory suggests that the nominal exchange rate between two different 
currencies will adjust to equate the aggregate price levels of the countries of these currencies. In 
another word, both the domestic and foreign currencies will have equal purchasing power when they 
are converted into one common currency.  Expressed in mathematical form, the PPP theory is 
* SP P =                   (13) 
Where P is the domestic price level, S is the bilateral nominal exchange rate, and P
* is the foreign price 
level. Equation 13 represents the absolute form of the PPP theory that has its foundation from the law 
of  one  price  (hereafter  LOOP).  Abstracting  from  any  impediments  to  international  trade  such  as 
transportation costs, taxes, and tariff, the LOOP states that the price of any particular homogenous 
good that is traded on world market should be the same, when converted at the market exchange rate 
(McDonald,  2007).  The  mechanism  that  forces  the  LOOP  condition  is  the  competitive  arbitrage 
activities at individual level. A major implication of the absolute PPP theory is that the real exchange 
rate (hereafter RER)-the nominal exchange rate adjusted for the difference in the national price levels- 
should  be  constant,  however,  this  not  true  for  any  real  and  nominal  exchange  rate  comparison 
(McDonald, 2007)
46. Furthermore, there is one very important condition, under which the law of one 
price generalize to yield the PPP between domestic and foreign currencies. The price indices of the 
domestic and foreign countries should include the same goods with the same weighting scheme so that 
a common market basket of goods is measured (Rogoff (1996), Pakko and Pollard 1996, McDonald 
2007).  Such  condition  is  clearly  restrictive  as  different  countries  may  have  different  weighting 
schemes-due to difference in consumption-, and different base years. Furthermore, the LOOP assumes 
perfect competition, no capital flows, and no impediment to trade in the sense that there are costless 
transportation, distribution, and resale (Goldberg and Knetter 1996, McDonald, 2007). However, these 
conditions are clearly unlikely to hold in practice.  
 
Given the difficulties to construct a common market basket as a measure of national price levels across 
countries and the other restricted assumptions of the LOOP, a weaker version of the PPP theory known 
as the relative PPP is often considered. The relative PPP theory states that differences in the national 
price levels, Inflation rates, between two countries will be adjusted by changes in exchanges rates. In 
other word, relative PPP states that changes in price levels will be related to changes in exchange rates 
(Pakko and Pollard, 1996). It can also be interpreted to indicate that economies with relatively higher 
                                                           
46 In mathematical form, RER =
P
SP
*
. Accordingly, by assuming that that the absolute PPP theory holds, then 
RER = 1, or the log of RER should equal zero:  The formula (McDonald, 2007). P a g e  | 81 
 
inflation rates will experience a depreciating currency (McDonald, 2007). Expressed in mathematical 
form, the relative PPP theory is: 
 
* % % % P P S D - D = D                (14) 
 
Where ∆ represents changes. From equation 14, it is clear that the relative PPP theory is less restrictive 
then  the  absolute  version  as  it  simply  relates  percentage  changes  in  exchanges  rate  between  two 
countries to the difference in their inflation rates. If for example, inflation in country A increased by 
6% while inflation in country B increased by only 4%, then according to the relative PPP theory the 
currency of A will depreciate by 2% to offset the inflation differentials between the two countries. The 
primary  requirement  for the  relative  PPP  theory  to  hold is  that the spread/difference  between the 
inflation differential and the changes in exchange rate should equal zero or at least tend to centre zero 
(Pakko  and  Pollard,  1996).  In  the  context  of  ERPT,  the  validity  of  PPP  means  any  changes  in 
exchanges rates will translate into proportional movements in domestic price level. In other word, PPP 
theory  assumes  complete  pass-through  from  changes  in  exchange  rate  to  domestic  price  level. 
Accordingly, incomplete pass-through will reflect deviation from PPP. Nonetheless, complete pass-
through can occur even though the LOOP fails. The failure of the LOOP need to invalidate only the 
absolute PPP, but incomplete pass-through will invalidate both variants (absolute and relative PPP) 
(Frankel et al, 2005). 
5. Factors affecting the extent of ERPT into Domestic prices  
5.1 Microeconomic Determinants of ERPT 
 
A major body in the literature of exchange rate and prices have looked at the slow or incomplete pass-
through of exchange rate to domestic prices. In reality, ERPT into domestic prices is found to be 
incomplete as in many cases prices were found not fully adjusting to changes in exchange rates or 
inflation rates were not showing similar movements in exchange rates. Early traditional analysis of 
exchange  rate  pass-through  applied  supply-demand  analysis,  and  concluded  that  the  impact  of 
exchange rate change depend on elasticities of supply and demand of imports (Venables, 1990). The 
elasticities  approach  lies  on  the  assumptions  of  perfectly  competitive  market  and  complete  pass-
through for small open economies and incomplete pass-through for large closed economies (Venables 
1990,  Menon  1995,  Hahn  2003).  However,  since  the  modern  industries  are  typically  imperfectly 
competitive and given the profound recent evidences on less than 100 percent ERPT, the elasticities 
approach was proved to be incapable of addressing the pass-through relationship.  P a g e  | 82 
 
 
Subsequent development in the literature that was based on imperfect competition draws from the 
industrial organization literature and focuses on the link between the ERPT and industry characteristics 
such as market structure and the nature of competition. The applied models are partial in equilibrium as 
they focus on the reaction of prices to exogenous movement in the nominal exchange rate (Bache, 
2006). 
Under imperfect competition, firms will no longer be operating at marginal costs; instead they will be 
able to earn some margins above normal profits even in the long-run (Menon, 1995). The economic 
theory of price discrimination states that firms will be able to maximize their profits by varying their 
prices across markets in accordance with the elasticity of demand for a product (Pakko and Pollard, 
1996). Firms can vary their prices or charge different prices by normally adjusting their margins; that is 
“pricing to market” (PTM). One way, in which firms PTM is by limiting the ERPT into domestic 
prices of their customers. In its attempt to maintain market share and avoid long run losses (due for 
example to an appreciation of its own currency), a firm will price to market by holding its prices 
constant and simply adjusting its mark-up to offset the changes in exchange rates
47.  
By assuming imperfect competition and introducing the profit margin into the aggregate equation of 
the LOOP that had helped to explain the short run variations in the pass-through of exchange rate into 
import prices. Under the condition of imperfect competition, the augmented equation of the LOOP is: 
 
) ( f f M C S P + ´ =                 (15) 
 
Where Cf and Mf represent the marginal cost and markup, respectively. In fact Cf and Mf together 
represent the foreign price (P
*) of the traded good. The markup Mf is assumed to be the key link 
between exchange rate and the price of the traded good (Mann, 1986).  It is also often interpreted as an 
indicator of changes in the competitive positions facing foreign exporter in the destination market 
(Campa and Minguez, 2005). Equation (15) states that the domestic price of the traded good equal the 
marginal cost plus the profit margin/markup times the exchange rate. If the marginal cost is assumed 
constant, then the profit maximizing firm will react to changes in exchange rates by simply adjusting 
its markup and keeping prices unchanged.  
                                                           
47 It is originally Krugman (1987) who dubbed the exchange rate induced mark-up adjustment as pricing to 
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The literature has advanced number of microeconomic factors that could affect the variations in mark-
up over marginal cost in response to changes in exchange rates. These factors are primarily observed 
from  market  structures of  the  individual industries that  deviate from  perfect competition  (Menon, 
1995). They can be “viewed as forces that come into play to determine the price-setting power of firms 
and will affect the leverage available to them in responding to exchange rate changes” (Menon, 1995, 
p: 200). Dornbusch (1987) in his seminal contribution had identified number of factors including the 
degree of market integration or segmentation, the degree of substitutability between the domestic and 
imported goods (determined by the degree of product differentiation)
48, and the market structure.  
For example, the lower the degree of market integration and the degree of substitutability the higher 
will be the market powers of firms that will enable them to set different mark-ups and accordingly 
different prices between markets for identical goods
49. In explaining the effect of market structure and 
strategic interaction among suppliers, Dornbusch (1987) had considered the case of a Cournot industry 
of domestic and foreign firms that supply a homogenous product in the domestic market.  He showed 
that the degree of ERPT will be less, the fewer foreign firms there are relative to domestic ones and the 
fewer firms there are in total (less competitive is the industry).   
On the other hand, the 'hysteresis models' illustrates the importance of dynamic supply-side effects. 
Under these models, pass-through of exchange rate into import prices is assumed to be influenced by 
the irretrievable sunk costs associated with entry-exit decisions in the world markets. The presence of 
such kind of costs is assumed to introduce some frictions (making arbitrage costly) in the market and 
                                                           
48  Integrated  market  “is  one  in  which  geography  and  /or  nationality  do  not  have  systematic  effects  on 
transaction prices for otherwise identical products”(Goldberg and Knetter, 1996, P: 3). In other world, if firms 
are unable to discriminate between countries (price-marginal costs is the same). On the other hand, segmented 
market is one, in which “the location of the buyers and sellers influences the terms of the transaction in a 
substantial way (e.g., by more than the marginal cost of physically moving the good from one location to 
another) (Goldberg and Knetter, 1996, P: 3-4). In segmented markets firms are charging different mark-ups, so 
they are price discriminating. Two commonly cited examples of integrated markets and segmented markets are 
the  markets  of  Gold  and  Autos,  respectively.  In  their  extensive  discussion  of  market  integration  and 
segmentation, Goldberg and Knetter (1996) have generally conclude that the pass through of exchange rate to 
domestic prices is lower in more segmented markets, as in such markets firms are more able to engage in third 
degree discrimination.  
49 Incomplete pass-through cannot always be adduced against market integration. For example, Kreinin (1977) 
had attributed incomplete pass-through to reasons like incomplete adjustments during the sample periods and 
the ability of the importer to influence the world price due to his size in the market. This was also confirmed 
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accordingly may make small or temporary changes in exchange rate to have no effect on import prices. 
Moreover,  ERPT  is  expected  to  be  incomplete  due  to  the  ‘hysteresis  effect’,  whereby  temporary 
exchange  rate  changes  have  permanent  effects  on  import  volumes  (Venables,  1990).  When 
appreciation causes new firms to enter the market, these new firms will not be able to exit the market 
easily when the appreciation is reserved. The sunk costs that have been invested by those new firms 
will deter them from leaving, thus resulting in a change in the market structure as there will be more 
firms, which in turn leads to higher volume of imports and eventually lower prices, assuming aggregate 
demand did not change (Lafleche, 1996). 
Menon (1996) emphasized some other institutional factors that are assumed to affect the pass-through 
relationship.  These  include  the  effects  of  intra-firm  pricing  policies  by  multinational  corporations 
(MNCs) and the effects of non-tariff barriers (NTB) (Menon, 1995). MNCs actively employ intra-firm 
pricing policies in order to offset the full transmission of exchange rate changes to selling prices in 
individual markets. Such practice can help the subsidiaries of MNCs to maintain their market share 
following large exchange rate depreciation in domestic markets. Furthermore, non-tariff barriers in the 
form of quantity restrictions are assumed to play an important role in preventing a full pass through to 
feed into domestic prices. Bhagwati (1988) and Branson (1989) have argued that the increase in NTB 
in the presence of a depreciating currency can limit the pass-through from changes in exchange rates to 
import prices. According to Branson (1989), the premium on restricted imported goods would fall first 
as the currency depreciates, thus leaving less effect into prices.   
Furthermore, the above advanced factors are assumed to affect the pass-through relationship mainly on 
the long run.  Menon (1994) had presented other factors to help explain the short-run variations in the 
pass-through relationship observed in the macroeconomic data. These factors include menu costs, costs 
of  changing  supply,  the  dynamics  of  demand  response  to  price  changes,  payment  lags,  hedging 
techniques, and currency denomination of trade contracts. 
Pricing decisions by firms are generally influenced by costs associated with changing prices
50. Given 
such costs, firms are expected to absorb any transitory variations in exchange rate in their margins and 
respond to variations that are perceived more permanent. Similarly, costs associated with changing 
supply in the foreign market influence firms’ decision to lower prices and consequently alter their 
supply patterns. Prices are also more likely to fall gradually in response to a currency appreciation as it 
takes time for firms to expand its supply capacity. As such, due to the presence of these supply-side 
factors, movements of exchange rates perceived as being transitory will be ignored (Menon, 1994). 
                                                           
50 These costs include collection and processing of new information, the associated costs with changing posted 
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Generally,  customers  are  more  likely  to  respond  with  some  lags  to  changes  in  the  competitive 
situations (lower prices). This is due to many factors such as slow diffusion of information about 
prices,  low  reliability  on  new  sellers,  loyalty  to  traditional  suppliers,  and  costs  associated  with 
switching suppliers. Similarly, lags also exist in the payment process. Due to the lead time involved 
during  the  order-payment period,  prices  may  not  reflect  the  current  exchange rates  but those  that 
prevailed in the past. Accordingly, delayed customers reaction to price changes and payment lags are 
assumed to affect the pass-through relationship in the short run (Menon, 1994). 
Firms  also  enter  into  hedging  contracts  (forward  exchange  rate  cover)  in  order  to  eliminate  any 
potential losses from fluctuations in exchange rates. In such case, payment by importers will not reflect 
current exchange rate, but those that prevailed in the past. As such, to the extent that hedging contracts 
are made, the pass-through relationship in the short-run is going to be affected. Moreover, the currency 
in which import contracts are dominated is also assumed to play a significant role in affecting the pass-
through in the short-run. If contracts are dominated in the importer’s currency, they will not be affected 
by changes in exchange rates as importers will not have to exchange a currency to make payment. 
Consequently, there will be some lags in the reaction of prices to movements in exchange rates as 
prices will not change until the next contract is negotiated (Menon, 1994). Hence, ERPT into import 
prices will be incomplete
5152. 
5.2 Macroeconomic Determinants of the ERPT 
Generally, the question of whether macroeconomic factors can influence pass-through from exchange 
rate to domestic prices is relatively recent. This development is drawn from the new open economy 
macroeconomic models (NOEM) that introduced the nominal rigidities and market imperfections into 
dynamic general-equilibrium, open economy model with well specified microfoundations (Bailliu and 
Fujii, 2004). 
According to the NOEM literature that is based on studies like Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), Betts and 
Devereux  (1996),  and  Devereux  et  al.  (2003),  the  extent  of  pass-through  depends  on  the  pricing 
strategies used by firms. Under producer currency pricing (PCP), where domestic nominal prices are 
fixed in producers’ currencies, consumers’ prices would be expected to show a one to one change with 
                                                           
51 The ability for greater hedging of foreign currency and to set prices in importer’s currency can as well imply a 
smaller long-run pass-through of exchange rate changes to import. 
52 According to Hegji (2003) the pass-through from exchange rate to consumer prices can also be low if the 
production of goods takes several stages in different countries, cross-border production.  In such case, the final 
goods would constitute costs in different currencies that may not move together and hence can result in low 
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changes in exchange rates (this case is in line with the traditional open-economy macromodels such as 
Mundell-Fleming and with the recent Keynesian small open economy models). However, under local 
currency pricing (LCP), where domestic nominal prices are set in advance in consumers’ currencies, 
changes in exchange rates are not expected to exert any effect on consumer prices in the short run.  
In  other  related  models (e.g. Bacchetta  and Van Wincoop,  2005),  the  economy  is  assumed  to  be 
characterized with different pricing strategies; foreign exporters follow PCP and domestic firms follow 
LCP (due for example to competition from other local producers). Under such mix of pricing strategies 
the aggregate degree of pass-through is assumed to be partial in the short-run, thus lending further 
support to some existing evidence that suggest that the pass-through differs by industry.  
In  another  related  approach  by  Obstfeld  (2001),  exchange  rate  changes  are  assumed  to  results in 
‘expenditure switching effect’
53, whereby substitution between imported and locally produced products 
is  expected  to  take  place  at  the  level  of  local  producers  only.  As  the  exchange  rate  changes 
(depreciation), local producers are expected to switch from imported intermediate goods to locally 
produced alternative
54. In this model, intermediate imported goods are priced in foreign currencies and 
final consumers’ goods are priced in consumers’ domestic currencies. Accordingly, complete pass 
through is assumed at the level of intermediate goods producers, but zero pass through to consumer 
prices. However, a major objective of this kind of models is to show that despite the zero response in 
consumer prices, the economy is not completely shield from changes in exchange rate as such changes 
have influenced an expenditure switching effect at the level of local producers (Engel, 2002). 
Generally, there are number of factors that condition the choice of optimal price-setting currency such 
as the domestic monetary policy (Devereux and Engel, 2002), the exporting firm’s market share in the 
foreign market (Bacchetta and Van Wincoop, 2005) and the degree of substitutability between foreign 
and domestic goods (Goldberg and Tille, 2005). Furthermore, in order to allow for limited but non-zero 
pass-through, subsequent studies have assumed that import prices are sticky in local currencies. In 
another word, import prices are not completely predetermined but take time to adjust (Bailliu and 
Bouakez, 2004). Such sluggishness in price adjustment had been explained on account of factors like 
explicit costs of changing prices as discussed earlier.  
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Further, the NOEM literature has also emphasized a link between the pass-through and the inflationary 
environment  in  a  country.  This  link  is  based  on  the  seminal  contribution  of  Taylor  (2000),  who 
emphasizes  the  importance  of  monetary  environment  on  determining  the  extent  of  ERPT.  Taylor 
(2000) explained the relationship between inflation and pass-through in a microeconomic model with 
staggered  price  setting  and  monopolistic  competition.  According  to  Taylor  (2000),  firms,  which 
normally set prices in advance for several periods, react to changes in costs (either as a results of 
depreciation  or  some  other  costs)  only  if  these  changes  are  perceived  to  be  of  persistent  nature. 
Countries with high average inflation tend to have more persistent costs. As a result, the extent of pass-
through tends to increase in high inflation environment. Therefore, a more stable regime with low 
inflation is  going  to  be characterised  with  a relatively  lower  rate  of  pass-through,  while  the  high 
inflation regime would tend to reverse the effects. 
Taylor’s study has sparked a further theoretical and empirical studies to show how a low inflation 
environment can lead to lower degree of pass-through. Emphasized mechanisms in this regard include 
a decline in the expected persistence of cost and price changes (e.g.Choudhri and Hakura, 2006), a fall 
in the frequency of price changes (e.g. Devereux and Yetman, 2002), and an increase in the prevalence 
of LCP (e.g. Devereux et al, 2003). 
Other  macroeconomic factors that  may  affect  firms'  pricing  strategy  and  the corresponding ERPT 
include the uncertainty about the nature of depreciation (duration) of exchange rate fluctuations, the 
volatility of exchange rate and aggregate demand, and the business cycles (Mann, 1986). ERPT tends 
to be higher when changes in exchange rates are perceived to be more of persistent nature as firms are 
more likely to change prices than adjust profit margins. In contrast, ERPT is assumed to be low under 
greater volatility of exchange rates and aggregate demand as in such circumstance firms are expected 
to be more wary of changing prices and more willing to adjust profit margins (McCarthy, 2000). 
According to Froot and Klemperer (1989), Krugman (1989), and Taylor (2000), firms are less likely to 
pass a given exchange rate change to import prices in an environment where such changes are common 
and transitory. Business cycles are also assumed to affect the extent of ERPT. For example firms are 
expected to be more willing to change prices rather than adjusting profit margin during a demand 
boom.  In contrast, in case of excess supply in the economy, it is less likely for firms to increase their 
prices under such an environment (Bailliu and Bouakez, 2004). Moreover, in a multiple shock scenario 
like  currency  depreciation  and  a  simultaneous  demand  boom,  the  pass-through  is  expected  to  be 
smaller (Mann 1986).  
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The extent of ERPT is also assumed to be influenced by the degree of openness of an economy. 
According to Romer (1991) the degree of openness of a country is assumed to have a negative impact 
on  its  inflation  as  openness  can  ensure  the  availability  of  goods  and  services  at  internationally 
competitive prices. However, the impact from openness to pass-through is hypothesised to be positive. 
In fact there should be no contradiction between the two hypotheses as the later hypothesis means in 
other word that the impact on inflation from depreciation of exchange rate is stronger in a more open 
economy (Amitrano et al 1997).  
Furthermore, the degree of trade integration and changes in relative productivities across countries had 
been  suggested  by  Gust  et  al  (2010)  to  pose  significant  influence  on  the  extent  of  pass-through. 
According to their model, the firm’s pricing decision depends not only on its marginal cost but also the 
prices  of  its  competitors.  As  a  result,  firms  do  not  want  their  prices  to  deviate  much  from  their 
competitors, and because of that they find it optimal to vary its mark-up more and their prices less in 
response to an exchange rate movement. Lower trade costs due to increasing trade integration and 
higher productivity induce domestic producer to lower their mark-ups in response to the decline in the 
prices  of  foreign  exporters,  thus  leading  to  fall  in  the  average  mark-up  across  all  producers,  and 
eventually lower pass-through. In summary, the proposition of Gust et al (2010) is that higher trade 
integration lowers the market power of firms, thus squeezing their profit margins and resulting in lower 
pass-through. 
Generally, the presence of various factors, as suggested by the theoretical and empirical literatures, 
indicate that there is no consensus on the determinants of ERPT, and that the micro as well as the 
macroeconomic sides in an economy are important in influencing the extent of the pass-through and its 
behaviour over time.  
6. Asymmetry in ERPT 
 
The existing literature suggests that the extent of pass-through is asymmetric and depends on the 
direction  of  the  change  (depreciation  or  appreciation)  as  well  as  on  the  size  of  the  change.  The 
economic theories have identified various circumstances that could generate asymmetric exchange rate 
pass-through.  
Capacity constraints: According to Knetter (1994), if the foreign exporter is facing binding quantity 
constraints in distribution net works, then an appreciation of the importing nation’s currency may lead 
to lower pass-through than depreciation. As the capacity constraint limits expansion of sales, they 
discourage the lowering of export price that an appreciation of the importing market’s currency might 
normally induce. On the other hand, capacity constraint does not have an effect on the increase of P a g e  | 89 
 
import price that depreciation would normally induce. The import price in the destination market could 
still rise even if the foreign exporter attempted to absorb the impact of depreciation by adjusting its 
profit margin. Thus, the extent of pass-through is higher for depreciation than appreciation.  
Market share: If the foreign exporter has some market share objective, then an appreciation in the 
currency of the destination market might cause higher pass-through than depreciation. Depreciation in 
the currency of the importing country  will cause the foreign exporter to offset the potential price 
increase, by reducing their mark-up, to keep the importing nation’s import price stable. However, in 
the case of appreciation, exports in the destination nation will become cheaper and will create incentive 
for the exporting firms to either maintain their prices or to reduce them in order to increase their 
market, hence, resulting in higher ERPT (Pollard and Coughlin, 2003).  
Production Switching: Input switching by the foreign exporter provides another asymmetry in pass-
through. An appreciation in the importing country’s currency will cause the foreign exporter to use 
domestic inputs, and the pass-through will depend  solely on the elasticity of the mark-up. In the case 
of depreciation, foreign exporter uses inputs from currency depreciating currency, and the pass-through 
is zero (Webber, 2000). 
 Menu costs: Foreign exporter also show asymmetric response to the size of the change in the exchange 
rate due to conditions like the presence of menu costs and the type of price invoicing followed. Given 
the fact that menu costs are like fixed costs, firms are expected to adjust prices only if the change in 
exchange rate is above a threshold. When the invoice currency is the foreign exporter’s currency, a 
small change in exchange rate does not make it worthwhile for the exporter to alter the price of its 
product in its own currency due to the menu costs. Hence, a small change in exchange rate does not 
impact the invoice price of imports in foreign currency, leading to a change in import prices in the 
domestic market of the importing country to the extent of the change in exchange rate. However, if 
there is a large change in the exchange rate, given the menu costs, it becomes worthwhile for the 
foreign exporter to change the invoice price in its own currency. By doing so, the foreign exporter 
absorbs part of the change in the domestic price of the importing market that resulted from large 
change in exchange rate. Therefore, when the invoice currency is the foreign exporter’s currency, the 
pass-through is higher when exchange rate changes are small (Pollard and Coughlin, 2003). 
Furthermore, if the invoice currency is the importing country’s currency, a small exchange rate change 
will also have little effect on the invoice price due to the menu costs. Thus, there will be little or zero 
pass-through in the invoice price of the importing country’s currency. However, the price received by 
the exporter in its own currency will vary to the extent of the change in exchange rate. In the case of a 
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currency in order to maintain their profit, thus leading to higher pass-through (Pollard and Coughlin, 
2003).  
Number of empirical studies has confirmed the presence of asymmetry in the impact of exchange rate 
changes in domestic prices. For example, Mann(1986) who examined the pass-through in US using 
aggregate data, have reported higher pass-through during the dollar’s appreciation than during the 
dollar’s depreciation, though the difference was statistically insignificant
55. Likewise, Khundrakpam 
(2007),  in  his  pass-through  study  for  India,  has  found  higher  pass-through  for  appreciation  than 
depreciation. In contrary, in another aggregate data-based study for seven Asian countries, Webber 
(2000) found higher pass-through during depreciation than the period of appreciation. Higher pass-
through during depreciation was also found by Dobrynskaya and Levando (2005) in their study for 
Russia. 
Studies at the industry level like Goldberg (1995) for the US automobile industry, Kadiyali (1997) for 
the US imports of photographic films, and Olivei (2002) for 34 US import industry, have reported 
higher pass-through for depreciation than appreciation. In another study for US industries, Pollard and 
Coughlin (2004) found asymmetry in pass-through in half of the 30 industries considered, with the 
direction  of  the  asymmetry  varies  across  industries
56.  In  a range  of  industries across  a  sample  of 
European countries, Gil-Pareja (2000) found that the degree and direction of asymmetry varied across 
industries and countries. 
Studies with respect to asymmetry based on the size of change in exchange rate include Ohno (1989) 
who found the Japanese export prices to vary more with large exchange rate changes than small. In 
their study for 30 US industries, Pollard and Coughlin (2004) have found that most of the firms adjust 
their prices when there are large exchange rate changes. In contrast, Khundrakpam (2007) found higher 
pass-through for small than large exchange rate changes in India. 
7. Exchange Rate and Inflation Rate 
Apart  from  its  implication  for  external  sector,  financial  stability,  and  the  functioning  of  foreign 
exchange  markets,  exchange  rate  fluctuations  have  as  well  some  implications  for  welfare  of  the 
society. To the extent that changes in exchange rate are passed on to domestic prices, changes in 
exchange rates are expected to affect inflation rate. The assumed link between changes in exchange 
rates and inflation rate, under the PPP theory, implies that the devaluation comes with important costs 
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that necessarily must be factored into the monetary policy. These costs normally come in the form of 
higher inflationary pressures as depreciating exchange rates would tend to raise prices, regardless of 
the stance  of  the  macroeconomic  policy  (Kahn, 1987)
57. Accordingly,  the exchange  rate  could  be 
potentially important under any policy regime that to some extent concerns about inflation, but it is 
likely to be of particular relevance when monetary policy is focused on controlling inflation (Lafleche 
1996, Ho McCauley 2003).  
7.1 Direct Effect on Inflation 
Changes in exchange rates can generally affect inflation rate directly and indirectly (figure 1). The 
importance of both of these channels is assumed to increase with an increase in the openness of the 
economy  (Hufner  and  Schroder,  2002).  The  direct  channel  operates  through  the  external  sector, 
specifically through the relative share of imports in the consumer basket (Lafleche, 1996). Exchange 
rate depreciation will raise the prices of imported final goods. As producers and importers raise their 
prices in line with the increase in imports, the depreciation will eventually get translated into producers 
and consumers prices, which in turn may lead into higher inflation.  
7.2 Indirect Effect on Inflation 
On the other hand, the indirect effect of ERPT can operates through different channels like changes in 
the composition of demand or in the level of aggregate demand and wages, and inflation expectations 
(Lafleche  1996,  Taylor  2000,  Ho  McCauley  2003). The channel  through  inflation  expectations  is 
originally suggested, as explained earlier in section 5.2, in the hypothesis of Taylor (2000), according 
to which the pass-through is highest when changes in exchange rate are perceived to be of persistent 
nature and prices adjust because of the expectations of the public.  
Another channel is through the pressure of increased aggregate demand on domestically produced 
goods. As the exchange rate depreciates, domestic goods become relatively cheaper in international 
markets, as a results exports and aggregate demand for domestic goods will rise. In the short run, such 
an increase in the aggregate demand will induce an increase in the price level and output, however, in 
the long-run as real wages rises to their initial equilibrium output will decrease and prices will remain 
at their new level (Kahn, 1987).  
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Similarly, the indirect effect can also manifestate through the pressure on the supply of goods. For 
example, assuming supply rigidity, if exchange rate depreciates and as a result exports increased, the 
supply of the same commodities for meeting domestic demand may appear short. Consequently, that 
will put higher pressures on prices. Stated differently, with unchanged domestic demand, if domestic 
supply declines due to higher exports, that may lead to higher inflation (Al Raisi and Pattanaik, 2005).  
Figure 1:  
The pass-through from an exchange rate depreciation to consumer prices. 
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Further, according to Al Raisi and Pattanaik (2005), under some special conditions, the direct channel 
may dominate the indirect channel. For example, when the import-intensity of exports is high for an 
economy and when the direct channel can results into faster adjustment in wages and prices in the 
domestic  economy.  In  contrast,  the  direct  channel  may  prove  to  be  weak,  particularly  in  more 
diversified economies, if depreciation can enhance domestic production of local substitutes, and if 
higher  prices  of  imported  goods  gave  rise  to  some  reduction  in  demand.  Accordingly,  the  direct 
channel is  stronger in  small and less  diversified  economies relative  to large  and  more  diversified 
economies.  
7.3 The importance of analysing ERPT into Inflation Rate 
There are quite number of reasons to justify the importance of analysing the degree of ERPT into 
inflation rate or generally including information content from exchange rate, as an external element, in 
analysing and forecasting inflation.  
The extent of pass-through to consumer prices is assumed to influence central bankers’ forecasts of the 
future path of inflation, a key element in the conduct of monetary policy (Bailliu and Bouakez, 2004). 
Successful implementation of monetary policy indicates that the central bank has good understanding 
of inflation dynamics and also relatively good at predicting the future path of inflation. In an economy, 
where  inflation  forecasts  are  based  on  estimates  of  ERPT,  regular  assessment  of  the  effect  of 
movement of exchange rate on consumer prices is therefore considered very important. If for some 
reason such assessment was bypassed or neglected, that could lead to an error in inflation forecasts. For 
example, if due to some reasons (higher degree of market segmentation) the extent of pass-through 
declined and such decline was not taken into account while carrying inflation forecasts, these forecasts 
could be overestimating the effect of movements in the exchange rate on inflation.   
 Further, despite the fact that the exchange rate regime is no longer the nominal anchor for many of the 
emerging countries in the wake of the financial crises in the 1990s, the variability/fluctuations of the 
exchange rate continue to pose an important implications for many other macroeconomic variables 
including inflation Ito et al. (2005). In their study on the role of exchange rate on inflation targeting 
regimes, McCauley and HO (2003) found the emerging markets to be relatively more exposed to 
exchange  rate  fluctuations  than  industrial  economies.  The  authors  also  reported  that  even  under 
inflation targeting regimes, the exchange rate considerations/management can be expected to play a 
more prominent role in emerging markets economies, given the considerable influence of the exchange 
rate  on  inflation  in  these  economies.  Furthermore,  the  authors  have  concluded  that  the  costs  of 
exchange rate movements and policy attention thereto are not only relevant to emerging markets, given P a g e  | 95 
 
the recent experience of some of the industrial economies like Australia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the 
G3.  
The continuation and importance of exchange rate management in reality even under a pure floating 
regimes or regimes with inflation targeting have also been evidenced by other studies like Levi Yeyati 
and  Sturzenegger  (1999)  and  Hausmann  et  al  (2000).  These  studies  have  found  that  number  of 
countries, including industrial as well as emerging and developing, which are officially classified as 
floating regimes are in fact intervening irregularly to limit the movements of exchange rate either 
through  foreign  reserves  or  domestic interest  rates. The high  level  of ERPT and  the  existence of 
important currency mismatches in the economy are viewed among the primary factors that may lead 
the Central Bank to limit exchange rate volatility (Hausmann et al, 2000). Furthermore, Ball (1998), in 
his study of optimal monetary policy rule under open economy, has theoretically argued that in an open 
economy framework, purely inflation targeting is dangerous due to the effects of changes in exchange 
rate on inflation through imports. Ball (1998) had suggested, as an optimal policy rule, to replace 
inflation on the right hand side of Taylor rule with long term inflation that takes into account the 
transitory effects of exchange rate fluctuations. In practice, Edwards (2006) have found some evidence 
for exchange rate management, when conducting monetary policy, in inflation targeting countries that 
are characterized with an unstable inflation.  
The importance of exchange rate on inflation had also been emphasized implicitly and explicitly in 
many official report and studies that tried to explain the low inflation rates in many countries during 
the 1990s. External factors such as the disinflationary effect of exchange rate depreciation and lower 
import prices that were in part induced by the financial crises in East Asia during 1997-98, have been 
among  the  most  cited  reasons.  That  clearly  reflects  the  importance  of  the  extent  of  impact  from 
exchange rate and import prices on domestic inflation (McCarthy, 2000). Such importance has been 
explicitly cited in number of official reports of central banks like the Bank of England (BOE) and the 
European Central Bank (ECB). For example, in its Inflation Report dated May 2000, the BOE has 
stated  
“The sterling prices of imported manufactures have continued to decline, reflecting the appreciation of 
the exchange rate over the past year” (p. 33). 
Furthermore, the ECB has cited in many instances in its monetary policy monthly report dated May 
2000 their concern of the inflationary impacts of the depreciation of the euro exchange rate on the 
Harmonized  Index  of  Consumer  Prices (HICP).  In  fact,  the  depreciation  of  the  nominal  effective 
exchange rate of the euro was partly behind raising the short-run interest rate (tightening monetary P a g e  | 96 
 
policy) in that time
58. Also the annual reports for the year 2007 of the central banks of the GCC 
countries have blamed the depreciation of their nominal effective exchange rate among other external 
sources that participated in the recent rising inflation rate in these economies. Moreover, in its inflation 
report for 2006, the Bank of Israel has blamed the depreciation of exchange rate for the deviation of the 
annual inflation from its target (Eckstein and Soffer, 2008). 
According to Ito et al. (2005) the degree of ERPT is assumed to influence the recovery process of the 
country from a financial crisis. Higher degree of pass through following currency depreciation may 
results in the loss of competitiveness through inflation, with sustained level of depreciated nominal 
exchange rate, thus, making economic recovery relatively slow. Furthermore, any increase in domestic 
inflation following currency depreciation may lead to financial instability that may lead to out-flow of 
international capital, or a sudden change of investors' sentiment, which in turn may result into collapse 
of monetary regimes (e.g. financial crises of South East Asian countries during 1997-98). As a result, 
whether there is a high ERPT to inflation or not has significant implication to the course of economic 
recovery.  
Furthermore, an important theoretical result that has recently emerged in the NOEM literature is that  
analyzing the degree of ERPT into inflation is considered essential in evaluating the relevance and 
feasibility of the exchange rate regime of a country. From the degree of ERPT, one could infer the 
relevant and optimal monetary policy of the economy. For example, according to Devereux and Engel 
(2003), lower degree of ERPT indicates the presence of LCP and accordingly fixed exchange rates are 
preferred because flexible exchange rates cannot achieve the optimal relative price adjustment. On the 
other hand, significant degree of ERPT indicates the presence of PCP, in which case flexible exchange 
rate is an optimal monetary policy (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995). Moreover, in case of a conventional 
peg, whereby a country has to follow the monetary policy of the country to which its currency is 
pegged, say the US. Accordingly, the interest and inflation rates have to be similar to that in the US. If 
for instance, after a depreciation of the US dollar in front of the currencies of the trading partners of the 
pegging  country,  the country  failed  to  maintain a  moderate  inflation  rate  (  due  primarily  to  high 
ERPT), then it would risk its export competitiveness in the medium run (Ito et al. 2005).  
Also the majority of the available studies of ERPT on the developing countries emphasize the role of 
macroeconomic conditions due to the common view that in smaller and more open economies with 
relatively high share of traded goods, high import, and limited local substitutes, the effect of ERPT into 
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aggregate domestic prices is expected to be greater (Ghosh and Rajan, 2007). Accordingly, as the 
majority of the developing counties are highly trade dependant, they are potentially susceptible to 
ERPT into domestic consumer prices. 
 Finally,  very  recent  hypothesis  of  Taylor  2000  and  the  subsequent  relevant  empirical  studies 
(Baqueiro et al 2003, Gagnon and Ihrig 2004, Frankel et al. 2005, Choudri and Hakura 2006, Mwase 
2006, Edwards 2006)) on the link between the ERPT and the monetary policy of the central bank 
further  emphasize  the  importance  of  analyzing  the  macroeconomic  relationship  of  the  ERPT. 
According to this strand of the literature, stable inflation and macroeconomic conditions should lead to 
lower implications of monetary expansion including devaluation of exchange rate.  
In view of the above advanced arguments, assessing the extent of the ERPT into inflation rate is 
important, given potential policy implications such as its effects on central bankers’ inflation forecasts, 
the recovery process of the economy, and optimal choice of exchange rate regime and monetary policy 
regime. 
7.4 Why Inflation Rate might Exhibit Lower Response than Import Prices to Changes in Exchanges 
Rates? 
 It is generally acknowledged that Inflation rate, as measured by the CPI (consumer price index), reacts 
lower than import prices to changes in exchange rates. In other word, ERPT into CPI is normally less 
than ERPT into import prices. Furthermore, in some case, the reaction of the CPI is lower than the 
share of imports in the consumption basket (Cunningham and Haldane, 2002, Bailliu and Bouakez, 
2004). The previously explained determinants of exchange rate pass-through into domestic prices may 
also be applied to explain the incomplete ERPT into inflation rate.  However, other factors can be 
stitched from the theoretical literature to further understand the lower response of consumer prices as 
compared to imports and producer prices to changes in exchange rate. Generally, these reasons are 
primarily related to some microeconomic factors like the composition of the CPI basket, distribution 
costs of the tradable goods, availability of domestic substitutes (Burstein et al, 2002, Corsetti and 
Dedola, 2005).  
The CPI of a country is generally a weighted average of its consumed tradable and non-tradable goods 
and services
59. Non-tradable goods and services are normally produced locally and priced in domestic 
currency, hence such items are assumed not be influenced by changes in exchange rates. As a result, 
the presence of non-tradable items in the CPI basket lower the response of the inflation rate to changes 
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in exchange rates. The larger the weight of non-tradable items compared to tradable items in the CPI 
basket, the lower the reaction of inflation rate is expected to be (Burstein et al (2002), Ho McCauley 
(2003)).  
Furthermore,  constructing  the  CPI  involves  using  consumer  prices  (retail)  that  normally  include 
distribution costs (transportation, wholesaling, and retailing). Specifically, the price of tradable goods 
includes costs for some distributional services
60. The presence of distribution costs is hypothesised to 
lower the response of tradable good prices at the consumer level to changes in exchange rates as the 
cost  of  distribution  services  are  large  and  may  dominate  the  cost  of  physical  tradable  goods. 
Accordingly,  changes  in  exchange  rates  will  have  smaller  impact  on  the  consumer  price  index 
(Burstein et al, 2002, Engel (2003), Corsetti and Dedola, 2005).  
Additionally, some of the locally produced goods are produced as inferior substitutes for imported 
commodities
61. Since the producer price of these kinds of tradable goods depends mainly on local 
economic  conditions,  they  are  assumed  not  to  adjust  proportionally  to  changes  in  exchange  rate 
(Burstein et al, 2002). However, that does not entirely role out the response of domestically produced 
goods from movements in exchange rate, a fact that further explains why the rate of pass-through to 
consumer prices need not to be equal to the share of import prices in the consumption basket even if 
the pass-through to import prices is complete (Bailliu and Bouakez, 2004). Furthermore, it is worth 
emphasizing that the reaction of prices of locally produced goods to movement in exchange rate is a 
function to factors like substitutability with imports, adjustment costs of domestic prices, and nominal 
wage stickiness (Bailliu and Bouakez, 2004).  
A related argument is also brought by Hahn (2003), who measured the pass-through of exchange rate 
along  the  distribution  chain  (from  import  prices,  producer  prices,  and  consumer  prices).  Hahn 
explained the decline in the size of pass-through along the distribution chain on the basis of two main 
factors namely the fraction of traded goods in the different stages of the distribution chain and the 
accumulation over larger number of incomplete pass-through stages. As the fraction of traded goods, 
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which are more likely to be affected by exchange rate shocks, tend to decrease along the distribution 
chain, the response of the consumer prices to exchange rate changes would be expected to be lower 
than that of pervious stages (importer and producer prices), where the share of traded goods is assumed 
to  be  higher.  Also,  the  accumulation  of  incomplete  pass-through  over  the  different  stages  would 
basically imply a decline in the pass-through along the distribution chain. Moreover, the adjustment 
speed/lags in consumer prices to exchange rate changes can generally be attributed to the issue of price 
stickiness which is assumed to results in the accumulation of adjustment lags at different stages in the 
distribution chain (Hahn, 2003). 
Furthermore, inflation is normally, defined as the persistent increase in the general price level of goods 
and services.  This pragmatic definition of inflation clearly illustrates that inflation occurs as a results 
of price increases that persist over an extended period of time. So once and for all increase in the price 
level should not lead to inflation
62. On the other hand, persistent increase in prices can occur only if 
aggregate demand continuous to grow faster than supply. Since it is generally known/evidenced that 
money supply is the main determinant of growth in aggregate demand, according to the monetary 
theory of inflation depreciation in exchange rate will only lead to inflation if the demand for higher 
nominal money balances, due to lower real money because of higher prices in goods and services on 
the account of depreciation, has been accommodated (Hafer,1989). Otherwise, depreciation will only 
results in changes in relative prices but not the general price level (CPI). The point to be made is that 
CPI unresponsiveness is not because of incomplete ERPT into the tradable. Rather, it is because central 
banks  are  so  good  at  containing  price  pressures  that  they  take  actions  that  immediately  isolate 
aggregate prices from exchange rate induced pressures (Campa and Minguez, 2005).   
Furthermore, relevant to the proceeding argument is the degree of slack in the economy as another 
potential determinant of pass-through from exchange rate to consumer prices (Takhtamanova, 2010). 
As mentioned previously, during booms episodes firms are more likely to change prices rather than 
adjusting  profit  margin,  hence  leading  to  higher  consumer  prices  and  eventually  to  higher  CPI 
inflation.  
Finally, institutional actions in the form of price regulations of essential products and foreign exchange 
controls may distort the pass-through into consumer prices (Choudhri and khan, 2002). Since under 
such policies, the measured values would not reflect the accurate market values, the corresponding 
ERPT at the consumer level would be distorted. Furthermore, the pass-through into inflation can also 
be  lowered  through  some  institutional  factors  that  can  enhance  global  competition  and  reduce 
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producers’ pricing power. For example, in their study on the Euro Area, Campa and Minguez (2005) 
have argued that the creation and expansion of the European Union and the common market has led to 
more competition and lowered pass-through.   
8. Empirical Literature on the Pass-through of Exchange Rate to Consumer price inflation  
8.1 Cross-country evidence from developed countries  
Due to its policy implications, the issue of ERPT has been the focus of a burgeoning number of 
empirical studies. The majority of the studies of ERPT have primarily focused on traded good prices 
such as import or export prices and there are only a few papers available which deal with the analysis 
of  pass-through  into  consumer  prices  (Darvas,  2001,  Takhtamanova,  2010).  However,  as  the 
economists  have  realized  the  importance  of  exchange  rate  fluctuations  on  inflation  and  economic 
activities, many recent studies have started to incorporate in their estimation of ERPT the aggregate 
consumer prices as it is more relevant for monetary policy.  
However, most of the analytical frameworks that underlie the empirical estimation of the influence of 
exchange rate changes on aggregate consumer prices were based on microeconomic foundations. The 
common standard specification found in the literature is basically based on the pricing behaviour of 
exporting firms. Drawing from the literature (e.g. Bailliu and Fujii, 2004), a profit maximizing problem 
for an exporting firm is: 
) ( max
1 Q C PQ s - =
- p             (16) 
 
Where π denotes profits in the exporting firm’s currency, S is the exchange rate of domestic currency 
per unit of foreign currency, P is price in domestic currency, C is the cost function in foreign currency 
(exporting firm’s currency), and Q is the quantity demanded. The first order condition for equation 
(16) is: 
m q sC P =                 (17) 
Where   q C  represents marginal cost of production and µ is the mark-up of price over marginal cost. 
Equation (17) states that the domestic price of imported good depends on the exchange rate, marginal 
cost, and mark-up of the exporting firm. Furthermore, changes in marginal cost is mainly subject to 
changes in the cost of local input (in the exporting country), whereas changes in the mark-up are 
assumed to be mainly affected by the demand pressure in the importing country. Accordingly, it is 
necessary to take into account the movements in other determinants of the price when measuring the P a g e  | 101 
 
pass-through in order to properly isolate the effects of exchange rate on prices. Thus, a reduced from 
for the price equation can be drawn as follows:  
t t t t t Y P S P e b a a a + + + + = 3
*
2 1 0           (18) 
Where 
* P  represents the marginal costs of the foreign firm and Y  represents the demand conditions in 
the importing country. Equation 18 defines the exchange rate pass-through as the partial elasticity of 
domestic price with respect to the exchange rate.  According to Goldberg and Knetter  (1996) and 
Bache (2007), variants of equation (18) are widely applied to estimate the pass-through.  
Menon  (1995)  made  an  extensive  survey  for  around  46  empirical  studies  on  the  pass-through  of 
exchange  rate.  The  first  major  finding  in  Menon’  survey  is  that  the  majority  of  the  studies  have 
concluded incomplete pass-through
63. Even in those studies (around 6) which reported a complete or 
close to complete pass-through, Menon mentioned that the results of these studies were associated with 
longer lags in the transmission of exchange rate changes to prices. Second major finding in Menon 
Survey was that the majority of the studies were focused on large economies namely the US, Japan, 
and Germany, with fewer studies on small open economies. This was also reported by Goldberg and 
Knetter, 1996. 
Other  major  findings  include  different  degree  of  pass-through  across  countries  and  products  and 
similarly  across  studies  for  a  given  country.  Two  main  factors  were  generally  used  to  justify  the 
diversity in the degree of the pass-through across countries and they are the openness and size of a 
country. Furthermore, Menon has attributed the difference in the results across studies for a country to 
be mainly from differences in methodology, model specification and variable selection. Menon has 
also  found  from  his  survey  that  the  pass-through  relationships  have  remained  stable  over  time. 
However, this last result has recently been challenged as we will see here later
64. Subsequent studies to 
Menon have tried to overcome some of the drawbacks in previous studies (e.g. expanding the analysis 
to include other industrial and non-industrial countries, introducing system techniques such as VARs in 
the estimation of ERPT as well as employing panel analysis). 
 
                                                           
63 This was also confirmed by the survey of Goldberg and Knetter (1996), who reported a range of around 60% 
pass-through from various studies.  
64 Menon had also found that the majority of the studies of his survey have used OLS techniques without taking 
into account the time series properties of the data. As a result of that, the estimation of these studies is under 
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Amirtano et al (1997) have used quarterly data during the period from 1966 to 1993 to measure the 
effects of exchange rate changes on consumer price inflation in seven industrial countries (France, 
Sweden, Italy, UK, Spain, Japan, and Australia) using cross-country regression. The authors found 
very significant effect for exchange rate depreciation on both consumer and wholesale price indices. 
However, the extent of pass-through, albeit less than 100 percent for both indices, was about 4-5 times 
higher in the later index. The degree of pass-through of depreciations of nominal exchange rate on 
consumer price inflation and wholesale price index were 0.2 and 0.8, respectively. Amirtano et al 
(1997)  found  the  restrictive  demand  policies  (monetary  and  fiscal  policies),  and  policy  of  wage 
moderation, that followed the exchange rate depreciation, as the main factors for low affect of the large 
depreciation on inflation in Europe  during 1992-93.  
The effect of the restrictive demand policies was also confirmed in the study of De Grauwe and Tullio 
(1994),  who  have  focused  as  well  on  the  inflationary  effect  of  the  depreciations  of  1992-93.  De 
Grauwe  and  Tullio  (1994)  have  concluded  that  the  low  acceleration  of  inflation  after  the  large 
depreciations was mainly influenced by the high real interest rate. However, the estimated degree of 
pass-through in this study was relatively higher; it was on average between 0.3-0.4. Amirtano et al 
(1997) have attributed the difference in the coefficients of pass-through between the two studies to a 
longer transmission lag (two years) in the estimation of De Grauw and Tullio (1994) compared to the 
one in their study (less than one year). Other studies that offered evidence for the influence of demand 
policies on the extent of pass-through include Murgasova (1996), Gordon (1999), Parsley and Popper 
(1998) and Dobrynskaya and Levando (2008). 
In a very recent study, Takhtamanova (2010) used an open economy Philips curve model to estimate 
the short and long term pass-through from exchange rate to inflation in 14 OECD countries during two 
periods; 1980-1989 and 1990-2007. In the first period the author found an average pass-through of 
about 0.1% in the short run and 0.45% in the long run following a 1% appreciation in the exchange 
rate. In the second period the pass-through coefficients were insignificants in both the short run as well 
as the long run. According to Takhtamanova, the weak link between changes in exchange rates and 
CPI inflation is caused in part by the low inflation environment, particularly in the second period of the 
estimation. The low inflation environment is assumed to encourage less update of prices by firms in the 
economy, and that in turn results in low pass-through to domestic prices. 
Further, from methodical prospective, most of the earlier studies used single equation technique that 
dominated the estimation of pass-through in the past two decades. In pass-through regression a price 
index (import price index, consumer price index, or producer price index) is regressed against the 
exchange  rate  plus  other  hypothesised  determinants  of  prices  (e.g.  equation  18).  The  estimated P a g e  | 103 
 
coefficient of the exchange rate variable represents the exchange rate pass-through, which in other 
word defined as the elasticity of prices to changes in exchange rate.  
However,  an  alternative  technique,  which  is  getting  increasingly  popular,  is  the  system  approach 
(Mwase, 2006, Bache, 2007)). The major difference in structural vector autoregressions (VARs) is that 
they  do  not  a  priori  assume  any  exogenous  variable  and  treats  each  variable  as  endogenous. 
Accordingly, each endogenous variable becomes a function of all lagged endogenous and exogenous 
variables in the system. Most the VARs used to estimate the pass-through typically include a nominal 
exchange rate variables, one or several set of price indices (typically, import prices, producer prices, 
and consumer prices), plus some other  additional variables like oil prices, output gap, money and 
interest rates.  The impulse responses analyses from VAR provide the degree and speed of pass-
through  from  shocks  to  price  indices.  VAR  is  also  used  to  analyse  the  importance  of  different 
macroeconomic shocks on domestic prices.  
For example, McCarthy (2000) used a VAR model to estimate the pass-through of exchange rate 
fluctuations along the distribution chain (import price, producer price, and consumer price) for nine 
industrial countries during the period 1976-1998.   McCarthy found the response of consumer price to 
changes in exchange rate to be modest in most of analysed countries. The impulse response of import 
price to changes in exchange rate was higher than that of producer price and consumer price. McCarthy 
had also used a variance decomposition analysis to investigate the importance of exchange rate shocks 
in explaining price variances in the examined countries. The variance decomposition indicated that the 
role  of  exchange rate  shocks  in  explaining  inflation  fluctuation  is relatively  modest.  Furthermore, 
McCarthy (2000), found the extent of pass-through to be positively related to the import share of 
domestic demand and the persistence of exchange rate changes and negatively with the exchange rate 
volatility. 
More recently, Hufner and Schroder (2002) applied co-integration analysis and vector error correction 
model (VEC) to estimate the pass-through into consumer prices in some European industrial countries 
for the period 1981-2001
65. Their estimation also included other stages of the distribution chain (Import 
and producer prices). The authors found positive significant response from consumer prices to changes 
in exchange rate, with the extent and speed of such response to differ across the analysed countries. 
The estimated pass-through from exchange rate to consumer prices ranges between 0.07-0.12 after one 
year and 0.08-0.18 after two years. Similar to McCarthy (2000), the authors also observed that the 
degree of pass-through from exchange rate changes declines along the distribution chain with the 
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largest effect on import prices. From their variance decomposition analysis, the authors found that 
external shocks from exchange rate explain large variation in import prices, while this impact declines 
along the distribution chain with the lowest impact on consumer prices
66.  
More recent study on the euro area was carried out by Faruqee (2006), who used VAR approach to 
investigate exchange rate pass-through in a set of prices along the pricing chain, during the period 
1990-2002. Similar to McCarthy (2000) and Hufner and Schroder (2002), Faruqee found very low 
response by consumer prices (around zero in the short-run and 0.02 in the long-run) to shocks in 
exchange rate, and the extent of pass-through is higher in producer and trading prices, with the highest 
degree of pass-through is reflected in the euro area import prices (near unity). The author has attributed 
the  difference  in  the  extent  of  pass-through  in  import  prices  and  consumer  prices  to  factors  like 
nominal rigidity, invoicing currency by firms, pricing to market behaviour, and the presence of local 
distribution costs. 
8.2 ERPT in Developing countries 
Generally, the analysis of pass-through of exchange rate in small open economies, specially developing 
ones, have had a fewer share compared to the large and more developed countries (Frankel, 2005). 
Indeed,  hundreds  of  theoretical  and  empirical  studies  analyzing  the  pass-through  issue  have  been 
published in developed countries but far fewer in developing countries (Darvas, 2001). Increasing 
attention, albeit relatively steadily, to developing countries was rekindled recently. Particularly, in the 
wake  of  the  large  devaluations  in  South  East Asia,  Latin  America,  and  other  emerging  countries 
between 1994 and 2001, number of studies were undertaken to investigate why large depreciations did 
not materialize into significant price increases although the traditional view states that the pass-through 
is relatively rapid and complete in small or less developed economies (Frankel, et al, 2005). However, 
studies on developing countries have focused on episodes of sudden large devaluations (e.g. currency 
crises) with less attention to analyse the pass-through in economies that are generally stable but are 
experiencing  a  sustained depreciation.  Furthermore,  available  studies  on small  and  less  developed 
countries are relatively small in number (compared to the developed-countries-based studies) so to 
                                                           
66 Hufner and Schroder (2002) have also tried to derive an estimate of the pass-through effects for the whole 
euro  area  by  using  Harmonized  Index  of  Consumer  Prices  (HICP).  They  found  that  on  average  10  percent 
depreciation in the effective euro exchange rate leads to an increase of 0.4 percentage points in the euro area 
inflation, as measured by the HICP, after one year. The total impact converges to around 8 percent after three 
years. Nonetheless, in similar study of the effect of changes in the effective exchange rate of the Euro on the 
HICP, Hahn (2003) reported twice as large as the above reported by Hufner and Schroder (2002). He found, 
using a VAR model, that one percent appreciation in the Euro effective exchange rate is passed on HICP by 0.08 
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draw a conclusion on the extent and behaviour of pass-through in each of these countries, or for the 
developing economies in general. Also, large part of the studies was focused on particular regions like 
South East Asia and Latin America. Studies on other important economic regions like Africa and the 
Middle  East  are  rare.  For  example,  the  countries  of  the  Gulf  Cooperation  Council  have  recently 
experienced a significant decline in the exchange rate of their currencies that are pegged to the US 
dollar, which in turn has depreciated over 40 percent, since 2002, against the currencies of major 
trading partners of the GCC countries
67. The depreciation of the currencies of the GCC members is 
likely to feed into higher inflation through higher cost of imports, which constitute very significant 
share in the GDP of each of these economies. As a result, analysing the pass-through from exchange 
rate  to  inflation  is  of  particular  interest  to  the  monetary  policy  of  the  central  banks  of  the  GCC 
countries. However, to my best knowledge to date, there is only one study (Al Raisi and Pattanaik, 
2005) that have analysed the pass-through of exchange rate into inflation rate in the region and it was 
solely on Oman.  
Studies that have focused on developing countries include Mihaljek and Klau (2001) who applied 
ordinary least squares procedure to 13 countries. Their estimates of exchange rate pass-through ranged 
from  0.1  to  0.84.  Their  major  finding  is  that  changes  in  exchange  rate  are  more  strongly  and 
contemporaneously  correlated  with  inflation  than  are  changes  in  import  prices
68.  This  finding  is 
considered in conflict with other studies (e.g. McCarthy, 2000) that emphasized the importance of 
exchange rate to import prices. The authors have as well reported a decline in the extent of pass-
through during the 1990s and they have attributed such decline to the more stable macroeconomic 
conditions and structural reforms implemented in emerging economies. 
In a contemporaneous study but with only four European Union candidate countries
69 Darvas (2001) 
analysed  ERPT  into  consumer  prices  over  the  period  1993-2000.  Darvas  had  reported  that  in  an 
exchange  rate  targeting  environment  a  change  in  the  exchange  rate  might  be  regarded  as  more 
permanent than in a floating regime, implying higher pass-through.  He has also identified a negative 
link between volatility of exchange rate and the extent of pass-through, which suggests that floating 
regimes  with  lower  volatility  can  yield  a  higher  exchange  rate  pass-through.  The  authors  have 
concluded that his findings are neither new nor surprising, but important as present thinking among 
many international economists tend to disregard the possible role of the exchange rate in curbing 
inflation in small open economies.  
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In a broader and with diversified sample of countries, Goldfajn and Werlang (2000) analyzed the effect 
from depreciation to inflation using panel data framework. Their study covered the period from 1980 to 
1998 and included 71 countries from different major regions namely America, Africa, Europe, Asia, 
and Oceania. The pass-through coefficient on inflation was found to be significant and increasing over 
time, with its peak at 12 months. However, the magnitude of the pass-through was smaller than one 
and it ranged between about 0.2 and 0.7. When the authors divided the sample geographically and 
extended the period up to 18 months, they found the highest pass-through in Latin America (1.2) and 
Asia (0.8) the lowest in Oceania (0.2) and Europe (0.5). The authors have also estimated the extent of 
the pass-through after dividing the countries according to their social economic conditions. The pass-
through was found to be almost complete (0.9) in emerging market after 12 months, while it was only 
around 0.6 and 0.5 in developed and other developing countries, respectively. Final classification by 
the authors was based on OECD members and non-members. This later classification had in fact 
confirmed the estimation results of the authors in their earlier classification as the pass-through, in 12 
months, was much lower for OECD members (0.2) than non-members (0.8)
70.  
Further, Goldfajn and Werlang (2000) have found the extent of misalignment of real exchange rate 
(RER), initial inflation, trade openness, and the cyclical component of output (GDP deviation) to be the 
main determinants of pass-through. Nonetheless, misalignment in real exchange rate was found to be 
particularly important for the pass-through coefficient in the American region (mainly developing) and 
the initial inflation was particularly important for European countries (industrial). The importance of 
factors like misalignment of RER, initial inflation, and GDP deviation were also reported as main 
determinants of the extent of ERPT in the study of Borensztein and De Gregorio (1999). 
In a relatively more recent study that emphasizes the importance of exchange rate management under 
inflation targeting framework, particularly in emerging economies, Ho and McCauley (2003) argue 
that lower-income economies are expected to show a stronger linkage between the exchange rates and 
                                                           
70Choudhri and Hakura (2006) have as well estimated the pass-through coefficients for the same sample of 
countries (71) in Goldfajn and Werlang (2000) but with different classification over the period 1979-2000. They 
classified the countries into three groups namely low, moderate, and high inflation, based on average inflation 
rate. The authors found positive significant relationship between exchange rate and inflation and the magnitude 
of such relation, albeit less then unity, increases over time for all the three groups.   The estimated average 
degree  of  pass-through  coefficient  for  the  group  of  countries  classified  as  low  inflation  countries  (mainly 
industrial countries) is 0.08, 0.14, and 0.16 after the first, fourth, and twentieth quarters, respectively. For the 
set of countries that are classified as moderate inflation countries the average pass-through elasticity is 0.19, 
0.33, and 0.35 after the first, fourth, and twentieth quarters. Finally, for the high inflation countries the results 
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domestic prices and that a history of high inflation accentuates linkage.  In contrast to other studies, Ho 
and McCauley (2003) do not find a significant link between the extent of pass-through and the degree 
of openness. They have explained that by putting forward the argument that the overall degree of 
openness is by no means a full reflection of the share of the imported goods in consumer price index. 
Accordingly,  large  and  relatively  close  countries  may  have  large  ERPT  if  their  imports  are  final 
consumer goods. The authors also highlight the role of past currency crisis as another factor for the 
relatively high ERPT in emerging countries. They argue that episode of rapid and large devaluation in 
the history of emerging markets could raise the salience of the local price of foreign exchange in 
domestic prices and wages, and could lead to the use of foreign currency in transaction and financial 
deals, all of which could further contribute to increasing sensitivity of domestic prices to changes in 
exchange rates.  
Kang and Wang (2003) employed VAR technique to study the extent of pass-through into aggregate 
prices for four East Asian countries (Japan, Singapore, Korea, and Thailand) during the period 1991-
2001. The authors found the import prices respond higher to changes in exchange rate than consumer 
prices, which conforms to above discussed results for developed countries. The authors have as well 
conducted variance decomposition analysis and observed that shocks to exchange rate are in general 
more important to import prices than the corresponding consumer prices. Moreover, the authors have 
split the horizon of the analysis into two periods; pre-crisis period (1991-1997) and post-crisis-period 
(1998-2001). Comparing the results between the periods, the authors observed that the extent of pass-
through in both aggregate prices is higher during post crisis periods in crisis-hit countries (Korea and 
Thailand)  compared  to  pre-crisis  period.  Similarly,  the  variance  decomposition  have  showed  that 
exchange rate shocks explain higher variations in both import prices and consumer prices during post-
crisis for crisis-hit countries. The authors have attributed the significant difference in the extent of 
pass-through  between  the  countries  that  were  severely  hit  by  the  crisis  and  those  that  were  less 
impacted during the post-crisis period to the adoption of a floating regime by the crisis-hit countries. 
The adoption of the floating exchange rate regime by and the subsequent temporary fluctuations in the 
crisis-hit  countries  are  assumed  to  have  increased  the  response  of  both  aggregate  prices  to  the 
depreciation in the exchange rates.    
More recent similar study on the East Asian crisis-hit countries was made by Ito et al. (2005) over the 
period 1986-2004.  The authors have basically employed two methods in their analysis; a conventional 
pass-through method based micro-foundations of the exporter's pricing behaviour and a VAR method. 
The results from the conventional method have revealed different degrees of pass-through elasticities 
from exchange rate into consumer prices among the analysed countries with a minimum pass-through 
of 0.13 and a maximum of 0.57. However, the pass-through elasticity into import prices were found P a g e  | 108 
 
relatively  higher  then  consumer  prices.  As  far  the  VAR  method,  the  results  of  impulse  response 
analysis have indicated lower pass-through along the distribution chain as the highest response to 
exchange rate shocks was by import prices, followed by producer prices and then consumer prices. 
Moreover, the variance decomposition analysis have showed that shocks from exchange rate account 
for around 40 percent in explaining the variations in consumer prices in only two countries and less 
than 20 percent in three countries. Furthermore, the authors have observed during the first ten months 
of the currency crisis (1997-1998) that hit these analysed economies  that the monetary shocks explains 
large amount of consumer prices in Indonesia compared to the rest of the sample. This finding has led 
the authors to attribute the relatively higher pass-through (0.57) in the consumer prices of Indonesia to 
the accommodative monetary shocks that followed the depreciation of the exchange rate. 
Further, several other studies have used the VAR approach in their evaluation of ERPT on individual 
basis (e.g. Leigh and Rossi (2002) for Turkey, Bhundia (2002) for South Africa, Billmeier and Bonato 
(2002) for Croatia, Belaisch (2003) for Brazil, and Al Raisi and Pattanaik (2005) for Oman, Mwase 
(2006) for Tanzania). Their main finding is lower pass-through along the distribution chain. 
 
9. The stability of ERPT 
A recognized fact from the empirical literature is the general decline in the extent of ERPT since the 
end of 1980s in both the industrial and developing countries. The empirical studies in this regard were 
originally motivated by number of events during the 1990s. For example, the surprisingly low inflation 
in countries like Sweden and Italy after the their currencies fell out of the European exchange rate 
mechanism in 1992, the low inflation after large devaluations in East Asia (1997-1998) and Latin 
America (Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and Argentina (2001). 
The most often cited and tested hypothesis for the decline in pass-through is that of Taylor (2000), 
discussed above. As per Taylor’s view, the recent attenuation in pass-through is primarily due to the 
low inflation environment that has been achieved in many countries. Taylor’s study has in fact sparked 
handful theoretical and empirical studies to test, in addition to the influence of monetary environment 
on the extent of pass-through, the stability of the pass-through relationship. For example, Choudhri and 
Hakura (2001) had emphasized a channel similar to Taylor (2000) in the context of a more elaborate 
dynamic general equilibrium model (DGE) with imperfect competition and staggered contracts. In 
their model, a low inflation environment decreases the extent of pass-through because the later reflects 
the expected impact of monetary shocks on current and future costs, which in turn are reduced by a 
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Furthermore, Choudhri and Hakura (2001) have tested their theoretical argument on a cross-sectional 
study using a sample of 71 countries including developing ones during the period 1979-2000. They 
found the average inflation rate to have positive and strong relation with the pass-through of exchange 
rate  across  all  the  analysed  countries.  They  also  found  the  inflation  rate  to  dominate  other 
macroeconomic factors in explaining the pass-through across the countries and periods. The authors 
have concluded that the dependency of ERPT on the inflation regime should be taken into account 
when designing the monetary policy rules.  
Devereux and Yetman (2002) tested Taylor hypothesis by presenting a theoretical argument to show 
that the low pass-through during the 1990s is in part a macroeconomic phenomenon. The authors have 
developed a simple model of small open economy, in which the extent of pass-through is determined 
by the frequency of price changes that in turn depends on the monetary policy role of the central bank. 
The monetary policy of the central bank determines the average rate of inflation and the volatility of 
the nominal exchange rate. The authors show that companies will choose higher frequency of price 
changes the higher is the average rate of inflation and the more volatile is the nominal exchange rate. 
The higher is the frequency of price adjustments, the greater is the pass-through of exchange rate into 
consumer prices. The authors have tested their model empirically on data set of 122 countries and 
found aggregate pass-through is very high (close to unity in many cases) in countries with very high 
inflation rates
7172.   
Gagnon and Ihrig (2004) had extended Taylor’s claim to a sample of 20 industrial countries industrial 
countries.  They  found,  after  splitting  their  sample  to  control  for  the  shift  in  the  monetary  policy 
behaviour  that  the  pass-through  has  generally  declined  in  many  countries  after  the  beginning  of 
1990s
73.  They  found  positive  significant  link  between  the  pass-through  and  inflation  variability. 
Furthermore, they have attributed the decline of pass-through in some of their sample of countries to 
the  strong  shift  towards  stabilizing  inflation  in  these  countries.  However,  the  authors  could  not 
                                                           
71 The authors have also reported a non-liner relation between average inflation and estimated pass-through 
coefficients; as inflation rises, pass-through rises but at a declining rate. 
72 Other theoretical argument was also presented by Devereux and Engle (2001), who have related the extent of 
pass-through into domestic prices to the monetary policy regime. In their theoretical model, which emphasizes 
the role of LCP versus PCP, the authors have argued that firms normally wish to set prices in the currency of the 
country  with  the  most  stable  monetary  policy.  With  this  argument,  the  authors  endogenize  the  choice  of 
currency, on which to set prices, to the monetary stability. That as well means that the ERPT into domestic 
prices in local currency terms will be low in countries with low monetary and nominal exchange rate variability. 
73 Similarly, McCarthy  (2000) have found a decline in the ERPT into inflation during the period 1983-1998 
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establish a systematic link between the exchange rate pass-through and the behaviour of the monetary 
policy. Other recent empirical studies that offered evidence for declining pass-through in developed 
and less developed nations include Baqeiro et al (2003), Ho McCauley (2003), Bailliu and Fujii (2004), 
Frankel et. al (2005), Mwase (2006), and Takhtamanova (2010).  
Along  somewhat  different  line,  Campa and Goldberg  (2005)  have  argued that  the  microeconomic 
factors related to the composition of a nation’s imports may dominate the macro factors in influencing 
the extent of pass-through elasticity and the pass-through relationship over time. The authors have 
reported that changes in the composition of imports by moving away from raw materials and energy 
imports towards manufacturing sectors (where more differentiated goods are produced and thus where 
PTM is likely to be more prevalent)  has been the primarily factor behind the recent pass-through 
changes into domestic prices among the OECD countries. This has also been confirmed by Otani et al. 
(2003) for Japan, Khundrakpam (2007) for India, and Marazzi et al. (2005) in the case of the US
74.  
Other micro-based theory include Burstein et al (2002) who analysed the reaction of inflation rates to 
devaluations during the 1990s for nine industrial and developing nations. Burstein et al (2002) have 
attributed the recent declining trend in pass-through from exchange rate to CPI to the disappearance 
from consumption of newly expensive import goods, and their replacement in the indices by inferior 
local substitutes, a phenomena that they dubbed as 'fright from quality'. Additional microeconomic 
factors were also argued for by Bailliu and Bouakez (2004), who explained the decline in the exchange 
rate pass-through to the higher degree of market segmentation because of (i) more firms are  engaging 
in PTM behaviour and/or (ii) a  larger proportion of goods are subjected to price discrimination across 
international markets. 
Some  other  studies  that  focused  on  analysing  the  low  pass-through  in  emerging  and  developing 
economies have further cited some other additional factors in addition to the above. For example, 
studies like Mihaljek and Klau (2001), Baqueiro (2003), Mwase (2006), and Khundrakpam (2007) 
have  in  part  emphasized  recent  structural  reforms  (e.g.  domestic  deregulation,  foreign  trade  and 
investment liberalisation, improved external accounts, and larger global integration in the production of 
goods and services) in the emerging and developing countries have contributed toward the low pass-
through from changes in exchange rate.   
 
                                                           
74 Marazzi et al. (2005) have presented additional explanations that include the increasing market shares of 
Chinese imports and changes in the pricing behaviours of firms in East Asia following the currency crises in 
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Furthermore, Frankel et al (2005) have also suggested the rising costs of non-traded services due 
perhaps to Baumol and Balassa-Samuelson effect, in which rich countries are assumed to have higher 
prices then poor countries once all price levels are expressed in a common currency at the prevailing 
nominal  exchange  rate.  Such  differences  in  price  levels  have  been  attributed  primarily  to  the 
differences in productivity across countries and sectors. High income countries are assumed to have 
higher productivity in traded sector than poor countries. Since non-traded good sectors are more labour 
intensive, then due to increased productivity in traded sectors prices in non-tradable goods increases 
and eventually such increase translates into higher price levels in high income countries. As a result of 
that, currencies of higher income countries will be overvalued relative to poor countries. Generally, the 
HBS hypothesis is found to be more useful in explaining differences in price levels (deviations from 
PPP) between developed and developing countries than between countries of similar productivity/per 
capita income (Balassa (1964), Pakko and Pollard (1996), Rogoff (1996), Taylor and Taylor (2004)).  
Further, recent strand in the literature of inflation have emphasized the role of globalization as a major 
factor for the declining role of exchange rate on the inflation process. For example, according to Borio 
and Filardo (2006), in a cross-section globalization means that  price differentials for identical goods is 
expected to narrow, arbitrage opportunities increase and location matters less for the production of 
certain products and services as production is delocalised. On the other hand, changes in exchange 
rates over time may tend to reflect more real and financial factors and less nominal influences, such as 
persistent and large inflation differentials. As a result, under such conditions, changes in exchange 
rates will be viewed temporary (reversible) and hence may have a smaller effect on the corresponding 
prices, at least in the short-run. 
Another mechanism, through which globalization weaken the role of exchange rate on domestic prices 
is by enhancing global economic integration. This mechanism is clearly articulated in the above-cited 
study of Gust et al (2010), who stated that increasing trade integration and higher productivity results 
in lower costs that in turn induce domestic producers to lower their mark-ups in response to the decline 
in the prices of foreign exporters, thus leading to fall in the average mark-up across all producers, and 
eventually lower pass-through. 
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10. Summery and conclusion 
This part of the chapter has attempted to survey the theoretical as well as the empirical literature of 
ERPT into aggregate domestic prices, with particular reference to ERPT into inflation rate as measured 
by the consumer price index.  The main findings of the survey are summarized as following: 
Pass-through relationship draws its theoretical underpinning from the PPP theory that assumes full 
impact from changes in exchange rate to domestic prices. However, earlier and recent studies on the 
ERPT have extensively documented incomplete pass-through to prices and even in those cases where a 
complete or  close to complete pass-through is reported  they  are  often  associated  with lags in the 
transmission/adjustment process from exchange rate to prices. Such finding is apparently at odd with 
the case of Friedman (1953) who assumed complete pass-through from exchange rate to consumer 
prices in his argument for flexible exchange rate. 
Various micro as well as macroeconomic causes has been proposed by the literature to explain the 
incomplete  pass-through  from  exchange  rate  to  domestic  prices.  The  most  often  offered 
microeconomic explanation is the strategy of PTM by imperfectly competitive firms. Other suggested 
microeconomic causes include trade distortions (e.g. tariff, non-trade barriers), transportation costs, 
domestic content in the distribution of traded products, and price stickiness in the local currency. On 
the other hand, macroeconomic causes include persistence of changes in inflation and exchange rates, 
volatility of inflation and exchange rate, and the business cycle. 
The extent of pass-through is asymmetric and depends on the direction of the change (depreciation or 
appreciation) as well as on the size of the change. The economic theories have identified various 
circumstances that could generate asymmetric exchange rate pass-through such as capacity constraint, 
market share, production switching, and menu costs. 
The majority of ERPT have primarily focused on traded good prices such as import or export prices 
and there are only a few papers available which deal with the analysis of pass-through into consumer 
prices. Given the theoretically as well as empirically identified link between the pass-through from 
exchange  rate  and  inflation  rate  and  the  importance  of  such  link  for  a  proper  assessment  of  the 
monetary policy transmission on prices as well as for inflation forecasts, many several recent studies 
have examined the impact of macroeconomic pass-through from exchange rate to inflation rate.  
Exchange rate can influence inflation directly and indirectly. The direct channel is basically through 
the prices of traded final goods, and the prices of imported intermediate goods. The indirect channel is 
through the competitiveness of goods in the international markets and inflation expectations. Both 
channels become more with an increase in the degree of openness in the economy. P a g e  | 113 
 
Most of the analytical frameworks that underlie the empirical estimation of the influence of exchange 
rate on aggregate consumer prices were generally based on microeconomic foundations. The reduced 
form for the pass-through equation defines the price level as a function of exchange rate plus other 
hypothesised determinants of prices:  P = ƒ(St, P
*, Y)  
where Pt is the domestic CPI, St is the exchange rate, 
*
t P   is the trading partner CPI, andU is the 
output gap. Furthermore, the most two common estimation techniques for the ERPT are the single 
equation method and the structural vector auto regressions (VARs). 
As per the empirical findings, the pass-through from exchange rate to inflation rate is incomplete even 
in the long run, and the exchange rate elasticity of inflation is less than the exchange rate elasticity of 
import prices. Generally, the size and the speed of adjustments decline along the different price stages; 
the impact of exchange rate changes is highest on import prices, then producer prices, and the lowest is 
on consumer prices. 
The literature has advanced number of factors that could account for the lower response of inflation 
rate relative to other prices in the distribution chain with respect to changes in exchange rate. The 
majority  of  these  factors  are  primarily  microeconomic-based  such  as  the  composition  of  the  CPI 
basket, distribution costs of tradable goods, availability of domestic substitutes, and the optimal pricing 
strategies  of  firms.  Other  factors  include  demand  policies  (monetary  and  fiscal  policies)  and 
institutional  factors;  like  price  regulations,  foreign  exchange  rate  controls,  and  enhanced  global 
competition. 
There is a declining trend in the extent of pass-through from exchange rate to inflation rate. This 
decline has been a characteristic of both developed and less developed economies. Several  plausible 
explanations  have  been  presented  for  this  potential  decline  in  the  literature  including  changes  in 
monetary environment (shift to a low-inflation regime), changes in the composition of import goods 
towards sectors that have lower rates of exchange rate pass-through, substitution between goods (from 
high-end selection of imports to lower quality substitutes), the increasing importance of non-traded 
goods in consumption and structural reforms (particularly in developing countries). Nonetheless, there 
is no consensus in the literature and the debate is still going on regarding the causes of the changed 
behaviour of the pass-through relation.    
Further, the extent of ERPT to inflation rate is generally larger in developing countries relative to more 
developed  ones.  Such  difference  is  more  often  attributed  to  factors  like  Baumol  and  Balassa-
Samuelson effect, high share of traded goods, high import content, and limited domestic substitutes, 
which generally reflect the characteristics of small and more open economies. From policy perspective, 
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authorities in these countries should take into account the underlying relationship between exchange 
rate and inflation rate and the factors determining such relationship while designing the monetary and 
exchange rate policies for their economies. 
The analysis of ERPT in general and at the aggregate level, in particular, for small open economies, 
specially developing ones, have had fewer share compared to the large and more developed countries. 
Studies on developing economies were spurred recently in the wake of large devaluations in South East 
Asia, Latin America, and other emerging countries between 1994 and 2001. Nonetheless, the majority 
of these studies have focused on episodes of sudden large devaluations (e.g. currency crises) with less 
attention to analyse the pass-through relation in economies that generally stable but are experiencing a 
sustained  depreciation.  Furthermore,  studies  of  pass-through  on  developing  economies  have 
concentrated on particular regions like South East Asia and Latin America, however other economic 
region like Africa and the Middle East were mostly neglected. Accordingly, future studies of ERPT 
could further contribute to the literature by trying to redress the imbalance in country study coverage 
within the context of developing countries. Future studies on developing countries can also contribute 
by giving more attention to episodes of sustained depreciation over time in addition to the analysed 
episodes of sudden large devolutions. Moreover, the diversity of the exchange rate regimes among the 
developing countries relative to the developed countries also offers other fertile grounds for empirical 
research to analyse effect of exchange rate regimes on the pass-through relationship. 
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Chapter Three 
Exchange Rate Pass-Through into Inflation Rate: A Case Study on the GCC Countries Using 
Single Equation Technique 
1. Introduction 
 
This  chapter  attempts  to  empirically  estimate  the  extent  of  exchange  rate  pass-through  into  the 
domestic consumer price indices of the GCC countries using the single equation method. It begins by 
briefly highlighting the primary motivation behind the study as well as the objectives and the general 
contribution of the study.  
 
Recently some inflationary pressures have emerged in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries (GCC) 
in the wake of recent high oil prices, the ensuing buoyant economic growth and rising import
75. As of 
2008, inflation rates ranged between a single digit figure of around 5% (Bahrain) to a double digit 
figure of around 15% (Qatar), with an average of around 11% (table 5).  Among the common factors 
for the recent inflationary pressures of the GCC countries are domestic absorption of high and rising oil 
revenues, bottleneck in factors of production like labour and raw materials, caused mainly by economic 
boom, and rising import prices.  
 
Furthermore, the recent rise in import prices of the GCC countries has coincided with significant 
depreciation in the US dollar, to which the currencies of the GCC countries are pegged
76. The sustained 
depreciation of the US dollar has been blamed as major factor behind the accelerating inflation rates. 
While the dollar-peg stabilizes the exchange rate between the GCC currencies and the US dollar, 
depreciation in bilateral exchange rates, relative to non-dollarized trading partners (e.g. euro and pound 
                                                           
75 The GCC countries are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates (UAE). 
76 The US dollar has been the de facto anchor for all of the GCC countries' currencies, with the exception of the 
Kuwaiti Dinar, for over two decades. Except for a short period when it was exclusively pegged to the US dollar 
(May 2003-May 2007) pursuant to an agreement in the context of the GCC’s monetary integration process, the 
Kuwaiti Dinar has been linked to a weighted basket of currencies, in which the US dollar forms the major part 
given that most of the Kuwaiti's exports (oil) are priced in US dollars and limited  fluctuation occurred vis-à-vis 
the US dollar, and subsequently the fluctuations vis-à-vis GCC countries’ currencies (Sturm and Siegfried, 2005).  
 P a g e  | 116 
 
sterling), is likely to magnify the increase in the price of imports and eventually inflation. The recent 
abandonment of the dollar peg by the Kuwaiti authority in May 2007 toward a weighted basket of 
currencies formed a vivid evidence for the inflationary pressure felt from the depreciation of the US 
dollar
77. Accordingly, recently there has been some increasing public demands in the rest of the GCC 
countries for an up-ward valuation, or even de-pegging the currencies of these countries from the 
existing US dollar, and a shift towards an exchange rate regime that should bring about higher price 
stability and enhance the foreign exchange value of the GCC countries’ currencies.  
 
However, with the exception of one single limited study (Al Raisi and Pattanaik, 2005) on Oman, no 
empirical studies have been carried out to thoroughly estimate the impact from exchange rate changes 
on  inflation  rates in  the GCC  countries.  In  other word,  the  pass-through  from exchange  rate  into 
domestic prices, including domestic CPI inflation of the GCC countries. The link between exchange 
rate and inflation in the GCC region was touched as part of general studies
78, albeit few, for analysing 
the inflationary process in the region.  
 
Against this background, we intended in this chapter to present an estimate for the underlying pass-
through relationship between exchange rate and inflation in the GCC countries. From the study we 
attempt to achieve a number of objectives. The first objective is to assess the risk to the domestic CPI 
inflation of the GCC countries arising from the fluctuations of the US dollar against the currencies of 
the major trading partners of the GCC countries. Given the fact that one of the major objectives of the 
central banks in the GCC countries is to ensure price stability, the results from this paper should be 
useful  for  these  economies’  central  banks  in  forecasting  domestic  inflation  and  determining  the 
appropriate policies and actions.  
 
A second major objective is to draw some conclusions, based on the observed associations between 
changes in exchange rate and domestic CPI inflation, and some policy implications for the existing 
exchange rate policies of the individual GCC countries. The choice of exchange rate regime by the 
GCC  nations  and  the  subsequent  economic  implications  are  critical  topics  that  necessitate  further 
examination,  particularly  given  the  potential  ramification  to  the  incipient  GCC  monetary  union. 
                                                           
77 According to the Kuwaiti authority, the depreciation of the dollar has resulted in a weaker dinar (Kuwaiti’s 
currency), which raised the local currency cost of imports not dominated in US dollars.  
78 E.g. Al Mutairy (1995), Darrat and Al-Yousif (1998), and  Hasan and Alogeel (2008). P a g e  | 117 
 
Furthermore, this study further enriches latest discussions on whether the individual members of the 
GCC need to consider their fixed exchange rate regimes, particularly, in the wake of the latest regional 
and  global  economic  developments.    Accordingly,  analyzing  exchange  rate  pass-through  into  the 
regional member countries inflation rates, as in this study, would undoubtedly add value to the body of 
studies on the regional block as a whole.   
 
Further, with this study we also attempt to cover some of the caveats in the literature of exchange rate 
pass-through (ERPT). For example, by focusing our analysis on the GCC countries, which are small 
and less developed countries, we are redressing the imbalance in country study coverage (Menon, 
1995).  Furthermore,  given  the  inconclusive  evidence  on  the  prediction  of  full  pass-through  from 
exchange rate to domestic prices of small less developed economies, the paper tries to further test such 
hypothesis in the context of the GCC countries. Also unlike most earlier available studies that focused 
on episodes of large sudden depreciations (De Grauwe and Tullio 1994, Amirtano et al 1997, Goldfajn 
and  Werlang  2000)  the  focus  of  our  study  is  on  economies  that  have  experienced  sustained 
depreciations in their currencies over a period of time. Moreover, we further contribute to the literature 
by  employing  monthly  macrodata  as  compared  to  most  other  studies  that  were  faced  with  data 
availability and have to use lower frequency data, like quarterly times series. According to Choudhri et 
al. (2005) and MacCarthy (2007) using monthly frequency is considered preferable in studying the 
pass-through. 
 
The  outline  of  the  remainder  of  this  chapter  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  two  will  present  a 
theoretical background on the link between exchange rates and inflation rates. Section three includes 
an overview on the pass-through relationship in the context of the GCC countries. Sections four and 
five present the estimation framework and the data description. An overview of the trade pattern in the 
GCC economies is given in section six. Section seven presents an analysis of the composition of the 
CPI baskets of the GCC countries. Preliminary data analysis, unit root tests, and some correlation 
analysis are presented in sections eight, nine, and ten, respectively. Finally, the estimation and analysis 
of the results is given in section eleven.  
 
2. Theory in the link between exchange rate and inflation rate 
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The  estimation  framework  of  the  study  is  primarily  motivated  by  the  following  brief  on  the  link 
between the movement in exchange rate and domestic prices based on the  Purchasing Power Parity 
(PPP) theory, and some relevant economic facts about the GCC countries: 
 
In its simplest form, the PPP theory suggests that the nominal exchange rate between two different 
currencies will adjust to equate the aggregate price levels of the countries of these currencies. In other 
words, both the domestic and foreign currencies will have equal purchasing power when they are 
converted into one common currency.  Expressed in mathematical form, the PPP theory is: 
 
* SP P =                   (1) 
 
Where P is the domestic price level, S is the bilateral nominal exchange rate, and P
* is the foreign price 
level. Equation 1 represents the absolute form of the PPP theory that has its foundation from the law of 
one  price  (hereafter  LOOP).  Abstracting  from  any  impediments  to  international  trade  such  as 
transportation costs, taxes, and tariff, the LOOP states that the price of any particular homogenous 
good that is traded on world market should be the same, when converted at the market exchange rate 
(McDonald,  2007).  The  mechanism  that  forces  the  LOOP  condition  is  the  competitive  arbitrage 
activities at individual level. A major implication of the absolute PPP theory is that the real exchange 
rate (hereafter RER)-the nominal exchange rate adjusted for the difference in the national price levels- 
should  be  constant,  however,  this  not  true  for  any  real  and  nominal  exchange  rate  comparison 
(McDonald, 2007)
79. Furthermore, there is one very important condition, under which the law of one 
price generalizes to yield the PPP between domestic and foreign currencies. The price indices of the 
domestic and foreign countries should include the same goods with the same weighting scheme, so that 
a common market basket of goods is measured (Rogoff,1996, Pakko and Pollard, 1996, McDonald, 
2007).  Such  a  condition  is  clearly  restrictive  as  different  countries  may  have  different  weighting 
schemes, due to difference in consumption, and different base years. Furthermore, the LOOP assumes 
perfect competition, no capital flows, and no impediment to trade in the sense that there is costless 
transportation, distribution, and resale (Goldberg and Knetter, 1996, McDonald, 2007). However, these 
conditions are clearly unlikely to hold in practice.  
                                                           
79 In mathematical form, RER =
P
SP
*
. Accordingly, by assuming that that the absolute PPP theory holds, then 
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Given the difficulties to construct a common market basket as a measure of national price levels across 
countries and the other restricted assumptions of the LOOP, a weaker version of the PPP theory known 
as the relative PPP is often considered. The relative PPP theory states that differences in the national 
price levels, inflation rates, between two countries will be adjusted by changes in exchange rates. In 
other words, relative PPP states that changes in price levels will be related to changes in exchange rates 
(Pakko and Pollard, 1996). It can also be interpreted to indicate that economies with relatively higher 
inflation rates will experience a depreciating currency (McDonald, 2007). Expressed in mathematical 
form, the relative PPP theory is: 
 
* % % % P P S D - D = D                (2) 
 
Where ∆ represents changes. From equation 2, it is clear that the relative PPP theory is less restrictive 
than the  absolute  version,  as  it  simply  relates  percentage  changes  in exchange  rates between  two 
countries to the difference in their inflation rates. If, for example, inflation in country A increased by 
6% while inflation in country B increased by only 4%, then according to the relative PPP theory the 
currency of A will depreciate by 2% to offset the inflation differentials between the two countries. The 
primary  requirement  for the  relative  PPP  theory  to  hold is  that the spread/difference  between the 
inflation differential and the changes in exchange rate should equal zero or at least tend to centre zero 
(Pakko  and  Pollard,  1996).  In  the  context  of  ERPT,  the  validity  of  PPP  means  any  changes  in 
exchanges rates will translate into proportional movements in domestic price level. In other words, PPP 
theory  assumes  complete  pass-through  from  changes  in  exchange  rate  to  domestic  price  level. 
Accordingly, incomplete pass-through will reflect deviation from PPP. Nonetheless, complete pass-
through can occur even though the LOOP fails. The failure of the LOOP need to invalidate only the 
absolute PPP, but incomplete pass-through will invalidate both variants (absolute and relative PPP) 
(Frankel et al, 2005). 
 
Generally,  movements  in  exchange  rates  affect  domestic  price  level  (inflation  rate)  directly  and 
indirectly (figure 1). The importance of both of these channels is assumed to increase with an increase 
in the openness of the economy (Hufner and Schroder, 2002). The former channel operates through the 
external sector, specifically through the relative share of imports in the consumer basket (Lafleche, 
1996). Exchange rates The depreciation of exchange rates will raise the prices of imported final goods P a g e  | 120 
 
as well as intermediate goods. As importers and producers raise their prises in line with the increase in 
imports, the depreciation will eventually get translated into producers and consumer prices, which in 
turn may lead to higher inflation.  
 
On the other hand, the indirect effect of ERPT can operate through different channels, like changes in 
the composition of demand or in the level of aggregate demand and wages, supply of goods, and 
inflation  expectations  (Lafleche,1996,  Taylor,  2000,  Ho  McCauley,  2003).  The  channel  through 
inflation expectations is originally suggested in the hypothesis of Taylor (2000), according to which 
the pass-through is highest when changes in the exchange rate are perceived to be of a persistent nature 
and prices adjust because of the expectations of the public.  
 
Another channel is through the pressure of increased aggregate demand on domestically produced 
goods. As the exchange rate depreciates, domestic goods become relatively cheaper in international 
markets; as a result exports and aggregate demand for domestic goods will rise. In the short run, such 
an increase in the aggregate demand will induce an increase in the price level and output, however, in 
the long-run, as real wages rise to their initial equilibrium, output will decrease and prices will remain 
at their new level (Kahn, 1987).  
 
Similarly,  the  indirect  effect  can  also  manifest  through  the  pressure  on  the  supply  of  goods.  For 
example, assuming supply rigidity, if exchange rate depreciates and as a result exports increase, the 
supply of the same commodities for meeting domestic demand may appear short. Consequently, that 
will put higher pressures on prices. Stated differently, with unchanged domestic demand, if domestic 
supply declines due to higher exports, that may lead to higher inflation (Al Raisi and Pattanaik, 2005).  
 
Further, according to Al Raisi and Pattanaik (2005), under some special conditions, the direct channel 
may dominate the indirect channel. For example, when the import-intensity of exports is high for an 
economy  and  when  the  direct  channel  can  result  in  faster  adjustment  in  wages  and  prices  in  the 
domestic  economy.  In  contrast,  the  direct  channel  may  prove  to  be  weak,  particularly  in  more 
diversified economies, if depreciation can enhance domestic production of local substitutes, and if 
higher  prices  of  imported  goods  gave  rise  to  some  reduction  in  demand.  Accordingly,  the  direct P a g e  | 121 
 
channel is  stronger in  small and less  diversified  economies relative  to large  and  more  diversified 
economies.  
 
Figure 1: The pass-through from an exchange rate depreciation to consumer prices P a g e  | 122 
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3. Pass-through relationship in the context of the GCC countries 
 
Further, given the nature of the GCC economies, this paper can be considered to form a general test on 
the  validity  of  the  PPP  theory  regarding  the  extent  of  ERPT  in  small,  open  and  less  developed 
economies.  According  to  the  existing  relevant  literature,  the  pass-through  from  movements  in 
exchange rate to domestic prices is generally greater in small open economies with a relatively high 
share of traded goods, high import, and limited local substitutes. Since such characteristics highly fit 
the nature of GCC economies, one would expect a relatively high degree of ERPT (detailed analysis of 
the GCC region trade pattern is presented in section 6). 
 
 The common view that pricing to market strategy (PTM) is less likely by importers in developing 
economies, further stresses the plausibility of a relatively large degree of ERPT in the GCC countries. 
Under such a view, consumers in developing countries are viewed as price takers, as foreign suppliers 
set their prices at a constant mark-up over costs. Local importers, on the other hand, in an attempt to 
protect  their  profit,  adjust  consumer  prices  to  completely  offset  any  changes  in  exchange  rates
80. 
Accordingly, the transmission process between movements in exchange rates and consumer prices will 
be greatly influenced by the conditions of the economy (Frankel et al, 2005)
81. 
  
In addition to the above characteristics, the presence of a pegged exchange rate regime to the US dollar 
is expected to accentuate the degree of ERPT in these economies
82. If the US dollar depreciated against 
the major trading partners of the GCC countries, there would be a corresponding depreciation in the 
                                                           
80 As a matter of fact, the mark-up set by the foreign producer depends primarily on the prices of domestic 
competing  goods.  However,  given  the  fact  that  the  production  of  import  competing  goods  in  the  GCC 
economies constitutes a relatively marginal share in the GDP of each of these countries, it is assumed that the 
prices of competing domestic goods cannot influence domestic prices. Therefore, foreign prices are expected to 
be influenced mainly by foreign production costs and exchange rates (Ghars El-Din and Mohammed, 2005). 
81 The low PTM strategy in the developing countries explains why the majority of the studies in developing 
countries have emphasized the role of macroeconomic factors in influencing the pass-through. 
82 In contrast, others view fixed exchange regime as a monetary discipline that should lead to lower inflation by 
basically preventing the active use of monetary policy for achieving real sector objectives. P a g e  | 124 
 
currencies  of  the  GCC  countries  against  other  non-US  dollar  currencies.  The  depreciation  in  the 
exchange rates of the GCC currencies will get transmitted into higher prices of imported goods and 
services that will eventually lead to an increase in the general price levels given the weight of such 
commodities in the consumer price indices of the GCC countries. High ERPT would indicate that the 
economies of GCC countries have high dependence on external shocks in the world market and that the 
domestic  prices  in  these  economies  are  highly  volatile,  due  to  changes  in  the  exchange  rate 
(Dobrynskaya and Levando, 2008). 
 
Furthermore, the high dependency of the GCC economies on foreign workers (from neighbouring 
countries like India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Egypt, etc.) has further accentuated the inflationary effect of 
the dollar peg (Willett et al, 2009). The recent economic growth in the area, following high revenues 
from a hike in oil prices, has led to economic development that resulted in higher demand for foreign 
labour in the GCC countries, given the low level of unemployment and the fact that most of the 
national labourers are being absorbed by the public sector.  Given the supply bottlenecks, on account of 
limited agricultural production and manufacturing, recent higher migration of labourers into the GCC 
countries fuelled demand for various consumer goods (e.g. food stuffs) that are mainly imported, thus, 
magnifying supply constraints and eventually enhancing the increase in domestic prices (Marzovilla et 
al. 2010).  
 
Moreover, another influence of higher dependency on foreign labour on domestic prices of the GCC 
countries is believed to have been transmitted through demand for higher wages (Gulf Talent, 2007). 
The depreciation of the US dollar has lowered the value of wages, and as results the purchasing power 
of  the  foreign  workers’  remittance  decreased.  That  has  made  it  difficult  to  attract/retain  staff, 
particularly skilled and highly qualified workers, in the GCC countries, thus resulting in a price-wage 
spiral (Ghars El-Din and Mohammed, 2005). 
 
Based on the monetary theory, the decline in the exchange rates can lead to an increase in the domestic 
prices only if it is being accommodated by the monetary authority, which lowered interest rates and 
increased aggregate demand and output (Hafer, 1989). In fact, by considering the current scenario of 
the  GCC  economies,  we  can  see  that  the  monetary  stance  in  the  GCC  countries  has  been 
accommodative to the decline in the effective exchange rates of these countries' currencies vis-à-vis the 
currencies of their other non-US trading partners. As the Federal Reserve Bank started to decrease its P a g e  | 125 
 
short term rate in a precautionary step to avoid any recessionary tendencies in the economy, in the 
aftermath of  the 11
th of September 2001 and the sub-prime market crisis in September 2007, the 
exchange rate of the US dollar has generally declined (compared to its level prior to the attack) against 
other major currencies in the world
83. As a result, the exchange rates of the GCC countries' currencies 
have exhibited a corresponding decline in relation to other non-US currencies (figure 9). Moreover, 
given the fixed regimes with the US dollar, the monetary authorities in the GCC countries have been 
tracking the monetary changes in the US by similarly lowering their short term interest rates, thus 
accommodating the demand for higher nominal money balances due to lower real money because of 
the depreciation
84. 
 
Further, relevant to the pegged exchange rate of the GCC countries’ currencies is also the current 
scenario of buoyant economic growth following high revenues from the increase in the demand and 
prices of oil (MacDonald, 2010). The recent development in the region, in the form of rapid economic 
growth due to massive revenues because of a hike in oil prices, has necessitated the use of stringent 
monetary policy, in order to contain inflationary responses to the expansion of monetary circulation. 
However, given the peg with US dollar, the GCC countries were forced to align their interest rate with 
that of the US, in order to resist any appreciation due to speculation in the form of capital inflow. That, 
in  turn,  has  motivated  further  borrowing  and  credit expansion  and  further  fuelled  the  inflationary 
pressure of the oil surpluses recorded by the GCC countries.  Given the policy constraint under the peg 
system, there were fewer incentives for the GCC economies to depend on monetary policy to curb 
inflation. Such a situation reflects a divergence in the business cycles of the GCC countries and the US 
and suggests a fundamental role on inflation rates of these economies from changes in the exchange 
rate of their domestic currencies (Marzovilla et al. 2010).  
 
Based on the above explained link between exchange rate and domestic price level and the given facts 
about the conditions of the GCC economies, we would infer that the inflation rates in these economies 
are  significantly  influenced  by  the  changes  in  the  exchange  rates  of  these  countries’  currencies. 
Accordingly, in this paper we would like to formally test the validity of such a hypothesis in the 
                                                           
83 Particularly, since 2002 the US dollar has lost around 40 percent of its value vis-à-vis a basket of major 
currencies, weighted by their countries' trade with the US. 
84 Ito et al (2005) have empirically found the accommodating monetary policy in Indonesia following the Asian 
crisis during 1997-98 to be a significant factor on the high domestic inflation, relative to other Asian countries 
that were affected by the crisis.  P a g e  | 126 
 
context of the GCC economies. Our null hypothesis is that there is high pass-through (almost complete, 
at least in the long-run) from changes in exchange rate to inflation rate in the GCC economies.   
 
4. Estimation Model 
 
Generally, the econometric methods that have been used to estimate the pass-through from exchange 
rate to inflation can be broadly divided into four categories: single equation models, VAR models, 
structural macroeconomic models, and open-economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) 
models (Mwase, 2006). Furthermore, single equation econometric methods are the most widely used in 
the  literature  (Goldberg  and  Knetter,  1996,    Amato  et.  al,  2005,  Bache,  2007).  In  pass-through 
regression  a  price  index  (import  price  index,  consumer  price  index,  or  producer  price  index)  is 
regressed  against  the  exchange  rate  plus  other  hypothesised  determinants  of  prices.  However, 
according  to  Menon  (1995),  who  carried  out  a  comprehensive  survey  on  the  relevant  empirical 
literature, the earlier studies have suffered from some deficiencies in the econometric part, which shed 
some doubt on their results. According to Menon (1995), most of the earlier studies on ERPT used 
traditional single equation methods that did not properly take into account the time series properties of 
the variables, e.g. the non stationary nature of the data. Specifically, the variables used in a great 
number of the 46 studies that were surveyed by Menon (1995) were non-stationary, so the regression 
estimates of the studies may have been spurious.  
 
However, an alternative technique, which is becoming increasingly popular, is the system approach 
(Mwase, 2006, Bache, 2007). The major difference in structural vector auto regressions (VARs) is that 
they  do  not  a  priori  assume  any  exogenous  variable  and  treat  each  variable  as  endogenous. 
Accordingly, each endogenous variable becomes a function of all lagged endogenous and exogenous 
variables  in  the  system.  Most  of  the  VARs  used  to  estimate the  pass-through  typically  include  a 
nominal exchange rate variable, one or several sets of price indices (typically, import prices, producer 
prices, and consumer prices), plus some other  additional variables like oil prices, output gap, money 
and interest rates.  The impulse responses analyses from VAR provide the degree and speed of pass-
through  from  shocks  to  price  indices.  VAR  is  also  used  to  analyse  the  importance  of  different 
macroeconomic shocks on domestic prices.  
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Accordingly,  given  the  popularity  of  both  the  single  equation  technique  and  the  VAR  method  in 
measuring the ERPT and given the deficiencies in many previous studies, we will use an Ordinary 
Least Square model (OLS) and a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) to analyse the pass-through 
relationship  between  exchange  rate  and  inflation  rate  within  the  context  of  the  GCC  countries. 
However,  in  this  chapter  we  will  only  focus  on  measuring  the  extent  of  ERPT  using  the  OLS 
technique. In the next chapter, chapter four, we will re-estimate the extent of ERPT using a VECM. 
The  policy  implications,  summary  and  conclusions  from  the  analysis  of  the  ERPT  in  the  GCC 
countries will be presented at the end of chapter four.  
 
Further,  the  popularity  of  the  single  equation  specifications  makes  such  techniques  amenable  to 
comparison with other recent empirical analysis of pass-through to domestic prices (e.g. Mihaljek and 
Klau 2001, Campa and Goldberg 2005, Choudhri and Hakura 2006, Khundrakpam 2007, Ceglowski 
2010, Takhtamanova 2010) since most have been based on the estimates of single equation models. In 
our model we basically follow the literature and use the following pass-through relation
85: 
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85 Our reduced form equation for the pass-through relationship follow generally the literature that modelled 
inflation as a function of current and lagged changes in exchanges rate and other control variables, suggested 
by the economic theory, that  capture changes in unit cost of exporting firm as well as changes in the level of 
economic activity in the importing country. P a g e  | 128 
 
 
Equation  (4)  will  be  estimated  for  each  country.  Different  information  criterion  will  be  used  to 
determine the optimal lag order for each variable in the equation (4). From a comparison point of view, 
we will replicate the estimation of the equation (4) using aggregate import price index and producer 
price index. Testing our hypothesis will take the following form:  
 
1) Short-run ERPT: 
 
H0: ∑ i 2 a  = 0 (No Pass-through) 
H1: ∑ i 2 a  ≠ 0 (Pass-through exists) 
 
2) Long-run ERPT: 
 
H0: ∑ ) 1 /( 1 2 ∑ - a a k = -1 (Complete ERPT) 
H1: ∑ ) 1 /( 1 2 ∑ - a a i < -1 (Incomplete ERPT)   
 
5. Data Description 
 
It is necessary to note at the outset that similar to many other developing countries, the GCC countries 
suffer from a data availability problem. In particular, high frequency time series are mainly available 
only from the beginning of the current decade onwards. All our data are time series with monthly 
frequency for the period January 2000 to December 2008. The rationale for such a period is primarily 
because the US dollar, to which the currencies of the GCC countries are pegged , have showed some 
significant persistent fluctuations during that period, thus providing fertile atmosphere to test the extent 
of  ERPT in the economies  of  these  countries. The main  sources of the  data are the  International 
Financial Statistics (IFS), IFS Direction of Trade Statistics, and the central banks of the examined 
countries. Due to lack of data for Qatar and UAE, the test will be confined to four GCC members; 
Bahrain,  Kuwait,  Oman,  and  Saudi  Arabia.  However,  given  the  similarity  in  the  structure  and P a g e  | 129 
 
conditions  of  the  economies  of  the  GCC  state  members-large  share  of  oil  production  in  total, 
dependency on oil exports, highly import-dependent, and similar trading partners’ weights, the inferred 
implications from the estimated results of the examined country members can be applied to the entire 
GCC area.  
Further, consistent with the IMF, we define NEER as the foreign currency price per local currency, so 
an increase in it would indicate an appreciation. Moreover, since we intend to capture the total effect of 
exchange  rate  changes  in  countries  with  diversified  trading  partners,  NEER  is  considered  the 
appropriate measure instead of the bilateral exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar, which is used in 
many other studies Ito et al. (2005).  For the trading partner CPI, we used World CPI. We followed 
other  studies  (e.g.  Campa  and  Gonzalez,  2005)  that  have  assumed,  based  on  the  integration  of 
international  markets,  that  there  exists  a  single  market  for  each  product,  regardless  of  its  origin, 
destination or currency of domination
86. We will also try to include some dummy variables to account 
for some events like the Iraqi war (2003).  
 
Furthermore, we used oil prices as a proxy for output gap or the status of the business cycle in the GCC 
economies. One reason behind that is primarily the lack of consistent monthly data for real activity 
measures (e.g. real GDP, industrial production, etc.) for the countries of our sample. Second reason is 
that due to the pro-cyclicality of the aggregate economic activity of the GCC countries to changes in 
oil prices, we think that oil prices can be used as a good representative for short-run changes in the 
business cycle of these economies
87. The use of oil prices can also serve to control for supply shocks. 
                                                           
86 Furthermore, other reason for using the World CPI as a proxy for foreign CPI includes the relatively large and 
diverse trading partners of the GCC countries. 
87 Also using a direct measure for excess capacity like output gap is not recommended in the case of our sample 
for number of reasons. First, it is generally known that information on excess capacity is not very reliable in 
several countries, particularly developing, and is difficult to find.  Second, Output gap, which is the difference 
between actual out and potential output where the latter is unobservable variable that reflects the maximum 
output an economy can sustain without inducing inflation (Mwase, 2006), has a measurement issue in the 
context of our sample. It is generally debatable whether lower income economies and relatively smaller and 
more open ones, like the case of our sample, have reached their potential level or display unused long run 
capacity. According to Hasan and Alogeel (2008) the large contribution of oil in the GDP of the GCC countries 
may affect the accuracy of measuring the GDP gap due to the fact that if changes in real GDP because of 
changes in the production of oil are not reflected into higher government expenditure, it would not affect local 
demand and thus would not results into higher inflationary pressures. P a g e  | 130 
 
 
 
6. Trade Pattern of the GCC Economies 
 
Analysing the trade pattern of the GCC economies is viewed necessary to further understand the nature 
of the pass-through relationship in the economies of the GCC countries. In particular, from analysing 
the international trade of these economies we are able to visualise the expected results from formal 
tests, in terms of significance.  
 
 In the wake of large revenues from the prolonged rise in oil prices during the period of our review, 
trade by the GCC economies has increased substantially. From 2000 to 2008, exports in most of the the 
six GCC countries more than tripled, as can be seen from figure (2). In absolute terms, Saudi Arabia 
and UAE registered the highest exports among the block as of 2008, with total exports of around USD 
313.5 billion and USD 231.6 billion, respectively. Collectively, the total export of goods of the GCC 
region  rose  dramatically  from  USD  175  billion  in  2000,  and  grew  to  USD  752  billion  in  2008. 
However, around 70% of these exports are dominated by hydrocarbon products. As a share of nominal 
GDP, total exports for the individual GCC countries stood at average of around 70 percent as of 2008, 
with annual growth of around 6.5 percent between 2000 and 2008, notwithstanding the significant 
expansion in theses economies’ GDP (figure 3 and 4). That reflects the importance of exports on 
domestic production. 
 
Similarly, imports have been buoyant in all the GCC countries, with a recorded growth of more than 
200 percent in most of them between 2000 and 2008 (figure 5). Collectively, total imports of the region 
have jumped from around USD 85 billion in 2000 to around 361 billion in 2008, with Saudi Arabia and 
UAE accounting for the majority of increases over the period.  As a share of nominal GDP in 2008, 
total imports in each of the GCC economies formed, on average, around 40 percent, with an average 
yearly growth of around 3 percent between 2000 and 2008, notwithstanding the increases in these 
economies  GDP  (figure  6).  This  signifies  the  importance  of  imports  in  meeting  the  domestic 
consumption and investment demand in the economies of the GCC nations.  
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However, there is a very clear difference between exports and imports with respect to structure of 
goods  traded  and  the  geographical  pattern  of  trade.  The  bulk  of  the  GCC  exports  consist  of 
hydrocarbon goods (oil and oil derivatives), which are mainly oriented towards Japan and emerging 
Asia (table 1). For example, in 2008, exports to Asian countries constituted around 60% of GCC 
countries’  aggregate  exports.  Japan  alone  accounted  for  about  20%  of  the  GCC  economies’  total 
exports. However, imports to the GCC countries are predominated by two regions, Asia and Europe, 
with  around  40%  and  30%  shares  from  total  GCC  imports  in  2008,  respectively  (table  2)
88. 
Furthermore, the European markets are among the main beneficiaries from the increases in oil revenue 
of the GCC economies. The European area is the only region that maintains a trade surplus with the 
GCC block (figure 7). Machinery and mechanical appliances, vehicles and parts, electrical machinery 
and  equipment  formed  the  main  imports  to  the GCC  economies  as  of  2008
89.  Intraregional  trade 
between the GCC countries is very limited and formed around only 7% of total trade in 2008. The 
limited  intra-GCC  trade  is  primarily  attributed  to  the  dominance  of  hydrocarbon  products  in  the 
external balance of these economies and to low diversification in their economic structure. 
 
Based on the GCC trade pattern and given the pegged exchange rate system that fixes the parities 
between the GCC countries’ currencies and the US dollar as well as the persistent depreciation of the 
US dollar over the past five years against the major currencies in the world, one would expect some 
significant  link,  during  the  period  of  our  sample  (2000-2008),  between  changes  in  the  nominal 
effective  exchange rates  of  the currencies  of the  GCC  countries  and  the  domestic  prices  of  these 
economies. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
88 In Asia, China is emerging as a major trading partner with the GCC countries, with respect to exports as well 
as imports (table 2 and 3). 
89 Based on GCC central Banks annual reports of 2008.  
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Figure: 3 (Ratio of GCC countries’ exports over GDP as of 2008) 
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Figure: 4 (Nominal GDP of the GCC countries) 
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Figure: 5 (GCC countries’ imports) 
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Figure: 6 (Ratio of GCC imports over GDP as of 2008)
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF
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Table: 1 (Direction of GCC countries’ exports as of 2008) 
Japan  Others 
2%  76% 
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Kuwait  8%  6%  2%  5%  16%  63% 
Oman  2%  1.00%  13%  29%  11%  44% 
Qatar  1%  6%  5%  2%  38%  48% 
Saudi 
Arabia  17%  11%  7%  9%  15%  41% 
UAE  1%  3%  5%  2%  19%  70% 
 
Source: Annual reports of the GCC countries’ central banks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table: 2 (Direction of GCC countries’ imports as of 2008) 
 
   USA  Europe  GCC  China  Japan  Others 
Bahrain  7%  14%  29%  6%  8%  36% 
Kuwait  11%  30%  9%  15%  10%  25%  
Oman  6.00% 
Qatar  9% 
Saudi 
Arabia  14% 
UAE  10% 
Source: Annual reports of the GCC countries’ central banks.
Source: DOTS, IMF.
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We can also get an initial glance at the expected magnitude of the estimated pass-through from our 
formal test in the subsequent sections by attempting to decompose and analyse the commodities that 
tems in the GCC economies’ CPI baskets 
are food stuffs and beverages, rents and housing, and transport and communication. Each of these 
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items constitutes not less than 15 to 20 percent in each of the GCC countries CPI baskets (table 3). 
Furthermore, food stuffs and rent and housing were behind most of the inflationary trends in the GCC 
countries over the past three years (table 4).  
A number of factors have contributed to the acceleration in the indices of food stuffs and rent and 
housing in the GCC countries during the period of our sample. For example, the recent inadequate 
global supply of food items was one reason behind the significant rise in the indices of these items, as 
most  of  the  consumed  products  and  goods  in  the  GCC  economies  are  imported.  The  sustained 
depreciation of the US dollar against the major trading partners of the GCC countries, during the 
period of our sample, represented a second major reason for the rise in the domestic prices of food and 
any other imported commodity prices. A further pressure was created on the domestic prices of food 
stuff through rapid economic growth, due to high revenue from  oil prices, that led to an unprecedented 
demand for additional expatriate work force
90, who in turn increased their share from imported goods 
and  services. The  large  influx  in  expatriate  labour due  to  the  economic  boom,  has  also  been the 
primarily factor for the significant increases in the rent and housing indices in the GCC countries, 
particularly in Qatar and UAE (Sturm et al., 2008). 
 
However, it is believed that the inflationary pressures experienced by the GCC economies during the 
period of our sample may not be completely reflected in the headline CPI of these countries. The 
reason for that has been the number of anti-inflationary measures introduced by the GCC countries in 
order to contain inflationary pressures. Given the limited role of their monetary policies due to the 
existing pegged systems, the GCC countries have resorted to some alternative tools to keep inflation in 
check. For example, imposing some administrated prices like announcing certain caps on permitted 
increases  in  house  rents
91,  introduction  of  further  subsidies  in  consumption  of  certain  essential 
commodities (e.g. water, energy, and food), lifting bans on certain importable items, and lowering or 
cancelling tariffs on certain imports, like steel. Further, the central banks in the GCC economies have 
further introduced additional measures like hikes in reserve requirement, tightening the lending ratio so 
to rein in fast credit growth, and increase in the volume of absorption of surplus liquidity through open 
market operations. 
                                                           
90  Basically,  labour  markets  in  the  GCC  economies  are  fragmented  between  nationals  and  expatriates. 
Expatriates represent the lion share in the private sector, which is highly flexible, and form a large share in the 
total population. On the other hand, the majority of the nationals are employed in the public sector, which is 
highly rigid (Sturm et al. 2008, Willett et al. 2009). 
91 For example a maximum annual increase of 15% in Oman, 10% in Qatar, and 7% in UAE. P a g e  | 139 
 
 
The above anti-inflationary measures that were imposed during the period of our sample suggest that 
the expected estimated pass-through from changes in the nominal exchange rates of the GCC countries 
to the inflation rates of these countries is likely to be limited and incomplete. 
 
Table: 3 (Major items of the CPI baskets of the GCC countries) 
 
   Kuwait  Oman  Qatar 
Saudi 
Arabia  UAE 
Food and beverage  19%  31%  18%  26%  15% 
Rents and Housing  27%  22%  21%  18%  36% 
Transport and 
Communication  16%  22%  23.4%  16%  15% 
 
Source: Annual reports of the GCC countries’ central banks 
 
 
Table: 4 (Contribution in Inflation by major items of CPI baskets in the GCC countries) 
 
 
Food and beverage 
 
Rents and Housing 
   2006  2007  2008  2006  2007  2008 
Kuwait  24%  16%  20%  23%  37%  33% 
Oman  51%  45%  53%  9%  28%  20% 
Qatar  11%  10%  24%  45%  44%  28% 
Saudi 
Arabia  64%  49%  39%  12%  51%  34% 
UAE  9%  8%  15%  59%  56%  39% 
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Source: Annual reports of the GCC countries’ central banks 
 
8. Preliminary Data Analysis 
 
During the period of our sample (2000-2008), the foreign exchange values of the currencies of the 
GCC countries have shown some persistent depreciation against the currencies of the major trading 
partners of these countries. According to figure (8), the NEERs of the GCC countries have declined 
considerably from the last quarter of year 2001 onwards. The primary reason for the decline is the 
pegging system of the GCC countries’ currencies to the US dollar, which has weakened significantly 
during  the  period  of  our  sample  as  depicted  in  figure  (9)
92.  As  of  December  2008,  cumulative 
depreciation in NEER, based on the average annual price index, over December 2001, stood at 20.89, 
8.98, 16.64, 21.10, 20.11, and 17.98 for Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE, 
respectively
93. Furthermore, figure (8) also reveals that the depreciations of the NEERs were associated 
with increasing inflation rates, as measured by the changes in the consumer price index, in the GCC 
economies. The 2008 year-end inflation rates, based on average annual consumer price indices, ranged 
from a single digit of 3.53 (Bahrain) to a double digit of 15.05 (Qatar) as compared to -1.22 (Bahrain) 
and 2.47 (UAE) over 2001 year-end (Table 5).  
 
Further,  another  aspect  that  deserves  mention  from  figure  (8)  is  that  inflation  rates  and  the 
depreciations of NEERs have generally moved in opposite directions during the period of our sample, 
which  confirms  the  hypothesis  of the economic theory  and provides  further evidence  for the  link 
                                                           
92 The persistent depreciation of the US dollar during the period of our sample is primarily attributed to a 
number of factors, including the continued narrowing of interest rate spreads between the US and other major 
trading partners of the US, and the greater uncertainty surrounding the economic outlook in the US, particularly 
after a number of events like the attack of  9/11, the increasing US deficit during the presidency period of W 
George Bush, and lately the sub-prime crisis that surfaced in middle of 2007 and intensified in 2008 (Annual 
Report, 2008, Central Bank of Oman).  
93 The relatively lower depreciation of the Kuwaiti Dinar exchange rate is primarily due to the fact that this 
currency is not bilaterally fixed to the US dollar, but to a weighted basket of currencies, in which the US dollar is 
believed to form the major part given that most of the Kuwaiti exports (oil) are priced in US dollars and limited 
fluctuation  occurred  vis-à-vis  the  US  dollar,  and  subsequently  the  fluctuations  vis-à-vis  GCC  countries’ 
currencies (Sturm and Siegfried, 2005). P a g e  | 141 
 
between CPI inflation and exchange rate. However, movements in exchange rates and inflation rates 
were not simultaneous. Inflations in GCC countries started to increase slowly after some lags of at least 
six months and accelerated from 2007 onward in all the GCC economies with the exception of Qatar 
and UAE, where inflation picked up relatively quickly
94. Moreover, despite that there were some ups 
(appreciations) in the exchange rate at some points of time in our sample period, however, inflation 
rates  generally  continued to increase in all the  GCC countries  with the  exception  of Bahrain and 
Kuwait,  where  there  were  some  lagged  declines  in  the  inflations  rates  (figure  8,  and  Table  5). 
Accordingly,  one  could  infer  that  depreciation  in  GCC  economies  can translate  into  a  permanent 
increase  in  inflation  rates  (through  expectation  most  probably).  Nonetheless,  this  inference  is 
unjustified as the sample of our period is characterised by an increase in the price of oil and partner 
inflation as well as persistent domestic demand, which is normally pro-cyclical to oil prices in the case 
of our sampled countries. Table (5) clearly indicates that the rising inflation rates during the period of 
our  sample  coincides  with  increases  in  oil  prices  and  partner  inflation,  suggesting  generally  the 
important role of external and supply side factors in influencing the inflationary pressures in the GCC 
economies,  as  explained  in  the  previous  section.  Yet  the  presence  of  other  potential  sources  for 
inflation in the GCC countries during the period of our sample cannot rule out the important influence 
of movement in NEERs on inflation rate in these economies, as depicted in figure (8) and table (5) and 
as have been admitted/reported by the central banks of these countries and the Public Information 
Notices (PINs) of the IMF over the late years
95. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
94 The difference in inflation performance in these two countries compared to the rest of the block is owed 
primarily to the boom in the real estate sectors during our sample period, that have driven up the rent prices in 
these two economies, and to a lesser extent their comparatively faster growing economies in recent years.  
95 E.g. see the annual report of the central banks of the GCC countries for the past three years. P a g e  | 142 
 
Figure: 8  
 
 
          
 
          
 
           
 
   Source: IFS Statistics, IMF. 
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Figure: 9 (movement in NEER for US and the GCC countries) 
 
 
 
Source: IFS Statistics, IMF. 
 
 
Table: 5  (Summery Statistics: 
Average Annual Percentage Changes) 
 
Country 
Nominal Effective Exchange 
Rate 
Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) 
Partner 
CPI  Oil Price 
Bahrain 
2001  3.78  -1.22  4.06  -13.76 
2002  -1.86  -0.50  3.36  2.41 
2003  -7.86  1.68  3.65  15.41 
2004  -5.08  2.25  3.57  32.74 
2005  -0.77  2.62  3.63  42.14 
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
US
UAE
Saudi Arabia
Qatar
Oman
Kuwait
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2006  -0.38  2.04  3.52  20.12 
2007  -4.24  3.25  3.84  11.20 
2008  -2.62  3.53  5.64  34.31 
Kuwait 
2001  6.03  1.45  4.06  -13.76 
2002  -0.47  0.80  3.36  2.41 
2003  -5.94  0.99  3.65  15.41 
2004  -3.91  1.26  3.57  32.74 
2005  0.45  4.12  3.63  42.14 
2006  0.59  3.09  3.52  20.12 
2007  -2.17  5.47  3.84  11.20 
2008  2.37  10.50  5.64  34.31 
Oman  
2001  3.74  -0.84  4.06  -13.76 
2002  -1.11  -0.33  3.36  2.41 
2003  -6.34  0.17  3.65  15.41 
2004  -4.39  0.67  3.57  32.74 
2005  -0.28  1.85  3.63  42.14 
2006  0.19  3.44  3.52  20.12 
2007  -3.28  5.89  3.84  11.20 
2008  -2.59  12.61  5.64  34.31 
Qatar 
2001  4.28  1.44  4.06  -13.76 
2002  -1.80  0.24  3.36  2.41 
2003  -7.90  2.26  3.65  15.41 
2004  -5.30  6.80  3.57  32.74 
2005  -0.86  8.81  3.63  42.14 P a g e  | 145 
 
2006  -0.37  11.83  3.52  20.12 
2007  -4.24  13.76  3.84  11.20 
2008  -2.60  15.05  5.64  34.31 
Saudi Arabia 
2001  5.16  -1.14  4.06  -13.76 
2002  -1.58  0.23  3.36  2.41 
2003  -7.30  0.59  3.65  15.41 
2004  -4.93  0.36  3.57  32.74 
2005  -0.67  0.63  3.63  42.14 
2006  -0.32  2.31  3.52  20.12 
2007  -4.10  4.11  3.84  11.20 
2008  -3.00  9.87  5.64  34.31 
UAE 
2001  4.21  2.74  4.06  -13.76 
2002  -1.80  2.93  3.36  2.41 
2003  -6.86  3.16  3.65  15.41 
2004  -4.21  5.02  3.57  32.74 
2005  -0.32  6.19  3.63  42.14 
2006  -0.26  9.27  3.52  20.12 
2007  -4.31  11.12  3.84  11.20 
2008  -1.59  11.45  5.64  34.31 
 
Source: The World Economic Outlook, IMF 
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9. Unit Root Test 
 
Our first step in the estimation process is to determine the order of integration of the variables. We 
have applied two unit root tests namely the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and the Phillip-
Perron (PP) test
96. The general form for the ADF test, including a constant and a linear trend, is 
presented in equation (5). Optimal lags were selected using Schwarz Criterion (SIC).  With respect to 
the PP test, we selected the truncation lag for the variance estimate test by the rule of thumb suggested 
by Newey-West. The summary for the unit root tests is given in table (6). It is clear that all the 
variables are non-stationary at their level, however, their first difference is integrated of order zero I(0). 
 
t
p
i
i t i t t u y y t a y + D + + + = D ∑
=
- -
1
1 d b a             (5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
96 The PP test is a modification of the ADF t statistics that takes into account the less restrictive nature of the 
error terms (Asteriou and Hall, 2007). P a g e  | 147 
 
 
Table: 6 (Unit Root Tests) 
Country 
 
ADF  PP  Integration 
  Constant  Trend  Constant  Trend   
Bahrain           
LCPI  (0) -2.89**  (0) -0.02  (6) -2.39  (6) -0.29  I(1) 
DLCPI  (4) -1.92  (0) -12.36***  (7) -11.98***  (6) -12.34***  I(0) 
LNEER  (1) -1.02  (1) -2.67  (4) -0.87  (4) -2.41  I(1) 
DLNEER  (0) -7.07***  (0) -7.04***  (0) -7.08***  (0) -7.04***  I(0) 
Kuwait           
LCPI  (0) 4.35  (0) 1.23  (6) 5.34  (5) 1.76  I(1) 
DLCPI  (0) -9.80  (0) -11.13***  (6) -10.17***  (2) -11.08***  I(0) 
LNEER  (0) -1.30  (1) -2.46  (3) -1.38  (3) -2.28  I(1) 
DLNEER  (0) -8.02***  (0) -7.98***  (2) -7.96***  (2) -7.62***  I(0) 
Oman           
LCPI  (0) 9.33  (0) 2.94  (3) 8.82  (2) 3.05  I(1) 
DLCPI  (4) -1.02  (0) -8.60***  (5) -5.65***  (5) -8.90***  I(0) 
LNEER  (1) -0.97  (1) -2.57  (4) -0.87  (4) -2.56  I(1) 
DLNEER  (0) -7.83***  (0) -7.80***  (2) -7.82***  (2) -7.79***  I(0) 
Saudi 
Arabia           
LCPI  (0) 8.17  (0) 2.70  (6) 6.09  (5) 2.16  I(1) 
DLCPI  (5) -1.39  (5) -2.09  (7) -6.65***  (7) -9.42***  I(0) 
DLCPI
2  (4) -7.62***  (4) -7.54***      I(0) 
LNEER  (1) -0.98  (1) -2.77  (4) -0.90  (4) -2.66  I(1) P a g e  | 148 
 
 
Note: Figures in brackets next to statistics represent number of lags in the test, *, **, *** denotes 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. CPI = Consumer price index, NEER = Nominal 
effective exchange rate, FCPI = partner consumer price index, WPI = producer price index, OP = Oil 
price, L = log, D = first difference.  
 
10. Correlation analysis
97 
 
To  further  assess  the  dynamic  relationship  between  inflation  rate  and  exchange  rate  in  the  GCC 
economies we performed cross correlation tests 
98. The cross correlation results in table (7) confirm 
earlier observation about the movement between exchange rate and inflation rate in the GCC countries 
and reveal further information about the magnitude of the link between these two variables. It can be 
                                                           
97 Due to data availability in Qatar and UAE, our analysis from this section onward will be focused on four GCC 
countries  namely,  Bahrain,  Kuwait,  Oman,  and  Saudi  Arabia.  However,  as  mentioned  earlier,  the  inferred 
implications from the estimated results of the four sampled countries can be applied to the entire GCC area 
given the similarity in the structure and conditions of the economies of the GCC state members. 
98 Due to the fact that the economic theory predicts lagged relationship between changes in exchange rate and 
changes  in  inflation  rate,  the  simple  correlation  coefficient  is  viewed  inadequate  to  characterise  the  link 
between the two variables (Tsay, 2002).  
DLNEER  (0) -7.48***  (0) -7.44***  (1) -7.48***  (1) -7.46***  I(0) 
Common 
Var.           
LWPI 
(0) 0.97 
(3) -2.48  (5) 1.04  (5) -2.76  I(1) 
DLWPI 
(1) -4.82***  (2) -4.81*** 
(5) -10.76***  (5) -10.96***  I(0) 
LIMP 
(0) 2.03  (0) -1.50  (1) 2.40  (2) -1.29 
I(1) 
DLIMP 
(0) -11.57***  (0) -12.57*** 
(6) -11.48***  (0) -12.57***  I(0) 
LFCPI  (1) -0.51  (1) -2.96  (5) -0.13  (5) -2.21  I(1) 
DLFCPI  (0) -4.57***  (0) -4.52***  (4) -4.71***  (4) -4.66***  I(0) 
LOP  (1) -1.26  (1) -1.84  (4) -1.29  (4) -1.86  I(1) 
DLOP  (0) -8.26***  (0) -8.25***  (3) -8.31***  (3) -8.30***  I(0) P a g e  | 149 
 
observed from table (7) that there is a significant lagged relationship between changes in exchange rate 
and  inflation rate. However,  this dynamic  relationship  is  generally  weak  as evident  from the low 
coefficients  of  correlation  in  the  significant  lags.    The  significant  correlations  range  in  between 
negative 0.27 to positive 0.27. The relatively higher coefficient of correlations in Bahrain and Kuwait 
at lag one reflects that changes in exchange rates filters more quickly into inflation rates in these two 
countries as compared to the other two countries in the sample. Moreover, the positive coefficient of 
Kuwait at lag one contradicts the PPP theory, given our definition of NEER. However, the positive 
sign suggests that appreciation increases the purchasing power of domestic savings (the wealth effect), 
leading  to  more  spending  and  higher  inflation  (Kandil  and  Mirzaie  (2002).      Generally,  the  low 
correlation coefficients initially suggest that inflation in the GCC countries is not strongly influenced 
by fluctuations in exchange rate. 
 
 
Table: 7 (Correlation between changes in NEER and inflation rate; DCPIt+i) 
 
Country 
Period  Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Saudi Arabia 
 DCPIt  -0.01  0.02  0.03  -0.07* 
 DCPIt+1  -0.27***  0.27***  -0.01  0.06* 
 DCPIt+2  -0.05*  0.15*  0.04  -0.01 
 DCPIit+3  -0.06*  -0.01  0.08*  -0.11* 
 DCPIt+4  -0.01  0.04  0.00  -0.01 
 DCPIt+5  -0.05*  0.01  0.03  -0.15** 
 DCPIt+6  -0.09*  -0.02  0.08*  -0.09* 
 DCPIt+7  0.00  0.08*  0.02  -0.05* 
 DCPIt+8  -0.10*  -0.03  -0.02  0.01 
 DCPIt+9  -0.13*  0.10*  -0.07*  -0.02 
 DCPIt+10  -0.17**  0.02  0.07*  0.00 
 DCPIt+11  -0.06*  0.07*  0.04  0.04 P a g e  | 150 
 
 DCPIt+12  -0.10*  0.02  0.09*  0.01 
 
Note: *, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. D stands for changes in 
consumer price index (first difference). 
 
 
11. Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Estimation 
 
Given the results from the unit root tests, we estimated our OLS model with first differenced variables. 
By estimating the model in first differences we are ignoring the possible co-integration among the 
variables. The OLS regression was used for each country separately to estimate the extent of the pass-
through.  Furthermore,  since  we  have  a  reasonably  large  sample,  we  applied  the  Newey-West 
Autocorrelation  and  Heteroscedasticity  to  correct  the  OLS  standard  errors  for  autocorrelation  and 
heteroscedasticity (Gujarati, 2003).  We relied on the available information criterion (e.g. AIC and 
SIC, etc) to decide on the optimal lag length for the explanatory variables. Generally, the optimal lag 
length for the countries in our sample ranged between a minimum of 5 (for Kuwait) and a maximum of 
8 lags (Bahrain). 
 
Table (8) summarises the results from the OLS estimation (Detailed OLS results are presented in 
Appendix 2). As per the estimation results, it appears that the depreciation of exchange rates of the 
GCC  countries  currencies  is  associated  with  increases  in  final  goods  prices  in  the  short-run,  as 
evidenced  by  a  number  of  significant  coefficients  of  the  exchange  rate,  which  reject  the  null 
hypothesis. Also, the results provide further support for the theoretical assumption regarding the lagged 
effect of changes in the exchange rate on inflation. Nonetheless, the estimated short term pass-through 
from exchange rate to inflation is very modest as the significant negative coefficients of exchange rate 
ranged between a minimum of 0.03  (Bahrain) to a maximum of only 0.16 (Oman). Accordingly, a 10 
percent depreciation in the exchange rate increases inflation (measured by changes in consumer price 
index) rates by 0.3 to 1.6 percent in the short run in the GCC economies. Furthermore, such an increase 
in the inflation rate following depreciation in exchange rate is expected to take effect not before a lag 
of at least one to three months.  
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The calculated long-run pass-through, relying on the estimated coefficients from the OLS regressions, 
is 13%, -15%, -69%, and -10% for Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Saudi Arabia, respectively. These 
figures clearly suggest the rejection of our second hypothesis for the complete pass-through from 
exchange rate to inflation rate as they are (the figures) less than 100%, hence confirming our earlier 
expectation  from  the  analysis  of  the  GCC  countries’  CPI  baskets.  Furthermore,  a  Wald  test  was 
performed to double check for complete ERPT in the long-run in the GCC economies. However, the 
hypothesis for full pass-through was rejected as the P-values were almost zero for all the countries. 
Hence, suggesting that the PPP theory does not hold for the GCC economies. 
 
Further, the magnitude of the calculated long-run pass-through for Oman is quite puzzling given the 
similarity in economic structure between the GCC countries, particularly if we consider the structure of 
imports during our sample period (table 9). However, generally the results suggest that in the long-run, 
the impact from exchange rate changes to inflation rates in the GCC countries range, in absolute terms,  
between a minimum of around 10% to a maximum of around 69%, with an average of around 27%. 
   
In terms of robustness, we tried to examine the sensitivity of the above results to some variation in the 
specification of equation (4). Oil prices in the case of our sample might not be considered to be a good 
representative of exogenous shocks because they were controlled by the state during the period of our 
sample, resulting in a cushioning of the impact of international price shocks on domestic energy prices. 
Furthermore, given the significantly high correlation between changes in the variables of oil prices and 
trading partners CPI (table 10), we have re-estimated our above OLS regressions for each country in 
our sample without the oil price variable. We have also re-estimated the regressions by including a 
dummy variable to account for the Iraqi War in 2003. However, we did not find very significant 
changes in the extent of pass-through from exchange rate to consumer prices under both the above 
suggested alternatives in specification.    
 
In  order  to  compare  the  ERPT  on  inflation  with  ERPT  on  other  aggregate  domestic  prices,  we 
replicated the OLS estimation but with import price index and producer price index as dependant 
variables. Tables (11) and (12) report the results from the OLS regressions for producer prices and 
import prices, respectively. It may be noted that in both tables, almost all the coefficients of exchange 
rate are correctly signed and statistically significant, particularly, those from the regressions of import 
prices. As per the result in table (11), producer prices are more elastic then consumer prices since P a g e  | 152 
 
coefficients of exchange rate are significant during the first month from changes in exchange rate, in 
the  majority  of  our  sampled  countries.  Nearly  half  the  adjustment  in  producer  prices,  following 
changes in exchange rate, takes place in three months time and full adjustment occurs within the first 
seven months time in all four countries. Furthermore, the magnitude of changes in aggregate producer 
index  following  exchange  rate  changes,  albeit  less  than  one,  is  relatively  higher  than  our  above 
estimated changes in inflation rate. This is expected since producer price index is assumed to contain 
higher share of traded goods than CPI index.  
 
With  regard  to  import  prices,  our  estimated  pass-through  in  all  four  of  our  sampled  countries  is 
considerably higher than the above estimation for producer prices and consumer prices. Around 50 to 
80 percent of adjustments in import prices occur within the first month following changes in exchange 
rate  and  around  40  to  60  percent  of  adjustments  take  place  in  the  second  month,  suggesting  an 
accumulated change of more than 100 percent. Out of the aggregate price indices, the import price 
index in each country in our sample is the most elastic and the highest in reaction to changes in 
exchange rate. This of course can be explained by the fact that the import price index includes the 
largest share of tradable goods compared to producer price and consumer price indices. The results also 
suggest that the pass-through from whole sale price to consumer price is low. 
 
 
Table:8 
OLS estimation for the effect of changes in exchange rate on inflation rates in GCC economies 
(2000: 01-2008:12) 
 
  Country 
Variable  Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Saudi Arabia 
DL(NEER)  0.01  0.00  -0.06  -0.02 
DL(NEER),-1  0.00  -0.06  0.11***  -0.02 
DL(NEER),-2  0.01  -0.04  -0.11***  0.00 
DL(NEER),-3  0.02  -0.13*  0.03  0.00 P a g e  | 153 
 
DL(NEER),-4  -0.04  -0.05  0.05  -0.04* 
DL(NEER),-5  0.00  0.07  -0.16***  0.00 
DL(NEER),-6  0.03*    0.05  -0.01 
DL(NEER),-7  -0.05*       
DL(NEER),-8  0.05**       
Adjusted R-squared  0.40  0.45  0.66  0.52 
S. E of regression  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
LM test   0.32  0.51  0.28  0.21 
 
Note: NEER: nominal effective exchange rate, D: first difference, *,**,*** denotes significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. D = first difference, L = logs 
 
 
Table: 9 (The structure of imports in the GCC countries during 2000-2008) 
 
Country  Imports/GDP 
Bahrain  0.60 
Kuwait  0.20 
Oman  0.32 
Qatar  0.23 
Saudi Arabia  0.20 
UAE  0.60 
 
    Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF 
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Table: 10 Pairwise Correlation Matrix 
 
Variable  DLOG(WCPI)  DLOG(OP) 
DL(FCPI)  1  0.58 
DL(OP)  0.58  1 
 
Note: FCPI = trading partner inflation, OP = Oil price, D = monthly changes, L = logs. 
 
 
Table: 11 OLS estimation for the effect of changes in exchange rate on producer prices in GCC 
economies (2000: 01-2008:12) 
 
   Country 
Variable  Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Saudi Arabia 
DL(NEER)  -0.10**  -0.04  -0.10*  -0.10* 
DL(NEER), -1  -0.01  -0.08  0.01  -0.02 
DL(NEER), -2  -0.01  -0.02  -0.01  -0.01 
DL(NEER), -3  -0.14**  -0.15***  -0.16**  -0.13** 
DL(NEER), -4  -0.02  -0.04  0.04  0.02 
DL(NEER), -5  -0.05  -0.03  -0.07  -0.10 
DL(NEER), -6  -0.11  -0.08  -0.11  -0.10 
DL(NEER), -7  0.20**  0.19***  0.25***  0.20*** 
DL(NEER), -8      -0.03   
Adjusted R-squared  0.33  0.32  0.33  0.30 
S. E of regression  0  0.01  0  0 
LM test   0.80  0.78  0.93  0.84 
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Note: NEER: nominal effective exchange rate, *,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels respectively. As per the information criterion, the optimal lag length is 7 for Bahrain, Kuwait, 
and Saudi Arabia, and 8 for Oman, D = first difference, L = logs. 
 
Table: 12 OLS estimation for the effect of changes in exchange rate on import prices in GCC 
economies (2000: 01-2008:12) 
 
   Country 
Variable  Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Saudi Arabia 
DLNEER  -0.68***  -0.53***  -0.80***  -0.69*** 
DL(NEER),-1  -0.43*  -0.62***  -0.49**  -0.41** 
Adjusted R-squared  0.37  0.28  0.30  0.35 
S. E of regression  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02 
LM test  0.30  0.20  0.30  0.24 
 
Note: NEER: Nominal Effective Exchange Rate, D: first difference, *,**,*** denotes significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. As per the information criterion, the optimal lag length for all 
the countries is one. 
 
12. Summary and Conclusion 
 
This  chapter  attempted  to  understand  and  analyse  the  nature  of  exchange  rate  pass-through  into 
domestic CPI inflation in the GCC countries on account of the recent inflationary development in the 
region. It used an ordinary least square method to estimate the extent of pass-through from changes in 
the  effective  exchange  rate  of  the  individual  GCC  countries  to  their  domestic  CPI  inflation.  The 
estimation used monthly data from January 2000 to December 2008. 
 
 The main findings of the estimated model reflected a rejection of both the null hypotheses. The pass-
through in the short-run was found statistically significant in a number of cases for all four countries. P a g e  | 156 
 
However, the magnitude of the coefficients turned out to be very modest, with a maximum significant 
short-run  pass-through  of  around  16%  in  the  case  of  Oman.  Accordingly,  a  10%  depreciation  in 
exchange rate increased inflation rates (measured by changes in consumer price index) in the GCC 
region by a maximum amount of 1.6% in the short-run. On the other hand, long-run pass-through 
ranged between a minimum of 10% (Saudi Arabia) to a maximum of 69% (Oman), with an average of 
around  27%,  hence,  clearly  indicating  the  failure  of  the  PPP  theory  in  the  context  of  the  GCC 
economies as the pass-through is incomplete in all cases. 
 
We have further stretched our estimation by using the import price index and producer price index as 
the dependent variables in order to compare the ERPT on inflation with ERPT on other aggregate 
domestic prices. The Producer Price Index in all four countries was found significant and more elastic 
then consumer price index, with an average extent of pass-through of less than one and equal to around 
21% in the short-run. On the other hand, the estimated extent of pass-through into import prices is 
considerably higher than in producer and consumer prices, with an average magnitude of around 70% 
in the short-run. Out of the aggregate price indices, import indices in all the countries of our sample are 
the most elastic and highest in reaction to changes in exchange rates. This of course can be explained 
by  the  fact  that  the  import  price  index  includes  the  largest  share  of  tradable  goods  compared  to 
producer and consumer indices. Such results suggest that the pass-through from whole sale prices to 
consumer prices is low. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Exchange Rate Pass-Through into Inflation Rate: A Case Study on the GCC Countries using 
Vector Error Correction Method 
 
1. Introduction 
   
This chapter contains a re-estimation of the extent of the ERPT into inflation rate of the GCC countries 
using a vector error correct method (VECM). Additionally it is important to note, that despite our effort 
in the previous chapter to correct for some of the deficiencies while applying the OLS technique in 
measuring the ERPT, there are still some doubts concerning the legitimacy of the results due to a 
number of criticisms surrounding the OLS techniques. This means further justifying of the idea of 
testing  the  robustness  of  the  results  by  applying  another  commonly  applied  technique,  instead  of 
depending solely on the results from the OLS method.  Using two different methods form in fact 
further  cross-check  on  the  estimated  results,  on  which  we  will  base  our  implications  and 
recommendations. 
 
Furthermore, a major drawback in the single equation techniques is that they do not allow for the 
endogenous determination between the variables in the model. They a priori assume the dependent 
variable as endogenous to the movements/changes in independent variables, which are assumed to be 
exogenous. However, number of recent studies (e.g. Taylor, 2000) have argued that pricing strategies 
of firms does not depend only on the market conditions (e.g. competition, business cycle, etc.), but also 
on monetary policy or expected future of monetary policy (Bandt and Banerjee, 2008).  For example 
according to Taylor (2000) the extent of pass-through from exchange rate to domestic prices depends 
on the inflationary environment of a nation. Low inflation environment decreases the extent of pass-
through, because the later reflects the expected impact of monetary shocks on current and future costs, 
which  in  turn  are  reduced  by  a  stable  inflation  environment  (Choudhri  and  Hakura,  2006).  Such 
argument has also been advocated by number of other theoretical and empirical studies including P a g e  | 158 
 
Choudhri and Hakura (2006), Devereux and Yetman (2002), McCarthy (2000), and Gagnon and Ihrig 
(2004)
99. 
Also,  by  employing  a  single  equation  technique  with  variables  in  first  difference  we  are  simply 
disregarding the majority of the theories in the literature of ERPT with regard to the long-run or steady 
state relationship in the levels of variables (Bandt and Banerjee, 2008). In fact this has been the case of 
most the empirical studies that failed to find a co-integration relationship between the variables prior to 
estimating the pass-through using the single equation methods or any other techniques like VAR. 
Accordingly, we intend to extend our analysis of the ERPT in the GCC by testing for the co-integration 
link. 
 
The outline of the reminder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section two presents the estimation 
model. The estimation and analysis of the results are presented in section three. Section four discusses 
the potential factors for higher long-run ERPT in the GCC countries, while section five discusses 
factors for incomplete ERPT in the GCC countries. Potential policy implications is given in section six, 
and summery and conclusion are presented in section seven.    
 
3- Estimation Model 
 
Conventional theory in the literature of exchange rate pass-through (ERPT) states that the level of our 
variables is linked in the long-term
100. According to Engel and Granger (1987), if a linear combination 
of two or more non-stationary variables is stationary, then these variables are said to be co-integrated, 
with the co-integrating equation interpreted to represent a long-run equilibrium relationship among the 
variables.  The  existence  of  co-integration  implies  the  presence  of  a  vector  error  correction 
representation showing the short run adjustment to the long-run equilibrium among the variables.  
 
                                                           
99 Also, according to Betts and Devereux (2000) the extent of local currency pricing limits the degree of 
exchange rate pass-through and in the same time amplifies nominal and real exchange rate volatility. 
100 According to the PPP theory, there should be a co-integrating relation between the exchange rate, the foreign 
price index, and the home price index, with a co-integrating vector of (1,1,-1) (Choudhri and Hakura, 2001). P a g e  | 159 
 
Accordingly, in this chapter we try to overcome some of the drawbacks that exist in earlier studies by 
simply using a co-integrating analysis with a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM). The strength of 
the VECM is its ability to incorporate short-run dynamics with long-run equilibrium relations among 
the variables
101 (Kim, 1998). In our model inflation is explained in terms of: past inflation, exchange 
rate, partner inflation, and oil prices (simply the same variables as in the preceding OLS estimation in 
chapter three): 
 
  P = ƒ(St, P
*, P
oil)                (1) 
 
  
Where Pt is the domestic CPI, St is the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER), 
*
t P   is the trading 
partner CPI, and
oil
t P is the oil price. The Johansen approach will be used to establish the co-integration 
link between the variables. Our error-correction equation for the price level will take the following 
form:  
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The first line in equation (2) shows the long-run dynamics of inflation and the second line shows the 
short-run dynamics of inflation. The coefficient  d represents the speed by which the inflation rate 
converges to its equilibrium. We have included a dummy variable to account for the Iraqi War in 2003. 
 
Further, some studies such as Hakkio and Rush (1991) argued that the frequency of the observations 
plays minor role in investigation co-integration links and that the time span is much more important 
than the frequency of the observation in studying co-integration. However, in a very recent study Zhou 
(2001), who despite agreeing with the argument regarding the importance of the time span in exploring 
co-integration relationships, has presented evidence suggesting that the use of a small sample of 30 to 
                                                           
101 A VECM is basically a restricted version of VAR in first differences of variables with an additional error 
correction term, with the VAR being a priori restricted by the presence of a co-integrating relationship. P a g e  | 160 
 
50 annual observations instead of more observations of higher frequency data can result in lower 
powerful tests for co-integration. Furthermore, Zhou (2001) has found that the use of small sample of 
annual data is particularly inappropriate for the application of the Johansen co-integration tests even if 
the data sets spans half century. Zhou (2001) has suggested based on his findings that studies that are 
limited with short time span of less than 50 years to use high frequency data in order to compensate for 
the loss in the power of the tests.  
 
In the context of our sample of countries, there is the problem of data availability, particularly in high 
frequency  data,  for  which  a  consistent  database  is generally  available  from  the  beginning  of  this 
decade. Furthermore, available data base of annual data is also relatively short and spans less than 40 
years for most the macroeconomic variables. Accordingly, we based our co-integration analysis using 
monthly data from January 2000 to December 2008.   
 
3. Estimation and results analysis 
 
First we tested for the co-integration test between our variables using the Johansen procedure
102. This 
test suggests a maximum likelihood estimation procedure that provides two test statistics (maximal 
eigenvalue statistic and trace statistic) for determining the number of co-integrating vectors as well as 
estimate of all co-integrating vectors that could exit among a group of variables. Furthermore, the 
Johansen test specifies three models; 1) non-trended variables, which presumes that there is no linear 
trend in the level and the underlying data generating process;2) trended variables, no trend in the data 
generating  process,  which  presumes  that  all  level  variables  have  deterministic  trend;  3)  trended 
variables, trend in the underlying data generating process, which presumes that variables as well as the 
underlying data generating process have deterministic trend (Asteriou and Hall, 2007). Nonetheless, 
given the fact that our variables show rising trends, the relevant models are 2 and 3.  Johansen (1992) 
                                                           
102 Another method for testing for co-integration was introduced by Engle and Granger (1987). This approach 
relies on looking for co-integration by testing weather the residuals from the long run relationship is stationary. 
However, despite its simplicity, this way is found to suffer from number of weakness. For example, this approach 
does not say anything about which of the variables can be used as regressor and why. Another weakness is that in 
the case of more than two variables in the system, E&G approach does not give the number of co-integrating 
vectors. One last weakness is that it relies on two-step estimator, so if any error was made in the first step it will 
be carried out into the second step (Asteriou and Hall, 2007). P a g e  | 161 
 
suggest the use of the so-called Pantula principle to decide on one of the models to use for testing for 
co-integration
103.  
We relied on several information criterions for deciding on the optimal lag length for the explanatory 
variables. The primary objective from selecting an optimal lag length in order to come up with a model 
that features good diagnostic results in terms of e.g. autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, and normality. 
By taking into account the above information, the optimal lag length for the countries of our sample 
ranged between one (for Kuwait) to seven lags (Oman). 
 
The optimal error correction model is linear with intercept and no trend for all the four countries in our 
sample (model 2).  The results for the co-integration test for the models of the four countries are 
presented in table (1). The table shows the LR test based on trace statistics and maximal eigenvalue 
statistic. Both tests  generally  suggest  the rejection  of  no  co-integration in all models  for  the four 
countries. Specifically, the trace statistics indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis of zero co-
integration for Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. However, the maximal eigenvalue statistics 
indicated the rejection of zero co-integration only in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, but it failed to report 
any co-integration in case of Kuwait and Oman. Based on both tests we could conclude that there 
appear to be one co-integration for all the countries and that testing for more one co-integration is 
highly rejected by both tests.  
                                                           
103 Generally speaking, the Johansen (1988, 1991) maximum likelihood method help overcome the limitations 
found in other co-integration methods (e.g. Engle and Granger) by avoiding the use of two-steps estimators,  
allowing to test for multiple con-integrating vectors, and allowing to test restricted version of the co-integrating 
vectors and speed of adjustment parameters (Asteriou and Hall, 2007). Additionally, Johansen approach does 
not require that all the variable in the system are of the same order of integration, which mean having some 
variables that are near-integrated or stationary is theoretically not an issue (Hjalmarsson and Osterholm 2007, 
Asteriou and Hall, 2007). However, number of studies has suggested that the Johansen tests (trace and max 
eginvalue) suffer from number of shortcomings. For example, the strict unit root assumption for at least some 
of the variables in the system render the results from such tests as spurious since unit root tests have very 
limited power to distinguish between a unit-root and a close alternative (Hjalmarsson and Osterholm 2007). 
There is also the problem of the finite-sample bias which affect the power and the size of the tests. The 
Johansen tests have the tendency to over reject the null hypothesis due to small sample bias (Gregory 1994, 
Harris and Judge, 1998). However, both tests are generally found to have similar properties with respect to 
small sample power (Lutkepohl et al 2001). Final problem concerns the sensitivity of the tests to the number of 
lag length in order to have Gaussian error term (Bewley and Yang 1998, Asteriou and Hall, 2007).  
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Table: 1  
Co-integration Tests 
 
Johansen Maximum Likelihood Procedure (Trended case, No trend in DGP)  
Cointegration LR Test Based on Trace Statistic 
Null  Alter  Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Saudi Arabia 
0  1 
67.46* 
(47.86) 
57.87* 
(47.86) 
61.16* 
(47.86) 
78.19* 
(47.86) 
1  2 
21.25 
(29.80) 
23.77 
(29.80) 
24.80 
(29.80) 
29.0 
(29.80) 
2  3 
10.98 
(15.50) 
12.61 
(15.50) 
14.46 
(15.50) 
14.57 
(15.50) 
3  4 
0.01 
(3.84) 
2.97 
(3.84) 
  4.60 
(3.84) 
2.16 
(3.84) 
Cointegration LR Test Based on Maximal Eigenvalue Statistic 
           
Null  Alter  Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Saudi Arabia 
0  1 
36.20* 
(27.58) 
24.10 
(27.58) 
26.36 
(27.58) 
39.01* 
(27.58) 
1  2 
20.27 
(21.13) 
21.16 
(21.13) 
18.34 
(21.13) 
19.72 
(21.12) 
2  3 
10.98 
(14.26) 
9.64 
(14.26) 
11.90 
(14.26) 
13.42 
(14.26) 
3  4 
0.01 
(3.84) 
2.97 
(3.84) 
4.58 
(3.84) 
2.16 
(3.84) 
 
Note: * donates the rejection of the null hypothesis of no co-integration between the variables under 
5% level of significance. Critical values are in brackets. P a g e  | 163 
 
Tables (A1 to A4) in Appendix (3) show the results from the estimates of the VECM for each country 
in our sample
104.  The estimates for the long-run co-integration price equations for each country could 
be presented as follows:    
  
Bahrain →   
oil
t t p p s p 09 . 0 27 . 0 54 . 0 + - - =
*          
                     (-3.87)    (-1.42)    (2.85) 
Kuwait →  
oil
t t p p s p 01 . 0 78 . 0 57 . 0 + + =
*                                     
      (3.28)      (4.53)     (0.20) 
Oman →     
oil
t p p p 05 . 0 45 . 1 54 . 0 + * - - =                                    
      (-1.78)    (-3.12)    (0.89) 
Saudi →      
oil
t t p p s p 02 . 0 60 . 0 65 . 0 - - - =
*                                                   (-
3.98)      (-2.86)  (-0.52)  
                         
The estimates of the long-run pass-through from exchange rate to domestic prices in the GCC countries 
are  significant  in  all  our  four  sampled  countries.  Furthermore,  the  sign  of  the  coefficient  of  the 
exchange rate is, as expected, negative for Bahrain, Oman
105 and Saudi Arabia, however, it is positive 
for Kuwait
106107. Also the coefficients of the exchange rates in all the four estimated models are less 
                                                           
104 Respective diagnostic tests for all the VECM have generally showed that the estimated models are stable as 
the  calculated  roots  of  the  characteristic  polynomial  are  located  within  the  unit  circle.  Furthermore,  the 
multivariate LM tests statistics for residual serial correlation could not reject the null of no autocorrelation. 
Heteroscedasticity test could not be rejected in all countries. The Jarque-Bera test as suggested by Urzua (1996) 
had failed to reject the hypothesis of normality in all the countries with exception to Bahrain. However, the 
rejection of normality should not totally invalidate the Monte Carlo tests for serial correlation, which should still 
be accurate, though not exact (see appendix 3).   
105 It is quite difficult to explain why trading partner inflation would have an effect that is higher than one (as 
predicted by the theory) in case of Oman, which is like the rest of the countries in the sample an open economy 
with very low and stable tariff system. 
106 The positive sign for Kuwait could be explained that due to the appreciation of the currency (dinar) increases 
the purchasing power of wealth, stimulating higher expenditure and price inflation in the long-run. Alternatively, 
the positive sign suggests that inflation  could be affected by many other factors that also influence the demand 
for and the supply of exports and imports in this economy. For example, if an appreciation of the nominal 
effective exchange rate of this country is accompanied by a reduced foreign supply, or by an increased domestic 
demand for imports, due to say a rapid growth in the money supply or income, the impact of the exchange rate on P a g e  | 164 
 
than one, which indicates that the PPP theory does not hold in the GCC countries, hence confirming 
earlier results of the OLS estimation. Nonetheless, the estimated individual long-run elasticities of 
prices to changes in exchange rate are significantly higher than those  estimated using our earlier OLS 
technique which suggest that depreciation in the nominal effective exchange rates plays  a significant 
role in driving inflation in the long-run in the GCC countries. We can also note that the pass-through 
coefficients are very close from each other and they range from 0.54 (Oman) to 0.65 (Saudi Arabia). A 
10 percent depreciation of exchange rate in the GCC countries will increase inflation in the long-run by 
5.4 to 6.5 percent.  
 
With regard to the short-run dynamics, despite bearing the correct expected negative sign, they were 
insignificant in all of the cases with exception to Oman, for which the coefficient of the exchange rate 
is found to have significant impact after two lags, however, with low magnitude of around 0.1, which 
is relatively less than the maximum estimated pass-through using the OLS technique in the previous 
chapter. The coefficient on the lagged error correction term for inflation is on average positive 0.03. 
That means if the price level was lower than the long run equilibrium level in the previous period by 
one percentage point, 3 percent of this deviation is adjusted for every month, so it takes around three 
years for inflation to adjust to its long-run equilibrium. Accordingly, that suggests that inflation is 
persistent. 
 
By comparing our results for the extent of ERPT in the GCC countries with earlier estimates for other 
economies, we find our results broadly similar to earlier estimates, regardless of the applied methods, 
in  some  industrial  as  well  as  emerging  countries.  For  example,  Gagnon  and  Ihrig  (2004),  who 
estimated the pass-through for 20 industerlized countries for the period from 1971 to 2003, reported a 
pass-through coefficient that ranged between 0.02 (Sweden) to 0.53 (Greece). Other similar result to 
ours  were  reported  by  Mihaljek  and  Klau  (2001),  who  used  OLS  with  quarterly  data  from  1981 
through 2001 to analyse ERPT in 13 emerging economies. Their estimated pass-through for some of 
their countries (Mexico, Hungary, and Turkey) ranged from 0.36 to 0.56. Choudhri and Hakura (2006), 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
the consumer prices would likely be neutralized or consumer prices may even rise (Kim, 1998).  In addition to 
that it could also be explained by the recent frequent adjustment in the exchange rate parity of the Kuwaiti 
currency by the authority following the recent increases in consumer prices. 
107 The presence of wrong sign for some of the variables in our models can be attributed to factors like data 
availability and price regulations for some items in the index of consumer prices by the local authority in the 
GCC countries.  P a g e  | 165 
 
who estimated ERPT for different economic regions, reported an average pass-through, for low and 
moderate inflation countries including industrial ones (inflation less than 10% and from 10% to 30%, 
respectively) that ranged from 0.16 to 0.35. However, in the moderate category, most of the estimates 
were from 0.3 to 0.60, an estimate which is very much similar in magnitude to our results. Another 
finding similar to ours include the one reported by Dobrynskaya and Levando (2005), who estimated a 
long-run pass-through into aggregate consumer price index of around 40% for Russia during the period 
from 1995 to 2002. 
 
Further, we stretched our comparison to include the estimates of those studies that have focused on 
episode of large devaluations or financial crises. For example De Grauwe and Tullio (1994), who 
focused on the inflationary effect of the depreciations of 1992-1993 in Europe, have estimated an 
ERPT  that  on average  ranged  from  0.3  to  0.4.  In  a  broader  study,  Goldfajn  and  Werlang  (2000) 
analysed the pass-through for 71 countries following large devaluations and have reported a pass-
through coefficient of around 0.5 and 0.9 for developing and emerging markets, respectively. Their 
estimated pass-through for Europe was around 0.5. 
 
3.1 Analysis of Impulse Responses and Variance Decomposition 
 
The impulse response functions and variance decomposition were used to further assess the impact 
from the exchange rate. The impulse response functions illustrate the effect of a temporary shock 
emanating from an endogenous variable to other variables through the dynamic structure of the VAR 
model. On the other hand, the variance decomposition indicates the amount of forecast variance in 
prices that can be attributed to exchange rate.  
 
Figures (1) to (4) plot the impulse responses for consumer prices, to one standard deviation shock to 
the exchange rate change for each of our sampled countries. The vertical axes report the approximate 
percentage change in domestic prices in response to a one percent shock in exchange rate. An increase 
in exchange rate reflects an appreciation. 
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The impulse response functions for all the countries illustrate persistent inflationary effects, albeit very 
modest, from changes in the nominal exchange rates of these countries. In response to one standard 
deviation  shock  to  the  exchange  rate (in  the form  of appreciation),  the  price  level  index  exhibits 
sustained decline at least for over one year in all the countries with exception to Bahrain, where the 
price level index takes an opposite path in the form of persistent increase. Moreover, we can also 
notice that the shock to exchange rate does not contemporaneously affect domestic price level in all the 
four GCC countries. Such notice basically reflect and confirm the theoretically lagged effect from 
exchange rate to domestic prices owing to factors like pricing strategy by firms, dynamics of demand 
response, payment lags, hedging technique, menu costs, etc.  
 
Now given the fact that our variables are co-integrated, we expect that the shock to exchange rate lead 
to the deviation of the price level from its equilibrium in the GCC countries only for a short period of 
time, after which we expect our individual series to converge to their long-run levels. This convergence 
is assured by the error correction terms, which on average is around 0.03 for inflation, suggesting that 
if inflation is below its equilibrium by 1 percentage point (e.g. because of a temporary exchange rate 
shock),  around 3.0%, of this deviation is adjusted for every month, reflecting a half life of nearly 1.5 
year. Accordingly, it takes about 3 years for inflation to adjust to its long-run equilibrium.  Generally, 
the analysis of the impulse responses suggest low long lasting effect from changes in exchange rates to 
inflation in the GCC economies, or low ERPT into domestic inflation. Additionally, the persistence in 
inflation suggests that inflation process in the GCC countries has significant inertia. 
 
Tables (2) to (5) show the results of the variance decomposition of the price level for the sample of our 
countries. The  results  demonstrate  that the  variations  in the  consumer  price index  are  dominantly 
explained by its own innovations, in all the four countries. Shocks to exchange rate explain around one 
quarter of the movements in the price level during the first year and increases to around one third 
percent in two year time
108. Such result implies that shocks to exchange rate are partly responsible for 
explaining the forecast error variance of the price level. It also reflect that changes in the price level 
evolve endogenously  with changes in exchange rate, hence, confirming our earlier above findings 
regarding the significant effect of the later variable , albeit incomplete, on the former variable.  
                                                           
108  This  results  is  rather  comparable  to  the  one  reported  by  McCarthy  (1999),  who  used  VAR  model  in 
investigating  the  pass-through  of  exchange  rate  in  a  set  of  nine  industrial  countries.  From  his  variance 
decomposition analysis, McCarthy found changes in exchange rate to account for about 5 to 30 percent of the 
variations in consumer prices.  P a g e  | 167 
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Table: 2 
 (Variance Decomposition) 
 
  Bahrain 
  Periods 
  6  12  18  24 
log CPI  86  68  55  48 
Log 
NEER  5  14  19  22 
Log 
FCPI  6  5  4  3 
Log OP  3  13  22  27 
       
CPI = consumer price index, NEER = nominal effective exchange rate, FCPI = 
Trading Partner consumer price index, OP = oil price. 
 
Table: 3 
(Variance Decomposition) 
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  Kuwait 
  Periods 
  6  12  18  24 
log CPI  87  77  69  63 
Log 
NEER  6  16  24  31 
Log 
FCPI  5  5  5  4 
Log OP  2  2  2  2 
 
CPI = consumer price index, NEER = nominal effective exchange rate, FCPI = 
Trading Partner consumer price index, OP = oil price. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table: 4 
(Variance Decomposition) 
 
  Oman 
  Periods P a g e  | 171 
 
  6  12  18  24 
log CPI  91  86  85  87 
Log 
NEER  3  9  11  9 
Log 
FCPI  1  1  1  1 
Log OP  5  5  4  4 
 
CPI = consumer price index, NEER = nominal effective exchange rate, FCPI = 
Trading Partner consumer price index, OP = oil price. 
 
 
Table: 5 
(Variance Decomposition) 
 
  Saudi Arabia 
  Periods 
  6  12  18  24 
log CPI  84  72  63  55 
Log 
NEER  8  16  25  35 
Log 
FCPI  7  10  10  8 
Log OP  1  1  2  2 
 
CPI = consumer price index, NEER = nominal effective exchange rate, FCPI = 
Trading Partner consumer price index, OP = oil price. 
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4. Potential factors for higher long-Run ERPT in the GCC countries 
 
Furthermore, the above results show generally that changes in the exchange rate have a significant 
impact on inflation in the long-run in the GCC economies. However, the findings from recent studies 
(Taylor 2000, Gagnon and Ihrig 2004, Campa and Goldberg 2006, and Choudhri and Hakura 2006) 
have  indicated  a  declining  trend in  the  extent  of  ERPT  in  several  countries including developing 
economies. Nonetheless, the relatively higher exchange rate pass-through into inflation rate in the GCC 
countries in the long-run can be explained by a number of factors.  
 
The degree of openness of an economy has been presented by number of studies (Dornbusch 1987, 
Goldfajn and Werlang 2000, Kang and Wang 2003) among the influential factors on the extent ERPT. 
The more open an economy, the more it would be exposed to higher pass-through. Other studies 
(McCarthy 1999, and Ho and McCauley 2003) have particularly emphasized the importance of imports 
penetration ratio in the consumption basket of consumers. By considering the characteristics of the 
GCC economies, and based on their trade pattern explained in previous chapter, we find that these 
countries are comparatively very open and highly import dependant. Particularly since the beginning of 
this century, the statistics show that both the openness and the import have increased substantially 
(figure 5-8 and table 6 ). 
 
Based  on Taylor  (2000) theory,  persistence of  inflation is  expected to influence the link  between 
movements in exchange rate and domestic prices. If increases in domestic prices are viewed to be of 
persistent nature, then it is highly likely that traders will pass the higher cost (e.g. because of exchange 
rate depreciation) to their prices, which would lead to higher inflation. In the case of our sample, there 
are number of factors to suggest increasing inflation persistence in the GCC economies. The recent 
significant depreciation in the US dollar, to which the currencies of the GCC countries are pegged, 
against the major trading partners of the GCC countries have resulted in a depreciation in the exchange 
rate  of  the  GCC  countries’  currencies.    This  depreciation  has  coincided  with  an  accommodative 
monetary policy due to the fixed exchange rate regime. The monetary authority in the GCC countries 
have been tracking the footsteps of the US monetary policy by similarly lowering their short term 
interest rates, in order to fend off potential speculations. Furthermore, the depreciation in the currencies P a g e  | 173 
 
of the GCC countries have also coincided during the period of our sample with an expansionary fiscal 
policy due primarily to increased revenues from a prolonged period of high oil prices
109.  
 
Another further factor for the increasing long-run effect from exchange rate to inflation in the GCC 
economies  can  be  attributed  to  the  expected  GCC  monetary  union  (January  2010).  The  expected 
potential  ramification  to  the  incipient  GCC  monetary  union  might  have  influenced  firms  pricing 
strategies in these economies which in turn have led toward an increasing pass-through in the long-run. 
Furthermore,  the  experience  of  the  Euro  countries  at  the  early  period  of  the  monetary  union 
(depreciation of the Euro) might have accentuated the firms’ expectations regarding the persistence of 
depreciation in the exchange rate of the GCC’s currencies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
109 The recent surge in oil prices have resulted in a substantial trade balance surpluses that have enabled the 
governments  in  GCC  countries  to increase  public  expenditure  and investment,  and subsequently  demand  of 
private sector. According to Fasano and Wang (2002), the fiscal policies in the GCC economies are highly pro-
cyclical and therefore government spending is correlated with oil prices. In period of low oil prices (like those 
during late1990s)  government spending in GCC countries is cut back rather than expanded as one might expect 
if an active fiscal policy were being pursued.   
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Figure: 8  
Degree of Openness, Saudi Arabia (2000 January-2007 December)
 
Source: Calculated by the author using data from the  DOTS, IMF 
Table: 6  
Imports In the GCC Countries (Units: US Dollar) (Scale: Millions)
Country 
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Years  Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Saudi Arabia 
2000  4633.24  7157.04  5039.53  30197.3 
2001  4306.12  7869.48  5797.92  31181.3 
2002  4987.77  9007.39  6005.46  32293.3 
2003  5657.18  10991.6  6572.17  36914.7 
2004  7384.84  12630.6  8865.28  44744 
2005  8790.16  15801  8827.05  59458.7 
2006  8944.41  17242.5  10915.2  69799.7 
2007  11293.1  21352.1  15977.6  90214.8 
2008  12530  24873.9  22924.6  115133 
 
Source: DOTS, IMF. 
 
 
5. Factors for Incomplete ERPT in the GCC countries 
 
From the vast theoretical literature in the pass-through of exchange we can cite a number of reasons to 
explain the incomplete pass-through in the GCC countries or the failure of the PPP theory in these 
economies. One reason could be attributed to the low share of traded goods in the CPI baskets of the 
GCC countries. Despite the fact that the share of imported goods is considerably large in the GDP of 
GCC economies, however, this share could be modest as compared to the weight of non-tradables. A 
related issue is that the cost of retail services, as a fraction of the value of consumer goods, could be, in 
many  instances,  larger  than  the  cost  of  the  physical  tradable  goods.  This  was  facilitated  by  two 
conditions. One  is that  during  our  sampled  period  there  has  been an  increasing  pressure  on  non-
tradable services due to heated development in the GCC countries. The second condition is related to 
the increasing competition between markets due mainly to globalisation, which have resulted in lower 
prices of tradable goods around the world. 
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A further reason could be that the common claim of low PTM in developing country is invalid in the 
context of the GCC countries. Given the relatively considerable size of the economy of the GCC region 
and the strategic importance and the prominent role of the GCC countries with respect to trade around 
the globe, it is expected that exporters to these countries use PTM strategy to maintain their market 
share in this region. Also exporters might have realized that changes in exchange rates are transitory 
and not permanent, so they were willing to absorb part of the exchange rate impact by adjusting their 
mark-up.  
 
The presence of relatively modern financial markets in the GCC countries have allowed the importers 
in these economies to shelter their profit and eventually consumer prices from fluctuation in exchange 
rates through hedging contracts. Moreover, since the US dollar forms the leading currency in the trade 
around the globe and given the fact that the entire oil exports of the GCC countries is priced and paid 
for in US dollar, it is expected that importers in these countries to be less affected by changes in 
exchange rates, which in turn would mean lower pass-through to producer and consumer prices. 
 
The composition of a nation’s import can also play another factor in the extent of the pass-through 
according to Campa and Goldberg (2004). As per their findings, moving away from raw materials and 
energy imports towards manufacturing sectors (where more differentiated goods are produced and thus 
where PTM is likely to be more prevalent) was a primary factor in reducing the extent of pass-through 
in the OECD countries. This was also confirmed by Otani et al (2003) for Japan, and Marazzi et al 
(2005) for the US, and Khundrakpam (2007) for India. By considering the composition of imports in 
the case of our sample (table 7), we found that the share of the manufactured items constitutes more 
than 70 percent of the total imported goods for each country. Hence, further explaining the incomplete 
pass-through  in  the  GCC  economies  and  rendering  further  support  to  the  theory  of  Campa  and 
Goldberg (2004).   
 
The  monetary  environment  in  the  GCC  countries  could  have  played  another  significant  role  in 
lowering  the  pass-through  from  exchange  rate  to  inflation.  Inflationary  expectations  through 
depreciation of effective exchange rates in the currencies of the GCC countries is believed to have been 
anchored through the pegged exchange rate regime that is furthermore highly credible in light of large 
foreign reserves and the open capital account. One last factor to be cited for the lower ERPT in the 
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in these countries. It is in fact common in these economies, and generally in many oil producing 
countries, that the state will intervene by regulating prices either by way of subsidies or putting caps on 
prices of certain necessary goods, and this was the behaviour/actions of most the authorities in the 
GCC countries as a reaction toward the surge in consumer prices over the past two years.    
 
Table: 7 
 Share of Manufactured Imports in the GCC countries 
 
  Country 
Year  Bahrain (%)  Kuwait (%)  Oman (%)  Saudi Arabia (%) 
2001  84  96  78  74* 
2002  83  96  75  74* 
2003  85  96  79  71 
2004  85  96  80  72 
2005  88  96*  82  74 
2006  87  97  85  77 
2007  88  97  85  77 
2008  86*  96*  76*  76 
 
Note: * These are averages as data for these years were not available. Source: Economic Reports from 
the websites of the central banks of the GCC countries. 
 
 
6. Potential Policy Implications of the Results 
 
An average pass-through of around 57% indicates that changes in the exchange rate have significant 
impact on inflation in the long-run in the GCC economies. In the long run depreciation of 10% in 
exchange rate will result in an average of 5.7% increase in the price level of the GCC countries. P a g e  | 180 
 
However, the fact that the pass-through is incomplete or significantly less than one, suggests the failure 
of the PPP theory in the economies of the GCC countries. It indicates that there is not a very high risk, 
as predicted by the PPP theory for small highly tradable dependant economies, on inflation in the GCC 
countries from fluctuations in the foreign exchange rate markets. This is further confirmed by the 
results of the impulse responses and the variance decompositions analysis.  The results  also suggests 
an influential role for other external as well as domestic factors on inflation in the GCC economies, and 
this is consistent with the our earlier inference from the preliminary analysis, in the previous chapter, 
regarding the simultaneous rise in consumer price indices of the GCC countries, partner inflation, and 
oil prices. 
From policy perspective, risk from imported inflation through fluctuations of the US dollar against the 
currencies of the trading partners of the GCC countries is considered generally low.  Based on the fact 
that the appropriateness of an exchange rate regime should be based on how it performs over time and 
not only on how it performs under stress, the single dollar peg will still be viewed viable for the 
economies of the GCC countries. A retrospective analysis shows that the macroeconomic conditions in 
the  GCC  countries  has  been  stable  over  the  past  two  decades,  even  during  the  periods  of  dollar 
fluctuations.  
 
Average inflation rates over the past two decades remained on average low and stable in most of these 
economies,  with  an  average  inflation  ranging  between  a  minimum  of  around  0.65  in  Bahrain  to 
maximum of around 4.77 in Qatar, hence, further signifying the success of the existing monetary 
policy/regime in maintaining price stability. The pegged regime is also viewed to have helped the GCC 
countries avoid nominal shocks from geopolitical risks feeding into their economies. Also during the 
past  two  decades  the  GCC  countries  continued  to  register  continuing  growth  in  the  size  of  their 
economies that jumped, in terms of nominal GDP, from an average of around US 251.3 billion during 
1991-2000 to an average of around US 604 billion during 2001-2008, hence, further confirming that 
the  existing  pegged  exchange  rate  regime  has  served  its  purpose  and  has  supported  economic 
performance.  
 
In addition to that, more than 50% of the GCC’s countries imports and exports are priced in US dollar, 
which further suggest that it is still worth keeping stable exchange rate with the US dollar for all the 
GCC  countries. This in  fact can  be  substantiated by the  case of Kuwait, which despite its recent 
movement from the single US dollar peg to a weighted basket of undeclared currencies it continued to 
maintain generally a stable link with the US dollar which reflect that  the US dollar has a significant P a g e  | 181 
 
weight in the basket. All in all, the results suggest that continuing to have a strong link with the US 
dollar in the form of the existing pegged regime is still viewed as a viable choice to ensure credibility 
of monetary policy and stability of trade as well as to protect the value of the financial wealth of the 
GCC countries. 
 
However, still the significant role of exchange rate on inflation in the long-run necessitates some 
cautionary  actions  by  the  authorities  in  the  GCC  countries.  Furthermore,  the  recent  persistent 
depreciation in the US dollar, the expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, suggest that the pass-
through  could  rise  in  the  short  to  medium  term,  which  implies  that  local  authorities  in  the  GCC 
countries should be vigilant in assessing potential impact from exchange rate to inflation. Given the 
fact that under the peg system the monetary authorities in the GCC country have limited control over 
the effect of exchange on inflation, it is suggested that through actions like partial monetary policy 
(required  reserve,  credit  controls,  and  open  market  operations),  containing  domestic  demand  and 
addressing supply bottlenecks might help in maintaining low impact from external side on domestic 
prices. 
 
7. Summery and Conclusion 
 
In this chapter and the previous chapter we tried to develop an idea about the nature of the link 
between changes in exchange rate and inflation in the GCC countries. The results from our two models 
(OLS and VECM) are found to be generally consistent with the results observed from preliminary 
analysis of the data in the preceding chapter. Our estimated results from both models have confirmed 
the link between movements in exchange rate and inflation in the GCC countries. Furthermore, the 
results of the short-run dynamics from the OLS and VERM model have showed very modest impact 
from exchange rate to inflation in the short-run. The estimated short-run coefficients were only from 
0.04 to 0.16. On the other hand, average estimated long-run pass-through was 27% and 57% based on 
the OLS and the VEC models, respectively.  The difference in the magnitude of the long-run effect 
from exchange rate to CPI inflation between the two models can be attributed to the different features 
of second model, VECM, which exploits the information contained in the level of variables and allow 
for  the  endogenous determination between the  variables  as  compared to the OLS  model that  was 
estimated  in  first  difference  and  a  priori  assume  the  dependant  variable  as  endogenous  to  the 
movements/changes in independent variables. P a g e  | 182 
 
 
The incomplete pass-through indicates that the PPP theory does not hold, with regard to the price level, 
in the context of the GCC countries. Our results also invalidate some familiar claims in the existing 
literature  of ERPT that  view  ERPT  on consumer  price  inflation as  almost  complete in  small less 
developed economies. Incomplete pass-through also implies that change in real exchange rate is long 
lasting and devaluation in nominal effective exchange rate is not neutral (Borens & Gregorio, 1999). 
Moreover, the impact of exchange rate was found to be larger and relatively quicker on producer prices 
and import prices (as per the estimates from the OLS model). Nonetheless, the largest effect was found 
on import prices across all sampled countries, with the extent of pass-through exceeding 100% in some 
cases in less than three months
110.   Furthermore, we found our results for the effect from exchange rate 
to inflation more comparable with those estimated on the industerlised nations as well as developing 
countries.  
 
The increasing long-run pass-through in the GCC countries during the period of examination can be 
attributed  to  many  factors  :  the  degree  of  openness  of  the  GCC  economies,  the  recent  persistent 
depreciation of the US dollar against the currencies of the trading partners of the GCC countries, the 
rapidly domestic demand, and the expected potential ramifications to the incipient GCC monetary 
union.  Moreover,  the  generally  incomplete  pass-through  to  consumer  price  inflation  of  the  GCC 
countries can also be attributed to some other factors. For example the low share of traded goods in the 
CPI baskets of the GCC economies, the presence of PTM strategy by many firms dealing in the GCC 
economies,  the  presence  of  modern  financial  markets  that  facilitated  hedging  contracts,  the 
composition of the import of the GCC economies, the credibility of the monetary environment, and 
some institutional factors like price regulations of some essential goods.  
 
From policy prospective, the incomplete ERPT suggest that there is no need for monetary authority in 
the GCC countries to adjust money supply to fluctuations in exchange rates as such fluctuations are not 
considered  harmful/risky  to  the  domestic  prices  stability  in  these  economies.  Despite  persistent 
depreciation of the exchange rates of the currencies of the GCC countries during the period under 
review, domestic inflation remained on average low and stable in most of these economies (table 5 in 
                                                           
110 In this chapter we have also used the Johansen procedures to test for the co-integration using producer prices 
and import prices, however we failed to find any co-integration in all countries of our sample for both prices with 
exception for producer prices in case of Kuwait, where the estimated long-run coefficient for exchange rate was 
small and insignificant.  P a g e  | 183 
 
chapter four), Accordingly, the results suggest the success of the existing monetary policy/regime in 
maintaining price stability, and lends further support to the credibility and relevancy of the pegged 
exchange rate regime in these countries.  
It also suggests (incomplete pass-through) a big role for other external as well as domestic factors in 
influencing inflation in the GCC economies. However, the significant long term influence of exchange 
rate on inflation suggests that the local authority in the GCC countries should be vigilant and take some 
cautionary action, if viewed necessary. Finally, given the peg system in the GCC countries and by 
considering the recent conditions of the GCC economies, it is suggested that through actions like 
partial monetary policy (required reserve, credit controls, and open market operations), containing 
domestic demand and addressing supply bottlenecks, the GCC economies will be able to maintain low 
impact from the external side on domestic prices and to generally control rising inflation. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Demand Policies and Pass-through of Exchange Rate: A case study on the GCC Countries 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter we attempted to analyse the influence of demand polices of the GCC countries on the 
effect from changes in exchange rate to inflation rates in these economies during the period 2000-2008. 
The chapter begins by presenting some literature review on the potential determinants of the pass-
through of exchange rate to domestic prices. 
 
Low or incomplete pass-through from exchange rate to consumer prices is seen to provide a better 
atmosphere in which to carry out an independent monetary policy and to facilitate the implementation 
of inflation targeting (Choudhri and Hakura, 2006). However, there is no consensus in the literature on 
the conditions that lead to a low exchange rate pass-through (ERPT). Early studies that focused on the 
US market and other industrial markets have mainly analysed the pass-through into import prices 
(Goldberg and Knetter, 1997) and have primarily stressed the role of imperfect competition and price 
discrimination in international markets (Dornbusch 1987, Krugman, 1987). Based on this literature the 
extent  of  pass-through  from  exchange  rate  to  import  prices (at the  sectoral  or aggregate  level)  is 
essentially a function of some microeconomic factors such as demand elasticities, degree of market 
integration  or  segmentation,  and  degree  of  substitutability  between  domestic  and  imported  goods 
(determined by the degree of product differentiation). For example, the extent of ERPT is expected to 
be high if the profit-maximizing firm has substantial market power in a given industry (Phillips, 1988). 
In contrast, if the primary target of a firm is to maximize its market share, ERPT will be lower (Hooper 
and  Mann,  1989).  Similarly,  Bailliu  and  Bouakez  (2004)  have  explained  that  the  decline  in  the 
exchange rate  pass-through  to the  higher degree  of  market  segmentation  is  due  to (i)  more  firms 
engaging in pricing to market (PTM) behaviour and/or (ii) a larger proportion of goods being subjected 
to price discrimination across international markets. 
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Recent micro-based theories include the study done by Burstein et al. (2002) who analysed the reaction 
of inflation rates to devaluations during the 1990s for nine industrial and developing nations. Burstein 
et al. (2002) have attributed the recent declining trend in pass-through from exchange rate to CPI to the 
disappearance  from  consumption  of  newly  expensive  import  goods,  and  their  replacement  in  the 
indices by inferior local substitutes, a phenomena that they dubbed 'fright from quality'.  
 
Along a somewhat different line, Campa and Goldberg (2005) have argued that the microeconomic 
factors related to the composition of a nation’s imports may dominate the macro factors in influencing 
the extent of pass-through elasticity and the pass-through relationship over time. The authors have 
reported that changes in the composition of imports caused by moving away from raw materials and 
energy imports towards manufacturing sectors (where more differentiated goods are produced and thus 
where PTM is likely to be more prevalent)  have been the primary factor behind the recent pass-
through changes into domestic prices among the OECD countries. This has also been confirmed by 
Otani et al. (2003) for Japan, Khundrakpam (2007) for India, and Marazzi et al. (2005) in the case of 
the US
111.  
 
Recently  the  decline  of  the  exchange  rate  pass-through  has  been  seen  to  be  related  to  some 
macroeconomic  factors.  This  development is  drawn  from  the  new  open  economy  macroeconomic 
models (NOEM). This literature suggests, based on studies like Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), Betts and 
Devereux (1996), and Devereux et al. (2003), that the extent of pass-through depends on the pricing 
strategies used by firms. Under producer currency pricing (PCP), where domestic nominal prices are 
fixed in producers’ currencies, consumers’ prices would be expected to show a one to one change with 
changes in exchange rates. However, under local currency pricing (LCP), where domestic nominal 
prices are set in advance in consumers’ currencies, changes in exchange rates are not expected to exert 
any effect on consumer prices in the short run. In these models choices for the appropriate pricing 
strategy (PCP or LCP) relies on monetary policy, in that economies with relatively stable monetary 
policies are assumed to have a prevalence of LCP. 
 
                                                           
111 Marazzi et al. (2005) have presented additional explanations that include the increasing market shares of 
Chinese imports and changes in the pricing behaviours of firms in East Asia following the currency crises in 
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The  link  between  the  pass-through  and  monetary  environment  has  also  been  articulated  more 
influentially by Taylor (2000) who argued, based on a microeconomic model with staggered price 
setting and monopolistic competition, that the recent decline in the degree of ERPT is due to the low 
inflation  environment.  According  to  Taylor  (2000),  firms  that  normally  set  prices  in  advance  for 
several periods, react to changes in costs (either as a result of depreciation or some other costs) only if 
these changes are perceived to be of a persistent nature. Countries with high average inflation tend to 
have more persistent costs. As a result, the extent of pass-through tends to increase in a high inflation 
environment. Therefore, a more stable regime with low inflation is going to be characterised by a 
relatively lower rate of pass-through, while a high inflation regime would tend to reverse the effects.  
 
Taylor’s study has sparked a handful theoretical and empirical studies to show how a low inflation 
environment can lead to lower degree of pass-through. Emphasized mechanisms in this regard include 
a decline in the expected persistence of cost and price changes (e.g.Choudhri and Hakura, 2006), a fall 
in the frequency of price changes (e.g. Devereux and Yetman, 2002), and an increase in the prevalence 
of LCP (e.g. Devereux et al, 2003). 
 
Further, recent strand in the literature of inflation have emphasized the role of globalization as a major 
factor for the declining role of exchange rate on the inflation process. For example, according to Borio 
and Filardo (2006), in a cross-section globalization means that  price differentials for identical goods is 
expected to narrow, arbitrage opportunities increase and location matters less for the production of 
certain products and services as production is delocalised. On the other hand, changes in exchange 
rates over time may tend to reflect more real and financial factors and less nominal influences, such as 
persistent and large inflation differentials. As a result, under such conditions, changes in exchange 
rates will be viewed temporary (reversible) and hence may have a smaller effect on the corresponding 
prices, at least in the short-run. 
 
Another mechanism, through which globalization may weaken the role of exchange rate on domestic 
prices is by enhancing global economic integration. This mechanism is clearly articulated in the work 
of Gust et al (2010), who attempted to theoretically attribute the decline in the extent of exchange rate 
pass-through to an increase in trade integration and changes in relative productivities across countries. 
According to their model, firm’s pricing decision depends not only on its marginal cost but also the 
prices  of  its  competitors.  As  a  result,  firms  do  not  want  their  prices  to  deviate  much  from  their P a g e  | 187 
 
competitors, and because of that they find it optimal to vary its mark-up more and their prices less in 
response to an exchange rate movement. Lower trade costs due to increasing trade integration and 
higher productivity induce domestic producer to lower their mark-ups in response to the decline in the 
prices  of  foreign  exporters,  thus  leading  to  fall  in  the  average  mark-up  across  all  producers,  and 
eventually lower pass-through. In summary, the proposition of Gust et al (2010) is that higher trade 
integration lowers the market power of firms, thus squeezing their profit margins and resulting in lower 
pass-through. 
 
Further, another recent mechanism on the link between the pass-through of exchange rate and domestic 
prices was proposed by Parsley and Popper (1998). However, their work was focused on how the 
actions  of  monetary  policy,  following  changes  in  the  exchange  rate,  can  affect  (e.g.  reinforce  or 
weaken) the extent of pass-through from exchange rate into domestic prices in a country.  Specifically, 
they have stressed the role of domestic monetary policy in effecting the link between depreciation and 
domestic prices. The authors have argued that theoretically the estimates of the responsiveness of the 
domestic prices to changes in exchange rates may reflect, in addition to other factors, the policies of 
the central bank during the period examined.  
   
According to Parsley and Popper (1998), a central bank that is concerned with price stability will react 
to insulate prices from fluctuations in exchange rates. The central bank is expected to adjust money 
supply, particularly in economies where there is high ERPT, in order to moderate price volatility. For 
example, in response to depreciation in the exchange rate value of domestic currency, the central bank 
will pursue a contractionary monetary policy to strengthen the currency and to moderate the impact of 
the depreciation on prices. In contrast, if the monetary authority followed an expansionary monetary 
policy, it would probably reinforce the inflationary effect of the exchange rate depreciation in domestic 
prices. Accordingly, if the action of the monetary policy is ignored, the estimation of the effect of the 
depreciation on prices may appear to be lower/higher than the underlying effect. In other words, the 
omission  of  the  monetary  policy  variable  in  the  estimation  of  the  ERPT  would  result  in  biased 
estimates of pass-through. 
 
In fact, the hypothesis of Parsley and Popper (1998) can be extended to generally represent the role of 
the demand policy following changes in the exchange rate. What we mean to suggest is the importance 
of the aggregate demand policies of an economy in influencing the price volatility caused by external P a g e  | 188 
 
shocks such as the change in the exchange rate. From the work of Parsley and Popper (1998) we find 
an important role for demand policy in the form of a central bank action in determining the impact of 
the exchange rate on prices in a floating exchange rate regime. Likewise, the fiscal policy can be 
expected to have a significant role, especially in the context of a fixed exchange rate regime. Also, both 
kinds of demand policies can be found to play an important role in exchange rate regimes where the 
currency is pegged; however, the central bank still has on hand some monetary policy instruments that 
can be used to influence the money supply. Our emphasis on the demand policies in general is not 
completely new, as in some earlier empirical studies both monetary policy and fiscal policy were found 
to have played significant roles on the low impact of the depreciation in Europe between 1992 and 
1993.  For example, De Grauw and Tullio (1994) have primarily attributed the low pass-through from 
the  depreciation  to  inflation  in  Europe  to  the  policy  of  a  high  real  interest  rate  following  the 
devaluation. In a similar, but more recent, empirical study Amirtano et al. (1997) have reported the 
restrictive demand policies (fiscal and monetary policy) that followed the depreciation in Europe were 
among the major factors that led to the low impact on inflation. More recently, Gagnon and Ihrig 
(2001), Baily (2003), and Bailliu and Fujii (2004), have as well argued that the depreciation of home 
currency might be countered with a tightened monetary policy given goals of maintain low and stable 
inflation. 
 
The  outline  of  the  reminder  of  this  chapter  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  two  presents  some 
theoretical background on the argument of Parsley and Popper (1998). Section three presents the role 
of demand policies in influencing the link between exchange rate and consumer prices in the GCC 
countries. Section three presents the estimation framework. Data description and unit root tests are 
given in section four and five, respectively. The estimation and results analysis are presented in section 
six. Section seven presents policy implication and finally summery and conclusion are presented in 
section eight.  
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2. Theoretical presentation for the argument of Parsley and Popper (1998) 
 
Parsley and Popper (1998) were one of the first to present a theoretical representation for the role that 
monetary policy plays in influencing the observable pass-through relationship. To briefly demonstrate 
the theory of Parsley and Popper (1998) suppose that the price of a particular good is determined by the 
following function: in each period, t, 
 
} / ] ), ( , [ { i it t t i it I z g m e f E p =               (1) 
 
Where Pit is the price of the i
it good; et is the nominal exchange rate in terms of foreign currency units 
per  domestic  currency  unit;  m(gt)  is  monetary  policy,  implemented  using  some  instruments  gt;  zit 
summarizes all other factors that affect the individual price; and It represents the information available 
when the price is determined. 
 
Then, the underlying responsiveness of individual and aggregate prices to the exchange rate can be 
characterized as follows:  
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When  monetary  policy  is  unrelated  to  exchange  rate  changes,  these  parameters,  γi  and  γ,  can  be 
estimated directly. In practice, measuring the effect from exchange rate to domestic prices may be 
complicated by the actions of the central bank. The monetary policies of many nations respond to 
movements in the exchange rate, even if only implicitly. That is, often 
 
 
0
) (
¹
de
g dm t    P a g e  | 190 
 
             
Which means that monetary policy is endogenous to movements in exchange rate. In such cases, 
changes in exchange rate affect domestic prices in two ways; directly, through the parameters γi and γ; 
and indirectly, through its influence on monetary policy: 
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Ignoring the role of monetary policy will simply bias the estimated responsiveness of domestic prices 
to changes in exchange rate. This problem affects estimates of the responsiveness of both individual 
prices and the aggregate price index: ignoring the action of monetary policy would underestimate the 
effects of exchange rate on prices. For example, if the central bank offsets the aggregate price response 
by a factor of θ, where 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, then the monetary policy response to movements in exchange rate can 
be  expressed  easily.  Let  δ  denote  the  aggregate  response  of  prices  to  monetary  policy;  that  is, 
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Correspondingly, the apparent responses of prices to exchange rates will differ from their underlying 
responses. While the underlying aggregate response is γ, the apparent aggregate response will be (1- θ) 
γ. In the extreme case, where θ = 1, aggregate prices can appear to be completely unresponsive to the 
exchange rate. Parsley and Popper (1998) have empirically supported their hypothesis through a study 
of disaggregated and aggregated prices of nondurable goods in the US market. 
 
3. Demand Policies in the GCC Countries as a Case Study 
 
In this chapter we intend to follow the work of Parsley and Popper (1998) and to empirically test for 
the effect of the actions of the demand policies (monetary and fiscal policies) on the extent of pass-P a g e  | 191 
 
through from exchange rate to inflation in the GCC economies
112 during the period from January 2000 
to December 2008.  
 
Our main objective from this work is to draw some implications regarding the current exchange rate 
regimes policies of the GCC countries. The choice of exchange rate regime by the GCC nations and the 
subsequent economic implications are critical topics that necessitate additional examination and in 
particular given potential ramification to the incipient GCC monetary union. Moreover, this work is 
assumed to further enrich latest discussions on whether the individual members of the GCC countries 
need to  consider  their  fixed  exchange  rate  regimes  following  many  recent  economic  development 
including evolving national objective and deeper integration with global trade and financial markets. 
Accordingly, analyzing the ERPT into the regional member countries inflation rates, as in this work, 
would undoubtedly add value to the body of studies on the regional block as a whole.  
 
Apart from its importance to the macroeconomic policies of the GCC countries, this work attempts to 
contribute to the relevant literature of ERPT.  The study of Parsley and Popper (1998) was applied in 
the context of floated exchange rate regime, while we contribute by applying the model on fixed 
exchange rate regimes and for hydrocarbon based economies. Accordingly by extending the model of 
Parsley and Popper (1998) to include fiscal policy has enriched the model.  
 
Further, by focusing our analysis on the GCC countries, which are small and less developed countries, 
we are redressing the imbalance in country study coverage regarding the analysis of ERPT (Menon, 
1995). With regard to the recent trend in the literature of the ERPT that deals with the conditions of the 
decline  in  the  ERPT,  this  work  contributes  by  empirically  investigating  the  demand  policies  as 
potential determinants on the extent of ERPT. Furthermore, given the inconclusive evidence on the 
prediction  of  full  pass-through  from  exchange  rate  to  domestic  prices  of  small  less  developed 
economies, the study can be considered to  provide further tests for such hypothesis in the context of 
the GCC countries. Also unlike most earlier available studies that focused on episodes of large sudden 
depreciations (De Grauwe and Tullio 1994, Amirtano et al 1997, Goldfajn and Werlang 2000, Ito et al. 
2005) the focus of our study is on economies that have experienced sustained depreciations in their 
currencies over a period of time. Moreover, we further contributes to the literature by employing 
                                                           
112  The  Gulf  Cooperation  Countries  are  Bahrain,  Kuwait,  Oman,  Qatar,  Saudi  Arabia,  and  the  United  Arab 
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monthly macrodata as compared to most other studies that were faced with data availability and have 
to  use  lower  frequency  data  like  quarterly  times  series.  According  to  Choudhri  et  al.  (2005)  and 
MacCarthy  (2007)  using  monthly  frequency  is  considered  more  preferable  in  studying  the  pass-
through. 
 
During the period of our sample the exchange rates of the currencies of the GCC countries experienced 
persistent and significant decline due mainly to the depreciation of the US dollar against the currencies 
of the trading partners of the GCC countries. As matter of fact, the US dollar has been the de facto 
anchor for all the GCC countries' currencies, with the exception of the Kuwaiti Dinar, for over two 
decades. Except for a short period when it was exclusively pegged to the US dollar, the Kuwaiti Dinar 
has been linked to a weighted basket of currencies in which the US dollar forms the major part given 
that most Kuwaiti exports (oil) are priced in US dollars and limited fluctuation occurred vis-à-vis the 
US dollar, and subsequently the fluctuations vis-à-vis GCC countries’ currencies (Sturm and Siegfried, 
2005). Figure number 1 shows the movements of the nominal effective exchange rates of the GCC 
countries along with the movement in the exchange rate of the US dollar during the period of our 
review.  However,  during  the  same  period  the  economies  of  the  GCC  countries  witnessed  some 
expansionary conditions due primarily to the sharp increase in global oil prices and to less extent by 
the pegged system.  
 
The revenue from the hydrocarbon sectors (oil and gas) in the GCC countries forms around three 
quarters of government revenues in most of these nations (figure 2). As a result, fiscal policies in these 
economies are very active during the periods of buoyant oil revenues. According to Fasano and Wang 
(2002), the fiscal policies in the GCC economies are highly pro-cyclical to variations in oil revenues 
and therefore government spending is correlated with oil prices (figure 3). In periods of low oil prices 
(like those during 1990s) government spending in GCC countries is cut back rather than expanded, as 
one might expect if an active fiscal policy were being pursued. However, the recent surge in oil prices 
has resulted in a substantial trade balance surplus that has enabled the governments in GCC countries 
to increase public expenditure and investment, and subsequently increased the demand of the private 
sector (figure 4, 5). In the wake of high revenues from increased oil prices, the governments in most 
the GCC countries became expansionary and increased investment in various sectors of the economy, 
primarily in real estate, construction, and services that  stirred income multiplication; this, in turn, 
increased demand for consumer goods that could not be fully entertained due to supply bottleneck. 
Furthermore, the increase in the number of expatriates that flow into most of the GCC countries due to P a g e  | 193 
 
the economic growth has further increased demand for most consumer goods, particularly the real 
estate, where rents have shot up due mainly to a shortage of accommodation
113.  The recent high price 
rents along with the increase in the price of other consumer goods, like food, which is also due to 
global factors, have led to demands for higher wages by employees in both public and private sectors 
in the GCC countries
114. That situation has further deteriorated with the recent decrease in the  value of 
the GCC countries’ currencies in foreign currency terms due to the depreciation of the US dollar 
against the trading partners of the GCC economies (figure 1). The interaction of high prices in various 
consumer goods, due to high domestic demand because of expansionary fiscal policy and high global 
prices, and the depreciation of the GCC countries’ currencies appear to have been the potential factors 
behind the recent inflationary pressures in the GCC countries (Sturm et al. 2008, Marzovilla et al. 
2010, Central bank of Oman 2008).  As of 2008, inflation rates in the GCC countries ranged between a 
single digit figure of around 5% (Bahrain) to a double digit figure of around 15% (Qatar), with an 
average of around 11% (figure 6).   
 
 In accordance with Parsley and Popper’s (1998) proposition, the recent expansionary fiscal policies of 
the GCC countries is believed to have helped to influence the extent of pass-through from exchange 
rate to inflation in these countries both directly and indirectly. The direct influence is through higher 
government spending that led to higher demand for goods and services, and eventually reinforced the 
spill over from depreciation of exchange rate to inflation in the GCC countries. The indirect influence 
is through its effect on wages. For example, if domestic prices started to adjust following depreciation 
in the currency, wage adjustment would be expected to follow. However, adjustments in wages are 
assumed to depend on a number of factors like the slack in the labour market and the state of aggregate 
demand (Ghars El-Din and Mohammed, 2005)
115. If the economy is in a recession, wage adjustments 
                                                           
113 The GCC labour markets are highly dependent on foreign labour forces. With the exception of real estate 
markets, where it is around 95%, the percentage of expatriates represents around 50% to 75% of the total 
labour force in most of the markets in the GCC countries. 
114 Gulf Talent (2008, 2009). 
115The relatively high dependency on foreign labour makes inflation pressures in the GCC economies more 
sensitive to external factors like exchange rates. For example, depreciation in the exchange rates of the GCC 
countries' currencies will lower the purchasing power of the foreign labourers' remittances and hence  the 
amount of wages required to attract them or to retain them in the GCC markets (Hasan and Alogeel 2008). It is 
worth noting that government expenditure in the GCC countries is the main exogenous factor that causes wage 
adjustment as the role of trade unions is negligible in these countries (Ghars El-Din and Mohammed, 2005). 
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will be weak, hence reducing the overall pass-through of the currency depreciation. Therefore, if the 
fiscal  authorities  in  the  GCC  countries  choose  a  restrictive  fiscal  policy  following  currency 
depreciation,  this  will  weaken/moderate  any  chance  of  a  wage-price  spiral,  thereby  reducing  the 
inflationary effects of depreciation.  
       
Furthermore, due to the pegged system of the exchange rate regimes in the GCC countries the recent 
monetary environment in these economies can be described as expansionary or loose. As the Federal 
Reserve Bank started to decrease its short term rate in a precautionary step to avoid a recession after 
the  attack  on  11
th of  September  2001, the  exchange  rate  of  the US  dollar  has  generally  declined 
(compared to its level prior to the attack) against other major currencies in the world
116. As a result, the 
exchange rates of the GCC countries' currencies have exhibited a corresponding decline in relation to 
other  non-US  currencies.  Moreover,  given  the  fixed  regimes  with  the  US  dollar,  the  monetary 
authorities in the GCC countries have been tracking the monetary changes in the US by similarly 
lowering their short term interest rates, thus accommodating the demand for higher nominal money 
balances due to lower real money balances because of the depreciation (figure7). Further downward 
pressures on domestic interest rates in the GCC economies during the period of our sample were stirred 
up through higher injunction of liquidity into the monetary system on account of higher oil revenues 
that facilitated credit and aggregate spending.  
 
Accordingly, given the active stance of both demand policies in the GCC countries during the period of 
significant depreciation in the exchange rate of the currencies of these economies, one would expect 
some influence of the action of these policies on the extent of pass-through from exchange rate to 
inflation rates in the GCC countries, at least based on the hypothesis of Parsley and Popper (1998). The 
recent inflationary effect of the exchange rate depreciation in the GCC countries is believed to have 
been reinforced or sustained through higher money growth that in turn was triggered by expansionary 
fiscal policy because of higher oil wealth and to less extent by the pegged exchange rate system (figure 
8). Furthermore, since the stance of both policies had been expansionary in most the GCC countries, it 
is  expected  that  these  policies  have  accentuated  the  extent  of  pass-through  into  inflation  in  these 
economies. Indeed, by looking at the behaviour of inflation rates from 2000 to 2008, we could infer, 
initially, that our expectation is right. Figure 6 shows the behaviour of inflation rates as measured by 
the changes in the consumer price index, along with the changes in the nominal effective exchange 
                                                           
116 Particularly, since 2002 the US dollar has lost around 40 percent of its value vis-à-vis a basket of major 
currencies, weighted by their countries' trade with the US (Mishkin 2008). P a g e  | 195 
 
rates of the GCC countries during the period of our sample. It is very clear that the depreciation of the 
currencies  of  the  GCC  countries  currencies  vis-à-vis  the  currencies  of  their  other  non-US trading 
partners had been followed by an increase in the inflation rates of the GCC countries. Such conditions 
provide a good atmosphere to test/validate the theory of Parsley and Popper (1998) and generally the 
importance of demand policies in influencing the pass-through relationship.   
 
However, it is worth noting at the onset that it can be argued that the assumed active role for the 
monetary policy to influence domestic demand by stimulating economic activity is negligible in our 
sample of countries due to the fixed exchange regimes that are highly credible in light of large foreign 
reserves and the open capital account. Nonetheless, that does not totally rule out the ability of the 
monetary authority in the GCC countries to influence domestic demand through instruments like credit 
controls, required reserves, open market operation, etc. That leaves us with only the fiscal policy as the 
main  stimulus of  real demand  in  the GCC  countries.  Indeed,  this  had  been the  case  in  the GCC 
economies, as explained above. 
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Figure: 1(Percentage changes in nominal effective exchange rate for the US and the GCC 
countries) 
 
 
 
 
 
   Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF.  
 
 
Figure: 2 (Ratio of oil revenue to total government revenue in the GCC countries in 2008) 
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Figure: 4 (Combined Current account surpluses of the GCC countries)
 
  Source: World Economic Outlook, IMF
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Figure: 4 (Combined Current account surpluses of the GCC countries)
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Figure: 4 (Combined Current account surpluses of the GCC countries) 
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Figure: 5 (Government Spending in GCC countries, Units, US Dollars, scale: Millions) 
 
 
       
 
 
 
   
 
Source: Central Bank’ Annual Reports of the GCC countries 
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Figure: 6 (Percentage changes in NEER and CPI indices of the GCC countries*) 
 
            
 
            
 
 
 
 
*NEER = Nominal effective exchange rate, CPI = Consumer price index. 
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF.   
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Figure: 7 (Three months inter-bank rates in US and the GCC countries) 
 
 
   
Source: Quarterly Statistical Bulletin (2010), Saudi Arabia Monetary Authority 
 
 
Figure: 8 (Growth in Broad Money in the GCC countries) 
 
 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
US
Bahrain
Kuwait
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Bahrain
Kuwait
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
UAEP a g e  | 202 
 
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF. 
4. Estimation Framework 
 
Following Parsley and Popper (1998), and due to data availability, we use aggregate price level in the 
form of the consumer price index, which will allow us to better understand the transmission from 
exchange rate to inflation, enhance our ability to identify the influence of demand policies to prices 
during the exchange rate depreciation, and differentiate our research from other related studies in the 
literature that focused on imports and exports. 
 
However, we attempt to slightly differentiate ourselves from Parsley and Popper (1998) by building a 
theoretical frame work for our empirical estimation based on micro-foundations of pricing behaviour 
by exporting firms, and then augment such specifications with some variables for demand policies. 
Drawing from the literature (e.g. Bailliu and Fujii, 2004), a profit maximizing problem for an exporting 
firm is: 
 
 
) ( max
1 Q C PQ s - =
- p             (2) 
 
 
Where π denotes profits in the exporting firm’s currency, S is the exchange rate of domestic currency 
per unit of foreign currency, P is price in domestic currency, C is the cost function in foreign currency 
(exporting firm’s currency), and Q is the quantity demanded. The first order condition for equation (2) 
is: 
 
m q sC P =                 (3) 
 
Where   q C  represents marginal cost of production and µ is the mark-up of price over marginal cost. 
Equation 3 states that the domestic price of imported good depends on the exchange rate, marginal 
cost, and mark-up of the exporting firm. Furthermore, changes in marginal cost is mainly subject to P a g e  | 203 
 
changes in the cost of local input (in the exporting country), whereas changes in the mark-up are 
assumed to be mainly affected by the demand pressure in the importing country. On the other hand, 
demand pressure in the importing country is assumed to be mainly stirred by domestic policies, e.g. 
fiscal or monetary policies. Accordingly, it is necessary to take into account the movements in other 
determinants of the price when measuring the pass-through in order to properly isolate the effects of 
exchange rate on prices. Thus, a reduced from for the price equation can be drawn as follows:  
t t t t t Y P S P e b a a a + + + + = 3
*
2 1 0           (4) 
 
 
Where 
* P  represents the marginal costs of the foreign firm and Y  represents the demand conditions in 
the importing country. Equation 4 defines the exchange rate pass-through as the partial elasticity of 
domestic price with respect to the exchange rate.
117  
 
Furthermore, given the fact that the conventional theory states that the level of exchange rates and 
prices are linked in the long run, we used an error correction framework to estimate equation 4. We 
also took into account the non-stationarity of the variables, and the lagged effect of the explanatory 
variables. Moreover, we used World CPI as a proxy for the marginal cost of the foreign firm, which is 
normally difficult to measure. We followed other studies (e.g. Campa and Gonzalez, 2005) that have 
assumed, based on the integration of international markets, that there exists a single market for each 
product, regardless of its origin, destination or currency of domination
118.  Fiscal policy variables and 
monetary  policy  variables  were  used  as  proxies  for  demand  pressure  in  the  importing  country. 
Specifically, we estimated the following model:
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117 According to Goldberg and Knetter (1997), variants of equation 4 are widely used as an empirical foundation 
for estimating the pass-through of exchange rate into prices. 
118 Furthermore, other reason for using the World CPI as a proxy for foreign CPI includes the relatively large and 
diverse trading partners of the GCC countries. P a g e  | 204 
 
 
Where the small letters indicate log form, 
oil
t P represents the oil price, and  t v  is the error term. The 
first line in equation 5 shows the long-run dynamics of inflation and the second line shows the short-
run dynamics of inflation. The coefficient d represents the speed by which the inflation rate converges 
to its equilibrium. We will employ the Johansen procedure to test for the presence of co-integration 
between the variables of our model.  
 
Also,  our  analysis  will  be  based  on  the  comparison  of  the  estimated  long-run  coefficients  of  the 
exchange rate from equation 5 with and without variables representing demand policies, Y . The signs 
for  the  long-run  parameters  in  equation  5  are  expected  to  be  all  positive  with  exception  to  the 
coefficient of exchange rate, which is expected to be negative.   
 
Based on the theory of Parsley and Popper (1998) and given the conditions of the GCC countries 
during the period under review, we expect the biased ERPT (without a variable for fiscal or monetary 
policies) to be higher than the underlying/true aggregate response (including a variable for fiscal or 
monetary policies). 
 
 
5. Data Description 
 
It is necessary to note at the outset that similar to many other developing countries, the GCC countries 
suffer from a data availability problem. In particular, high frequency time series are mainly available 
only  from  the  beginning  of  the  current  decade  onward.  Furthermore,  times  series  data  on 
microeconomic variables are not compiled on a regular basis in most the GCC countries, hence making 
the micro-based analysis of exchange rate pass-through difficult.   
 
All the data are times series with monthly frequency for the period January 2000 to December 2008. 
The rationale for choosing such a period is firstly because the US dollar, to which the currencies of the 
GCC  countries  are  pegged,  has  showed  relatively  significant  fluctuations  during  that  period,  and P a g e  | 205 
 
secondly due to the heated economic conditions of the GCC countries during the same period. Hence, 
the period provides fertile grounds to test the influence of demand policies on the extent of pass-
through  from  exchange  rate  to  inflation.  Furthermore,  we  further  contributes  to  the  literature  by 
employing  monthly  macrodata  as  compared  to  most  other  studies,  including    Parsley  and  Popper 
(1998) that were faced with data availability and have to use lower frequency data like quarterly times 
series (Mihailov, 2010). According to Choudhri et al. (2005) and MacCarthy (2007) Using monthly 
frequency is considered more preferable in studying the pass-through.The main sources of the data are 
the International Financial Statistics (IFS), IFS Direction of Trade Statistics, and the central banks of 
the examined countries. Due to a lack of data for Qatar and the UAE, the test will be confined to only 
four GCC members: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. However, given the similarity in the 
structure and conditions of the economies of the GCC state members (large share of oil production in 
total, dependency on oil exports, highly import-dependent, and similar trading partners’ weights), the 
inferred implications from the estimated results of the examined country members can be applied to the 
entire GCC area.  
 
Furthermore, we use NEER as a proxy for exchange rate, and consistent with the IMF, we define 
NEER  as  the  foreign  currency  price  per  local  currency,  so  an  increase  in  it  would  indicate  an 
appreciation
119. For monetary policy, we will use domestic credit instead of any broad money measure 
on account of instability in money demand in the GCC economies
120.  Monthly series on government 
spending/expenditure for the period of our sample were only available for Kuwait and Oman. As a 
result, for the rest of our sample (Bahrain and Saudi Arabia) we used monthly total oil exports as a 
proxy for government expenditure due to the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policies in the GCC economies 
with revenue from exports of oil. A dummy variable was considered in the case of Kuwait to account 
for the Iraqi War in 2003.  
 
6- Unit Root Test 
                                                           
119 We did not use the bilateral exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar for two reasons. The first reason is that the 
exchange rates of the GCC countries are pegged to US dollar. The second reason is that normally the NEER is 
viewed to be more appropriate for capturing the total impact of the exchange  rate on domestic prices in 
countries with diversified trading partners (Ito et al. 2005). 
120 Reported results by Al Raisi and Pattanaik (2005) and Hasan and Alogeel (2008) on the link between money 
supply and inflation on the GCC countries were not in favour of using broad money as a proxy for monetary 
policy or demand side in general.  P a g e  | 206 
 
 
Our first step in the estimation process is to determine the order of integration of the variables. We 
have applied two unit root tests, namely the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and the Phillip-
Perron  (PP)  test
121. The  general  form  for the ADF  test including  a  constant  and  a  linear trend is 
presented in equation 6. Optimal lags were selected using Schwarz Criterion (SIC).  With respect to the 
PP test, we selected the truncation lag for the variance estimate test by the rule of thumb suggested by 
Newey-West. The summary for the unit root tests is given in appendix 4. It is clear that none of the 
variables are stationary at their level, however, their first difference is integrated of order zero I(0). 
 
t
p
i
i t i t t u y y t a y + D + + + = D ∑
=
- -
1
1 d b a             (6) 
 
7. Estimation and results analysis 
 
Following Parsley and Popper (1998) we started to estimate equation 5 without including variables for 
demand policies. After testing for the non-stationarity conditions in the level of our variables we used 
the Johansen procedure to establish the co-integration link between these variables. In both cases, with 
and without variables for demand policies, our co-integration tests, which are detailed in Appendix 5, 
indicate the presence of co-integration (long-run relationship) between the variables in our model. 
 
Our analysis will focus on the estimated values and the significance of the coefficients on the exchange 
rate variable and whether the addition of variables for demand policies influences the pass-through 
from exchange rate to inflation in the GCC countries. However, unlike Parsley and Popper (1998), who 
focused on short term coefficients of exchange rate, our analysis will be confined on the long-term 
coefficients of exchange rate. Also unlike Parsley and Popper, we attempted to utilize the results of the 
variance decompositions from our estimated model in our analysis.  
 
                                                           
121 The PP test is a modification of the ADF t statistics that takes into account the less restrictive nature of the 
error terms (Asteriou and Hall, 2007). P a g e  | 207 
 
The  results  from  the  normalized  co-integrating  coefficients  from  estimating  equation  5  without 
variables for demand policies are summarized in table 1. Detailed versions of the estimated VECMs 
along with system diagnostic tests are attached in appendix 6. The VECMs were subject to single 
equation  as  well  as  system  diagnostic  tests  and  the  results  generally  suggest  that  our  VARs  are 
acceptable. 
 
Table (1) 
 
Country  Co-integration Equation for Consumer Price Level 
Bahrain  oil
t t p p s p 1 . 0 21 . 0 54 . 0 + - - =
*  
(-3.34)    (-1.12)    (2.88) 
Kuwait  oil
t t p p s p 01 . 0 78 . 0 57 . 0 + + =
*                                                                     
(3.28)     (4.53)   (0.20) 
Oman  oil
t p p p 05 . 0 45 . 1 54 . 0 + * - - =  
(-1.78)    (-3.12)    (0.89) 
Saudi Arabia  oil
t t p p s p 02 . 0 60 . 0 65 . 0 - - - =
*  
(-3.98)      (-2.86)  (-0.52) 
 
From the results of the estimated co-integration equations presented in table 1 we can see that there is a 
long-run link between inflation (given by changes in the consumer price index) and changes in the 
nominal  effective  rate  in  the  GCC  countries.  In  other  words,  changes  in  exchange  rates  can  be 
considered  a  significant  long-run  influential  factor  on  the  inflation  rates  of  the  GCC  countries. 
Moreover, the sign of the coefficient of the exchange rate is, as expected, negative in all countries, 
except in Kuwait
122,123. The coefficients of the exchange rate in the models of the four countries are 
                                                           
122 The positive sign for Kuwait could be explained by the appreciation of the currency (dinar), which increases 
the  purchasing  power  of  wealth  and  stimulates  higher  expenditure  and  price  inflation  in  the  long-run. 
Alternatively,  the  positive  sign  suggests  that  inflation  could  be  affected  by  many  other  factors  that  also 
influence  the  demand  for  and  the  supply  of  exports  and  imports  in  this  economy.  For  example,  if  an 
appreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate of this country is accompanied by a reduced foreign supply, 
or by an increased domestic demand for imports, due to say, a rapid growth in the money supply or income, the P a g e  | 208 
 
very close and range between a minimum of 0.54 (Oman) to a maximum of 0.65 (Saudi Arabia). This 
amount of elasticity is considered to be at odds with the expected theoretical argument of the PPP 
theory that claims a complete pass-through from the exchange rate to domestic prices. Furthermore, the 
results of the variance decompositions for the price level index for all the countries presented in table 2 
confirm the link between an effective exchange rate and inflation in the GCC economies. Changes in 
the exchange rate are found to explain on average around 15 percent and 25 percent over one and two 
years, respectively, in the GCC economies. However, the majority of the variations in the price level 
index are explained by its own lags in the four GCC countries. 
Table: 2 (Variance decompositions for price level indices of the GCC countries) 
 
   Log CPI  logNEER  logFCPI  logOP 
Bahrain             
6  86  5  6  3 
12  68  14  5  13 
24  48  22  3  27 
Kuwait             
6  87  6  5  2 
12  77  16  5  2 
24  63  31  4  2 
Oman             
6  91  3  1  5 
12  85  9  1  5 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
impact of the exchange rate on the consumer prices would likely be neutralized or consumer prices may even 
rise (Kim, 1998).  It could also be explained by the recent frequent adjustment in the exchange rate parity of the 
Kuwaiti currency by the authority following the recent increases in consumer prices. 
 
123 The presence of the wrong sign for other of the variables in our models can be attributed to factors like data 
availability and price regulations for some items in the index of consumer prices by the local authority in the 
GCC countries. P a g e  | 209 
 
24  86  9  1  4 
Saudi 
Arabia             
6  84  8  7  1 
12  72  17  10  1 
24  55  35  8  2 
 
 
We repeated the estimation of equation 5, but this time by including a variable that represents the 
partial monetary policy in the economies of our sample, namely the domestic credit. The estimation 
results for the equations of the price level are summarized in table 3. Detailed VECMs, along with the 
respective system diagnostic tests, are presented in Appendix 7. The coefficient of domestic credit is 
significant in all the countries of our sample and it got the expected positive sign for both Kuwait and 
Oman; however, it is negative for both Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. The negative sign in Saudi Arabia 
and Bahrain can be attributed to the large share of highly subsidised industrial and development loans, 
and it can also be interpreted to suggest that credit growth eases capacity constraints in these two 
economies and lowers price inflation in the long-run. Furthermore, the sign of other variables in the 
models for all four countries have generally improved after including the domestic credit variable. 
Most importantly, from the results of table 3 it can be seen that the coefficients of the exchange rate 
have showed some significant changes after including the variables of domestic credit. In all cases, we 
can note that the coefficients of exchange rates or the pass-through elasticities have decreased and have 
become less negative. For example the pass-through elasticity for Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Saudi 
Arabia  decreased  from -0.64,  0.57,  -0.54, and  -0.65  to  -0.25,  0.38,  -0.21,  and  -0.19,  respectively. 
Hence, confirming the arguments of Parsley and Popper (1998) on the importance of monetary policy 
on the pass-through elasticity from the exchange rate to prices. 
 
Also, the results of the variance decomposition are presented in table 4. Variations in the price level 
index are found to be explained by domestic credit in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, and by their own 
innovation in Kuwait and Oman. However, changes in the exchange rate are found to be negligible in 
all four countries.  
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Country  Co-integration Equation for Consumer Price Level 
Bahrain  dc p p s p
oil
t t 38 . 0 04 . 0 97 . 1 25 . 0 - + + - =
*  
    (-3.99)   (12.84)    (2.42)       (-10.18)    
Kuwait                     dc p p s p
oil
t t 11 . 0 03 . 0 26 . 0 38 . 0 + + + =
*         (7.92)    
(2.88)   (3.49)      (3.77)     
Oman                    dc p p s p
oil
t t 40 . 0 10 . 0 79 . 2 21 . 0 + + * + - =                         (-
2.03)    (2.96)    (5.35)      (8.41)    
Saudi Arabia                   dc p p s p
oil
t t 10 . 0 02 . 0 35 . 1 22 . 0 - + + - =
*                                       
(-7.24)     (3.69)    (2.79)        (10.56)   
 
 
Table: 4 (Variance decompositions for price level indices of the GCC countries) 
 
   Log CPI  logNEER  logFCPI  logOP  logDC 
Bahrain                
6  5  5  6  6  78 
12  2  6  1  4  87 
24  1  6  1  4  88 
Kuwait                
6  72  2  12  1  13 
12  69  2  7  0.3  21.7 
24  66  5  5  0  24 
Oman                
6  93  5  1  0.7  0.3 
12  84  4  5  4  3 
24  49  6  33  8  4 P a g e  | 211 
 
Saudi 
Arabia                
6  23.7  0.3  2  2  72 
12  1  0  3  0  96 
24  1  0  3  0  96 
 
Additionally, we repeated the estimation for all the countries in our sample, but we included a public 
expenditure variable to represent the action of the fiscal policy during the period of our sample. Table 5 
summarizes the results of the estimation (detailed VECMs are presented in appendix 8 along with the 
respective  system  diagnostic  tests).  From  table  5,  we  can  see  that  the  fiscal  policy  variable  is 
significant in all the models for the four countries of our sample. However, the expected positive sign 
is found in the cases of Bahrain and Kuwait, and it was negative in the cases Oman and Saudi Arabia. 
The negative sign can be interpreted to suggest that government spending in Oman and Saudi Arabia is 
geared  toward  easing  capacity  constraints  and  structural  bottleneck  in  order  to  eventually  reduce 
inflationary  pressure  in  the  long-run.  With  regard  to  the  coefficient  of  the  exchange  rate,  it  had 
decreased remarkably in all countries except for Saudi Arabia, where it decreased to only 0.57. In case 
of the Kuwait, the exchange rate coefficient had showed very similar decrease to that produced in the 
preceding estimation when the domestic credit was included. Furthermore, we can also see that the 
pass-through is significant for only Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, while it turned out to be insignificant in 
the cases of Bahrain and Oman.  Results of the variance decomposition in table 6 indicate that the 
variance of the consumer price level index is dominated by its own innovation, followed by foreign 
inflation, in all four countries, with an almost negligible role for changes in the exchange rate. 
 
 Table (5) 
 
Country  Co-integration Equation for Consumer Price Level 
Bahrain  gov p p s p
oil
t t 46 . 0 29 . 0 01 . 0 11 . 0 + - + - =
*  
    (-.71)   (0.03)    (-4.74)       (5.58)    
Kuwait                          gov p p s p
oil
t t 15 . 0 122 . 0 65 . 1 36 . 0 + + + =
*       
  (2.47)    (1.53)   (4.49)      (6.96)     P a g e  | 212 
 
Oman                    gov p p s p
oil
t t 35 . 0 03 . 0 39 . 0 20 . 0 - + * - - =                      
  (0.48)    (-0.73)    (0.40)      (-2.93)    
Saudi Arabia                   gov p p s p
oil
t t 22 . 0 26 . 0 64 . 0 57 . 0 - + - - =
*                                       
(-5.01)     (-4.85)    (3.29) (-2.77)           
 
 
Table: 6 (Variance decompositions for price level indices of the GCC countries) 
 
   Log CPI  logNEER  logFCPI  logOP  logGV 
Bahrain                
6  90  0  8  0  2 
12  91  0  7  0  2 
24  91  0  7  0  2 
Kuwait                
6  76  5  17  2  0 
12  69  4  24  3  0 
24  66  4  27  3  0 
Oman                
6  78  1  12  1  8 
12  67  1  14  1  17 
24  54  1  13  1  31 
Saudi 
Arabia                
6  78  8  13  1  0 
12  72  15  10  3  0 
24  72  15  8  4  1 
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In a fourth attempt, we re-estimated the error correction model for all four countries, but this time we 
included both domestic credit and fiscal expenditure variables. Table 7 presents the estimated long-
term coefficients of the price level equations (detailed VECMs are presented in appendix 9 along with 
the respective system diagnostic tests).   This time, both variables are significant for all countries, with 
the  exception  to  the  domestic  credit  in  the  case  of  Kuwait  where  this  variable  turned  out  to  be 
insignificant. Furthermore, government expenditure continued to bear the expected positive sign for 
Bahrain and Kuwait and continued to be negative for Oman and Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, the 
domestic  credit  variable  continued to retain  a positive  sign only  in  the  case of  Oman,  where the 
magnitude of the coefficient was the same as in the second estimation. Consistent with the above 
theoretical discussion and with the last two estimations, the coefficient of the exchange rate has shown 
significant  decline  in  all  countries  as  compared  to  its  magnitude  in  our  first  estimation  (without 
variables for demand policies). It continued to bear the correct sign in all countries, with the exception 
to Kuwait where it is insignificant. The average estimated ERPT in the countries of our sample is 0.23, 
as compared to 0.60 before taking account of the actions of the demand policies during the period of 
our sample. The results of the variance decompositions in table 8 indicate that the variations in the 
price  level  index  is  explained  by  its  own  lags,  followed  by  the  domestic  credit  and  government 
expenditure, respectively, with a negligible role for changes in exchange rates. 
 
Table (7) 
 
Country  Co-integration Equation for Consumer Price Level 
Bahrain  gov dc p p s p
oil
t t 16 . 0 31 . 0 07 . 0 63 . 2 14 . 0 + - - + - =
*  
    (-2.30)   (5.51)    (-3.05)    (-6.26)     (4.71)    
Kuwait                          gov dc p p s p
oi
t t 21 . 0 02 . 0 17 . 0 83 . 26 . 0 + - + - =
*       
  (1.43)    (-3.28)   (4.67)  (-0.22)    (6.73)     
Oman                    gov dc p p s p
oil
t t 10 . 0 41 . 0 12 . 0 16 . 2 19 . 0 - + + * + - =                      
  (-1.95)    (2.47)    (6.25)         ( 8.98)    (-1.56)    
Saudi Arabia                   gov dc p p s p
oil
t t 10 . 0 10 . 0 11 . 0 46 . 0 34 . 0 - - + + - =
*                                       
(-9.98)     (1.18)    (3.54)      (-5.36)      (-3.21)           
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Table: 8 (Variance decompositions for price level indices of the GCC countries) 
 
   Log CPI  logNEER  logFCPI  logOP  logDC  logGV 
Bahrain                   
6  79  0  6  0  4  11 
12  74  0  3  0  8  15 
24  68  0  2  0  11  19 
Kuwait                   
6  56  1  12  0  23  8 
12  43  1  11  0  40  5 
24  35  1  10  0  50  4 
Oman                   
6  93  2  0  1  0  4 
12  83  0.5  0.5  8  3  5 
24  50  3  22  13  6  6 
Saudi 
Arabia                   
6  4  2  1  1  92  0 
12  4  1  2  0  93  0 
24  4  1  2  1  92  0 
 
 
The above results confirm the arguments of Parsley and Popper (1998) on the importance of economic 
policies on the pass-through elasticity from the exchange rate to prices, or generally on the relationship 
between the economic variables of interest. However, our result is at odds with the findings of Parsley 
and  Popper  (1998),  who  found  that  the  omission  of  monetary  policy  variables  leads  to  a  lower 
exchange  rate  pass-through,  implying  that  the  monetary  policy  in  the  United  States  is  aimed  at 
reducing the effect of the exchange rate on prices. We found that failure to take into account variables P a g e  | 215 
 
representing demand policies will lead to biased estimates of pass-through from the exchange rate to 
prices. During the period of our sample the expansionary stance of monetary policy and the pro-
cyclical fiscal policy were found to have further accentuated the long-run effect of depreciation in the 
exchange rate to consumer prices in the GCC economies. 
 
8. Policy Implications 
 
 
The different estimated coefficients for exchange rate variables have a number of implications. For 
example, they generally suggest how important it is to account for the actions of economic policies 
when studying the relationships between economic variables in an economy. They also confirm earlier 
findings in the literature, including Parsley and Popper (1998), regarding the relevancy of domestic 
demand policies in determining/influencing the impact of changes in the exchange rate on domestic 
prices. To the extent that changes in macroeconomic policies are not properly taken into account, the 
apparent relationship between the exchange rate and the inflation rate may be spurious.  
 
Moreover, the results confirm that the primary aim of monetary policies in the GCC economies is not 
to control inflation. Given the pegged exchange rate regimes, the primary aim of the monetary policies 
in the GCC countries is to maintain the internal, as well as the external, value of their currencies. That 
explains why our results contradict those of Parsley and Popper (1998) and why monetary policy in the 
GCC economies does not eliminate ERPT, but, on the contrary, made it stronger during the period of 
our sample. 
 
The independent effect of the exchange rate on consumer prices in the GCC countries is misleading 
when the variables of demand policies are neglected in the estimation. By taking into account the 
actions of demand policies, the average long-run ERPT in the GCC economies is estimated to be about 
0.23, as compared to an average of 0.60 when the demand policies are neglected.  Furthermore, such a 
relatively moderate pass-through should be a priori expected given the recent anti-inflationary actions 
that were carried out by most of the local authorities in the GCC countries. In a step to keep inflation in 
check, particularly following the recent regional and international macroeconomic development, the 
GCC  countries  have  introduced  number  of  anti-inflationary  measures;  e.g.  imposing  some P a g e  | 216 
 
administrated prices, like announcing certain caps on permitted increases in house rents
124; introducing 
further subsidies in consumption of certain essential commodities (e.g. water, energy, and food); lifting 
bans on certain importable items; and lowering or cancelling tariffs on certain imports, like steel. 
Furthermore,  the  central  banks  in  the  GCC  economies  have  introduced  additional  measures,  like 
increasing the reserve requirement, tightening the lending ratio in order to rein in fast credit growth, 
and increasing the volume of absorption of surplus liquidity through open market operations. 
 
Generally, an average pass-through of 0.23 indicates that changes in the exchange rate have significant 
impact on inflation in the long-run in the GCC countries. Ten percent depreciation in the exchange rate 
will result in an average of 2.3 percent increase in the price level of the GCC countries, in the long-run. 
Moreover, the fact that in absolute terms the extent of pass-through in all the sampled countries is less 
than 1, suggests the failure of the PPP theory in the context of the GCC countries. Also, an average 
long-run  pass-through  of  0.23  is  considered  very  moderate  and  does  not  signify  high  risk  from 
fluctuations  in  the  foreign  exchange  market  for  domestic  prices.  In  other  words,  the  volatility  of 
exchange rates of the currencies of the GCC countries does not necessitate the adjustment of the money 
supply in these economies, hence indicating the relevancy and success of the existing fixed exchange 
regime in these economies. Furthermore, the relevancy of the existing exchange rate regimes is also 
supported by the success of this regime over the past two decades by generally playing an active role in 
maintaining price stability, stable value of the currency, and credible monetary  policy,  while also 
providing  a  good  environment  for  economic  growth  in  the  GCC  countries  despite  the  regular 
fluctuations in the international price of oil.  
 
Also, the results suggest that the recent impact of the exchange rate on the inflation rate in the GCC 
countries is influenced by the actions of the domestic demand policies that had followed/accompanied 
the recent decline in the effective value of the currencies of the GCC countries. In other words, the 
recent expansionary actions of the domestic demand policies of the GCC countries are found to have 
reinforced the inflationary pressure of the exchange rate depreciation in their economies.  The fiscal 
policy and the pegged system is believed to have accentuated the impact of the weaker values of the 
currencies of the GCC countries on domestic price levels in these countries as firms are expected to be 
more willing to change prices, rather than adjusting their profit margins during a demand boom (Mann, 
1986). That implies that the depreciation of the currencies of the GCC countries has not been the major 
or primary factor for the abnormal rise in inflation rates in these economies during the past few years. 
                                                           
124 For example, a maximum annual increase of 15% in Oman, 10% in Qatar, and 7% in UAE. P a g e  | 217 
 
That lends further support to the opinions that view the existing pegged exchange rate regimes of the 
GCC countries as still viable macroeconomic policy to these economies. 
 
Now, given the fact that fully independent monetary policies in these economies do not exist, as they 
do in other economies with more flexible exchange rate regimes, it can be argued that the  domestic 
credit variable that we have used in our above estimation would mainly be an indication of money 
growth or liquidity and not the action of monetary policy. Furthermore, since revenue from exports of 
oil forms the main source for money growth in the GCC economies and given the pro-cyclicality of 
fiscal policy in the GCC economies to oil revenues, fiscal policies should be considered among the 
dominant  factors  that  influence  the  pass-through  from  the  exchange  rate  to  domestic  prices  and 
eventually  to  inflation  in  the  GCC  economies
125.  In  other  words,  fiscal  policy  forms  the  key 
macroeconomic tool in the hands of the policy makers in the GCC countries to contain inflation. 
 
Further, it is normally believed that inflationary consequences of depreciation in the exchange rate are 
temporary, since once the price level reaches its new equilibrium, the rate of inflation falls back to its 
previous level (Kahn, 1987). However, that is subject to the assumption that the authority will not try 
to permanently accommodate the depreciation by increasing money growth in the economy (Kahn, 
1987).  Now, since the growth in money, through the pegged exchange regime and pro-cyclical fiscal 
expansion, has accompanied the recent decline in the value of the GCC countries’ currencies, and has 
given optimistic economic growth in these economies because of substantial budget surplus from oil 
prices, it is imperative that the authorities in these countries take some prudent actions in order to 
control the increases in the price levels. 
 
Among the suggested solutions for lowering the influence of fiscal policies on the extent of ERPT to 
domestic prices and inflation in general in the GCC countries is to pursue some gradual steps toward 
domestic development in the economy, since such development is mainly dependant on government 
spending, which is the main source of money growth in the GCC economies. Gradual development is 
particularly stressed during the periods of perceived continuous depreciation of the currency, like the 
                                                           
125 Fiscal policies in the GCC countries are generally considered the main source for money growth in these 
economies and are believed to lead directly to an increase in the money supply due primarily to less developed 
financial markets (Keran, and Malik 1979). Furthermore, government spending forms the major stimulator for 
private sectors in the GCC economies. P a g e  | 218 
 
case  of  our  above  examined  sample  period,  in  order  to  avoid  any  monetary  accommodation  to 
depreciation in the exchange rate
126.  
 
Additionally, the problems of supply bottleneck in labour and raw material in these economies amid 
the recent heated economic growth has further stressed the effect of the expansionary fiscal policies on 
the extent of ERPT in the GCC countries during the period of our sample. Therefore, the  fiscal 
expansion  in  the  GCC  countries  also  needs  to  take  into  account  the  absorptive  capacity  of  the 
respective  economies  and  to  avoid  triggering  supply  bottleneck,  which  will  eventually  trigger 
inflationary pressures.  This also includes attempting to address supply bottlenecks in order to maintain 
a low impact from the external sector in general. Addressing a supply bottleneck can be achieved 
through  directing  public  and  private  resources  toward  easing  binding  capacity  constraints  and 
capitalizing on the generated revenues of oil resources. 
 
With regard to the incipient monetary union, the different signs in the model may reflect the lack of 
fiscal divergence among the GCC countries, which suggest a failure to meet the OCA criteria of fiscal 
convergence despite the pro-cyclicality trend between oil prices and government expenditure.  
 
Finally, despite the pegged exchange rate system, the monetary authority is believed to be able, to 
some extent, to participate in moderating the inflationary effects of the exchange rate by attempting to 
contain the liquidity of the GCC economies through instruments like credit controls, required reserves, 
open market operation, etc. 
 
9. Summery and Conclusion 
 
This  chapter attempted  to  explore the influence of the  demand policies  on the  pass-through  from 
exchange rate to inflation rates in the economies of the GCC countries. The link between demand 
                                                           
126 Others may argue that this recommendation might be difficult in practice, in particular when oil price on the 
rise  to  offset  the  effect  of  the  depreciation,  and  the  urgency  to  build  and  expend  physical  and  social 
infrastructure, keeping in mind that the GCC countries are still not fully developed in many areas. The concept 
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policies and the extent of ERPT into domestic CPI inflation in this chapter is basically based on the 
work  of  Parsley  and  Popper  (1998),  who  have  theoretically  argued  that  the  estimates  of  the 
responsiveness of domestic prices to changes in exchange rates may reflect, in addition to other factors, 
the policies of the central bank during the period examined. Based on the proposition of Parsley and 
Popper (1998), the recent inflationary effect of exchange rate depreciation in the GCC countries during 
the period of our review (2000-2008) is believed to have been reinforced or sustained through higher 
money growth that in turn was triggered by expansionary fiscal policies because of higher oil wealth 
and to less extent by the pegged exchange rate system. 
 
A VECM was used to estimate a model for the price level in the GCC countries. The model was 
estimated two times; with and without the variable for demand policies. After taking into account the 
action of the fiscal and monetary policies, the estimated coefficients of exchange rate is significantly 
lower,  in  all  the  sampled  countries,  than  the  estimated  ones  when  the  model  was  not  including 
variables  representing  demand  policies.  Average  ERPT  in  the  log-run  turned  out  around  23%,  as 
compared to an average of around 57% when the actions of demand policies were not accounted for. 
 
An average exchange rate pass-through of around 23% indicates that depreciation in nominal effective 
exchange  rates  has  a  significant  impact  on  inflation  in  the  GCC  economies  in  the  long-run. 
Depreciation of 10% in exchange rate will results in an average of around 2.3% increase in the price 
level of the GCC countries in the long-run. Moreover, the fact that in absolute terms the extent of pass-
through is far less than one, suggest the rejection of the PPP theory in the economies of the GCC 
countries. Furthermore, an average long-run pass-through of around 23% is considered very moderate 
and does not signify high risk from fluctuations in the foreign exchange market for domestic prices in 
the GCC countries. In other words, the volatility of exchange rates of the currencies of the GCC 
countries does not necessitate the adjustment of the money supply in these economies, hence indicating 
the viability of the existing pegged regime in these economies. The results of the pass-through also 
indicate  more  freedom  for  the  monetary  authorities  in  the  GCC  countries  to  pursue  the  main 
macroeconomic goals without disturbance from external side like fluctuations in the exchange rate of 
their currencies. 
 
Further,  the  results  generally  suggest  how  important  it  is  to  account  for the  actions  of  economic 
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GCC countries. The important role of fiscal policies in the GCC countries can mainly be attributed to 
level of their economic development and to the pegged exchange rate regime that paralyses their ability 
to  use independent  monetary  policy  to  sustain  internal  stability  and  growth.  Moreover,  the recent 
impact  of  the  inflationary  depreciation  of  the  exchange  rate  in  the  GCC  countries  was  mainly 
influenced by the actions of the expansionary fiscal policies in these economies. Accordingly, to the 
extent  that  changes  in  macroeconomic  policies  are  not  properly  taken  into  account,  the  apparent 
relationship between exchange rate and the inflation rate may be spurious. 
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Chapter Six 
 
Literature review on the choice of exchange rate regime 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter and the next we shall attempt to complement our analysis of the relevancy of the current 
pegged exchange rate regimes to the GCC economies by trying to identify the most suitable alternative 
exchange rate regime for these countries. More specifically, we assumed that the GCC countries may 
decide for reasons other than recent inflationary pressures, such as changing national priorities, to shift 
to some other available alternative exchange rate regimes. Accordingly, we shall attempt to give a 
thorough analysis on potential choices available to the GCC countries with regard to their exchange 
rate policies. Furthermore, our analysis included an empirical testing for the proposition of pegging the 
currencies of the GCC countries with a basket of two currencies, namely the US and the euro, instead 
of the current single dollar peg. We start by presenting brief survey of the recent literature on exchange 
rate regimes. In the next chapter, we focus on analysing the alternative exchange rate regimes within 
the context of the GCC countries.  
 
The exchange rate regime of a country is normally defined as the mechanism by which a country 
manages  the  monetary  value  of  its  currency  in  the  foreign  exchange  market.  They  are  generally 
categorized on the basis of flexibility that the local monetary authority of a country shows against the 
variability in the exchange rates of the country’s currency. Since the last third of the 19
th century, the 
world has witnessed a variety of historical exchange rate regimes. These regimes include the classical 
gold standard, the inter-war  gold (fixed rate) exchange standard, the inter-war floating rate experience, 
the Bretton Woods fixed (adjustable peg), and post-Bretton Woods regime, in which currencies are 
allegedly floating  (MacDonald, 2007). Between the two extreme corner exchange rates (firm fixing 
and free floating) there exist intermediate regimes, which are normally referred to as “soft pegs”, 
containing  limited  flexibility  in  comparison  to  the  two  corner  regimes.  Soft  peg  is  defined  as 
“exchange rates that are currently fixed in value (or a narrow range of values) to some other currency 
or basket of currencies, with some commitment by the authorities to defend the peg, but with the value 
likely to change if the exchange rate comes under significant pressure” (Fischer, 2001, P.3). P a g e  | 222 
 
Furthermore, a variety of intermediate exchange rate regimes have been identified in the literature; 
however, the list is not exhaustive, since chances remain available to mix these regimes in order to 
generate new hybrid regimes. For example,  Frankel (1999, 2003) has described nine exchange rate 
regimes including the two corner regimes, and listed them based on their degree of flexibility; currency 
union, currency board, truly fixed, adjustable peg, crawling peg, basket peg, target zone or band,  
managed float (dirty float), and free float
127.  Their flexibility increases as we move down from the 
very rigid system (currency union) to the very flexible system (free float).  
 
The reminder of this chapter is organized thus. Section two attempts to present recent trends in the 
choice of exchange rate regimes. The factors that determine the choice of exchange rate regimes based 
on the literature are summarized in section three. A summary and conclusion are given in section four. 
 
2. Recent Trends in Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
Some recent studies have reported, based on the official (de-jure) exchange rate policies, that since the 
late 1990s a great number of countries have increasingly shown  shifts toward either one of the extreme 
exchange rate regimes (fixed or floating). Such trends have been dubbed bipolarity, hollowing out, the 
missing middle, and the hypothesis of vanishing intermediate regime (Frankel, 1999, 2003). According 
to  Fischer  (2001),  one  of  the  main  proponents  of  the  bipolarity  assumption,  countries  open  to 
international  capital  flows  are  in  the  process  of  shifting  away  from  adjustable  peg  exchange  rate 
regimes toward firm fixing or systems with greater flexibility. Such movements or trends in vanishing 
soft pegs were initially applied to the developed economies
128, however they were extended to the 
emerging markets after the East Asian currency and financial crises in 1997-1998. The claim for the 
vanishing middle hypothesis was supported by apparently existing trends during that time and by 
official statistics about the classification of the regimes during the 1990s. For example, based on the 
IMF annual report 2000 , Fischer reported that between the period 1991-1999 the proportion of  IMF 
members that followed soft systems decreased from 62% (98 countries) to 34% (63 countries) . On the 
                                                           
127 Dollarization is included under firm fixing. 
128 Earlier reference to the corner hypothesis of missing middle include Eichengreen (1994), Crocket (1994),  
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other  hand,  the  portion  of  floating  regimes  had  increased  from  23%  (36  countries)  to  42%  (77 
countries), and firm fixing had increased from 16% (25 countries) to 24% (45 countries)
129.  
 
Further, according to the “bipolar view”, soft pegs are not sustainable long term and their viability is 
suspect, since they assumed to make an economy, particularly those that are open or opening to the 
international capital market, prone to currency and financial crises. Fischer (2001) reported that all 
major capital market crises since 1994 have involved a pegged or fixed exchange rate system
130131. A 
number of factors have been presented in the literature to justify the fragility and nonviability of the 
soft peg systems. For example Fischer (2001) has cited the laxity and false perception of stability, the 
impossible trinity, and ineffectiveness of capital controls
132.  
 
Laxity and false perception develop after a few years of stability under an exchange rate regime, as the 
agents come to believe that the exchange rate won’t ever change resulting in a reduced perception of 
risk while conducting a commercial or financial transaction in foreign currencies, to the extent that 
hedging is viewed as unnecessary. As a result, rapid excessive risk taking will take place during booms 
in capital flows. According to Larrain and Velasco (2001) sudden withdrawal of capital will leave the 
domestic financial sector at severe distress. Furthermore, the sudden large reversal of capital under a 
pegged exchange rate can result in self-fulfilling crisis as the monitory authority may not be able to 
defend its currency due to depleted reserves of foreign currency. When an exchange rate crisis occurs, 
its consequences will be unusually severe and damaging to different sectors of the economy
133.  
                                                           
129  Statistics  on  the  exchange  rate  arrangements  based  on  the  IMF    annual  report  on  the  exchange  rate 
arrangement dated (2002) had shown further trends from soft pegs to one of the corner regimes. 
130 Fischer (2001) has also blamed to some extent the soft pegged regime for the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system in the early 1970s. 
131 However, other studies (e.g. Daniel 2001, Corsetti and Mackowiak 2005) have emphasized inconsistency 
between the fixed exchange rate and fiscal policy fundamentals.  
132 Another argument in favour of the corner solution was presented by Frankel (2000), who argued that it is 
diffcult for the public  to judge announced government  policy in the case of intermediate targets,  such as 
exchange  rates,  due  to  factors  like  the  complexity  of  some  intermediate  regimes  and  the    amount  of 
information needed.  
133  The  episodes  during  which  banking  and  currency  crises  occur  together,  are  normally  called  twin  crises 
(Larrain and Velasco, 2001). Others (e.g. Aghion et al., 2004) call them triple crises due to the fall in output 
through the credit channel.  P a g e  | 224 
 
 
The  impossible  trinity,  or  the  “macroeconomic  trilemma”,  suggests  that  a  country  cannot 
simultaneously maintain a fixed exchange rate, an independent monetary policy, and an open capital 
account (Obstfeld and Taylor, 2004). This theory hints directly at the relevance of the “bipolar view” 
or  the  hypothesis  of  vanishing  intermediate  regime.  On  the  basis  of  the  “impossible  trinity”,  any 
attempt by an economy with unrestricted cross border movement of capital to enjoy both a fixed 
exchange  rate  and  a  monetary  policy  will  end  up  creating  conflicting  goals,  and  eventually  fail. 
Moreover,  Fischer  (2001)  states  that  the  inconsistency  of  domestic  goals,  as  expressed  in  the 
“impossible trinity”, is further apparent with the increasing openness of capital accounts combined 
with the associated development of private agents capital flow toward emerging markets.  Being faced 
with picky foreign investors and rapidly depleting foreign exchange reserves, emerging countries are 
not left with many options but to abandon their pegs  to float, or go to the opposite extreme, if they are 
prepared to do so (Frankel, 2003). 
 
Capital controls have been imposed as a way to protect the exchange rate from the effect of unwanted 
capital flows. It is regarded as suitable to create breathing space within which to carry out  policy 
adjustment  (Goldstein,  2002).  However,  in  the  long-run  the  effectiveness  of  capital  controls 
diminishes, and the associated costs increase. Also there are problems associated with the application 
of capital controls. For example, controls on outflows are likely to have an effect on capital inflows, as 
foreign investors may stop sending their capital to the country, where controls in outflow had been 
imposed. That also includes remittances of immigrants, who would also seize from transferring their 
income, which would further dry up the inflow of foreign exchange to the country. Also controls are 
believed  to  become  both  distorting  and  less  effective    as  a  country  develops  and  experiences  an 
increasing range of economic contracts with foreign economies. Furthermore, controls on outflow are 
considered ineffective to prevent a devaluation of the currency if domestic policies are inconsistent 
with the maintenance of the pegged exchange rate (Fischer, 2001).  
 
However,  some  recent  studies  have  attempted  to  argue  against  the  “bipolar  view”,  by  providing 
evidence that the soft peg or interior solution is still at work, particularly in emerging and developing 
economies. For example Frankel (2003) has argued that, despite each of the arguments (laxity and false 
perception of stability, the impossible trinity, and futility of capital controls) offered by proponents of 
the “bipolar view” having some  truth, none of them looks to be able to stand as a theoretical rationale P a g e  | 225 
 
for the superiority of the two extreme regimes over the intermediate regimes
134. Another counter-
argument can be found from the phenomena of “fear to float” (Calvo and Reinhart 2000, 2002) or “fear 
to peg” (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenergger, 2005).  
   
Based on Calvo and Reinhart, (2002) fear to float reflects a situation where a country is experiencing a 
very small variability in the exchange rate of its currency against other currencies, or in the foreign 
exchange market, but at the same time has high variability in its reserves and interest rate, despite the 
monetary authority not making any official commitment to maintain  parity. According to Calvo and 
Reinhart countries are generally reluctant to freely float their exchange rate on account of issues like 
credibility,  loss  of  excess  to  international  capital  markets,  high  exchange  rate  pass-through,  and 
international compatibility
135. In the case of free floating, high depreciation of exchange rates can have 
severe repercussions in economies with inflation targeting monetary policy and developing countries 
with high liability in  foreign currency, financial fragility, and large share of imports. The fear of 
floating is believed to be more widespread in emerging economies that have to worry not only about 
the depreciation of their currencies, for the above-mentioned reasons, but also about their international 
compatibility in case of appreciation, due to its likely adverse affect on exports. Also, due to their 
relatively limited access to international capital market, a  high volatility of exchange rates in emerging 
markets  might  trigger  downgrading  by  credit  rating  agencies,  leading  to  drying  up  of  foreign 
investment, and possibly triggering a financial crisis (Calvo and Reinhart, 2000). Accordingly, central 
banks in many floating economies intervene in the exchange rate markets to smooth variability in the 
exchange  rate.  Calvo  and  Reinhart  (2002)  have  reported  that  massive  open  market  operations  or 
interest rate changes are being used increasingly in countries claiming free float in order to manage 
their exchange rate, which makes these countries similar to those who have explicitly announced less 
                                                           
134 H. Akiba et al. (2009)  have also argued that the theoretical foundation for the comparison between the 
intermediate regimes with corner solutions, particularly in terms of welfare points of view, is scant and still in its 
early stage.  
135 Hausmann et al. (2000) have also justified the fear of floating to higher liability in foreign currency. The 
authors have argued that cross country variations in fear of floating are better explained by currency mismatch 
than  differences  in  pass-through  of  exchange  rate  into  inflation.  Another  argument  for  fear  to  float  was 
presented by Alesina and Wagner (2006), who suggested that economies with comparatively poor institutional 
arrangements are less likely to adhere to their announcements of fixing and abandon it more often. A more 
recent argument was given by Barajas et al (2008), who suggested that the international capital market might 
reward countries that are categorized toward the flexible, and once this flexibility is declared there appears to 
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flexible exchange rate regimes. Based on this, Calvo and Reinhart have concluded that “when it comes 
to exchange rate policy, the middle has not disappeared” (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002, p 404). 
 
On the other hand, Levi-Yeyati and Sturzeneger (2005) define fear of pegging as a situation where a 
country runs a fixed exchange rate system without explicitly declaring that they do. In other words, a 
country may exhibit a pegged exchange rate, while it intervenes frequently in the exchange market to 
adjust the parity of its currency against other currencies.  Moreover, the study of Levi-Yeyati and 
Sturzeneger (2005) is one among many that have found evidence for an asymmetry between the de-
jure and the de-facto exchange rate policy, leading to re-evaluation of many hypotheses, including the 
bipolar view. Their classification of the de facto regimes was based on data, compiled during the 
period 1974-2000, on the behavior of changes in the nominal exchange rate, the volatility of these 
changes,  and  the  volatility  of  international  reserves.  With  this  data  they  ended  up  clustering  the 
exchange rates systems into four groups; fixed, intermediate (including crawling peg and dirty floats), 
flexible,  and  inconclusive.  The  last  classification  included  countries,  in  which  the  implemented 
exchange rate regime is not clear from direct comparison with the rest of the sample. Levi-Yeyati and 
Sturzeneger have reported that, despite finding some evidence for the “hollowing out hypothesis”, the 
number of countries which used fixed rate as their de facto has been relatively stable during the 1990s, 
in  contrast  reports  by  the  IMF  classification  (e.g.  1997,  2000,  and  2002).  Levi-Yeyati  and 
Sturzeneger’s interpretation of the asymmetry in exchange rate policy is that the de facto fixers, who 
declare a more flexible regime, are reluctant to announce a fixed rate, in order not to attract any 
speculative attacks associated with explicit commitments. Levi-Yeyati and Sturzeneger (2005) have 
called this phenomenon or behavior “hidden pegs”
136137.  
 
Another  prominent  de-facto  classification  was  carried  out  by  Reinhart  and  Rogoff  (2004),  who 
distinguished 15 de-facto exchange rate systems for 153 countries during the period 1946-2001. Their 
classification  is  considered  the  most  comprehensive  de-facto  classification  in  the  literature.  They 
focused on market-determined dual and parallel exchange rates, as well as on statistical analysis of 
                                                           
136  Genberg  and  Swoboda  (2005)  concurred    with  the  findings  of    Levi-Yeyati  and  Sturzeneger  (2005),  by 
reporting that countries which actively use monetary policy instruments to stabilize their exchange rate may 
rationally not want to declare and commit to a fixed exchange rate, in order not to attract speculative attacks. 
137 In Levi-Yeyati and Sturzeneger (2007), the data set was extended to cover the period 1974-2004. Based on 
the new sample period it was revealed that, as of 2004, the share of the non-floats (intermediate, conventional 
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observed behavior in the exchange rate. Based on their classification, the authors reported that the 
pegged exchange rate has been the most popular exchange rate system (around 33% of their 150 
countries during 1970-2001), followed by crawling peg (accounted for over 26% of the observations), 
or a variant thereof. They also reported that among the announced freely floating regimes, only 20 
percent practically operate as true float, while 60 percent were either intermediate or pegged regimes, 
and the remaining 20 percent had “free falling currencies”. Free falling is a term that the authors 
introduced for those regimes in which 12 months inflation equals or exceeds 40%. Moreover, using the 
classification  of  Reinhart  and  Rogoff,  Husain  et  al  (2005)  found  that  intermediate  regimes  have 
categorized the bulk of exchange rate regimes in the emerging economies for the past two decades. 
Husain et al have also reported that very few emerging countries have shifted to true firm fixing or to 
pure free float as late as 2001
138139. 
 
Furthermore,  other  studies  have  argued  in  favour  of  the  intermediate  regimes,  on  account  of  the 
superiority of these regimes over the two corner solutions from the welfare point of view. For example, 
Goldfajn and Silveira (2002) have shown, in a general equilibrium model for a small open economy, 
that exchange rate intervention is Pareto-improving where foreign investors are pessimistic about the 
home country’s performance, and hence about its ability to repay its debts. More explicitly, Goldstein 
(2002) have presented a case in favor of managed floating regime for emerging economies, by arguing 
that such a regime could work as a deterrent to currency mismatch, balance sheet vulnerability and fear 
of  floating.  They  also  argue  that  a  managed  floating  regime  would  ensure  sufficient  monetary 
independence, deal with shifts in capital, and maintain a workable nominal anchor to control inflation. 
Recently, H. Akiba et al (2009) have theoretically argued that the expected loss of an intermediate 
system in the form of managed floating, with appropriate intervention by the monetary authority, is no 
less  than  that  of  a  freely  floating  system  when  there  is  informational  friction  (asymmetry  in  the 
exchange rate policy) in a small economy.  This finding implies that hidden intervention by deceiving 
the private agents is welfare improving, at least for the short term.       
 
                                                           
138 Among other studies that have introduced alternative classification methods include Shambaugh (2004), 
Dubas et al (2005), and Frankel and Wei (2008). 
139 It is worth noting at the outset that  the findings of increasing recent studies on de facto classification do not 
imply the total irrationality of the announced official regimes, since these are still believed to have an active 
role in guiding the financial market’s expectations on exchange rate developments, and influence international 
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3. Choice of Exchange Rate regimes 
 
The choice of exchange rate regime is an important policy component for all countries. However, there 
has been long-standing debate on the choice of appropriate regime. Despite increasing  studies over the 
past three decades, there is still no consensus on subjects like the optimal choice of exchange rate 
regimes, their  determinants, and  whether  regimes  are  sustainable  or  not  (Kato  and Uctum,  2008).  
Traditional approaches to the selection of exchange rate regimes were based on the optimum currency 
criteria  (OCA)  developed  by  Mundell  (1961,  1963),  McKinnon  (1963),  and  Kenen  (1969).  The 
analysis in this literature had mainly taken the form of comparison between purely fixed exchange rate 
regimes against fully flexible. The nature of economic disturbance in the form of nominal and real 
shocks, and the fundamentals of OCA, were the main criteria on which to base the selection of an 
exchange rate regime. For example, the flexible exchange rate is preferable in the case of supply-side 
shocks  (changes  in  exports  and  terms  of  trade)  and  the  fixed  regime  is  preferred  in  the  case  of 
monetary and financial market disturbances
140.  
Based on the OCA criteria, the advantages of a fixed exchange rate increase with higher degree of 
economic integration. The most commonly stressed type of economic integration is asymmetry in 
economic shocks.  If the neighboring nations/regions have a high degree of symmetry in their business 
cycles, then there would be less advantage in having separate currencies, and the two neighbors can 
share monetary expansion in tandem (Frankel, 2003). However, if the neighboring economies face 
widely varying economic conditions, then it is more effective for stability purposes to stick with the 
conventional  view  of  an  independent  monetary  policy  with  flexible  exchange  rates  (Patridge  and 
Rickman, 2005).   
 
Economic integration includes other criteria like trade openness, labor mobility, fiscal cushions, and 
political willingness (Frankel, 2003). Small and very open economies (highly trade dependant) are 
more likely to adopt a fixed exchange rate regime than large and closed economies, which are more 
likely to have an independently floating currency (McKinnon, 1963). The smaller the economy, the 
more prone it is to external shocks through exchange rate, and thus the higher probability that it will 
choose a regime with lower flexibility. The degree of openness of the economy is assumed to be 
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the fact that in a world of sticky prices, the nominal exchange rate could be employed to insulate the economy 
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related negatively to flexibility of exchange rate. The higher the degree of openness, the worse-off is 
the  inflation-unemployment  trade-off  with  a flexible  exchange rate  due  to  the  depreciation  of the 
currency, and large is the impact of external shocks on the economy (Rogoff, 1985). Thus, these 
countries will most likely choose a regime of lower exchange rate flexibility in order to reduce the 
disadvantage of openness on the economy (e.g. inflation) 
 
High labor mobility between one country and its neighbors, particularly in the case of wage and price 
stickiness,  would  less  likely  lead  to  the  need  of  monetary  expansion  or  devaluation  in  case  of 
asymmetric shocks. According to MacDonald (2007), the ease of worker movements between the 
countries will assist in restoring equilibrium under a fixed exchange rate regime. In other words, the 
flexible labour market lowers the need for higher flexibility in the currency, in order to bring about 
adjustment in the economy following an exogenous shock. 
 
 Moreover, the presence of a fiscal transfer among the OCA member countries offers another way to 
assist in mitigating the macroeconomic shocks, when independent monetary policy has been foregone. 
Finally, if the economies are integrated in terms of political relations, in the sense that they have 
common economic priorities (e.g. fighting inflation vs. unemployment), then there would be less need 
for an asymmetric economic response to common shocks (Frankel, 2003)
141142. 
 
Following the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, the period of high inflation during the 1970s 
and 1980s, and the recent currency crises since the 1990s, the literature on the choice of exchange rate 
regime narrowed to  macroeconomic performance under alternative regimes. In this regard, our review 
can be divided into two basic categories; the relevant theoretical properties of each regime (fixed vs. 
                                                           
141 Kenen (1969) has argued that diversified economies are less likely to require a flexible exchange rate to 
mitigate the impacts from adverse shocks. Whereas undiversified economies with very concentrated production 
structure are more likely to adopt a flexible regime. 
142 Given the emphasis on the condition of symmetric economic shocks in OCA theory, much of the empirical 
work focused on examining synchronisation in the business cycles between the potential OCA members; e.g.  
Partridge and Rickman for US (2005), Buigut and Valev for east African countries (2005), Abu-Qarn and Bader 
for GCC countries (2008), Economidou and Kool for Europe (2009), Lee and Azli for East Asia (2009), among 
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flexible),  and  the  empirically  tested  behavior  of  macroeconomic  performance  under  alternative 
exchange rate regimes.   
 
Among the main arguments for the fixed exchange rate regime is its ability to import credibility and 
ensure low inflationary environment (Dornbusch, 2001)
143.  Due to inflationary bias, in the case of a 
monetary policy with full discretion, the anti-inflationary central bank can provide more commitment 
to its intention by fixing the exchange rate to hard currency with stronger monetary discipline. In such 
cases,  economic  agents  (e.g.  workers,  managers)  would  set  prices  on  the  basis  of  low  inflation 
expectation, since it is believed that the currency pegging will prevent central banks from pursuing 
expansionary polices by increasing money supply.  Accordingly, that will lead to a lower level of 
inflation rate at any given level of output
144. Other advantages of fixed exchange rate regimes include 
reducing  exchange  rate  uncertainty,  thus  promoting  trade  and  investment  and  better  allocation  of 
resources
145, preventing competitive depreciation or competitive appreciation
146, importing financial 
                                                           
143 The credibility view was mainly raised in the late seventies and early eighties. The literature in this regard 
was mainly based on the theory developed by Barro and Gordon (1983) on monetary policy credibility. During 
the same time and in contrast to the credibility view that argued for the fixed exchange rate regime, the 
consistency view, that was originally introduced through the writings of Kyndland and Prescott (1977), had 
called for retaining the flexible exchange rate regime when the potential inflation bias is stronger. According to 
this  view,  government  restraints  need  to  be  established  through  domestic  institutions,  to  guarantee  that 
discretion is not misused,  and economic policies are consistent and sustainable in order to avoid inflation. 
144 Domestic inflation can also originate on account of excessive government budget deficits (Obstfeld and 
Rogoff, 1995). Because of  this, the credibility of the fixed regime is also justified on the grounds of some 
political factors. It is argued that the pegged regime is an instrument for governments to address credibility-
deficits and dynamic inconsistency problems.  Based on the credibility view, the fixed regime ties the hands of 
the policy makers to a specific policy course (Carmignani et al., 2008). In contrast, other studies  have shown the 
viability of flexible exchange rate regimes when political costs are taken into account. E.g. Poirson (2002) and 
Carmignani et al., (2008), among many others. 
145 This issue is particularly emphasized in the case of developing countries with incomplete forward markets. 
Also,  some  recent  studies  that  have focused  on  developing  countries  were  able  to  find some  relationship 
between exchange rate volatility on trade and investment (Parsley and Rose 2001, Frankel and Rose 2002).  
146 Frankel (2003) has updated the interpretation of this advantage by the currency crises that took place in the 
1990s, where the strategy of improving trade balance through devaluation was ineffective, as such strategies 
between the neighbouring economies made them feel at a competitive disadvantage. P a g e  | 231 
 
stability
147, and allowing for more efficient adjustments when shocks are of nominal nature (Corbo, 
2003).  
 
On the other hand, countries with floating exchange systems tend to enjoy independent monetary 
policies.  Countries  with  independent  monetary  policies  are  viewed  as  able  to  quickly  pull  their 
economies out of recessions by monetary expansion and depreciation of exchange rate, leading to 
stimulation of domestic as well as global demand (export), eventually returning the economy to the 
desired  level  of  employment.  In  contrary,  countries  with  fixed  regimes  have  to  depend  on  the 
automatic mechanism of wage and price flexibility that may take a long time to manifest, thus resulting 
in longer recessions in these countries (Baqueiro et al., 2003).  
 
 A  second  advantage  to  flexible  exchange  rates  is  their  ability  to  facilitate  real  exchange  rate 
adjustments  when  real  shocks  make  those  adjustments  necessary.  An  early  case  for  the  flexible 
exchange rate regime was pioneered by Milton Friedman (1953), who argued that in a world of stick 
prices and wages, flexible exchange rates are necessary to insulate the economy from real shocks. A 
third advantage of flexible exchange rate regimes is that they offer economic stability compared to 
fixed rate regimes that are prone to speculative attacks and periodic crises (Frankel, 2003). Also, under 
the flexible exchange rate regime, the monetary authority of a country is allowed to enjoy two potential 
advantages of an independent central bank: lender of last resort and seigniorage (Frankel, 2003). Two 
more advantages of flexible exchange rate regimes is their ability to let the world economy function 
with less barriers to trade (e.g. tariffs and quotas) and the unnecessary need to hold foreign reserves 
(MacDonald, 2007).  Depending on policy objectives, intermediate exchange rate regimes tend to cash 
in on some of the benefits from the two corner solutions.    
 
With regards to costs associated with the two corner solutions, fixed exchange rate regimes normally 
suffer from fragility in commitment, and forfeiting of monetary policy independence. Another potential 
cost associated with fixed regimes is the pre-requisite that domestic interest rates movements trail those 
of  the  anchor  country.  While  this  pre-requisite  was  meant  to  mitigate  arbitrage  conditions  and 
subsequently capital outflows, economic conditions may be divergent between the anchor country and 
the follower country, thus requiring some misalignment between domestic interest rates and those of 
the anchor country. Another cost attributed to fixed exchange rate regimes is a potentially expensive 
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currency crisis that could result from difficulties in mitigating external as well as internal shocks, given 
the lack of a sovereign monetary policy. Economies with floating regimes are also prone to the risk of 
imported inflation, and contraction in international trade or transfers of savings in the presence of 
major exchange rate volatility (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995). As was the case with respect to benefits, 
intermediate exchange rate regimes tend to some of the costs from the two-corner solution.  
 
Furthermore, it is worth noting at the onset that, despite the amount of vast empirical literature on the 
macroeconomic performance under different exchange rate regimes, there is no consensus between the 
studies  as  to  which  exchange  rate  regime  is  optimal  to  continuously  promote  and  maintain  the 
macroeconomic status of a country.  The different classification schemes of the de facto exchange rate 
regimes are viewed to be among the main factors of  the debate (Bleaney and Francisco, 2007).  
 
A great part of the empirical studies investigated the influence of the choice of the exchange rate 
regime on inflation and economic growth.  For example, Ghosh et al (1997, 2002), who relied on the 
IMF classification, found a negative relationship between fixed exchange rate regime and inflation; 
however, they failed to find evidence for a strong link between the choice of exchange rate regime and 
economic growth. Similar findings were also reported by Bleaney and Francisco (2005), who relied on 
the  classification  of  Bubula  and  Otker-Robe  (2002),  that  is  slightly  different  from  the  IMF 
classification.  A  weak  link  between  output  growth  and  exchange  rate  arrangement  had  also  been 
reported by Razin and Rubinstein (2005), who based their analysis on the IMF classification, as well as 
on Reihart and Rogoff (2004). 
 
In contrast, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001,2003b)
148, who used their own de facto classification, 
reported  lower  inflation  rates  and  slower  growth  in  developing  economies  with  pegged  systems, 
compared  with  their  more  flexible  counterparts.   
A  low  inflation  environment  under  fixed  exchange  regime  was  also  confirmed  by  Edwards  and 
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hand, the authors have argued that the inability of rigid systems to absorb trade shocks forms a major factor 
behind lower growth under such regimes. A similar reason was presented by Calvo (1999), who argued that the 
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Magendzo (2003), who reported that, dollarized economies and economies under union currency (e.g. 
Euro area) enjoy a significantly lower inflation rate than countries with their own currencies. Their 
finding implies that the harder the fix, the higher its effectiveness in enhancing credibility. Similarly, 
Bleaney and Francisco (2007), who relied on different de facto classification schemes, have reported in 
their study on developing countries that hard pegs have lower inflation than other regimes (floats and 
soft pegs)
149.  Bleaney and Francisco have also reported that growth is similar in floating and pegged 
regimes; however, it is lower in hard fixed than in other regimes. A positive strong link between hard 
peg and growth was confirmed by Frankel and Rose (2002), who reported higher trade between trading 
partners under currency unions.   
 
A similar link between exchange rate arrangement and inflation and economic growth was found in the 
studies of Rogoff et al (2004) and Husain et al (2005). Both studies used the de facto classification of 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) to analyse the performance of exchange rate regimes in developing and 
developed economies.  Generally, both studies concluded that pegged systems work well and are able 
to  deliver  both  relatively  low  inflation  and  relatively  high  exchange  rate  durability,  without 
compromising growth objectives for poor nations with little access to international capital markets. On 
the contrary, both studies also concluded that as countries become richer and more mature in terms of 
institutional frameworks, they can enjoy higher growth without any cost to credibility, if they adopted 
more flexible exchange rate regime. Similar findings were reported by Bailliu, Lafrance, and Perrault 
(2001), who provided evidence that more flexible exchange rate arrangements are associated with 
higher economic growth, but only for countries that are relatively open to international capital flows 
and, to a lesser extent, have well developed financial markets. 
 
Further to the link between  the level of development and exchange rate arrangement,  Dodge (2007) 
has argued that under market-based, liberalized trade and financial order, flexible exchange rates are 
viewed as a key element in promoting good economic performance, both domestically and globally. 
Dodge particularly emphasized the choice of flexible exchange rate for large economies with well-
developed and well-functioning domestic financial markets. By citing the Canadian experience, Dodge 
argued that the flexible exchange rate had helped the economy to deal with economic shocks without 
forcing very difficult changes in the overall level of output, wages and prices. On the other hand, he 
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also acknowledged that a fixed exchange rate system can be necessary for small economies, where an 
independent  monetary  policy  is  difficult  to  execute  and  the  costs  associated  with  having  floating 
currency can outweigh the benefits.  
 
Furthermore, exchange rate arrangements and economic performance are also evaluated from balance 
sheet effects and the probability of currency crises. This strand of studies has accelerated, particularly 
following the currency crisis during the 1990s. Some studies, such as Goldstein (2002) Calvo and 
Reinhart (2002), Hausmann et al (2001), Aghion et al (2004), and Meissner and Oomes (2009) have 
indicated that the greater the importance of foreign debts in the balance sheet, the less likely the option 
for flexible exchange rates, particularly in the case of emerging markets, where liability dollarization is 
relatively very large .  
 Currency crises, on the other hand, are generally defined as events of large depreciation of exchange 
rates triggered by speculative attacks (Esaka, 2009). The famous claim in this context is that pegged 
regimes are considered to be among the main factors leading to currency crisis. This claim is clearly 
explained on account of the laxity and false perception under pegged arrangement with open capital 
accounts explained earlier. The pegged regimes under liberalized capital accounts encourage a large 
capital inflow under reduced perception of risk, which in turn makes the economy prone to currency 
crises, in the case of sudden large reversal of capital. 
  
However, unlike the case in the balance sheet effect, and similar to the above exhibited empirical 
studies on the link between exchange rate regime and inflation and growth, there is no conclusive 
evidence  on  the  impact of  exchange  rate  arrangement  and  the  occurrence  of  currency  crises.  For 
example, Ghosh et al (2003) investigated the occurrence of currency crises under different regimes 
during the period from 1972 to 1999, using the IMF classification, and concluded that floating regimes 
are the most likely to experience banking crises. Similarly, and more recently, Esaka (2009), who used 
a probit model to examine whether the de facto exchange rate regimes - as per the classification of 
Reihart and Rogoff (2004) -  influenced the occurrence of currency crises during the period from 1980-
2001, reported that pegged systems significantly decrease the probability of currency crises compared 
with  floating.  Furthermore,  the  author  concluded  that  pegged  systems  with  capital  account 
liberalization  are  substantially  less  prone  to  speculative  attacks,  due  to  enhanced  credibility  by 
abandoning monetary policy autonomy. 
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In contrast, Rogoff et al (2004) and Husain et al (2005) have reported, based on statistical analysis for 
the period 1970-2000, that the highest probability of a banking crisis occurred in the emerging markets, 
and that the probability of a crisis increases with the increase in the rigidity of the exchange rate 
regime. Similarly, Razin and Rubinstein (2005) have reported, based on a probit estimation during 
1971-2002,  that  the  probability  of  a  crisis  increases  with  the  switch  to  a  pegged  exchange  rate. 
Furthermore, in an earlier study by Otker-Robe (2003), who used a probit model based on the de facto 
classification of Otker-Robe (2002) to estimate the probability of currency crises under alternative 
regimes,  it  was  reported  that  the  probability  of  currency  crises  is  significantly  higher  under 
intermediate regimes than for both hard pegs and floating regimes. Their results are supportive of the 
“bipolar view” of Fisher (2001) discussed earlier. 
 
On the other hand, Hail and Pozo (2006) analysed the probability of currency crises by focusing on 
developed  countries.  They  used  probit  estimation  for  the  period  1974-1998,  with  two  alternative 
classifications; namely the de jure of the IMF and the de facto classification of the Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2005). Under the IMF classification, they found a higher probability of currency crises 
for the pegged regime than for other regimes. However, they failed to find any link between exchange 
rate arrangement and currency crises when the Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) classification was 
used .  
 
4.  Summary and Conclusion 
 
Exchange rate arrangement forms one of the most controversial issues in international economies. 
From the above brief survey, the relevant literature does not have a consensus on subjects like optimal 
exchange rate regimes and their determinants. A great number of recent studies, particularly those that 
have depended on the de-facto classification of regimes, have provided evidence against the move 
toward the corners, and that intermediate regimes are still viable and not vanishing. Accordingly, this 
further confirms the arguments of scholars like Frankel (1999, 2003) that there is no single regime is 
right for all countries at all times. According to Frankel, the appropriate exchange rate system varies, 
depending on the specific conditions of the nation in question, and depending on the conditions of the 
time period in question.  
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The assessment of exchange rate regimes has evolved over time. Given the growing importance of 
international  capital  flows  and  the  predominance  of  external  over  domestic  monetary  shocks,  the 
traditional trade-off has narrowed down to a price stability-growth dilemma, according to which fixes 
are expected to enhance the credibility of non-inflationary monetary policies, reducing inflation and the 
volatility of nominal variables, while floats are seen as allowing necessary price adjustments in the face 
of  external  (real  and  financial)  shocks,  reducing  output  fluctuations  and  improving  growth 
performance. Such evolvement has been enhanced and justified due to a series of economic crises 
including the Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis in 1992, the Mexican peso crisis in 1994, and the Asian 
crisis in 1997.  
One of the key assessments in selecting an appropriate exchange rate regime pertains to a country’s 
economic structure. For emerging markets, the literature that examines the determinants of choice of 
the exchange rate regime has identified a number of factors, including international financial market 
integration,  macroeconomic  performance,  financial  sector  development,  and  political  economy 
considerations. For example, a sound and well-developed financial sector is a necessary precondition 
to establish a floating exchange rate regime, as flexible systems are associated with increased volatility 
in the nominal exchange rate. However, emerging markets are also permeated with shallow capital, 
making it difficult to manage a flexible exchange rate regime. To a certain extent, the literature has 
confirmed  the  positive  co-integration  link  between  the  choice  of  the  exchange  rate  regime  and 
macroeconomic performance.  
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Chapter Seven 
Choice of Exchange Rate Regime in the Case of the GCC countries 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter we attempt to analyse the alternative exchange rate regimes to the GCC economies 
based on the recent economic development in the region and their level of development. We also 
attempted to empirically test the feasibility of pegging the currencies of the GCC countries with a 
basket peg of two currencies; namely the US dollar and euro. The chapter begins by presenting some 
background on the exchange rate regime policies of the GCC countries and some brief analysis of the 
recent economic development in the region. 
 
The US dollar has been the de facto anchor for all the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries' 
currencies, with exception of the Kuwaiti Dinar, for over two decades (table 1). Except for a short 
period  when  it  was  exclusively  pegged  to  the  US  dollar  (May  2003-May  2007)  pursuant  to  an 
agreement in the context of the GCC’s monetary integration process, the Kuwaiti Dinar has been 
linked to an undisclosed weighted basket of currencies, in which the US dollar is believed to form the 
major  part,  given  that  most  of  the  Kuwaiti's  exports  (oil)  are  priced  in  US  dollars  and  limited  
fluctuation  occurred  vis-à-vis  the  US  dollar,  and  subsequently  the  fluctuations  vis-à-vis  GCC 
countries’ currencies (Sturm and Siegfried, 2005).  
 
The  choice  of  the  dollar  as  an  anchor  currency  had  been  based  primarily  on  the  account  of  the 
dominance of this currency in the international oil trade (Sturm et al., 2008).  Continuing with the 
dollar has been influenced by a number of factors, such as the large share of stabilizing exports as well 
as fiscal revenues (since oil revenue constitutes the major part of government budget), credibility of 
monetary policy under the peg, and shielding the value of the financial wealth from fluctuation in the 
exchange rate with the US dollar
150.  Furthermore, in terms of internal stability, the pegged system 
looks to have maintained the purchasing power of the currencies of the GCC country members as the 
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average  annual  inflation  rate  during  the  period  1990-2002  ranged  between  a  minimum  of  -0.23 
(Bahrain) to a maximum of 3.3 (UAE)
151. 
 
 
Table: 1 (National Currency per US Dollar) 
 
Time  Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Qatar 
Saudi 
Arabia  UAE 
1990  0.38    0.38  3.64  3.75  3.67 
1991  0.38  0.28  0.38  3.64  3.75  3.67 
1992  0.38  0.29  0.38  3.64  3.75  3.67 
1993  0.38  0.30  0.38  3.64  3.75  3.67 
1994  0.38  0.30  0.38  3.64  3.75  3.67 
1995  0.38  0.30  0.38  3.64  3.75  3.67 
1996  0.38  0.30  0.38  3.64  3.75  3.67 
1997  0.38  0.30  0.38  3.64  3.75  3.67 
1998  0.38  0.30  0.38  3.64  3.75  3.67 
1999  0.38  0.30  0.38  3.64  3.75  3.67 
2000  0.38  0.31  0.38  3.64  3.75  3.67 
2001  0.38  0.31  0.38  3.64  3.75  3.67 
2002  0.38  0.30  0.38  3.64  3.75  3.67 
2003  0.38  0.30  0.38  3.64  3.75  3.67 
2004  0.38  0.29  0.38  3.64  3.75  3.67 
2005  0.38  0.29  0.38  3.64  3.75  3.67 
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2006  0.38  0.29  0.38  3.64  3.75  3.67 
2007  0.38  0.28  0.38  3.64  3.75  3.67 
2008  0.38  0.27  0.38  3.64  3.75  3.67 
  
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF 
 
 
However,  since  the  beginning  of  the  current  decade  and  following  the  rapid  economic  growth 
facilitated by higher oil revenue, some inflation pressure has emerged in all the GCC member states. 
The average inflation rate in GCC countries stood around 10% as of 2008, with significant differences 
between the member countries (table 2).  Factors that are believed to have driven up recent inflation in 
the GCC economies include increasing domestic demand accompanied by rapid money and credit 
growth, emerging bottlenecks in labour and materials caused by economic booms, and rising import 
prices (Sturm et al. 2008, Marzovilla et al. 2010, Central bank of Oman 2008).  
Furthermore, apart from being a global phenomenon, rising import prices in the GCC economies have 
been also due, to some extent, to the recent  persistent  depreciation of the US dollar against the 
currencies  of  the  major  trading  partners  of  the  GCC  countries  (notably  the  Euro,  since  a  very 
significant share of the GCC’s imports come from Europe). The nominal effective exchange rates of 
the currencies of the GCC countries have witnessed significant depreciation since 2002 due mainly to 
the dollar’s decline against the currencies of the trading partners of the GCC economies (figure 1), 
notwithstanding that a significant share of imports comes from economies whose currencies are pegged 
to, or highly influenced by, the US dollar and to a lesser extent from the US (further detail on trade 
pattern of the GCC countries is given in section 2).  
 
Table: 2 (Inflation Rate, Average consumer prices) 
 
Time  Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Qatar 
Saudi 
Arabia  UAE 
1990  -0.91  15.80  10.01  3.01  2.08  0.60 
1991  0.93  8.13  4.60  4.42  4.56  5.50 P a g e  | 240 
 
1992  -0.29  -0.32  0.96  3.06  -0.37  4.31 
1993  2.62  0.60  1.14  -0.87  0.84  5.23 
1994  0.42  2.37  -0.66  1.32  0.65  5.72 
1995  3.13  2.53  -1.13  2.96  5.05  4.37 
1996  -0.19  3.04  0.50  7.26  0.87  2.98 
1997  -4.59  0.81  -0.36  2.60  -0.43  2.95 
1998  -0.42  0.60  0.43  2.92  -0.17  1.96 
1999  -1.26  3.08  0.51  2.16  -1.31  2.10 
2000  -0.73  1.57  -1.20  1.68  -1.10  1.36 
2001  -1.18  1.45  -0.84  1.44  -1.14  2.80 
2002  -0.50  0.80  -0.33  0.24  0.23  2.92 
2003  1.68  0.99  0.17  2.26  0.59  3.12 
2004  2.25  1.26  0.67  6.80  0.36  5.04 
2005  2.62  4.12  1.85  8.81  0.63  6.20 
2006  2.04  3.09  3.44  11.83  2.31  9.29 
2007  3.25  5.47  5.89  13.76  4.11  11.65 
2008  3.53  10.50  12.61  15.05  9.87  11.54 
Average  0.65  3.47  2.01  4.77  1.45  4.72 
 
Source: World Economic Outlook, IMF 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, the high dependency of the GCC economies on foreign workers (from neighbouring 
countries like India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Egypt, etc.) has further accentuated the inflationary effect of 
the dollar peg (Willett et al, 2009). The recent economic growth in the area, following high revenues 
from a hike in oil prices, has led to economic development that resulted in higher demand for foreign P a g e  | 241 
 
labour in the GCC countries, given the low level of unemployment and the fact that most of the 
national labourers are being absorbed by the public sector.  Given the supply bottlenecks, on account of 
limited agricultural production and manufacturing, recent higher migration of labourers into the GCC 
countries fuelled demand for various consumer goods (e.g. food stuffs) that are mainly imported, thus, 
magnifying supply constraints and eventually enhancing the increase in domestic prices ( Marzovilla et 
al. 2010).  
 
Moreover, another influence of higher dependency on foreign labour on domestic prices of the GCC 
countries is believed to have been transmitted through demand for higher wages (Gulf Talent, 2007). 
The depreciation of the US dollar has lowered the value of wages, and as results the purchasing power 
of  the  foreign  workers’  remittance  decreased.  That  has  made  it  difficult  to  attract/retain  staff, 
particularly skilled and highly qualified workers, in the GCC countries, thus resulting in a price-wage 
spiral (Ghars El-Din and Mohammed, 2005). 
.   
Figure: 1(Movement in NEER for US dollar and the GCC currencies) 
 
 
 
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF. 
However, in addition to the above inflationary implications of the adverse movements in the 
US dollar, the US dollar peg is believed to have amplified the inflationary effects of oil prices 
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due to divergence in the business cycles between the United States and the GCC economies 
(Sturm et al. 2008, MacDonald 2010).  The recent development in the region, in the form of 
rapid  economic  growth  due  to  massive  revenues  because  of  a  hike  in  oil  prices,  has 
necessitated the use of stringent monetary policy in order to contain inflationary responses to 
the expansion of  monetary  circulation. However,  given  the  peg  with  US  dollar, the  GCC 
countries were forced to align their interest rate with that of the US, which lowered its interest 
rate to resist recessionary  tendencies in the aftermath of the  September 11 attack  and the 
recent sub-prime market crisis in September 2007, in order to resist any appreciation due to 
speculation  in  the  form  of  capital  inflow  (figure  2).  That,  in  turn,  has  motivated  further 
borrowing  and  credit  expansion  and  further  fuelled  the  inflationary  pressure  from  the  oil 
surpluses recorded by the GCC countries.  Given the policy constraint under the peg system, 
there were fewer incentives for the GCC economies to depend on monetary policy to curb 
inflation. As a result, most of the GCC economies have resorted to some alternative tools like 
administrative and prudential measures. In fact, a similar scenario took place in the late 1990s 
when the economic conditions of the GCC countries necessitated the pursuit of expansionary 
monetary policy in order to avoid deflationary pressures because of a strong dollar and low oil 
prices (MacDonald, 2010).  
 
The significant persistent depreciation of the US dollar and its adverse consequences on the import 
prices of the GCC economies has caused huge monetary losses in the region (e.g. rising inflation and 
higher budgetary expenditures invoiced in non-dollar currencies) and cast doubts on the dollar-peg; 
these  doubts  have  resulted  in  an  increasing  pressure  from  the  public  demanding  for  an  up-ward 
revaluation of the GCC countries’ currencies or even a de-pegging from the US dollar. Moreover, the 
fears that the US current account may be unsustainable have further enhanced the grounds for the 
demand to de-peg from the US dollar. 
 
Other reasons that have been advanced to support the idea of de-pegging the currencies of the GCC 
countries from the current hard fix with the US dollar include the necessary alignment in the real 
exchange rate of these economies.  The current scenario of rising oil prices calls for an adjustment in 
the real exchange rate of the GCC countries. However, under the dollar peg, such adjustment is only 
expected to take place via domestic inflation of the local currency, which is  experienced by most of 
the GCC countries. The downside of such a process is that it is slow and can create inflationary P a g e  | 243 
 
expectations, which can result in further misalignment in the real exchange rate in the form of real 
overvaluation (MacDonald, 2010)
152.        
 
Relevant to the issue of misalignment is the undervalued nominal effective exchange rate of the GCC 
countries’ currencies against some other leading international currencies like the euro and the sterling 
pound.  In a flexible exchange rate system, the recent increase in oil prices and the consequent inflow 
of foreign exchange would have caused the currencies of the GCC countries to appreciate. Instead, 
owing to current peg and the depreciation of the US dollar, the currencies of the GCC countries have 
been falling.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
Other reasons for de-pegging include the emerging changes in trade and investment patterns (Abed et 
al., 2003, Sturm et al., 2008, Iqbal 2010). This has particular relevance to countries like Oman and 
Bahrain because of their limited oil resources. As a result, these countries are required to promote non-
oil  exports  (tourism,  financial  sector,  hydrocarbon-based  industries,  etc.).  So,  as  these  countries 
diversify their manufacturing and service industries, a more flexible exchange rate regime is necessary 
in order to ensure sufficient competitiveness in the international market
153. Furthermore, diversifying 
entails more recurrence in aggregate demand and supply shocks, hence the need for flexible exchange 
rate. 
 
Also, the further integration of the GCC country members into the international markets (e.g. WTO, 
Free  trade  with  Europe,  US,  and  other  regions)  underline  the  need  for  maintaining  international 
                                                           
152However, a number of studies (e.g. Kumah, 2009, Iqbal, 2010) have suggested that the misalignment of 
exchange rates has not been an issue to the GCC countries as the real exchange  rates (REERs) for most of these 
countries are found to be undervalued. Furthermore, according to Kumah (2009), the estimated undervaluation 
of REERs of the GCC economies remains low, averaging between 7 and 15%.  The undervaluation in REERs is 
attributed to causes like temporary frictions and adjustment costs associated with continued depreciation of 
the US dollar and structural economic reforms such as improvement in the business climate, modernization of 
large segments of the economy, and flexibility in the supply of foreign labour (Iqbal, 2010).  
153 The need for further diversification is generally viewed to be required by all the GCC state members. For 
example Abed et al. (2003) and, recently, Sturm et al. (2008) claim diversification is necessary on basis of the 
need to expand the share of  the non-oil sector in order to provide employment opportunities for the increasing 
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competitiveness in the non-oil sector (Abed et al., 2003). Moreover, the increasing integration of the 
financial  sectors    of  the  GCC  countries  with  the  global  economies  make  such  economies  more 
vulnerable to  exogenous  shocks, thus  necessitating greater  flexibility  in  the exchange  rates  of the 
currencies of these countries (Iqbal, 2010). 
 
Further to the issue of diversification in the GCC countries, the recent fluctuations in the US dollar in 
relationship to non-dollar currencies led to higher instability of non-oil exports and imports and that 
resulted in higher costs by increasing the exchange rate risk for trade and capital transactions as well as 
altering relative prices affecting production and investment decisions.   Moreover, on account of the 
recent changes in the price of oil, it is believed that the US dollar-peg has placed a larger burden on 
fiscal policy of the GCC countries to sustain internal stability and growth. This scenario is particularly 
relevant to periods of low oil prices (e.g. late 1990s) during  which the governments of the GCC 
countries are forced to draw upon their foreign assets, managed by sovereign wealth funds, in order to 
sustain economic growth, which on the other hand comes at the cost of higher vulnerability to future 
negative terms of trade shocks (Iqbal, 2010). 
 
Another argument for an alternative exchange rate in the GCC economies is based on these economies’ 
financial assets, which are mainly dollar dominated. It is assumed that these assets will get rid of the 
dominant influence of the dollar on account of globalization, growth prospects in emerging markets, 
and the rise of the Euro as a reserve currency. Finally, given the increased degree of capital flow, trade 
openness, and foreign direct investment in the GCC economies, the attractiveness of keeping the dollar 
peg could be decreased, particularly if increased openness leads to higher volatility (Khan, 2009). 
 
Before we turn to discussing the suggested alternative exchange rate strategies for the GCC member 
states, we will first highlight the importance of studying the choice of exchange rate regimes for the 
GCC economies in section two. The outline of the reminder of this chapter is organized as follows. 
Section three presents a survey on the studies that have attempted to analyse the choice of exchange 
rate regimes for the GCC countries. The proposition for a dollar-euro basket peg as suggested by this 
chapter is illustrated in section four. Methodology of estimation, data and empirical estimation, and 
unit root tests are presented in sections five, six, and seven, respectively. Analysis of the results from 
the first part of estimation is given in section eight. The second part of estimation, co-integration 
analysis, is presented in section nine, and finally summery and conclusion are presented in section ten.   P a g e  | 245 
 
 
2. The Importance of Analysing the Choice of Exchange Rate Regimes of the GCC Economies 
 
Basically,  the  importance  of  analysing  the  GCC  economies  in  general  stems  from  their  recent 
increasing role as global investors and trade partners, in addition to playing a crucial role in the global 
energy markets. Furthermore, together with other oil-exporting countries, they have become part of the 
international policy debate on global imbalances (Sturm et al., 2008).  
 
The GCC economies are major players in global energy markets in terms of their current production 
and the availability of spare oil capacity.  The GCC countries collectively account for around 40% of 
the global oil reserves and 23% of natural gas reserves (figures 3, 4, and 5)
154. According to the IEA 
report (2008), oil and gas are expected to continue dominating the global energy sector for the next 20-
30 years. Furthermore, in view of the forecasted depletion of oil reserves in many countries, including 
the US and some European countries, the expected increasing demand of oil in emerging as well as 
developing countries, and the relatively low exploiting costs in the GCC countries, suggest that the 
GCC countries will continue to play a great role in the supply of energy around the world. That in turn 
implies any major policy changes in the GCC region, including in the macroeconomic environment, 
will most likely have some impact on oil prices, which in turn would impact economies all over the 
globe. 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
154 Saudi Arabia is ranked the world’s largest oil producer, alongside Russia, with an average of over 10 million 
barrels per day in 2008. It holds more than one fifth of global oil reserves and accounts for more than half of all 
oil reserves in the GCC region.  According to IEA (2008), Saudi Arabia will remain the world’s largest oil producer 
until 2030, with its production expected to climb from 10.2 mb/d to 15.6 mb/d. Kuwait and the UAE are listed 
among the top ten world net oil producers. On the other hand, Qatar sits on the third largest natural gas 
reserve after Russia and Iran. Bahrain and Oman have comparatively very limited oil and gas reserves (Sturm et 
al., 2008)  P a g e  | 246 
 
 
Figure: 2 (Three months inter-bank rates in US and the GCC countries) 
 
 
   
Source: Quarterly Statistical Bulletin (2010), Saudi Arabia Monetary Authority 
 
 
Figure: 3 (Distribution of Oil Reserves in 2008) 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
US
Bahrain
Kuwait
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia 
 
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2009
 
5.60%
9.80%
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2009. 
 
 
 
 
Figure: 4 (Oil Production in 2008) 
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Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2009 
 
 
Furthermore, over the past five years, the GCC countries have recorded impressive economic growth 
facilitated by higher oil revenues, which is primarily due to the persistent rise in international oil 
prices. The combined nominal GDP of the six GCC states have jumped from around USD 406  billion 
in 2003 to around USD 1,070 billion as of 2008, which represents a growth of more than 100% over 
five years (table 4). Saudi Arabia and the UAE account for the bulk of this growth, with an increase of 
around USD 261 billion and USD 172 billion, respectively, over the past five years. In real terms, the 
GCC countries have, on average, recorded an annual GDP growth of around 7.7% over the past five 
years, with growth in exports representing the main drivers of real GDP growth (table 3). Similarly, 
non-oil real GDP in the GCC economies have witnessed, over the past five years, significant growth 
that has exceeded in some cases the growth of oil real GDP (figure 6). The highest non-oil real GDP 
growth was registered by Qatar, the UAE, and Oman at 20%, 15%, and 12% per annum, respectively. 
The past five years have also witnessed an enhancement in GDP per capita, which surged from an 
average of 18,144 US dollars in 2003to an average of 43,251 US dollars as of 2008 (table 5), putting 
the GCC countries among the richest nations of the world.  
 
Table: 3 (Real GDP Growth) 
 
Time  Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Qatar 
Saudi 
Arabia  UAE 
2000  5.23  4.69  4.65  10.94  4.87  12.38 
2001  4.62  0.22  5.56  6.32  0.55  1.70 
2002  5.19  3.01  2.08  3.20  0.13  2.65 
2003  7.25  17.33  0.34  6.32  7.66  11.89 
2004  5.64  10.24  3.42  17.72  5.27  9.69 
2005  7.85  10.62  4.89  9.24  5.55  8.19 
2006  6.65  5.14  6.00  15.03  3.16  8.72 
2007  8.07  2.51  7.74  13.69  2.02  6.06 P a g e  | 250 
 
2008  6.12  6.40  12.26  15.81  4.33  5.14 
 
Source: World Economic Outlook, IMF 
 
Table: 4 (Nominal GDP, Units: billions of US dollars) 
 
Time  Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Qatar 
Saudi 
Arabia  UAE 
2000  7.97  37.72  19.45  17.76  188.69  70.22 
2001  7.97  34.90  19.40  17.54  183.26  68.68 
2002  8.49  38.14  20.05  19.36  188.80  75.89 
2003  9.75  47.84  21.54  23.53  214.86  88.96 
2004  11.23  59.44  24.67  31.73  250.67  106.75 
2005  13.46  80.80  30.91  42.46  315.76  134.17 
2006  15.85  101.56  36.81  56.92  356.63  163.72 
2007  18.44  111.76  41.64  71.04  385.20  207.56 
2008  21.24  158.15  59.95  100.41  475.73  261.35 
 
Source: World Economic Outlook, IMF 
 
 
 
Figure: 6 (Oil and non-oil real GDP growth rates) 
  
Source: Annual Reports of the GCC countries’ central banks
 
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
 
Source: Annual Reports of the GCC countries’ central banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P a g e  | 251 
 
Oil GDP Growth
Non-oilGDP GrowthP a g e  | 252 
 
Table: 5 (GDP per capita, constant prices, Units: US dollars) 
 
Time  Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Qatar 
Saudi 
Arabia  UAE 
2000  11,889.98  17,012.78  8,096.83  29,290.36  9,216.39  23,446.15 
2001  11,719.42  15,114.33  7,994.03  27,030.27  8,736.41  21,685.14 
2002  12,127.44  15,761.11  8,202.52  28,354.80  8,785.13  22,660.97 
2003  13,725.67  18,783.06  8,759.85  32,787.55  9,758.02  25,051.74 
2004  15,601.16  21,585.56  9,954.44  41,949.31  11,126.52  28,382.49 
2005  18,322.67  27,012.51  12,317.68  53,332.91  13,657.95  32,677.09 
2006  21,156.85  31,908.76  14,282.00  67,921.63  15,049.63  38,713.15 
2007  24,137.60  33,759.99  15,180.31  76,373.73  15,858.75  46,248.63 
2008  27,247.79  45,937.97  20,887.14  91,477.78  19,108.15  54,848.52 
 
Source: World Economic Outlook, IMF 
 
 
The substantial revenue from oil exports has led to a remarkable increase in the current account surplus 
of the GCC member countries. The current account of the GCC countries is primarily characterised by 
a very high trade surplus given the size of the hydrocarbon exports. As of 2008, the accumulated 
combined current account surpluses of the GCC economies stood at around USD 260 billion (figure 7), 
which accounted on average for about 25% of the region’s total GDP (figure 8). The recent impressive 
surge in the account surpluses of the GCC economies is mainly attributed to increase in demand for 
and the prices of hydrocarbons. The recent current account surpluses of the GCC region forms almost 
half the joint account surplus of the OPEC member states, making the region a major net supplier of 
capital on a global scale, second to Asian countries (Sturm et al., 2008).  
 
 
  
Figure: 7 (Current account surpluses, Units: billions US dollars)
 
 
Source: World Economic Outlook, IMF
 
Figure: 8 (Current account Surpluses
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Figure: 8 (Current account Surpluses as percentage of GDP)
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Figure: 7 (Current account surpluses, Units: billions US dollars) 
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About half of the GCC regions’ oil revenues are currently absorbed through the trade channel. In the 
wake of large revenues from a prolonged rise in oil prices, trade by the GCC economies has risen 
substantially. A retrospective analysis shows that the total export of goods of the GCC region has risen 
dramatically from USD 88 billion in 1990, to USD 175 billion in 2000, and grew to USD 752 billion in 
2008 (figure 9). Around 70% of these exports are dominated by hydrocarbon products. Similarly, 
imports have risen from around USD 48 billion in 1990, to USD 85 billion in 2000, and reached 
around 361 billion in 2008. As of 2008, exports and imports formed, on average, around 70 and 40 
percent of the nominal GDP, respectively, in the GCC countries; this highlights the significance of 
international trade in aggregate domestic output of the GCC economies (figure 10).  
 
However, there is a clear difference between exports and imports with respect to the structure of the 
goods  traded  and  the  geographical  pattern  of  trade.  The  bulk  of  the  GCC  exports  consist  of 
hydrocarbon goods (oil and oil derivatives), which are mainly oriented towards Japan and emerging 
Asian markets. For example, in 2008, exports to Asian countries constituted around 60% of GCC 
countries’  aggregate  exports.  Furthermore,  Japan  alone  accounted  for  about  20%  of  the  GCC 
economies’ total exports (figure 11). However, imports to the GCC countries are dominated by two 
regions, Asia and Europe, with around 40% and 30% shares from total GCC imports, respectively 
(figure 12). The European markets are among the main beneficiaries from the increases in oil revenue 
of the GCC economies. The European area is the only region that maintains a trade surplus with the 
GCC  block  (figure  13).  Machinery  and  mechanical  appliances,  vehicles  and  parts,  and  electrical 
machinery and equipment formed the main imports to the GCC economies as of 2008. Intraregional 
trade between the GCC countries is very limited and formed around only 7% of total trade in 2008. 
The limited intra-GCC trade is primarily attributed to the dominance of hydrocarbon products in the 
external balance of these economies and to low diversification in their economic structure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure: 9 (Imports and Exports of goods and services, Units: millions US dollars)
 
    Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF
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Figure: 10 (Exports and imports as share of GDP)
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Figure: 10 (Exports and imports as share of GDP) 
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Figure: 11 (Direction of GCC exports in 2008) 
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Figure: 12 (Direction of GCC countries Imports in 2008)
Source: DOTS (IMF), and the Annual Reports of GCC central banks.
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Figure: 12 (Direction of GCC countries Imports in 2008)
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Source: DOTS (IMF), and the Annual Reports of GCC central banks. 
Figure: 12 (Direction of GCC countries Imports in 2008) 
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The remaining share of the  petrodollar revenues are invested in financial assets around the globe, 
resulting in a sizable build
and savings funds, which are also referred to as sovereign wealth funds (SWFs)
are normally of medium
term volatility stemming from oil revenues in government expenditure
cycles (Sturm et al., 2008)
also meant to improve the conduct of fiscal policy. Furthermore, the SWFs are assumed to have played 
a  large  role  in  sterilizing  the  effect  of  oil  revenues  resulting  from  high  demand  for  and  price of 
hydrocarbon products. 
 
                                                          
155 Early SWF was established in Kuwait during 1950s, however, they are found now in all of the GCC countries, 
with the exception of Saudi Arabia, where the monetary agency continues to manage the entire foreig
on behalf of the government (Sturm et al, 2008).
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The remaining share of the  petrodollar revenues are invested in financial assets around the globe, 
up of traditional foreign exchange reserves and, increasingly, stabilization 
funds, which are also referred to as sovereign wealth funds (SWFs)
155.  These funds, which 
term horizon, are primarily established for the purpose of smoothing short 
term volatility stemming from oil revenues in government expenditure so as to avoid boom and bust 
. Accordingly, they are part of the general fiscal policy framework and are 
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Detailed figures for the total assets of these state-owned funds are not normally disclosed, which makes 
it difficult to have a full view of the financial petrodollar recycling of the GCC countries. Based on the 
recorded foreign exchange rate reserves and the recent current account surpluses of the GCC countries, 
it is believed that these economies have assets in the range of USD 1-1.5 trillion under sovereign 
management (Sturm et al., 2008).  On account of the great size of financial petrodollar recycling, the 
oil-exporting nations and the GCC states are assumed to play a significant role in the world capital 
market. Such influence on international capital markets is largely felt in the impact of the petrodollar 
investments on asset prices (particularly US dollar dominated assets), emerging market yield, and the 
US dollar exchange rate, thus suggesting some implications for global financial stability
157158.  
 
Given their recent remarkable amount of international trade and upswings in their combined current 
account surplus, the GCC economies and the oil-exporting countries in general are assumed to take 
part in the international agenda for addressing global imbalances (Kumah, 2009). One of the ways 
through  which  oil-exporting  nations  like  the  GCC  economies  can  participate  in  addressing  global 
imbalances is by trying to accelerate investment in oil production capacity and increasing economic 
diversification. That will result in stabilising global oil markets and more importantly mobilising part 
of the petrodollar inflow of the oil exporting countries back to the oil importing countries through the 
import of goods by the former (countries with current account surpluses) from the later (countries with 
current account deficits like the US), thus mitigating the negative effect of the ongoing increase in oil 
prices on the purchasing power of oil-importing countries
159.  
 
                                                           
157 It is believed that the major share of the petrodollar investments of the GCC countries is in US government 
securities.  
158 The shift toward viable investment in the emerging markets is part of portfolio diversification by the GCC 
economies.  Other  factors  have  also  made  the  investments  in  the  emerging  markets  more  promising  and 
attractive, like the recent dynamic development and improved fundamentals in these economies (Sturm et al., 
2008). 
159 However, there are several caveats to the trade channel in addressing the global imbalances, at least with 
respect to the GCC economies. Given the structure of the trade pattern of GCC economies, it is believed that 
their impact in combating global imbalances through the trade channel will be limited. Since Europe and Asia 
absorb the largest share of imports by the GCC countries, it is highly likely that the trade channel will be of 
benefit to the Euro area and Asian countries, and then the US, which have the world’s largest current account 
deficit.   P a g e  | 260 
 
Increasing the flexibility of the GCC exchange rates has been suggested as another way to rapidly and 
efficiently address global balances. However, this channel has been undermined as far as the GCC 
countries are concerned primarily because of the small share of their non-oil exports of goods and 
services, which can hardly compete with those of the industrialised economies. Furthermore, the low 
elasticities of exports (price inelastic of global demand for oil products) and imports of the GCC 
countries is another argument against the use of the exchange rate changes to correct current account 
balances (Mokhtar, 2004, Kumah, 2009). It is also argued that despite the flexibility of the exchange 
rates, the GCC economies is expected to continue investing in the US-dominated assets for reasons like 
the US deep capital markets, the US status of being a safe haven for many investments, and the fact oil 
is still dominantly priced in US dollars. Furthermore, the exchange rate flexibility channel is also 
weakened by the lack of empirical evidence on the effect of the petrodollar investments on the level of 
long-term US interest rates (Warnock and Warnock, 2009)
160. 
 
The remarkable role of the GCC countries in the global context based on the above presented facts and 
characteristics  (being a major producer and supplier of hydrocarbon products in global markets; a 
major net supplier of capital in the global market; the home of the world’s largest sovereign funds; and 
a major trading partner with many regions in the world, particularly Europe and Asia, as well as their 
rising importance in addressing global imbalances) suggests that changes in the exchange rate regime 
policies of these economies might have a great impact in the global foreign exchange rate markets. 
Furthermore,  given  the  empirical  evidence  on  the  non-linearity  of  regime  choice  in  trade  flows 
(Meissner and Oomes, 2009), the changes in the exchange rate regime polices of the GCC economies 
can have rapid effects on the geography of the international monetary system
161.   
    
 
 
                                                           
160 That is more often attributed to factors like availability of data and the relatively broad diversification of the 
investment portfolios of oil-exporting countries, including the GCC economies. 
161 According to Meissner and Oomes (2009), a relatively small amount of regime change can have large effects 
on  the  geography  of  the  global  monetary  system  at  certain  levels.  For  example,  once  a  few  important 
economies, like the GCC countries, de-peg from the US dollar (for one or more of the reasons explained above; 
e.g. inflation, US deficit) their trading partners may be encouraged to do the same, leading to a rapid decline in 
the popularity of the US dollar. P a g e  | 261 
 
3.  Literature  Review  on  the  Alternative  Choices  of  Exchange  Rate  Regimes  for  the  GCC 
Economies 
 
Based  on  the  empirical  literature,  the  most  widely  analysed  exchange  rate  choice  for  the  GCC 
economies is a corner solution in the form of currency union. The GCC countries are viewed as a 
homogenous group not only from an economic perspective (e.g. large share of oil production in total, 
dependency on oil exports, highly import-dependent due to low degree of commodity diversification, 
and similar trading partners’ weights), but also share a common language,  and cultural and political 
history. These economic and socio-political characteristics increase the region’s eligibility for forming 
a monetary union. Despite the large amount of progress that has been made toward achieving the goal 
of a full-fledged monetary union
162, the GCC economies are generally viewed as not ready to abolish 
their national currencies and adopt a unified one.  
 
Examples of the studies that have assessed the readiness of the GCC economies to form a single 
currency include Zaidi (1990), Dar and Presley (2001), Laabas and Limam (2002), Jadresic (2002), 
Darrat and al Shamsi (2005), Sturm and Siegfried (2005), Al-Barwani (2006), Abu-Qarn and Abu-
Bader  (2008),  and  El  Hag  (2009).  Generally,  the  assessment  of  these  studies  have  depended  on 
analysing the applicability of the traditional OCA criteria to the GCC economies, as well as on the 
monetary and fiscal convergence. Despite the reported similarities in a number of economic and socio-
political characteristics, the GCC economies were found to lack significance in intra-regional trade and 
capital mobility, as well as to show asymmetry in shocks and business cycles. Further insignificances 
were  reported  with  regard  to  commodity  diversification,  price  and  wage  flexibility,  political 
                                                           
162 For example, they now have virtually unrestricted intra-regional mobility of goods, national labour, and 
capital; they have also developed prudential regulations and supervision of the banking systems are being 
progressively harmonized. The US dollar-peg has been declared as the de-jure anchor by all members starting 
from January 2003, with the exception of Kuwait, which went back to a basket of currencies in May 2007. In 
2005, the GCC economies adopted the European Union convergence criteria with respect to budget deficit, 
public debt, currency reserves, interest rates, and inflation. Most of these criteria have been met, with the 
exception of inflation, which poses a major challenge to all the GCC members given the late surge in global 
prices, declining US dollar, and the economic growth due to a prolonged hike in oil prices.  In January 2008, the 
GCC countries launched a common market, the purpose of which is to provide equal treatment to all the GCC 
citizens in all  economic activities including freedom of movement, work  opportunities, pensions and  social 
security, taxation, etc. (IMF, 2008).  P a g e  | 262 
 
integration, and slow implementation of some macroeconomic fundamentals.   Other studies, like that 
carried  out  by  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF),  have  also  pointed  out  some  delays  in 
establishing harmonized systems and in institution building; namely the harmonization of monetary 
policy  framework,  payment  and  settlement  systems,  regulatory  and  supervisory  structures, 
macroeconomic statistics, and setting up a common accounting framework and adequate budgetary 
procedures.    
 
Furthermore, the recent developments in the region have, to some extent, confirmed the findings of the 
above studies regarding the readiness of the GCC economies to form a monetary union. In May 2007 
the State of Kuwait showed some divergence from the block by moving from the dollar peg, which was 
officially  declared  as  the  anchor  currency  for  all  the  GCC  currencies  as  an  explicit  step  toward 
monetary union, to an undisclosed currency basket
163. Moreover, Oman and the UAE declared their 
withdrawal from the planned monetary union in 2006 and 2009, respectively
164. Also, during their 
regular annual summit meeting in December last year, the State leaders of the remaining four countries 
(Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia) took a decision to put off the planned date, which is first of 
January  2010,  for  the  single  currency  because  some  extra  time  was  needed  to  complete  the 
development of a common monetary and regulatory framework (Willett et al, 2009). 
 
Other studies have suggested the efficacy of more flexible exchange rate regimes for the oil exporting 
economies like those of the GCC countries. For example Setser (2007) argued in favour of a more 
flexible exchange rate for the currencies of the oil exporting nations since the dollar-pegged exchange 
rate makes it harder for these economies to adjust to large swings in the price of oil and forces these 
economies to import monetary policy that may not suit their local needs. Furthermore, the dollar peg 
forces the adjustment in the real exchange rate to come from changes in the price level (inflation), 
which may lead to slower real term changes and may generate a price-wage spiral and a low level real 
interest rate, thus increasing the degree of risk associated with asset bubbles as investors shift toward 
real  estate  and  equity  assets. Accordingly,  Setser (2007)  called for a  more  flexible  exchange  rate 
regime in order to reduce the need for domestic prices to rise and fall along with the price of oil, to 
                                                           
163 This was mainly due to the recent prolonged depreciation of the US dollar that led to high inflation through 
costlier imports. 
164 According to official statements by its Finance Minister, Oman had withdrawn due to its inability to meet the 
established convergence criteria. On other hand, the UAE withdrawal was mainly due to disagreement over 
certain issues, like the location of the central bank for the monetary union.  P a g e  | 263 
 
better pursue domestic goals of inflation and output through higher monetary policy independence, to 
easily absorb adverse real shock, and to dampen oil related swings in government revenue. 
 
However, Khan (2009) countered this argument by arguing that the effectiveness and efficiency of an 
independent monetary policy is subject to the efficacy of the interest rate transmission mechanism 
channel.  A lack in the sensitivity of the market interest rates to the interest rate policy will weaken the 
monetary policy transmission and render the independent monetary policy ineffective.  Investment and 
spending  decisions  in  the  GCC  economies  depend  greatly  on  actual  and  forecasted  government 
spending, thus constraining the role of financial markets and interest rates. Khan’s argument has been 
further confirmed by the works of Al Raisi et al. (2008) and Al Jasser- and Banafe (2007), who 
reported weak sensitivity for market interest rates to changes in authority rates in both Oman and Saudi 
Arabia, respectively.  
 
The argument for a flexible exchange rate in the GCC economies is further weakened by the issue of 
the choice of nominal anchor under a float. Inflation targeting, on the one hand, must be established on 
a thorough understanding of the inflationary process and its determinants as well as the availability of 
some institutional and technical requirements, such as sophisticated market-based monetary operations, 
central bank independence, and transparency of policy to build accountability and credibility (Mishkin 
2000, Khan 2009, and Coats 2010)
165. On the other hand, monetary targeting requires a stable and 
predictable  money  demand  function,  the  development  of  instruments,  and  adequate  forecasting 
capabilities for efficient liquidity management (Khan 2009, Coat 2010). The lack of most of these 
requirements for either inflation targeting or monetary targeting in the individual GCC economies 
further  confirm  the  weak  case  for  the  flexible  exchange  rate  regimes  for  the  currencies  of  these 
countries.  
Under flexible exchange rates large swings in oil prices may lead to larger fluctuations in the nominal 
exchange rates of the GCC countries, which could result in higher fluctuations in non-oil sectors and 
higher and more volatile inflation (Cashin and McDermott, 2001). Given the thin foreign exchange rate 
                                                           
165 Furthermore, according to MacDonald (2010), for commodity exporting countries like the GCC economies, 
an adverse shock in terms of trade would normally necessitate a counteracting policy in the form of currency 
depreciation, but rigid inflation targeting requires maintaining a strong currency by tightening the monetary 
policy. The resulting effect in non-oil sectors of the GCC countries would have important implications for the 
national output. P a g e  | 264 
 
market that is characterised by a relatively small number of agents, it’s highly likely that the individual 
GCC central banks would intervene to smooth the movements of the exchange rate, and to keep such 
movements consistent with macroeconomic fundamentals.  
 
Also, according to Khan (2009), letting the exchange rate float would introduce a new and different 
kind of uncertainty and risk into the international transactions of the GCC economies. Furthermore, the 
case is further deteriorated by the absence of deep and well-functioning financial markets purporting to 
facilitate hedging at low transaction costs so as to minimize the additional risks that economic agents in 
the GCC economies would face under a floating regime.  
 
Frankel (2003) has suggested pegging the currency of the country with the price of its main exported 
product. Frankel’s (2003) proposition pertains particularly to small, open economies that are relatively 
specialized in the production and export of mineral and agricultural commodities. Based on Frankel’s 
(2003) proposition, the GCC countries should peg their individual currencies to the price of the oil as it 
constitutes the major share of these economies’ exports.  Pegging to the price of oil will simultaneously 
deliver automatic accommodation in terms of trade shock, as flexible exchange rates are expected to 
do, while maintaining the credibility-enhancing advantages of a nominal anchor.  
 
However, there are some reservations on pegging the exchange rate of the currency with the price of an 
export good. For example, as long as the price of oil remains volatile, pegging directly to the price of 
oil would entail excessive swings in the exchange rate and higher volatility in other sectors in the 
economy (Setser 2007, Khan 2009). For example, high oil prices will lead to real appreciation, which 
in  turn  will  increase  the  cost  of  other  non-oil  exports  (the  Dutch  disease),  thus  dampening  the 
diversification  efforts.  Furthermore,  when  the  price  of  oil  declines,  it  is  not  guaranteed  that  such 
decline would be followed by sufficient depreciation in the currency to accommodate the adverse 
shock in terms of trade and to stabilize export earnings. Also, oil producing economies like the GCC 
countries are constrained by production capacity, extraction limits, and the OPEC quota system, which 
suggest that adjustment following real depreciation due to a decline in oil prices would have to come 
partly through expanding the share of non-oil exports or, alternatively, cutting imports. 
 P a g e  | 265 
 
MacDonald (2010),  who  focused on  analysing  the  exchange rate regime  of  the UAE,  viewed the 
current US dollar peg as inappropriate given the asymmetric nature of the US and UAE economies. 
The asymmetry between the two economies shows up in the fact that the US is a net-oil importing 
country and the UAE is a net-exporting country. Stated differently, the asymmetry implies increasing 
incompatibility of the UAE’s economic interest and those of the US monetary policy, with further 
implications for the effectiveness of the existing exchange rate system even if the US dollar were to 
start appreciating (Iqbal, 2010). Accordingly, MacDonald (2010) has suggested shifting away from the 
current regime of pegging to the dollar to one in which the dirham (the UAE’s currency) is fixed to an 
appropriate basket of currencies, thereby providing the non-oil sectors with the stability and credibility 
they need to flourish while at the same time allowing the price of oil to influence the external value of 
the currency. To achieve the latter, MacDonald (2010) has suggested either including the price of oil 
directly in the basket of currencies or adjusting the basket, along the lines of a crawling peg, as the 
price of oil changes.   
 
Among the very few studies that have focused on empirically analysing the exchange rate regime in the 
individual  GCC  economies  is  Erbas  et  al.  (2001),  who  examined  pegging  the  currencies  of  the 
individual GCC countries to the SDR (German mark, Japanese yen, US dollar, French franc, and 
British pound sterling), instead only to the US dollar, in view of the large share of the other SDR zone 
countries in the external trade of the GCC countries. The argument for the SDR is that it is far more 
stable than its components, and thus might produce a more stable exchange rate and might further 
improve the stability of imports and exports. Furthermore, the SDR peg improves the stability of the 
exchange rate between the currencies of the GCC countries and the SDR currencies other than the US 
dollar; however, the volatility in the exchange rate between the GCC currencies and the US dollar is 
increased.   The  authors work  was based  on  empirically  comparing  the  elasticities  of  imports and 
exports to changes in the exchange rate under the US dollar peg and the SDR peg. The authors found 
that for most of the GCC countries and for most of the components of the trade account, the stability 
gains from maintaining the US dollar peg outweigh the stability gains from switching to the SDR peg. 
 
Finally, an upward revaluation of the GCC countries’ currencies against the US dollar was among the 
discussed alternatives in the literature of the GCC countries (Central Bank of Oman 2007, MacDonald, 
2010).  Despite the ability of revaluation to address the short-run concerns about imported inflation, the 
asymmetric consequences of revaluation for the economies of the GCC countries render such strategy 
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would  raise  the  prices  of  non-dollar  dominated  exports  in  foreign  markets,  hence,  eroding  the 
competitiveness  of  the  economy  and  dampening  the  diversification  efforts.  Also,  with  strong 
currencies, imported foreign goods become cheaper, hence, increasing the inflow of imports, which in 
turn could put high pressure on the balance of payment and consequently erode the current account 
surpluses of the GCC countries.   
 
Further,  a  revaluation  could  also  damage  the  credibility  of  the  monetary  policy  and  increase  the 
uncertainty  about  the  value  and  movement  of  exchange  rate,  which  would,  hurts  investments 
(including  deterrence  of  foreign  investors)  and  ultimately  economic  performance.  Moreover,  a 
revaluation would not give rise to an independent monetary policy, and hence, the constraints on 
independent  monetary policy  under  pegged  exchange  rate  regime  would  continue.   Any  valuation 
would also entail a loss for the GCC countries in the form of a reduction in the value of foreign 
earnings  and  assets.  That  in  turn  might  results  into  higher  volatility  in  future  fiscal  revenue  and 
government spending, particularly if revenues from oil decreased, since most of the current foreign 
assets are meant to be used in future for financing investment and growth in the GCC economies 
(Central bank of Oman, 2007).    
 
4. A proposition for a dollar-euro basket peg 
 
Given the strong evidence against the current viability of either one of the corner exchange rate options 
(monetary union or flexible exchange rate) for the GCC economies, and the scarcity of empirical 
studies on the viability of other alternative intermediate exchange rate regimes for these economies, 
this paper contributes by analysing the feasibility of a dollar-euro basket, as an alternative exchange 
rate regime for the currencies of the GCC countries. The above proposition has been suggested based 
on a number of factors. 
 
First, the criteria of the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) confirms that the GCC countries are better off 
with a peg to an external anchor, since they are small, open economies with a flexible labour market
166 
                                                           
166  According  to  the  Global  Competitiveness  Report  of  the  World  Economic  Forum  2007-2008,  the  labour 
markets in the GCC countries are flexible given the relatively high rank of these countries in terms of labour 
market flexibility. The flexibility in the labour markets of the GCC countries is due to the heavy use of expatriate P a g e  | 267 
 
and limited ability to run an independent monetary policy. Moreover, the choice of the euro and the US 
dollar for the basket peg is basically based on the OCA theory that suggests adopting the anchor 
currency that minimizes the sum of bilateral exchange rate fluctuations, weighted by the importance of 
each trade partner (Meissner and Oomes, 2009). Accordingly, we suggest a basket of the US dollar and 
the euro, as these two currencies account for a large share of the GCC economies’ international trade 
and non-trade financial transactions. However, despite the fact that GCC countries have significant 
trade with other countries (notably Asia), the currencies of these countries are pegged or tightly tied to 
the  US  dollar,  which    weakens  the  idea  of  including  these  countries’  currencies  in  the  basket. 
Furthermore, the Asian countries mainly invoice their exports in US dollars (Habib and Strasky, 2008), 
and therefore, the term of trade of the GCC countries-on the imports’ side- are affected by changes in 
their  exchange  rate  against  this  currency.  In  addition  to  that,  the  role  of  the  Japanese  yen  as  an 
international currency is fading
167. 
Second, looking into the current goal and challenge of all the GCC countries that have started to lower 
reliance on oil and create employment opportunities for the rapidly growing national workforce. The 
diversification of their economies and the development of non-oil sectors will, most probably, require, 
at least at some stage in the future, a more flexible exchange rate policy in order to enhance the 
international competitiveness of the GCC economies.  
 
Third, fixing with a basket of the currencies most often used in financial and commercial transactions 
will ensure some ability to easily adapt to the adverse effects from fluctuations among the value of the 
major reserve currencies. This will lead to lower volatility in the nominal effective exchange rate, 
which in turn will result in higher external trade and balance stability. Furthermore, a basket peg will 
continue to retain the main properties of an exchange rate peg, such as credibility of the monetary 
policy.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
workers, who work primarily in the private sectors, and usually come from neighbouring Asian countries like 
India, Pakistan, Iran, the Philippines, Indonesia, other Middle Eastern nations or from Europe and the USA 
(Willett et al., 2009). Domestic labour are mainly employed in the public sector, which is characterized by wage 
rigidity, immobility, and inflexibility (Willett et al., 2009). 
167 Furthermore, according to some studies (e.g. Dominguez 1999, Faruqee 2006) the Japanese exporting firms 
predominantly engage in local currency pricing, a case which further weaken the potentiality of the yen to act 
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Fourth, beginning with a basket of two currencies is viewed to be simple to manage and a useful way 
to introduce more flexibility in the exchange rate in a gradual manner that will also allow economic 
agents  to  learn  to  manage  and  live  with  foreign  exchange  risks.  Also,  the  initial  and  essential 
operational requirements for a basket peg are no different than those now in place (Coats, 2010).   
 
Fifth, pegging with the dollar-euro basket is assumed to reduce the reliance of the GCC economies on 
the US Federal Reserve, cover most transaction costs in external trade and financial instruments (which 
are largely in US dollars and to lesser existent in euros), and further facilitate the use of both the dollar 
and euro hedging instruments to efficiently manage financial risks given the considerable depth in the 
euro financial instruments (Khan, 2009).  
 
Six, the option to include the US dollar in the dual currency peg despite the recent uncertainty about 
the US economy (weakening of the dollar and rising deficit in the US economy) is due to a number of 
factors. In addition to the above mentioned factors for the long stable link between the GCC countries’ 
currencies and US dollar, the US dollar continues to be used as the main invoicing currency around the 
world.  Goldberg and Tille (2005) have reported that the US dollar is the currency choice in most 
transactions involving  the United  States. They  have  as  well  reported that  the  US  dollar has  been 
extensively used as a vehicle currency in trade of goods that do not directly involve the United States 
but that are traded on organized markets or that are referenced priced international trade flows. The US 
dollar enjoys network externality due to the large number of people and agents who accept it and use it 
(Cooper, 2009). The dollar enjoys a large market in low-risk and highly liquid securities (e.g. US 
Treasury  bills).  Furthermore,  most  of  the  foreign  exchange  transactions  around  the  globe  directly 
involve the US dollar. Even in the recent economic crisis, the US dollar was demanded by many 
troubled  organizations  and  the  US  Fed  made  provided  up  to  $600  billion  in  liquidity  to  non-US 
residents through swap lines (Ferry et al., 2009). 
 
In addition to the fact that the euro area forms the main trading partner of the GCC countries, other 
factors have further contributed to the selection of the euro in the suggested euro-dollar basket. For 
example, the euro represents the currency of around 16 countries in Europe, and it is increasingly used 
by the non-euroland members of the EU in their transactions with the euroland countries (for invoicing, 
payment, and holding international balances) (Cooper, 2009).  Galati and Wooldridge (2006) have 
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decade and were fast approaching those of the dollar markets and as a consequence the euro is eroding 
some of the advantages that have historically supported the pre-eminence of the US dollar as a reserve. 
The stability of the euro and the great size and financial depth of the euro markets have qualified the 
euro as an international currency. The euro is also expected to increasingly compete with the US dollar 
in fulfilling the tasks of an international reserve, intervention currency (Masson & Turtleboom, 1997, 
Chinn and Frankel, 2005).  Furthermore, the euro is also expected to continue capturing a large share 
of international trade and asset accumulation both as unit of account and as means of payment not only 
within the EU area, but also in other countries that are economically linked to Europe (e.g. Morocco, 
Tunisia, and non-EU European countries).   
 
5. Methodology of Estimation 
 
Drawing from the theory of the OCA, a Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) model will be used 
to investigate the influence of the external shocks to the economies of the individual GCC countries.  
Specifically, the model tends to investigate the extent to which the economies of the individual GCC 
countries, represented by real GDP, are affected by external factors such as changes in global oil 
prices, which represents trade shocks and the business cycles in the US and the European economies.  
The assumed impact from these two areas (US and Europe) will be assessed independently on the 
individual GCC countries. Technically speaking, for each of the six GCC countries, we will employ a 
VAR model with three variables, namely global output (GDP of the US or the EU), real oil price, and 
the domestic real GDP of the individual GCC country.  
 
The SVAR technique has been used extensively in the economic studies and it build on Sims’ approach 
(1980) but attempts to identify the impulse response by imposing a priori restrictions on the covariance 
matrix of the structural errors (as suggested for example by Bernanke 1986, Sim 1986) and/or on long-
run impulse responses themselves (as suggested for example by Blanchard and Quah 1989 and Astley 
and Garratt 1996)
168.   In our system of three variables, the number of restrictions to identify the SVAR 
model is equal to n (n-1)/2, where n is the number of variables in the system. Accordingly, we use 
                                                           
168  In contrast with the unrestricted VAR model, which is theory-free model, SVARs attempts explicitly to offer 
some  economic  rationale  behind  the  covariance  matrix  used,  and  thus  try  to  avoid  the  use  of  arbitrary 
identifying  restrictions  (Garrat  et    al,  1999).  Nonetheless,  the  restrictions  in  the  SVAR  do  not  allow  the 
identification of the long-run relationships among the variables, which make it in some sense misnomer to call 
them structural (Garrat et  al, 1999).  P a g e  | 270 
 
three restrictions; 1) we assume that only oil prices have long-run effect on real oil prices; 2) Global 
output are only influenced by global shocks in the long-run; and 3) domestic shocks have no long-run 
impact on global output. The first restrictions in generally on line with many empirical studies that 
assume  global  shocks  from  the  international  oil  markets  are  highly  exogenous  to  most  other 
microeconomic variables. Our second and third assumptions are basically based on the small-large 
country hypothesis of the basic Mundell-Fleming model
169. Furthermore, domestic shocks are mainly 
related to volatility in oil prices and geopolitical events. The long-run effects can be summarized in the 
following matrix; 
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t e   represents  trade  shocks,  global  shocks,  and  domestic  shocks, 
respectively.  The  lower-triangular  structure  implies  that  the  terms  of  trade  shocks  are  the  most 
exogenous variable, and that the domestic variable responds to shocks from both oil markets and global 
output.  The impulse response functions and the variance decompositions analysis from the VAR 
results will be employed to describe the dynamic impact of the innovations. 
 
The second part of the empirical work complements the first part by testing for the long-run business 
cycle synchronization (BCS). In testing for the synchronous long-run movements between the business 
cycles of the individual GCC countries and the US and or the EU, we will use the Johansen co-
integration approach. The Johansen approach will allow us to examine and identify the number of co-
integrating  relationships  between  the  non-stationary  variables  in  the  model  using  the  maximum 
likelihood procedure. The presence of co-integration would indicate that the countries whose variables 
are studied share synchronous long-run movements in their economic activity, thus indicating a higher 
support for fixing their currencies with each other, or to form a monetary union. 
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6. Data and Empirical Estimation  
 
It is necessary to note at the outset that similar to many other developing countries, the GCC countries 
suffer from a data availability problem. In particular, high frequency time series are mainly available 
only from the beginning of the current decade onward. For our estimation of the SVAR model we use 
quarterly data spanning from Q1, 1991 to Q4, 2009 for all the countries in our sample. We used a lag 
length of 4, which was found to be supported by most the other information criteria across models. The 
main sources of the data are the International Financial Statistics, IFS Direction of Trade Statistics, 
World Economic Outlook, and the European Central Bank. Our data include the individual real GDP 
of the six GCC countries, the US, and the European Union; and the real price of oil, which is defined 
as the normal oil price deflated by the US consumer price index. Furthermore, with respect to the 
output of Europe, we used the aggregate quarterly real GDP data for the EU 27, for which a consistent 
time series is available only from Q1, 1995. 
 
6.1Unit Root Tests 
 
Our first step in the estimation process is to determine the order of integration of the variables. We 
have applied two unit root tests, namely the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and the Phillip-
Perron  (PP)  test
170. The  general  form  for the ADF  test including  a  constant  and  a  linear trend is 
presented in equation 1. Optimal lags were selected using Schwarz Criterion (SIC).  With respect to the 
PP test, we selected the truncation lag for the variance estimate test by the rule of thumb suggested by 
Newey-West. The summary for the unit root tests is given in Table 6. It is clear that none of the 
variables  are  stationary  at  their  level,  which  means  that  the  time  series  of  our  variables  have  a 
stochastic trend, or in other words the series do not have a constant mean and variance.  However, the 
first difference of the time series of the variables is integrated of order zero I(0). 
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Table (6) 
 
Unit Root Tests 
 
Country 
 
ADF  PP  Integration 
  Constant  Trend  Constant  Trend   
Bahrain           
LGDP  (0) 1.84  (0) -0.87  (4) 2.18  (2) -0.94  I(1) 
DLGDP  (0) -4.38***  (0) -4.8***  (1) -4.34***  (6) -4.81***  I(0) 
Kuwait           
LGDP  (0) -0.78  (0) -2.89  (2) -0.67  (3) -2.85  I(1) 
DLGDP  (1) -5.44***  (1) -5.61***  (23) -6.62***  (26) -10.89***  I(0) 
Oman           
LGDP  (0) 3.05**  (1) 3.03*  (1) -2.66  (4) 4.10**  I(1) 
DLGDP  (0) -3.0**  (0) -2.57  (2) -2.99**  (1) -2.57  I(0) 
Qatar           
LGDP 
(0) 2.61  (0) -0.84  (1) 2.67  (0) -0.71 
I(1) 
DLGDP 
(0) -3.90***  (0) -5.83***  (0) -3.91*** 
(4) -6.34***  I(0) 
Saudi 
Arabia           
LGDP  (0) 0.93  (2) -4.46***  (2) 0.53  (2) -2.66  I(1) 
DLGDP  (2) -3.96***  (0) -4.75***  (2) -3.96***  (3) -4.91***  I(0) 
UAE           
LGDP  (0)1.12  (0) -1.88  (0) 1.12  (4) -1.80  I(1) 
DLGDP 
(0) -4.13***  (2) -3.27*  (0) -4.14*** 
(1) -
4.90*** 
I(0) 
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LGDP 
(0) -0.76  (1) -2.70  (7) -0.89  (2) -2.05 
I(1) 
DLGDP 
(0) -3.76***  (0) -3.74**  (3) -3.55**  (4) -3.48* 
I(0) 
LOP 
(0) -1.38  (0) -0.76  (2) -1.51 
(12) 0.12  I(1) 
DLOP 
(0) -4.75***  (1) -5.38***  (0) -4.75*** 
(26) -15.06***  I(0) 
European 
Union           
LGDP 
(0) 0.11  (5) -4.39**  (0) 0.11 
(2) -2.40  I(1) 
DLGDP 
(0) -3.66**  (0) -3.52**  (3) -3.58**  (4) -3.41* 
I(0) 
 
Note: Figures in brackets next to statistics represent number of lags in the test, GDP = real gross domestic 
product,  Op =  real oil price,  L = Log form, D = first difference,  *, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels respectively. 
6.2 Analysis of Impulse Response Functions and the Variance Decompositions 
 
Appendix 10 provides the results of the impulse response functions for each of the six GCC countries’ 
output to shocks in the US and Europe
171.  It can be seen that in both zones there is a positive and 
significant response by output in all the GCC countries to one standard deviation shock in terms of 
trade represented by real oil price. That reflects the weight of the hydrocarbon exports in the GDP of 
the GCC countries. The response of the GCC countries’ output to global shocks emanating from the 
US and Europe is significant and positive and it is similar in pattern among all the GCC countries; a 
positive one standard deviation shock to global shocks led to a slight increase in the domestic output. 
However, responses to global shocks from both zones are much lower than to the terms of trade; 
furthermore, the magnitude of the response is relatively higher in the Euro zone.  The lower impact 
from US output shock is quite surprising given the dominant role played by the US dollar in the 
economies of the GCC countries. Furthermore, the relatively higher impact from the Europe zone can 
be  interpreted  on  the  basis  of  a  large  and  growing  trade  link,  particularly  the  imports,  and  the 
geographic proximity between the GCC region and Europe as compared to US. Positive domestic 
shocks in the GCC countries are found to lead to high but short-lived responses in the output of these 
countries, as compared to the trade and global shocks.  
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Moreover, tables 7 and 8 present the results for the variance decomposition of forecast errors of the 
domestic output for only the individual GCC countries. In the US zone, variations in the output of the 
individual GCC countries seem to be mainly explained by term of trade shocks followed by domestic 
shocks in most cases.  There is a relatively modest role for the US GDP shock in explaining the 
variations in the output of the GCC countries. Shocks from the US output account for only about 10% 
of the variations in the output of the individual GCC countries output. This result is consistent with the 
previous results from the impulse response functions.  With respect to the Europe zone, shocks to the 
output of the EU area seem to account for a significant share in variations of the individual GCC 
countries’ output. For example, in Bahrain, global shocks are found to account for as much as 35% and 
30% of the variations in the output in the short-run and the long-run, respectively. For the rest of the 
GCC countries, shocks to the EU output is found to account for, on average, between a minimum of 
10% to a maximum of nearly 20%, throughout the short and the long-run, of the variations of their 
output. However, as is the case in the dollar zone, trade shocks appear to explain the bulk of the 
variations of the output in the economies of the GCC countries. In fact, cross correlation, in table 9, of 
output growth between the GCC countries and the US and Europe lend support to the findings of the 
impulse response functions and the results of the variance decomposition. 
Table (7) 
(Variance Decomposition, US Zone) 
 
   Oil  Global Output  Domestic Output 
Bahrain 
      6  17  10  73 
12  19  10  72 
18  19  10  71 
Kuwait 
      6  62  10  28 
12  64  10  26 
18  64  10  26 
Oman 
      6  50  8  42 P a g e  | 275 
 
12  51  8  41 
18  51  8  41 
Qatar 
      6  40  6  54 
12  43  5  52 
18  43  5  52 
Saudi 
Arabia 
      6  76  5  19 
12  77  5  18 
18  77  5  18 
UAE 
      6  69  7  24 
12  70  7  22 
18  71  7  22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table (8) 
(Variance Decomposition, Euro Zone) 
 
   Oil  Global Output  Domestic Output 
Bahrain 
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12  38  27  35 
18  39  28  33 
Kuwait 
      6  67  8  25 
12  65  10  25 
18  64  10  26 
Oman 
      6  49  12  39 
12  50  13  37 
18  50  13  37 
Qatar 
      6  37  18  45 
12  38  19  43 
18  38  19  43 
Saudi 
Arabia 
      6  75  7  18 
12  73  9  18 
18  73  9  18 
UAE 
      6  62  13  25 
12  61  15  24 
18  62  15  23 
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Table (9)  
(Cross correlation test between the real GDP growth of the GCC countries and US and Europe, 
1990-2009) 
 
   US  EU 
BAHRAIN  0.29  0.38 
KUWAIT  0.28  0.50 
OMAN  0.19  0.37 
QATAR  0.20  0.51 
SAUDI  0.31  0.48 
UAE  0.34  0.56 
 
 
The above results have a number of implications, particularly in the framework of our above suggested 
Euro-dollar basket. With respect to global shocks, the results indicate that the business cycles of the 
individual GCC countries respond more to the movements in the output of Europe than to the output of 
the US. The relatively stronger impact of the Europe GDP shock on the individual output of the GCC 
countries reflects the importance of the macroeconomic development in Europe on the economies of 
the GCC countries. That in turn can imply that the monetary policies of the GCC countries should be 
adjusted to the economic development in Europe, particularly given the growing significant share of 
the GCC imports that originate from Europe. Completely neglecting the European macroeconomic 
conditions and continuing to fully account for the US dollar in the form of a dollar pegged exchange 
rate regime will be costly and can lead to destabilising economic conditions, like what has happened 
recently.  Accordingly,  if  the GCC countries  opted  to  move  toward  a  more  flexible exchange  rate 
regime, to promote the competitiveness of their exports, in the form of a basket-based exchange rate 
regime  it  is  strongly  suggested  that  they  should  include  the  dollar  as  well  as  the  euro.  Such  a 
multilateral based exchange rate arrangement should not only provide higher flexibility but should also 
help to address other issues like imported inflation. 
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7. Co-integration Tests 
 
According to the literature, if two or more variables, which are non-stationary in levels and have 
individually stochastic trends, share a long-run equilibrium relationship, these variables are said to be 
co-integrated. Co-integrated variables are less likely to permanently drift from each other as some 
common  stabilization  forces  (called  error  correction  terms)  in  the  system  will  tend  to  bring  the 
variables back to equilibrium. We will use the Johansen-Juselius (1990) efficient approach to test for 
the presence  of a long-term  economic link between  the  economies  of the GCC  countries  and the 
economies of the US and/or Europe.  We used the real GDP and inflation rates (represented by the 
consumer price index) to proxy the macro economies of the countries in question.   
 
Furthermore, according to Hakkio and Rush (1991), when investigating a co-integrating relationship, 
the time span should be long enough; the length of the time span is much more important than the 
number of observations used. Therefore, for this test we used a sample period that consists of annual 
data spanning almost three decades (1981-2008), which should be long enough to provide credible co-
integration results. The optimal lag length in the tests was determined by relying on the different 
available information criterion, in conjunction with the necessary requirement that the resulting errors 
should also be serially uncorrelated (Kim, 1998). In order to avoid any contamination in the tests due 
to some possible structural shifts, we included a dummy variable that captured the Iraqi war (1990) in 
the region in 1990.  
 
The  results of  the co-integration  tests  for  both the real GDPs  and  the  inflation rates  between the 
individual GCC countries and US and/or Europe are presented in tables 10-13. The  null hypothesis of 
no long-run common trend with respect to the real GDPs and inflation rates of the individual GCC 
countries and the US and/or Europe have been rejected in most of the tests. The results show some 
synchronized trends between inflation rates in the GCC economies and those in either US or Europe. 
Similar synchronized trends were observed between the real GDP of each of the GCC countries and 
that of either the US and Europe. 
 
Such results indicate that generally the macro economies of the individual GCC countries and the US 
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that the monetary policy which works for the output and inflation in the US and/or Europe may also 
work  in  each  of  the  GCC  countries.  Significant  business  synchronization  also  indicates  smaller 
differences in optimal discretionary monetary policies; hence, the constraint for fixing the exchange 
rate to a dollar-euro basket would be less costly.  
 
This of course does not mean that the economies of the GCC countries and the US and/or Europe do 
not differ over time. Rather, the results suggest that individual GCC countries and the US and/or 
Europe do share a common trend; however, when the short-run departure occurs, there will be some 
internal common forces that will correct the misalignment and push these economies back to their 
long-run equilibrium. Moreover, our results are further supported and confirmed by the presence of 
several non-zero co-integrations in some cases, in both the real GDPs tests and the inflation rates 
tests
172.  
 
Table (10) 
 
Testing for co-integration between  real GDP of the US and the GCC countries 
Co-integration based on trace statistics test 
Null  Alter  95%  Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Qatar 
Saudi 
Arabia  UAE 
0  1  15.49  19.25**  17.26**  43.72***  27.31***  16.39**  17.01** 
1  2  3.84  0.18  4.56**  7.17  0.04  0.56  0.02 
Co-integration based on maximum eigenvalue test  
Null  Alter  95%  Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Qatar 
Saudi 
Arabia  UAE 
0  r≥1  14.26  19.06**  12.70*  36.55***  27.27***  15.84**  16.99** 
1  r≥2  3.84  0.18  4.56**  7.17  0.04  0.56  0.02 
 
                                                           
172 According to Dickey et al. (1991), the presence of multiple co-integrating vectors suggest that these co-
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Notes: r donates the order of the co-integration rank. The optimal lag length was chosen by using the different 
information criteria. Maximum lag allowed is 4. *, **,  *** indicate  rejection of the null at 10%,  5%, 1%, 
respectively. 
 
Table (11) 
 
Testing for co-integration between  real GDP of Europe and the GCC countries 
Co-integration based on trace statistics test 
Null  Alter  95%  Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Qatar 
Saudi 
Arabia  UAE 
0  1  15.49  39.72***  16.24**  17.77**  19.63**  18.61**  22.47*** 
1  2  3.84  5.59**  0.01  0.01  1.72  0.58  6.56** 
Co-integration based on eigenvalue test 
Null  Alter  95%  Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Qatar 
Saudi 
Arabia  UAE 
0  r≥1  14.26  34.13***  16.23**  17.76**  17.92**  18.02**  15.91** 
1  r≥2  3.84  5.59**  0.01  0.01  1.72  0.58  6.56** 
 
Notes: r donates the order of the co-integration rank. The optimal lag length was chosen by using the different 
information criterion. Maximum lag allowed is 4. *, **, *** indicate rejection of the null at 10%, 5%, 1%, 
respectively. 
 
Table (12) 
 
Testing for co-integration between  inflation rates of US and the GCC countries 
Co-integration based on trace statistics test 
Null  Alter  95%  Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Qatar 
Saudi 
Arabia  UAE 
0  1  15.49  19.49**  26.16***  28.32***  11.24  15.95**  32.01*** 
1  2  3.84  2.67  4.04**  2.29  1.68  4.77**  8.04 P a g e  | 281 
 
Co-integration based on eigenvalue test 
Null  Alter  95%  Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Qatar 
Saudi 
Arabia  UAE 
0  r≥1  14.26  16.82**  22.12***  26.04***  9.56  11.18  23.97** 
1  r≥2  3.84  2.67  4.04***  2.29  1.68  4.77  8.04 
 
Notes: r donates the order of the co-integration rank. The optimal lag length was chosen by using the different 
information criterion. Maximum lag allowed is 4. *, **, *** indicate rejection of the null at 10%, 5%, 1%, 
respectively. 
 
Table (13) 
 
Testing for co-integration between  inflation rates of Europe and the GCC countries 
Co-integration based on trace statistics test 
Null  Alter  95%  Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Qatar 
Saudi 
Arabia  UAE 
0  1  15.49  22.46  30.85***  43.65***  16.65**  10.20  23.83*** 
1  2  3.84  2.15  4.27**  9.39  4.04**  1.95  1.74 
Co-integration based on eigenvalue test 
Null  Alter  95%  Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Qatar 
Saudi 
Arabia  UAE 
0  r≥1  14.26  20.30**  26.57***  34.26***  12.61*  8.25  22.09*** 
1  r≥2  3.84  2.15  4.27**  9.39  4.04**  1.95  1.74 
 
Notes: r donates the order of the co-integration rank. The optimal lag length was chosen by using the different 
information criterion. Maximum lag allowed is 4. *, **, *** indicate rejection of the null at 10%, 5%, 1%, 
respectively. 
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8. Summary and Conclusion 
 
In the wake of the recent economic development in the GCC region, such as high oil prices, lower 
exchange rate value of the currencies of the GCC countries due to depreciating US dollar, and the 
rising inflation rates in these economies, this chapter attempted to empirically test the suitability of an 
alternative  fixed  exchange  rate  regime  against  the  recent  US-dollar  peg  of  the  GCC  countries. 
Specifically, in this chapter we have attempted to investigate the feasibility of pegging the currencies 
of the individual GCC countries to dollar-euro baskets. Basically, our tests included two empirical 
estimations, namely a structural vector autoregression model (SVAR) and a co-integration test. In the 
SVAR we estimated the response of the output of the individual GCC countries to external shocks 
from the US and Europe, as well as from terms of trade (oil prices) and domestic shocks. In the co-
integration tests we attempted to investigate if there is any integration between the business cycles of 
the GCC countries and the US or Europe.  
 
The results of the variance decomposition and impulse response functions from the estimated SVAR 
models showed that output in the GCC countries are dominantly influenced by terms of trade shocks, 
which can be justified on the basis of the large share of oil revenues in the GDP of these countries. 
Furthermore, the results have also shown that shocks from Europe have a larger impact on the GCC 
economies than shocks emanating from the US. That in fact reflects the growing trade between the 
GCC countries and the Europe zone. From the results of the co-integration tests we found that there is 
a significant common long-run trend between output and inflation of the GCC countries and those of 
the US and Europe.  
 
Generally, from the above results we could infer that individual economies of the GCC countries are 
influenced by the macroeconomic conditions in the Europe area and that in turn suggests that the 
monetary  policies  of  the  GCC  countries  should  be  adjusted  to  take  into  account  the  economic 
development  in Europe,  particularly  given  the  growing  significant share  of  the  GCC  imports  that 
originate from Europe. The lower impact from the US side on the GDP of the GCC countries implies 
that pegging to only the US dollar can be costly and can destabilize the economies of these countries; 
thus, lending further support to our suggested proposal of pegging the individual currencies of the GCC 
countries to a dollar-euro basket. Such an exchange rate arrangement is deemed necessary under the P a g e  | 283 
 
evolving national objectives of the GCC countries, including increasing attention to economic and 
export diversification, low inflation, and regional integration.  
 
Pegging to dollar-euro baskets will guarantee the credibility of the existing unilateral peg as well as 
some  flexibility  for  the  non-oil  sectors  in  the  GCC  economies  to  grow  and  flourish.  It  will  also 
minimize  the  likelihood  of  importing  the  wrong  monetary  policy  at  the  wrong  time  and  it  will 
minimize the burden on the fiscal policy for sustaining internal stability and growth. The dollar-euro 
baskets can also be seen to serve as a gradual step toward a more flexible exchange rate regime in the 
future, when necessary requirements to build up credibility in the market are in place, thus, avoiding 
the need for an abrupt change that would disturb the current existing market credibility.  
 
Finally,  it  should  be  understood  that  exchange  rate  regime  is  only  one  element  in  the  general 
macroeconomic framework of a country, which means that exchange rate stability alone cannot deliver 
or guarantee overall internal and external stability. A prerequisite for any exchange rate arrangement to 
function effectively are sound fiscal and monetary policies (Iqbal, 2010).  Therefore, the choice of 
exchange  rate  regime  also  includes  the  determination  of  a  regime  that  in  combination  with  other 
macroeconomic policies, best attains its internal and external goals. The move toward an alternative 
exchange rate regime including dollar-euro baskets depends on the policy objectives and common 
preferences  of  the  local  authority  of  the  GCC  countries.  Changing  objectives  from  say  increased 
attention on price stability to international competitiveness and growth would entails changing the 
decision about the choice of exchange rate regime and the corresponding macroeconomic policies.  
 
All in all, being attached for such number of decades with the single dollar peg suggests that the 
rational for the GCC countries to change/de peg should be more based on structural economic basis, 
not only on movements in foreign exchange markets.  
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Chapter Eight 
Summary and Conclusions 
1. Introduction  
This  chapter  summarises  the  work,  results  and  implications  of  the  empirical  sections  in 
chapters  three,  four,  five,  and  seven.  It  also  presents  the  author’s  conclusions  and 
recommendations with respect to the exchange rate regime policies of the GCC countries. The 
final section of this chapter discusses the limitations of the research and offers further areas for 
future research within the context of the GCC economies. 
Nominal exchange rate stability has long been considered as a policy choice for many oil-
exporting economies, including the GCC countries (Sturm et al, 2008). The main motives 
behind such policy choices in oil-exporting countries include the desire to confer credibility on 
domestic currencies, stabilize oil revenues, and in turn government revenues (given their role 
in the fiscal budget of these economies), and to avoid Dutch disease, particularly for those 
countries which have been trying to promote their non-oil exports. Recently, however, with 
respect to the GCC countries, the advantages of the exchange rate stability/peg have been 
overshadowed by some adverse domestic and global developments. 
Since the beginning of the century, and following the rapid economic growth facilitated by 
higher oil revenue, some inflation pressure has emerged in all the GCC countries, with average 
inflation measured by consumer price index increasing from around 0.2% between 1998 and 
2002 to around 10% in 2008, with some individual countries running at higher rates. On the 
other  hand,    real  interest  rates  have  become  very  low,  and  even  negative  in  some  cases. 
Against this backdrop, some estate members like Kuwait have revalued their currency against 
the US dollar by de-pegging from the single US dollar peg to a currency basket of undeclared 
composition. Subsequently, calls for an upward revaluation of the domestic currency or even 
de-pegging from the current exchange rate regime policy has started to gain some ground in 
the rest of the GCC countries. 
Against this background, this thesis was put forth in order to comment on the relevancy of the 
existing pegged exchange rate systems of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries (GCC), with 
a special focus on the link between changes in the effective exchange rates of these countries' 
currencies and their domestic inflation. In particular, we attempt to test if there had been some P a g e  | 285 
 
large  significant  inflationary  effects  from  the  recent  depreciation  of  the  GCC  countries' 
currencies  by  quantifying  the  pass-through  from  changes  in  exchange  rates  into  domestic 
consumer prices inflation. Along a somewhat different line, we attempt to further analyze the 
viability  of  the  existing  exchange  rate  regimes  of  the  GCC  countries  by  considering  an 
alternative pegging in the form of a dollar-euro basket instead of the unilateral US dollar peg. 
2. Summery and implications of the results for chapters three, four, and five 
2.1 Estimation and Results 
Exchange rate pass-through to domestic prices has important consequences on transmission of 
shocks across countries, and for the ensuing macroeconomic policies. This importance is even 
greater for small open economies like the GCC countries that are highly import-dependent for 
most  kinds  of  their  goods,  and  have  been  working  hard  to  promote  their  non-oil  sectors. 
Accordingly, for the purpose of evaluating the viability of the current single US dollar peg for 
the GCC economies, we focused on the pass-through from nominal effective exchange rate to 
domestic  CPI  inflation,  and  followed  the  relevant  empirical literature  by  employing  some 
econometrical techniques to measure/quantify the extent of pass-through in these economies. 
More  specifically,  we  used  two  different  econometric  methods,  namely  a  single  equation 
method and a co-integrated VAR method to estimate the impact from changes in the exchange 
rate to domestic CPI inflation in the GCC economies. The estimation was based on monthly 
data to comply with a sampling that is more relevant to exchange rate variability, and covered 
the period from January 2000 to December 2008. Furthermore, we based our analysis and 
implications on the results of the long-run pass-through, as most evidence in the literature had 
indicated the failure of the PPP theory in the short-run, and suggested its applicability in the 
long-run. 
In  the  single  equation  method  we  regressed  domestic  CPI  inflation  against  the  nominal 
effective exchange rate plus other hypothesized determinants of prices like foreign inflation 
and oil prices. Furthermore, the model was estimated in first difference, in order to avoid 
spurious  results due to  the  non-stationarity  of  the  variables.  The  estimated long-run  pass-
through ranged between a minimum of 10% (Saudi Arabia) to a maximum of 69% (Oman), 
with an average of around 27%, clearly indicating the failure of the PPP theory in the context 
of the GCC economies, as the pass-through is incomplete. P a g e  | 286 
 
In the second attempt, which is in two parts, we re-estimated the model of the price level using 
a VEC model, in which the information contained in the non-stationary data is exploited fully.  
In the first part, as in chapter four, we re-estimated exactly the same model of the price level 
that was estimated using the single equation method in chapter four, however, this time by 
applying a co-integrated VAR method. According to the results of the estimated VECM, the 
estimates of the long-run pass-through from exchange rate to domestic prices  are significant. 
However, the extent of these estimates were less than one for all the countries in the sample, 
with an average of around 57%. A 10% depreciation of exchange rate in the GCC countries 
will increase inflation in the long-run by 5.7%.  
Furthermore, the estimated significant magnitude of pass-through using VECM was further 
confirmed  by  utilizing  the  results  of  the  impulse  response  functions  and  the  variance 
decompositions of the VAR model. The analysis of the impulse response functions illustrated 
low persistent inflationary effects from changes in the nominal exchange rates of the GCC 
countries.  On  the  other  hand,  the  analysis  of  the  variance  decompositions  showed  that 
variations in the consumer price index are, in the main, explained by its own innovations, in 
all four countries, followed by changes in exchange rates that explain around one quarter 
during the first year and increase to around one third percent in two years
173. 
In  the  second  part,  as  in  chapter  five,  the  VEC  technique  was  used  again  to  estimate  an 
augmented version of the price level model that was estimated in the previous two attempts. 
Basically, we have added variables that represent the role of demand policies in general and 
fiscal policy, in particular, in effecting the extent of pass-through following changes in the 
exchange rate. Based on the work of Parsley and Popper (1998), the recent inflationary effect 
of exchange rate depreciation in the GCC countries during the period of our review (2000-
2008) is believed to have been reinforced or sustained through higher money growth, that in 
turn was triggered by expansionary fiscal policies because of higher oil wealth, and to some 
extent, by the pegged exchange rate system. 
                                                           
173 This result is comparable to the one reported by McCarthy (1999), who used the VAR model in investigating 
the pass-through of exchange rate in a set of nine industrial countries. From his variance decomposition analysis, 
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After  taking  into  account  the  actions  of  the  fiscal  and  monetary  policies,  the  estimated 
coefficients of exchange rate are significantly lower in all the sampled GCC countries, than 
the  estimated  ones  in  the  second  attempts  using  the  same  technique,  co-integrated  VAR. 
Average ERPT in the log-run is now around 23%, which is more or less similar to the average 
amount  (27%)  that  we  estimated  in  chapter  three  based  on  the  single  equation  method. 
Moreover,  the  variance  decomposition  analysis  indicated  that  variations  in  the  price  level 
index are explained by its owned lags, followed by variables representing demand policies, 
respectively, with a negligible role for changes in exchange rates. 
2.2 Implications 
Based on the estimated results of chapter five, which included a more or less complete model 
for the price level compared to the model of chapter three and four, an average exchange rate 
pass-through of around 23% indicates that depreciation in nominal effective exchange rates 
have a significant impact on inflation in the GCC economies in the long-run. Depreciation of 
10% in exchange rate will results in an average of around 2.3% increase in the price level of 
the GCC countries in the long-run. Moreover, the fact that in absolute terms, the extent of 
pass-through is far less than one, suggests the rejection of the PPP theory in these countries’ . 
Furthermore, an average long-run pass-through of around 23% is considered moderate, and 
does  not  signify  high  risk  from  fluctuations  in  the  foreign  exchange  market  for  domestic 
prices. In other words, the volatility of exchange rates of the currencies of GCC countries does 
not necessitate the adjustment of the money supply in these economies, hence indicating the 
viability of the existing pegged regime. The results of the pass-through also indicate more 
freedom for monetary authorities in the GCC countries to pursue their main macroeconomic 
goals, without external disturbances like fluctuations in the exchange rate of their currencies. 
Further, the results of chapter five also suggest how important it is to account for the actions of 
economic policies when studying the relationship between economic variables in oil exporting 
nations. The important role of fiscal policies in the GCC countries can  mainly be attributed to 
the  level  of  their  economic  development,  and  to  the  pegged  exchange  rate  regime  that 
paralyses their ability to use  independent monetary policy to sustain internal stability and 
growth. Moreover, the recent impact of inflationary depreciation of the exchange rate in the 
GCC countries was mainly influenced by the actions of expansionary fiscal policies in their 
economies.  Accordingly,  to  the  extent  that  changes  in  macroeconomic  policies  are  not P a g e  | 288 
 
properly taken into account, the apparent relationship between exchange rate and  inflation 
rate may be spurious. 
3. Summary and implications of the results for chapter seven 
3.1 Estimation and Results 
The second part of our empirical work forms  grounds to test the viability of moving from the 
single  dollar  peg  to  a  multilateral  basket  peg,  with  regard  to  the  currencies  of  the  GCC 
countries.  The choice of the euro and the US dollar for the basket peg has been based on the 
OCA theory, that suggests adopting the anchor currency that  minimize the sum of bilateral 
exchange rate fluctuations, weighted by the importance of each trading partner. Accordingly, 
we suggested a basket of the euro and the US dollar, as these two currencies account for a 
large share of the GCC economies’ international trade and non-trade financial transactions. 
The tests in this part of the empirical work were two fold. First we used a structured VAR 
model to investigate the influence of external shocks like the business cycles in the US and 
Europe on the economies of the GCC countries. In the second test we examined the likelihood 
for a long-run business cycle synchronization between the economies of the GCC countries 
and the US and Europe. With regard to the first test, the analysis of the results of impulse 
response functions and variance decompositions from the estimated structured VAR model 
indicated that output in the GCC countries is dominantly influenced by trade shocks, which 
reflects the large weight of hydrocarbon exports in the GDP of these countries. The results 
also showed that the GCC countries’ output is significantly influenced by shocks from the US 
and Europe. However, the changes in European output were found to have a higher impact on 
the GCC economies compared to the impact from changes in output of the US. That in fact 
reflects the growing trade link between the GCC countries and European countries, and the 
geographic proximity between the GCC region and Europe, compared to the US. 
The tests for the synchronization of business cycles presented some evidence for long-run 
association between the GCC countries’ economies,  and those of the US and Europe. Real 
GDPs and inflation rates in the GCC countries were found to share some significant long-term 
trends with their counterparts in the US and Europe, indicating that the macro economies of 
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support to the proposition of using a dollar-euro basket peg for the currencies of the GCC 
countries. 
3.2 Implications 
With regard to global shocks, the results indicate that the business cycles of the individual 
GCC countries respond more to movements in the output of Europe than to US  output . The 
relatively stronger impact of the European GDP shock on the individual output of the GCC 
countries  reflects  the  importance  of  macroeconomic  development  in  Europe  on  their  
economies. That in turn can imply that the monetary policies of the GCC countries should be 
adjusted to economic development in Europe, particularly given the growing significant share 
of  the  GCC  imports  that  originate  from  Europe.  Completely  neglecting  European 
macroeconomic conditions and continuing to fully account for the US dollar in the form of a 
dollar pegged exchange rate regime will be costly, and could lead to destabilising economic 
conditions, as has happened recently. Accordingly, if the GCC countries opted to move toward 
a more flexible exchange rate regime, to promote the competitiveness of their exports in the 
form of a basket-based exchange rate regime, it is strongly suggested that they should include 
the dollar as well as the euro. Such a multilateral based exchange rate arrangement should not 
only  provide  higher  flexibility  but  should  also  help  to  address  other  issues  like  imported 
inflation. 
With respect to business synchronizations tests, the results imply that generally the macro 
economies of the individual GCC countries and the US and/or Europe are linked together over 
the long run. That can be taken to suggest that the monetary policy which works for output and 
inflation  in  the  US  may  also  work  in  each  of  the  GCC  countries.  Likewise,  a  similar 
implication  applies to monetary policy in Europe, in terms of inflation and real GDP and the 
economies of the GCC countries. This of course does not mean that the economies of the GCC 
countries and the US and/or Europe do not differ over time. Rather, the results suggest that 
individual GCC countries and the US and/or Europe do share common trends; however, when 
the short-run departure occurs, internal common forces will correct the misalignment and push 
these economies back to their long-run equilibrium. 
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4. Conclusion and Recommendations  
Generally, the  results  of the  pass-through  relationship  suggest  that  for  the  GCC  countries 
importing monetary policy from the United States via the dollar peg to ensure stable domestic 
inflation is found viable.  This is further substantiated by the results from the second part of 
the  empirical  work  in  chapter  seven,  that  presented  evidence  for  synchronized  movement 
(common long-term trends) between the inflation rates in each of the GCC countries and the 
US.  Furthermore,  the  estimated  moderate  long-run  pass-through  of  around  23%  from 
exchange rate to domestic CPI inflation of the GCC countries does not reflect a high risk from 
the existing US dollar peg. In fact it is viewed as indicating or  suggesting significant freedom 
for local monetary authorities in the GCC economies to pursue macroeconomic goals.  The 
moderate estimated amount of pass-through of around 23% suggests that imported inflation 
has not been the major factor behind recent rising domestic prices. It further confirms the 
influence of other factors like rising global commodity prices and local bottlenecks due to 
rapid economic growth form the major causes, a fact that has been also confirmed by the 
reports of most  GCC countries’ central banks.  
Furthermore, based on the fact that the appropriateness of an exchange rate regime should be 
based on how it performs over time and not only on how it performs under stress, the single 
dollar peg will still be viewed as viable. A retrospective analysis shows that macroeconomic 
conditions in the GCC countries have been stable over the past two decades, even during the 
periods of dollar fluctuations. Average inflation rates over the past two decades remained on 
average low and stable in most of these economies, with  average inflation ranging between a 
minimum of around 0.65 in Bahrain to maximum of around 4.77 in Qatar,  further signifying 
the success of the existing monetary policy/regime in maintaining price stability. The pegged 
regime  is  also  viewed  to  have  helped  the  GCC  countries  avoid  nominal  shocks  from 
geopolitical risks feeding into their economies. Also, during the past two decades, the GCC 
countries continued to register continuing economic growth, in terms of nominal GDP, from 
an average of around US 251.3 billion during 1991-2000 to an average of around US 604 
billion during 2001-2008, further confirming that the existing pegged exchange rate regime 
has served its purpose and supported economic performance.  
In addition to this more than 50% of the GCC’s countries imports and exports are priced in US 
dollar, which further suggest that it is still worth keeping a stable exchange rate with the US P a g e  | 291 
 
dollar for all the GCC countries. This can be substantiated by the case of Kuwait, which 
despite its recent movement from the single US dollar peg to a weighted basket of undeclared 
currencies, continued to maintain a stable link with the US dollar, which reflects that the US 
dollar has a significant weight in the basket. All in all, the results suggest that continuing to 
have a strong link with the US dollar in the form of the existing pegged regime is still viewed 
as a viable choice to ensure credibility of monetary policy and stability of trade, as well as to 
protect the value of the financial wealth of the GCC countries. 
However, from the diversification or growth of non-oil sectors perspective, there might be 
some adjustment costs or losses for the GCC economies in continuing to peg their currencies 
with the US dollar. As of 2008, average share of non-oil GDP of total output stood at around 
64%,  which  indicates  the  success  of  the  diversification  effort.  However,  increasing  stable 
growth (as judged by the standard deviation) in the share of non-oil output to GDP suggests 
the continuing validity of the existing dollar peg to these economies.  On the other hand, the 
significant share of non-oil sector gives further emphasis on continuing to maintain and carry 
on policies that ensure the stability and growth of these sectors. The higher influence on GCC 
countries’ output from  changes in European output as per the empirical results in chapter 
seven, suggest that their macroeconomic policies should factor in the monetary policy of the 
euro area, lending partial support to the proposition of a dollar-euro basket peg as an optimal 
peg. The case for a dollar-euro basket peg is further recommended if the US dollar continues 
to  depreciate  and the  GCC  economies  increase  their  concern  over  the stability  of  non-oil 
sectors.  
Further, it is generally suggested that if the rest of the five GCC countries opted to move 
toward a more flexible exchange rate regime, they should consider going gradually in this 
regard, in order to avoid an abrupt change that would disturb the existing market credibility. 
More  specifically,  a  gradual  step  by  step approach would  be  recommended,  that  provides 
initially a move toward a currency basket, as proposed in chapter seven, to allow for some 
flexibility. Furthermore, during this phase of flexibility, some steps could be taken to establish 
the necessary  institutional infrastructure to prepare the economy for the subsequent phases 
(e.g. widening of margins) that accompany  complete market determination of exchange rate.  
Preparatory steps could include a deep and liquid foreign exchange rate, the availability of 
mechanisms to ensure effective management of exchange rate risk, policy for central bank 
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Finally, it should be understood that the exchange rate regime is only one element in the 
general macroeconomic framework of a country, which means that exchange rate stability 
alone cannot deliver or guarantee overall internal and external stability. Prerequisite for any 
exchange  rate  arrangement  to  function  effectively  are  sound  fiscal  and  monetary  policies 
(Iqbal, 2010).  Therefore, the choice of exchange rate regime also includes the determination 
of a regime that in combination with other macroeconomic policies, best attains its internal 
and external goals. The move toward an alternative exchange rate regime including dollar-
euro baskets depends on the policy objectives and common preferences of the local authorities 
of GCC countries. Changing objectives from, for example increased attention to price stability 
to  international  competitiveness  and  growth  would  entail  changing  the  decision  about  the 
choice of exchange rate regime and corresponding macroeconomic policies.  
All in all, being attached for decades to the single dollar peg suggests that the rational for the 
GCC countries to change/de peg should be based on the structural economic basis, not only on 
movements in foreign exchange markets. Also, an up-ward revaluation is  not recommended, 
given the fact that the remedy from such a strategy is short-lived, and if the same set of 
circumstances continued into the future, then the process would have to be repeated again, 
triggering the possibility of speculation attack. An additional reason for not favouring an up-
ward  revaluation  is  because  the  adverse  effects  from  such  strategy  could  be  severe  and 
permanent. Revaluation  would raise the prices  of non-dollar dominated exports in foreign 
markets,  eroding  the  competitiveness  of  the  economy  and  dampening  the  diversification 
efforts. Also, with strong currencies, imported foreign goods become cheaper, increasing the 
inflow of imports, which in turn could put high pressure on the balance of payment, and 
consequently  erode  the  current  account  surpluses  of  the  GCC  countries  (Central  Bank  of 
Oman 2007, MacDonald, 2010).   
Furthermore,  a  revaluation  could  also  damage  the  credibility  of  the  monetary  policy  and 
increase  uncertainty  about  the  value  and  movement  of  exchange  rate,  which  would  harm 
investment (including deterrence of foreign investors) and ultimately economic performance. 
Moreover, a revaluation would not give rise to an independent monetary policy, hence the 
constraints  on  independent  monetary  policy  under  a  pegged  exchange  rate  regime  would 
continue.    Any  valuation  would  also  entail  a  loss  for  the  GCC  countries  in  the  form  of 
reduction  in the  value  of foreign earnings  and  assets.  That  in  turn  might  result  in higher 
volatility in future fiscal revenue and government spending, particularly if revenues from oil P a g e  | 293 
 
decreased, since most current foreign assets are intended to be used in future for financing 
investment and growth in the GCC economies (Central Bank of Oman, 2007).    
Finally,  the  significant  role  of  fiscal  policies  indicates  that  these  policies  form  the  key 
macroeconomic  tool  in  the  hands  of  policy  makers  in  the  GCC  countries  to  pursue 
macroeconomic goals, including the maintenance of a low inflation rate. Furthermore, among 
suggested solutions for lowering the influence of fiscal policies on the extent of ERPT to 
domestic  prices  and  inflation  in  general,  is  to  pursue  gradual  steps  toward  domestic 
development in the economy, since such development is mainly dependant on government 
spending,  the  main  source  of  money  growth  in  these  economies.  Gradual  development  is 
particularly stressed during periods of perceived continuous depreciation of currency, like the 
case of our sample period, in order to avoid any monetary accommodation to depreciation in 
the exchange rate
174. Fiscal expansion in the GCC countries also needs to take into account the 
absorptive capacity of the respective economies, and to avoid triggering supply bottleneck, 
which  will  eventually  trigger  inflationary  pressures.    This  includes  attempting  to  address 
supply bottlenecks, in order to maintain a low impact from the external sector in general. 
Addressing a supply bottleneck can be achieved through directing public and private resources 
towards easing binding capacity constraints, and capitalizing on the generated revenues of oil 
resources. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
174Others may argue that this recommendation might be difficult in practice, in particular where oil price is on the 
rise to offset the effect of depreciation, and the urgency to build and expend physical and social infrastructure, 
keeping in mind that the GCC countries are still not fully developed in many areas. The concept of opportunity 
cost comes to mind here. 
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5. Limitations and Future work 
Generally, our work has been  constrained by limitations in data.  For example, we had to 
confine our estimation of exchange rate pass-through to only four GCC countries, and neglect 
the  other  two,  where  consistent  time  series  data  for  the  variables  of  our  model  were  not 
available. Moreover, our estimation in the first part of the empirical work was focused on the 
pass-through of exchange rate at aggregate prices. However, consistent time series data on 
import price indices were not available, and indices for producer prices were only available for 
one or two countries. Also, we could not extend our aggregate analysis of the pass-through to 
include different industries in the sampled countries, due to problems of data availability. 
Accordingly, future work in the context of the GCC economies could be extended to include 
analysis of exchange rate pass-through in different industries, an analysis which is deemed 
important not only for the local authorities but also for firms in the markets. Firms in the 
market  are  assumed to  utilize  information on  the  extent of  exchange  rate  pass-through  to 
forecast future cash flows and profits, in developing pricing strategies, and in the management 
of  their  exchange  rate  risk  (Dobrynskaya  and  Levando,  2005).  Exchange  rate  risk  is 
considered high in markets/industries with low pass-through of exchange rate at the level of 
consumer prices. In such industries, the costs of imported goods to the GCC countries’ firms, 
expressed  in  domestic  currencies,  will  normally  rise  more  in  the  case  of  exchange  rate 
depreciation, than the revenue generated from selling the goods in domestic GCC countries’ 
markets, as it is difficult to pass-through the entire change in the exchange rate onto consumer 
prices. As a result, importers in the GCC countries will lose some of their profits, and be in a 
situation where they will face difficulties in repaying their outstanding debt, dominated in 
foreign currency, to the foreign exporter. 
Furthermore, the need to analyse pass-through  in different industries in the economy  also 
rises, because the government needs, as part of their price stability strategy, to isolate those 
industries  most  relevant  in  protecting  the  consumption  of  the  poor  from  fluctuations  in 
exchange rate. Accordingly, in order for the monetary authority to shield the purchasing power 
of people on a low income from fluctuations in the exchange rate, an idea of the extent of 
pass-through in the industries most relevant to these people need to be formed. 
Also, we focused on studying and analysing the effect and the transmission mechanism of 
mainly one determinant of exchange rate pass-through, the demand policies. However, given P a g e  | 295 
 
the  fact  that  the  literature  has  identified  numerous  determinants  that  may  affect  the  link 
between exchange rate and domestic CPI inflation, future research in the context of the GCC 
countries can be extended to include further analysis of other determinants, particularly when 
data is available. Future work may include analysing whether the pass-through of exchange 
rate into domestic prices is asymmetric, as suggested by the literature.  
The availability of data in the future can also help in improving the empirical work as in 
chapter  seven.  For  example,  availability  of  consistent  time  series  data  for  variables  like 
unemployment can further extend our grasp of the full effect of monetary policy imported 
from the US and Europe, by the form of a suggested common basket peg in the economies of 
the GCC countries. 
Further work could also include the use of simulation methods, based on available data from 
previous years to further test the behaviour of the exchange rate of the currencies of the GCC 
countries under a hypothetical US dollar-euro basket peg of currencies, or any other suggested 
basket of currencies. 
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Appendix: 1 
 
A. Common Variables 
 
The four examined GCC countries lack the availability of comparable continuous monthly data on 
variables like import price index and wholesale price index. Accordingly, we use the import unit values 
for emerging and developing economies as a proxy for import prices in modelling the pass-through to 
import prices for all the four members. The monthly time series are provided by the IFS of the IMF, 
March/2009 (2000 = 100). We also used the wholesale price index of Kuwait (2000 = 100) as a proxy 
variable for the three examined GCC members. 
 
Price of Oil: Price of the UK Brent is taken as price of oil of the examined GCC members. The 
monthly time series is taken from the IFS, March/2009. Seasonality is adjusted using the Census X12 
program. 
 
Trading Partner CPI: World CPI. Monthly series were obtained from the IFS, 2009, (2000 = 100). 
Seasonality is adjusted using the Census X12 program. 
 
B. Country-Specific Variables 
 
B1. Bahrain 
 
Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (NEER): The monthly series is obtained from the IFS, March/2009, 
(2000 = 100). Seasonality is adjusted using the Census X12 program. 
 
CPI: The monthly time series had been estimated by the author by using the PPP formula for the real 
exchange rate: * / * ) ( P P NEER REER= , where REER stands for the real effective exchange rate 
(2000 = 100), P
* is the foreign price index, for which World CPI is used as a proxy.
 P a g e  | 338 
 
 
 
B2. Kuwait 
 
Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (NEER): The monthly series is obtained from the IMF through Mr. 
Maher Hasan and Mr. Ribeiro Da Silva, who based their measurement on the weight of the Kuwait's 
trading partners for the period between 2000 and 2007. Seasonality is adjusted using the Census X12 
program. 
CPI: The monthly series is obtained from the IFS, March/2009, (2000 = 100). Seasonality is adjusted 
using the Census X12 program. 
 
Wholesale Price Index (WPI): The monthly series is obtained from the IMF March/2009, (2005= 100). 
Seasonality is adjusted using the Census X12 program. 
 
B3. Oman 
 
Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (NEER): The monthly series is obtained from the IFS, March/2009, 
(2000 = 100). Seasonality is adjusted using the Census X12 program. 
 
CPI: The monthly series is obtained from the IFS, March/2009, (2000 = 100). Seasonality is adjusted 
using the Census X12 program. 
 
B4. Saudi Arabia 
 
Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (NEER): The monthly series is obtained from the IFS, March/2009, 
(2000 = 100). Seasonality is adjusted using the Census X12 program. 
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CPI: The monthly series is obtained from the IFS, March/2009, (1999 = 100). Seasonality is adjusted 
using the Census X12 program. 
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Appendix (2) 
 
Table: 1 
 
Bahrain (2000: 10 2008: 12), Effects of Exchange Rate Changes on Consumer Price  
Inflation, 99 observations (after adjustment). 
 
Dependent Variable: DLOG(CPI) 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample (adjusted): 2000M10 2008M12 
Included observations: 99 after adjustments 
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=3) 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
C  0.00  0.00  0.08  0.94 
DLOG(CPI), -1  -0.11  0.16  -0.70  0.49 
DLOG(CPI), -2  0.26  0.10  2.65  0.01 
DLOG(CPI), -3  0.18  0.19  0.93  0.36 
DLOG(CPI), -4  0.31  0.12  2.67  0.01 
DLOG(CPI), -5  0.34  0.09  3.57  0.00 
DLOG(CPI), -6  -0.08  0.12  -0.68  0.50 
DLOG(CPI), -7  -0.14  0.09  -1.50  0.14 
DLOG(CPI), -8  0.06  0.08  0.78  0.44 
DLOG(NEER)  0.01  0.02  0.37  0.71 
DLOG(NEER), -1  0.00  0.02  0.26  0.79 
DLOG(NEER), -2  0.01  0.01  0.58  0.56 
DLOG(NEER), -3  0.02  0.02  0.73  0.47 
DLOG(NEER), -4  -0.04  0.03  -1.45  0.15 
DLOG(NEER), -5  0.00  0.02  0.02  0.99 
DLOG(NEER), -6  0.03  0.02  1.53  0.13 
DLOG(NEER), -7  -0.05  0.03  -1.87  0.07 
DLOG(NEER), -8  0.05  0.02  2.26  0.03 P a g e  | 341 
 
DLOG(FCPI)  0.17  0.25  0.68  0.50 
DLOG(FCPI), -1  -0.28  0.20  -1.37  0.18 
DLOG(FCPI), -2  0.09  0.16  0.59  0.55 
DLOG(FCPI), -3  -0.11  0.16  -0.67  0.51 
DLOG(FCPI), -4  0.36  0.27  1.34  0.19 
DLOG(FCPI), -5  0.58  0.27  2.16  0.03 
DLOG(FCPI), -6  0.01  0.19  0.06  0.95 
DLOG(FCPI), -7  -0.39  0.31  -1.25  0.21 
DLOG(FCPI), -8  -0.32  0.25  -1.29  0.20 
DLOG(OP)  0.00  0.00  -0.32  0.75 
DLOG(OP), -1  0.00  0.00  0.89  0.38 
DLOG(OP), -2  0.00  0.00  -0.40  0.69 
DLOG(OP), -3  0.00  0.00  1.10  0.28 
DLOG(OP), -4  0.00  0.00  -0.39  0.70 
DLOG(OP), -5  0.00  0.00  -0.76  0.45 
DLOG(OP), -6  -0.01  0.01  -1.47  0.15 
DLOG(OP), -7  0.00  0.00  -1.05  0.30 
DLOG(OP), -8  0.00  0.00  -0.94  0.35 
R-squared  0.60      Mean dependent var  0.00 
Adjusted R-squared  0.40      S.D. dependent var  0.00 
S.E. of regression  0.00      Akaike info criterion  -9.91 
Sum squared resid  0.00      Schwarz criterion  -8.96 
LM test  0.33      Prob(F-statistic)  0.00 
 
Note: CPI = Consumer price index, NEER = Nominal effective exchange rate, FCPI = Trading partner consumer 
price index, OP = Oil price, D = first difference.  
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Table: 2  
 
Kuwait (2000: 07 2008: 12), Effects of Exchange Rate Changes on Consumer Price  
Inflation, 106 observations (after adjustment). 
 
Dependent Variable: DLOG(CPI) 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample (adjusted): 2000M07 2008M09 
Included observations: 99 after adjustments 
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=3) 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
C  0.00  0.00  -1.66  0.10 
DLOG(CPI), -1  0.00  0.10  0.04  0.97 
DLOG(CPI), -2  0.05  0.10  0.51  0.61 
DLOG(CPI), -3  0.16  0.09  1.75  0.08 
DLOG(CPI), -4  0.04  0.12  0.34  0.74 
DLOG(CPI), -5  0.11  0.13  0.81  0.42 
DLOG(NEER)  0.00  0.05  0.03  0.97 
DLOG(NEER), -1  -0.06  0.05  -1.06  0.29 
DLOG(NEER), -2  -0.04  0.04  -1.05  0.30 
DLOG(NEER), -3  -0.13  0.08  -1.61  0.11 
DLOG(NEER), -4  -0.05  0.07  -0.62  0.54 
DLOG(NEER), -5  0.07  0.06  1.09  0.28 
DLOG(FCPI)  0.01  0.55  0.03  0.98 
DLOG(FCPI), -1  1.40  0.69  2.02  0.05 
DLOG(FCPI), -2  -0.13  0.52  -0.25  0.80 
DLOG(FCPI), -3  0.84  0.50  1.66  0.10 
DLOG(FCPI), -4  -1.02  0.65  -1.56  0.12 
DLOG(FCPI), -5  0.94  0.56  1.67  0.10 
DLOG(OP)  0.00  0.01  0.19  0.85 
DLOG(OP), -1  0.00  0.01  -0.64  0.52 P a g e  | 343 
 
DLOG(OP), -2  0.00  0.01  0.39  0.70 
DLOG(OP), -3  -0.02  0.01  -1.49  0.14 
DLOG(OP), -4  0.01  0.01  0.85  0.40 
DLOG(OP), -5  -0.01  0.01  -0.74  0.46 
R-squared  0.55      Mean dependent var  0.00 
Adjusted R-squared  0.45      S.D. dependent var  0.01 
S.E. of regression  0.00      Akaike info criterion  -7.58 
Sum squared resid  0.00      Schwarz criterion  -6.95 
LM test  0.51      Prob(F-statistic)  0.13 
 
Note: CPI = Consumer price index, NEER = Nominal effective exchange rate, FCPI = Trading partner consumer 
price index, OP = Oil price, D = first difference.  
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Table: 3  
Oman (2001: 08 2008: 12), Effects of Exchange Rate Changes on Consumer Price Inflation, 88 
observations (after adjustment). 
 
 
Dependent Variable: DLOG(CPI) 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample (adjusted): 2001M08 2008M11 
Included observations: 88 after adjustments 
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=3)  
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
C  0.00  0.00  0.67  0.50 
DLOG(CPI), -1  0.15  0.14  1.07  0.29 
DLOG(CPI), -2  0.06  0.13  0.43  0.67 
DLOG(CPI), -3  0.27  0.08  3.29  0.00 
DLOG(CPI), -4  0.26  0.10  2.55  0.01 
DLOG(CPI), -5  0.08  0.11  0.69  0.49 
DLOG(CPI), -6  0.24  0.11  2.28  0.03 
DLOG(NEER)  -0.06  0.04  -1.29  0.20 
DLOG(NEER), -1  0.11  0.03  3.35  0.00 
DLOG(NEER), -2  -0.11  0.04  -2.60  0.01 
DLOG(NEER), -3  0.03  0.05  0.57  0.57 
DLOG(NEER), -4  0.05  0.03  1.43  0.16 
DLOG(NEER), -5  -0.16  0.03  -5.11  0.00 
DLOG(NEER), -6  0.05  0.04  1.21  0.23 
DLOG(FCPI)  0.53  0.32  1.66  0.10 
DLOG(FCPI), -1  -0.65  0.26  -2.50  0.02 
DLOG(FCPI), -2  -0.02  0.41  -0.05  0.96 
DLOG(FCPI), -3  -0.88  0.34  -2.62  0.01 
DLOG(FCPI), -4  0.33  0.35  0.96  0.34 
DLOG(FCPI), -5  -0.31  0.28  -1.09  0.28 
DLOG(FCPI), -6  0.44  0.28  1.60  0.12 P a g e  | 345 
 
DLOG(OP)  0.00  0.00  -0.67  0.51 
DLOG(OP), -1  0.00  0.01  0.34  0.74 
DLOG(OP), -2  -0.01  0.01  -1.48  0.15 
DLOG(OP), -3  0.03  0.01  4.22  0.00 
DLOG(OP), -4  0.00  0.01  0.37  0.71 
DLOG(OP), -5  0.00  0.00  -0.19  0.85 
DLOG(OP), -6  0.00  0.01  -0.95  0.35 
R-squared  0.76      Mean dependent var  0.00 
Adjusted R-squared  0.66      S.D. dependent var  0.00 
S.E. of regression  0.00      Akaike info criterion  -8.77 
Sum squared resid  0.00      Schwarz criterion  -7.98 
LM test  0.30      Prob(F-statistic)  0.00 
 
Note: CPI = Consumer price index, NEER = Nominal effective exchange rate, FCPI = Trading partner consumer 
price index, OP = Oil price, D = first difference.  
Table: 4  
Saudi Arabia (2000: 08 2008: 12), Effects of Exchange Rate Changes on Consumer Price 
Inflation, 100 observations (after adjustment). 
Dependent Variable: DLOG(CPI) 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample (adjusted): 2000M08 2008M11 
Included observations: 100 after adjustments 
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=4) 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
C  0.00  0.00  -1.29  0.20 
DLOG(CPI), -1  0.19  0.14  1.35  0.18 
DLOG(CPI), -2  0.18  0.09  2.11  0.04 
DLOG(CPI), -3  0.23  0.16  1.49  0.14 
DLOG(CPI), -4  -0.08  0.16  -0.51  0.61 
DLOG(CPI), -5  -0.23  0.14  -1.61  0.11 
DLOG(CPI), -6  0.41  0.16  2.62  0.01 P a g e  | 346 
 
DLOG(NEER)  -0.02  0.02  -0.83  0.41 
DLOG(NEER), -1  -0.02  0.02  -0.72  0.47 
DLOG(NEER), -2  0.00  0.03  -0.10  0.92 
DLOG(NEER), -3  0.00  0.02  0.02  0.99 
DLOG(NEER), -4  -0.04  0.02  -1.66  0.10 
DLOG(NEER), -5  0.00  0.03  -0.11  0.91 
DLOG(NEER), -6  -0.01  0.02  -0.36  0.72 
DLOG(FCPI)  0.08  0.29  0.28  0.78 
DLOG(FCPI), -1  0.48  0.22  2.15  0.03 
DLOG(FCPI), -2  0.09  0.27  0.32  0.75 
DLOG(FCPI), -3  0.01  0.29  0.04  0.97 
DLOG(FCPI), -4  -0.29  0.29  -1.01  0.32 
DLOG(FCPI), -5  0.45  0.25  1.81  0.08 
DLOG(FCPI), -6  0.01  0.33  0.04  0.97 
DLOG(OP)  0.00  0.01  -0.24  0.81 
DLOG(OP), -1  0.00  0.00  -0.53  0.60 
DLOG(OP), -2  0.00  0.00  0.38  0.70 
DLOG(OP), -3  0.00  0.00  -0.79  0.43 
DLOG(OP), -4  0.00  0.00  0.46  0.65 
DLOG(OP), -5  0.00  0.00  0.31  0.76 
DLOG(OP), -6  0.00  0.00  -1.22  0.22 
R-squared  0.62      Mean dependent var  0.00 
Adjusted R-squared  0.52      S.D. dependent var  0.00 
S.E. of regression  0.00      Akaike info criterion  -8.78 
Sum squared resid  0.00      Schwarz criterion  -8.05 
LM test  0.21      Prob(F-statistic)  0.00 
 
Note: CPI = Consumer price index, NEER = Nominal effective exchange rate, FCPI = Trading partner consumer 
price index, OP = Oil price, D = first difference.  
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Appendix (3) 
 
Table: 1  
Bahrain: VECM 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 Sample (adjusted): 2000M10 2008M12 
 Included observations: 105 after adjustments 
t-statistics in [ ] 
Cointegrating Eq:   CointEq1          
LOG(CPI(-1))  1          
LOG(NEER(-1))  0.54          
   [ 3.34418]          
LOG(FCPI(-1))  0.21          
   [ 1.11432]          
LOG(OP(-1))  -0.10          
   [-2.88365]          
C  -7.77          
             
Error Correction:  D(LOG(CPI))  D(LOG(NEER))  D(LOG(FCPI))  D(LOG(OP)) 
              
CointEq1  0.02  -0.06  -0.01  0.67 
   [ 3.16510]  [-1.56538]  [-1.12440]  [ 1.91585] 
D(LOG(CPI(-1)))  -0.13  -0.96  -0.02  -6.45 
   [-1.33335]  [-1.64898]  [-0.28643]  [-1.25492] 
D(LOG(CPI(-2)))  0.22  0.63  0.09  -5.55 
   [ 2.24739]  [ 1.09521]  [ 1.16532]  [-1.09833] 
D(LOG(NEER(-1)))  -0.02  0.38  -0.01  -1.50 
   [-0.87269]  [ 3.53909]  [-0.69271]  [-1.59413] 
D(LOG(NEER(-2)))  0.00  -0.17  0.00  -0.45 
   [ 0.27739]  [-1.67214]  [-0.30558]  [-0.49113] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-1)))  -0.23  -0.34  0.22  1.03 P a g e  | 348 
 
   [-1.24825]  [-0.30593]  [ 1.51360]  [ 0.10627] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-2)))  0.39  0.29  0.08  7.45 
   [ 2.28394]  [ 0.28973]  [ 0.63663]  [ 0.84656] 
D(LOG(OP(-1)))  0.00  -0.01  0.01  0.16 
   [ 1.03930]  [-0.36008]  [ 3.99952]  [ 1.13288] 
D(LOG(OP(-2)))  0.00  -0.01  0.00  -0.08 
   [-0.50474]  [-0.87348]  [ 0.49762]  [-0.62389] 
C  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
   [ 1.35420]  [ 0.07060]  [ 3.79190]  [-0.04938] 
WD  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.03 
   [-0.41145]  [-0.83691]  [-0.37501]  [-0.95377] 
 R-squared  0.31  0.26  0.46  0.11 
 Adj. R-squared  0.23  0.18  0.40  0.01 
 Sum sq. resids  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.80 
 S.E. equation  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.09 
 F-statistic  4.14  3.34  7.85  1.13 
 Akaike AIC  -9.72  -6.19  -10.23  -1.83 
 Schwarz SC  -9.44  -5.91  -9.96  -1.55 
 Mean dependent  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 S.D. dependent  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.09 
Note: CPI = Consumer price index, NEER = Nominal effective exchange rate, FCPI = Trading partner consumer 
price index, OP = Oil price, D = first difference, WD = War Dummy (Iraqi War). Lags are selected based on the 
information criterion. 
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Table: 2  
 
Kuwait: VECM 
 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Sample (adjusted): 2000M07 2008M09 
Included observations: 99 after adjustments 
 t-statistics in [ ] 
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1       
LOG(CPI(-1))  1.00       
LOG(NEER(-1))  -0.57       
   [-3.27524]       
LOG(FCPI(-1))  -0.78       
   [-4.52561]       
LOG(OP(-1))  -0.01       
  [-0.20080]       
C  1.68       
         
Error Correction:  D(LOG(CPI))  D(LOG(NEER))  D(LOG(FCPI))  D(LOG(OP)) 
CointEq1  0.06  0.09  0.01  0.40 
  [ 2.87220]  [ 2.45218]  [ 2.87679]  [ 1.24311] 
D(LOG(CP(-1)))  -0.14  0.27  -0.01  -0.97 
   [-1.36864]  [ 1.38905]  [-0.36201]  [-0.57904] 
D(LOG(NEER(-1)))  -0.02  0.07  0.01  0.58 
   [-0.48262]  [ 0.67212]  [ 0.89267]  [ 0.67847] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-1)))  0.82  -1.09  0.13  -17.27 
   [ 1.96451]  [-1.38115]  [ 1.30093]  [-2.50697] 
D(LOG(OP(-1)))  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.09 
   [ 0.02498]  [-0.25744]  [ 4.06203]  [ 0.78877] 
  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.07 
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WD  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01 
  [-0.87305]  [-1.53823]  [-0.39350]  [-0.45049] 
R-squared  0.35  0.18  0.33  0.07 
Adj. R-squared  0.26  0.13  0.29  0.02 
Sum sq. resids  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.63 
S.E. equation  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.08 
F-statistic  3.86  3.46  7.99  1.29 
Akaike AIC  -7.74  -6.46  -10.52  -2.12 
Schwarz SC  -7.56  -6.28  -10.34  -1.95 
Mean dependent  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01 
S.D. dependent  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.08 
 
Note: CPI = Consumer price index, NEER = Nominal effective exchange rate, FCPI = Trading partner consumer 
price index, OP = Oil price, D = first difference, WD = War Dummy (Iraqi War). Lags are selected based on the 
information criterion. 
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Table: 3  
 
Oman VECM 
 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 Sample (adjusted): 2001M08 2008M11 
 Included observations: 99 after adjustments 
  t-statistics in [ ] 
Cointegrating Eq:   CointEq1          
LOG(CPI(-1))  1          
LOG(NEER(-1))  0.54          
   [ 1.78231]          
LOG(FCPI(-1))  1.47          
   [ 3.12265]          
LOG(OP(-1))  -0.05          
   [-0.89034]          
C  -13.92          
              
Error Correction:  D(LOG(CPI))  D(LOG(NEER))  D(LOG(FCPI))  D(LOG(OP)) 
CointEq1  0.02  0.01  -0.01  -1.00 
   [ 1.59238]  [ 0.21286]  [-3.55695]  [-3.24899] 
D(LOG(CPI(-1)))  -0.04  -0.57  0.18  9.55 
   [-0.29131]  [-1.45953]  [ 3.98733]  [ 2.81775] 
D(LOG(CPI(-2)))  0.04  -0.73  0.22  11.59 
   [ 0.33979]  [-1.83380]  [ 4.65521]  [ 3.37700] 
D(LOG(CPI(-3)))  0.27  -0.38  0.15  8.29 
   [ 1.82243]  [-0.84216]  [ 2.84077]  [ 2.11511] 
D(LOG(CPI(-4)))  0.01  -0.21  0.09  4.65 
   [ 0.06690]  [-0.44441]  [ 1.54850]  [ 1.13638] 
D(LOG(CPI(-5)))  0.03  0.48  0.06  4.89 
   [ 0.20621]  [ 1.02999]  [ 1.06745]  [ 1.22005] P a g e  | 352 
 
D(LOG(CPI(-6)))  -0.10  0.63  -0.09  -0.36 
   [-0.71258]  [ 1.45207]  [-1.76362]  [-0.09480] 
D(LOG(CPI(-7)))  -0.14  0.15  0.08  8.26 
   [-1.02655]  [ 0.36666]  [ 1.52071]  [ 2.26400] 
D(LOG(NEER(-1)))  0.05  0.23  0.00  0.00 
   [ 1.26321]  [ 1.89211]  [-0.23319]  [-0.00303] 
D(LOG(NEER(-2)))  -0.08  -0.02  0.00  -0.31 
   [-1.98416]  [-0.17127]  [ 0.07076]  [-0.28487] 
D(LOG(NEER(-3)))  0.00  -0.13  -0.01  0.00 
   [ 0.11441]  [-1.02761]  [-0.52269]  [ 0.00184] 
D(LOG(NEER(-4)))  -0.05  0.11  -0.02  -0.51 
   [-1.26280]  [ 1.00166]  [-1.78670]  [-0.51507] 
D(LOG(NEER(-5)))  -0.05  -0.01  0.01  0.04 
   [-1.39812]  [-0.09450]  [ 0.61063]  [ 0.04374] 
D(LOG(NEER(-6)))  -0.03  -0.09  0.01  0.62 
   [-0.75769]  [-0.76877]  [ 0.70671]  [ 0.62882] 
D(LOG(NEER(-7)))  0.00  -0.17  0.00  -2.12 
   [ 0.00958]  [-1.56146]  [ 0.01328]  [-2.22071] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-1)))  -0.19  0.51  0.07  -6.69 
   [-0.45988]  [ 0.40922]  [ 0.49900]  [-0.62024] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-2)))  0.18  2.00  -0.01  0.73 
   [ 0.46016]  [ 1.66250]  [-0.10627]  [ 0.06994] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-3)))  -0.17  0.35  -0.03  -25.09 
   [-0.43506]  [ 0.30268]  [-0.19695]  [-2.47602] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-4)))  0.03  -1.00  0.01  2.36 
   [ 0.08857]  [-0.86145]  [ 0.10615]  [ 0.23403] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-5)))  0.02  0.29  -0.29  -27.66 
   [ 0.05947]  [ 0.25834]  [-2.18957]  [-2.81406] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-6)))  0.88  0.52  0.18  -2.33 
   [ 2.45448]  [ 0.47662]  [ 1.38755]  [-0.24804] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-7)))  0.06  0.94  -0.12  -18.79 
   [ 0.16810]  [ 0.89081]  [-0.96418]  [-2.05085] P a g e  | 353 
 
D(LOG(OP(-1)))  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.03 
   [ 0.68918]  [ 0.09087]  [ 4.42274]  [ 0.24194] 
D(LOG(OP(-2)))  0.00  -0.04  0.00  -0.21 
   [ 0.31860]  [-1.94694]  [ 0.95531]  [-1.36556] 
D(LOG(OP(-3)))  0.01  -0.04  0.00  0.22 
   [ 2.33101]  [-2.32528]  [ 0.69684]  [ 1.41423] 
D(LOG(OP(-4)))  0.01  -0.03  0.00  -0.04 
   [ 1.20766]  [-1.49087]  [-0.21439]  [-0.27418] 
D(LOG(OP(-5)))  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.13 
   [ 0.49725]  [ 1.14604]  [-0.55350]  [ 0.81529] 
D(LOG(OP(-6)))  -0.02  0.02  0.00  -0.10 
   [-3.18354]  [ 0.92795]  [-1.51995]  [-0.65266] 
D(LOG(OP(-7)))  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.22 
   [-0.73922]  [-0.26434]  [ 0.96691]  [ 1.45329] 
C  0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.14 
   [-0.21537]  [-1.47826]  [ 2.79917]  [ 2.73229] 
WD  0.00  -0.01  0.00  -0.03 
   [-1.15740]  [-2.18861]  [-0.87475]  [-1.13939] 
              
 R-squared  0.71  0.41  0.73  0.48 
 Adj. R-squared  0.59  0.15  0.61  0.26 
 Sum sq. resids  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.40 
 S.E. equation  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.08 
 F-statistic  5.61  1.58  6.10  2.13 
 Akaike AIC  -8.59  -6.36  -10.65  -2.04 
 Schwarz SC  -7.77  -5.55  -9.83  -1.23 
 Mean dependent  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01 
 S.D. dependent  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.09 
 
Note: CPI = Consumer price index, NEER = Nominal effective exchange rate, FCPI = Trading partner consumer price 
index, OP = Oil price, D = first difference, WD = War Dummy (Iraqi War). Lags are selected based on the 
information criterion. 
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Table: 4 
Saudi Arabia: VECM 
 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 Sample (adjusted): 2000M08 2008M11 
 Included observations: 103 after adjustments 
  t-statistics in [ ] 
Cointegrating Eq:   CointEq1          
LOG(CPI(-1))  1.00          
LOG(NEER(-1))  0.65          
   [ 3.97921]          
LOG(FCPI(-1))  0.58          
   [ 2.86467]          
LOG(OP(-1))  0.02          
   [ 0.51508]          
C  -10.40          
              
Error Correction:  D(LOG(CPI))  D(LOG(NEER))  D(LOG(FCPI))  D(LOG(OP)) 
CointEq1  0.02  0.02  -0.02  -1.54 
   [ 1.84397]  [ 0.58367]  [-4.93025]  [-5.53679] 
D(LOG(CPI(-1)))  0.03  -0.06  0.10  6.88 
   [ 0.25170]  [-0.13561]  [ 2.06870]  [ 2.07184] 
D(LOG(CPI(-2)))  0.10  -0.04  0.12  10.77 
   [ 0.84476]  [-0.07082]  [ 2.24367]  [ 3.08142] 
D(LOG(CPI(-3)))  0.19  -0.42  0.20  12.07 
   [ 1.51216]  [-0.81253]  [ 3.60311]  [ 3.33256] 
D(LOG(NEER(-1)))  -0.04  0.29  -0.01  -0.63 
   [-1.48784]  [ 2.68883]  [-0.64340]  [-0.82335] 
D(LOG(NEER(-2)))  -0.03  -0.06  0.02  0.83 
   [-0.97830]  [-0.53959]  [ 1.34592]  [ 1.05298] 
D(LOG(NEER(-3)))  -0.01  0.01  -0.01  -0.04 P a g e  | 355 
 
   [-0.40335]  [ 0.12827]  [-0.70353]  [-0.04722] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-1)))  0.43  -0.65  0.24  -6.56 
   [ 1.49503]  [-0.56378]  [ 1.96975]  [-0.80656] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-2)))  -0.04  2.82  0.06  2.23 
   [-0.15148]  [ 2.36766]  [ 0.45199]  [ 0.26761] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-3)))  0.29  -0.91  0.20  -1.55 
   [ 1.09003]  [-0.84595]  [ 1.78584]  [-0.20558] 
D(LOG(OP(-1)))  0.00  -0.01  0.01  -0.04 
   [ 0.51564]  [-0.59125]  [ 3.10633]  [-0.33353] 
D(LOG(OP(-2)))  0.00  -0.03  0.00  -0.12 
   [-0.55986]  [-1.54181]  [ 0.57162]  [-0.89793] 
D(LOG(OP(-3)))  0.00  -0.03  0.00  0.06 
   [-0.45551]  [-1.68110]  [-0.41819]  [ 0.50110] 
C  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.02 
   [-0.75683]  [-0.46392]  [ 1.61354]  [-0.48905] 
WD  0.00  -0.01  0.00  -0.04 
   [-0.46546]  [-1.43080]  [-1.59113]  [-1.56119] 
              
 R-squared  0.52  0.23  0.54  0.32 
 Adj. R-squared  0.45  0.11  0.47  0.21 
 Sum sq. resids  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.55 
 S.E. equation  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.08 
 F-statistic  6.85  1.88  7.50  2.90 
 Akaike AIC  -8.79  -6.00  -10.50  -2.11 
 Schwarz SC  -8.41  -5.62  -10.11  -1.72 
 Mean dependent  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01 
 S.D. dependent  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.09 
 
Note: CPI = Consumer price index, NEER = Nominal effective exchange rate, FCPI = Trading partner consumer 
price index, OP = Oil price, D = first difference, WD = War Dummy (Iraqi War). Lags are selected based on the 
information criterion. 
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Table: 5 
 
Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests  
 
   Country 
Lags  Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Saudi Arabia 
   LM-Statistics  P-Value  LM-Statistics  P-Value  LM-Statistics  P-Value  LM-Statistics  P-Value 
1  21.71  0.15  14.23  0.58  23.00  0.11  22.79  0.12 
2  22.87  0.12  19.76  0.23  13.71  0.62  24.48  0.08 
3  16.21  0.44  14.09  0.59  8.83  0.92  18.11  0.32 
4  15.00  0.52  23.74  0.10  19.99  0.22  21.17  0.17 
5  18.01  0.32  11.82  0.76  14.91  0.53  21.46  0.16 
6  13.05  0.67  12.20  0.73  20.90  0.18  13.89  0.61 
7  26.04  0.05  21.46  0.16  18.85  0.28  25.22  0.07 
8  12.45  0.71  12.13  0.73  18.76  0.28  13.27  0.65 
9  12.09  0.74  11.95  0.75  22.79  0.12  15.80  0.47 
10  15.98  0.45  17.55  0.35  14.01  0.60  18.01  0.32 
11  19.65  0.24  12.73  0.69  17.35  0.36  11.32  0.79 
12  24.50  0.08  19.43  0.25  23.74  0.10  17.63  0.35 
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Table: 6 
 
Normality Test Joint (Jarque-Bera) 
 
Country 
Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Saudi Arabia 
Chi-square Statistics  P-Value  Chi-square 
Statistics 
P-Value  Chi-square 
Statistics 
P-Value  Chi-square 
Statistics 
P-Value 
192.95  0.00  71.58  0.07  62.65  0.22  52.12  0.59 
 
 
Table: 7 
 
Heteroscedasticity Tests 
 
Country 
Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Saudi Arabia 
Chi-square Statistics  P-Value  Chi-square 
Statistics 
P-Value  Chi-square 
Statistics 
P-Value  Chi-square 
Statistics 
P-Value 
500  0.40  132.51  0.07  595.12  0.43  299.66  0.10 
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Appendix: (4)  
Table: 1 
 Unit Root Tests 
 
Country 
 
ADF  PP  Integration 
  Constant  Trend  Constant  Trend   
Bahrain           
LCPI  (0) -2.89**  (0) -0.02  (6) -2.39  (6) -0.29  I(1) 
DLCPI  (4) -1.92  (0) -12.36***  (7) -11.98***  (6) -12.34***  I(0) 
LNEER  (1) -1.02  (1) -2.67  (4) -0.87  (4) -2.41  I(1) 
DLNEER  (0) -7.07***  (0) -7.04***  (0) -7.08***  (0) -7.04***  I(0) 
LDC  (0) -2.05  (0) -2.98  (0) -2.05  (0) -2.98  I(1) 
DLDC  (1) -2.76**  (1) -2.29  (0) -1.12  (0) -0.71  I(1) 
LEXP  (2) 0.47  (2)-2.05  (5) -0.54  (5) -4.14  I(1) 
DLEXP  (1) -11.12***  (1) -11.21***  (2) -18.7***  (4) -19.33***  I(0) 
Kuwait           
LCPI  (0) 4.35  (0) 1.23  (6) 5.34  (5) 1.76  I(1) 
DLCPI  (0) -9.80  (0) -11.13***  (6) -10.17***  (2) -11.08***  I(0) 
LNEER  (0) -1.30  (1) -2.46  (3) -1.38  (3) -2.28  I(1) 
DLNEER  (0) -8.02***  (0) -7.98***  (2) -7.96***  (2) -7.62***  I(0) 
LDC  (2) 0.62  (4) -3.19*  (7) 1.34  (7) -2.02  I(1) 
DLDC  (1) -4.28***  (1) -4.46***  (8) -10.19***  (1) -10.33***  I(0) 
LGV  (2) 0.59  (0) -4.07  (5) -1.93  (13) -1.12  I(1) 
DLGV  (1) -12.05***  (1) -12.02***  (43) -41.19***  (38) -48.60***  I(0) 
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LCPI  (0) 9.33  (0) 2.94  (3) 8.82  (2) 3.05  I(1) 
DLCPI  (4) -1.02  (0) -8.60***  (5) -5.65***  (5) -8.90***  I(0) 
LNEER  (1) -0.97  (1) -2.57  (4) -0.87  (4) -2.56  I(1) 
DLNEER  (0) -7.83***  (0) -7.80***  (2) -7.82***  (2) -7.79***  I(0) 
LDC  (1) -3.55***  (2) -3.63**  (1) -2.71*  (2) -2.35  I(0) 
LGV  (0) -1.95  (0) -1.37  (2) -1.89  (2) -1.33  I(1) 
DLGV  (0) -5.76***  (0) -5.77***  (2) -5.85***  (3) -6.11***  I(0) 
Saudi 
Arabia           
LCPI  (0) 8.17  (0) 2.70  (6) 6.09  (5) 2.16  I(1) 
DLCPI  (5) -1.39  (5) -2.09  (7) -6.65***  (7) -9.42***  I(0) 
LNEER  (1) -0.98  (1) -2.77  (4) -0.90  (4) -2.66  I(1) 
DLNEER  (0) -7.48***  (0) -7.44***  (1) -7.48***  (1) -7.46***  I(0) 
LDC  (3) 1.38  (1) 5.65  (1) 3.38  (6) 5.35  I(1) 
DLDC  (2) -1.44  (2) -2.45  (7) -22.63***  (7) -20.95***  I(0) 
LEXP  (0) -0.56  (0) -2.23  (4) -0.54  (5) -2.29  I(1) 
DLEXP  (0) -12.47***  (0) -12.42***  (5) -12.26***  (5) -12.21***  I(0) 
Common 
Var.           
LFCPI  (1) -0.51  (1) -2.96  (5) -0.13  (5) -2.21  I(1) 
DLFCPI  (0) -4.57***  (0) -4.52***  (4) -4.71***  (4) -4.66***  I(0) 
LOP  (1) -1.26  (1) -1.84  (4) -1.29  (4) -1.86  I(1) 
DLOP  (0) -8.26***  (0) -8.25***  (3) -8.31***  (3) -8.30***  I(0) 
 
Note: Figures in brackets next to statistics represent number of lags in the test, CPI = Consumer Price Index, 
NEER = Nominal Effective Exchange rate, DC = Domestic Credit, EXP = oil Exports, GV = Government 
Expenditure, Op = Oil Price, FCPI = Trading partner consumer price index,  L = Log form, D = first difference,  
*, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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Appendix (5) 
 
 Co-integration 
 
We started to test for co-integration in model (5) without variables for demand policies using Johansen 
procedure
175.  This test  suggest  a  maximum  likelihood  estimation  procedure that  provides two  test 
statistics (maximal eigenvalue statistic and trace statistic) for determining the number of cointegrating 
vectors as well as estimate of all cointegrating vectors that could exit among a group of variables. 
Furthermore, the Johansen test specifies three models; 1) non-trended variables, which presume that 
there is no linear trend in the level and the underlying data generating process;2) trended variables, no 
trend in the data generating process, which presume that all level variables have deterministic trend; 3) 
trended variables, trend in the underlying data generating process, which presume that variables as well 
as  the  underlying  data  generating  process  have  deterministic  trend  (Asteriou  and  Hall,  2007). 
Nonetheless, giving the fact that our variables show rising trends, the relevant models are 2 and 3.  
Johansen (1992) suggest the use of the so-called Pantula principle to decide on one of the models to 
use for testing for cointegration.  
 
We relied on several information criterion for deciding on the optimal lag length for the explanatory 
variables. The primary objective from selecting an optimal lag length in order to come up with a model 
that features good diagnostic results in terms of e.g. autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, and normality. 
By taking into account the above information, the optimal lag length for the countries of our sample 
ranged between one (for Kuwait) to seven lags (Oman). 
 
The optimal error correction model is linear with intercept and no trend for all the four countries in our 
sample (model 5).  The results for the cointegration test for the models of the four countries are 
                                                           
175 Another method for testing for co-integration was introduced by Engle and Granger (1987). This approach 
relies on looking for cointegration by testing weather the residuals from the long run relationship is stationary. 
However,  despite  its  simplicity,  this  way  is  found  to  suffer  from  number  of  weakness.  For  example,  this 
approach does not say anything about which of the variables can be used as regressor and why. Another 
weakness is that in the case of more than two variables in the system, E&G approach does not give the number 
of cointegrating vectors. One last weakness is that it basically relies on two-step estimator, so if any error was 
made in the first step it will be carried out into the second step (Asteriou and Hall, 2007). P a g e  | 361 
 
presented in table (A1). The table shows the LR test based on trace statistics and maximal eigenvalue 
statistic. Both tests  generally  suggest  the rejection  of  no  co-integration in all models  for  the four 
countries. Specifically, the trace statistics indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis of zero co-
integration for Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. However, the maximal eigenvalue statistics 
indicated the rejection of zero co-integration only in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, but it failed to report 
any co-integration in case of Kuwait and Oman. Based on both test we could conclude that there 
appear to be one co-integration for all the countries and that testing for more than one co-integration is 
highly rejected by both tests.  
 
Table: 1  
 
Co-integration Tests 
 
 
Johansen Maximum Likelihood Procedure (Trended case, No trend in DGP)  
Cointegration LR Test Based on Trace Statistic 
Null  Alter  Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Saudi Arabia 
0  1 
67.46* 
(47.86) 
57.87* 
(47.86) 
61.16* 
(47.86) 
78.19* 
(47.86) 
1  2 
21.25 
(29.80) 
23.77 
(29.80) 
24.80 
(29.80) 
29.0 
(29.80) 
2  3 
10.98 
(15.50) 
12.61 
(15.50) 
14.46 
(15.50) 
14.57 
(15.50) 
3  4 
0.01 
(3.84) 
2.97 
(3.84) 
  4.60 
(3.84) 
2.16 
(3.84) 
Cointegration LR Test Based on Maximal Eigenvalue Statistic 
Null  Alter  Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Saudi Arabia 
0  1 
36.20* 
(27.58) 
24.10 
(27.58) 
26.36 
(27.58) 
39.01* 
(27.58) 
1  2 
20.27 
(21.13) 
21.16 
(21.13) 
18.34 
(21.13) 
19.72 
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2  3 
10.98 
(14.26) 
9.64 
(14.26) 
11.90 
(14.26) 
13.42 
(14.26) 
3  4 
0.01 
(3.84) 
2.97 
(3.84) 
4.58 
(3.84) 
2.16 
(3.84) 
 
Note: * donates the rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration between the variables under 5% level of 
significance. Critical values are in brackets. 
 
 
The  Johansen  procedure  was  repeated  for  model  (5),  however  this  time  by  including  variables 
representing monetary policy, namely domestic credit. The optimal lag length  is one for Bahrain, nine 
for Kuwait, six for Oman, and four for Saudi Arabia. The optimal model is linear with intercept for 
Bahrain and Kuwait, and linear with intercept and trend for Oman and Saudi Arabia. The results for the 
co-integration tests are presented in table A2.  The trace statistics have rejected the null of no co-
integration  and have  revealed  the  presence  of  two  co-integrations  for  Bahrain,  Kuwait  and  Saudi 
Arabia. However, based on the maximal eigenvalue statistics there appear to be only one co-integrating 
vector for each countries.  
 
Table: 2 
 
 Co-integration Tests 
 
Johansen Maximum Likelihood Procedure 
Co-integration LR Test Based on Trace Statistic 
Null  Alter  Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Saudi Arabia 
0  1  115.46*  112.32*  128.04*  125.10* 
    (69.82)  (69.82)  (88.80)  (88.80) 
1  2  66.21*  62.52*  57.54  83.71* 
    (47.86)  (47.86)  (63.88)  (63.88) 
2  3  25.02  22.19  51.81  40.72 
    (29.80)  (29.80)  (42.92)  (42.92) P a g e  | 363 
 
3  4  9.89  11.10  27.33  23.82 
    (15.49)  (15.49)  (25.87)  (25.87) 
4  5  0.00  1.80  13.56  5.83 
    (3.84)  (3.84)  (12.52)  (12.52) 
Co-integration LR Test Based on Maximal Eigenvalue Statistic 
Null  Alter  Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Saudi Arabia 
0  1  49.25*  49.81*  50.51*  41.39* 
    (33.88)  (33.88)  (38.33)  (38.33) 
1  2  21.19  20.32  25.72  28.99 
    (27.58)  (27.58)  (32.12)  (32.12) 
2  3  25.14  21.09  24.48  20.90 
    (21.13)  (21.13)  (25.82)  (25.82) 
3  4  9.88  9.30  13.77  17.99 
    (14.26)  (14.26)  (19.39)  (19.39) 
4  5  0.00  1.80  13.56  5.83 
    (3.84)  (3.84)  (12.52)  (12.52) 
 
Note: * donates the rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration between the variables under 5% level of 
significance. Critical values are in brackets. 
 
 
Again  we  repeated the  co-integration tests  but this time by  replacing  domestic  credit  variable  for 
monetary policy with the government spending variable for fiscal policy.  The optimal lag length is 
found to be two for Bahrain and Oman, three for Kuwait, and five for Saudi Arabia. The optimal model 
is linear with intercept for Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia, and linear with intercept and trend for 
Kuwait. Table A3 summarizes the results of the co-integration tests.  Based on the trace statistics, there 
appear to exist two co-integrating vectors in Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia, and only one co-
integration in Kuwait. On the other hand, based on the maximal eigenvalue statistics there appear to be 
no co-integration between the variables in Kuwait and only one co-integration in the rest of countries 
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Table: 3 
 
Co-integration Tests 
 
Johansen Maximum Likelihood Procedure 
Co-integration LR Test Based on Trace Statistic 
Null  Alter  Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Saudi Arabia 
0  1  103.22*  108.33*  129.35*  121.33* 
    (69.82)  (88.80)  (69.82)  (69.82) 
1  2  60.04*  60.48  67.88*  65.89* 
    (47.86)  63.87  (47.86)  (47.86) 
2  3  28.63  34.76  23.17  24.10 
    (29.80)  42.62  (29.80)  (29.80) 
3  4  16.14  15.36  10.03  14.13 
    (15.49)  25.87  (15.49)  (15.49) 
4  5  6.11  6.69  0.68  6.73 
    (3.84)  12.52  (3.84)  (3.84) 
Co-integration LR Test Based on Maximal Eigenvalue Statistic 
Null  Alter  Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Saudi Arabia 
0  1  43.18*  31.85  61.46*  55.45* 
    (33.88)  (38.33)  (33.88)  (33.88) 
1  2  21.40  31.72  24.71  21.79 
    (27.58)  (32.12)  (27.58)  (27.58) 
2  3  12.49  19.40  23.14  19.98 
    (21.13)  (25.82)  (21.13)  (21.13) 
3  4  10.03  8.67  9.35  7.39 
    (14.26)  (19.39)  (14.26)  (14.26) 
4  5  6.11  6.69  0.68  6.73 
    (3.84)  (12.52)  (3.84)  (3.84) 
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Note: * donates the rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration between the variables under 5% level of 
significance. Critical values are in brackets. 
 
Finally,  the  co-integration  tests  were  carried  out  by  including  both  domestic  credit  variable  and 
government  spending  variable in  model (5). The  optimal  lag  length  is  two  for  Bahrain, three  for 
Kuwait, six for Oman, and five for Saudi Arabia. The optimal Johansen model is linear with intercept 
for Kuwait, and linear with intercept and trend for the rest of the sample. The results for the co-
integrating tests are given in table A4. The results from both the co-integration tests are more or less 
identical. Both tests (trace statistics and maximal eigenvalue statistics) have identified only one co-
integrating vector  for Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman. However, in the case of Saudi Arabia, the trace 
statistics has revealed two co-integrating vectors, but the maximal eigenvalue statistics has identified 
only one co-integration.  
 
Table: 4 
 
Co-integration Tests 
 
Johansen Maximum Likelihood Procedure 
Cointegration LR Test Based on Trace Statistic 
Null  Alter  Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Saudi Arabia 
0  1  151.59* 
(117.71) 
117.61* 
(95.75) 
152.61* 
(117.71) 
159.21* 
(117.71)     
1  2  83.04 
(88.80) 
68.40 
(69.82) 
70.07 
(88.80) 
104.70* 
(88.80)     
2  3  58.84 
(63.88) 
35.72 
(47.86) 
59.24 
(63.88) 
60.65 
(63.88)     
3  4  34.82 
(42.92) 
20.57 
(29.80) 
42.77 
(42.92) 
37.25 
(42.92)     
4  5  19.88 
(25.87) 
9.80 
(15.49) 
25.03 
(25.87) 
19.07 
(25.87)     
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    (12.52)  (3.84)  (12.52)  (12.52) 
Co-integration LR Test Based on Maximal Eigenvalue Statistic 
Null  Alter  Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Saudi Arabia 
0  1  58.55*  49.21*  52.54*  54.50* 
    (44.50)  (40.08)  (44.50)  (44.50) 
1  2  34.21  32.69  30.83  34.05 
    (38.33)  (33.88)  (38.33)  (38.33) 
2  3  24.02  15.15  26.48  23.41 
    (32.12)  (27.58)  (32.12)  (32.12) 
3  4  14.93  10.77  17.73  18.18 
    (25.82)  (21.13)  (25.82)  (25.82) 
4  5  13.03  7.78  14.21  12.37 
    (19.39)  (14.26)  (19.39)  (19.39) 
5  6  6.86  2.02  10.82  6.70 
    (12.52)  (3.84)  (12.52)  (12.52) 
 
Note: * donates the rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration between the variables under 5% level of 
significance. Critical values are in brackets. 
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Appendix  (6) 
 
Table: 1 
  
Bahrain: VECM 
 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 Sample (adjusted): 2000M10 2008M12 
 Included observations: 105 after adjustments 
t-statistics in [ ] 
Cointegrating Eq:   CointEq1          
LOG(CPI(-1))  1          
LOG(NEER(-1))  0.54          
   [ 3.34418]          
LOG(FCPI(-1))  0.21          
   [ 1.11432]          
LOG(OP(-1))  -0.10          
   [-2.88365]          
C  -7.77          
             
Error Correction:  D(LOG(CPI))  D(LOG(NEER))  D(LOG(FCPI))  D(LOG(OP)) 
              
CointEq1  0.02  -0.06  -0.01  0.67 
   [ 3.16510]  [-1.56538]  [-1.12440]  [ 1.91585] 
D(LOG(CPI(-1)))  -0.13  -0.96  -0.02  -6.45 
   [-1.33335]  [-1.64898]  [-0.28643]  [-1.25492] 
D(LOG(CPI(-2)))  0.22  0.63  0.09  -5.55 
   [ 2.24739]  [ 1.09521]  [ 1.16532]  [-1.09833] 
D(LOG(NEER(-1)))  -0.02  0.38  -0.01  -1.50 
   [-0.87269]  [ 3.53909]  [-0.69271]  [-1.59413] 
D(LOG(NEER(-2)))  0.00  -0.17  0.00  -0.45 P a g e  | 368 
 
   [ 0.27739]  [-1.67214]  [-0.30558]  [-0.49113] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-1)))  -0.23  -0.34  0.22  1.03 
   [-1.24825]  [-0.30593]  [ 1.51360]  [ 0.10627] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-2)))  0.39  0.29  0.08  7.45 
   [ 2.28394]  [ 0.28973]  [ 0.63663]  [ 0.84656] 
D(LOG(OP(-1)))  0.00  -0.01  0.01  0.16 
   [ 1.03930]  [-0.36008]  [ 3.99952]  [ 1.13288] 
D(LOG(OP(-2)))  0.00  -0.01  0.00  -0.08 
   [-0.50474]  [-0.87348]  [ 0.49762]  [-0.62389] 
C  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
   [ 1.35420]  [ 0.07060]  [ 3.79190]  [-0.04938] 
WD  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.03 
   [-0.41145]  [-0.83691]  [-0.37501]  [-0.95377] 
 R-squared  0.31  0.26  0.46  0.11 
 Adj. R-squared  0.23  0.18  0.40  0.01 
 Sum sq. resids  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.80 
 S.E. equation  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.09 
 F-statistic  4.14  3.34  7.85  1.13 
 Akaike AIC  -9.72  -6.19  -10.23  -1.83 
 Schwarz SC  -9.44  -5.91  -9.96  -1.55 
 Mean dependent  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 S.D. dependent  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.09 
 
Note: CPI = Consumer price index, NEER = Nominal effective exchange rate, FCPI = Trading partner consumer 
price index, OP = Oil price, D = first difference, WD = War Dummy (Iraqi War). Lags are selected based on the 
information criterion. 
 
Table: 2 
  
Kuwait: VECM 
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Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Sample (adjusted): 2000M07 2008M09 
Included observations: 99 after adjustments 
 t-statistics in [ ] 
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1       
LOG(CPI(-1))  1.00       
LOG(NEER(-1))  -0.57       
   [-3.27524]       
LOG(FCPI(-1))  -0.78       
   [-4.52561]       
LOG(OP(-1))  -0.01       
  [-0.20080]       
C  1.68       
         
Error Correction:  D(LOG(CPI))  D(LOG(NEER))  D(LOG(FCPI))  D(LOG(OP)) 
CointEq1  0.06  0.09  0.01  0.40 
  [ 2.87220]  [ 2.45218]  [ 2.87679]  [ 1.24311] 
D(LOG(CP(-1)))  -0.14  0.27  -0.01  -0.97 
   [-1.36864]  [ 1.38905]  [-0.36201]  [-0.57904] 
D(LOG(NEER(-1)))  -0.02  0.07  0.01  0.58 
   [-0.48262]  [ 0.67212]  [ 0.89267]  [ 0.67847] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-1)))  0.82  -1.09  0.13  -17.27 
   [ 1.96451]  [-1.38115]  [ 1.30093]  [-2.50697] 
D(LOG(OP(-1)))  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.09 
   [ 0.02498]  [-0.25744]  [ 4.06203]  [ 0.78877] 
  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.07 
C  [ 0.60584]  [ 1.26795]  [ 7.65191]  [ 2.99228] 
WD  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01 
  [-0.87305]  [-1.53823]  [-0.39350]  [-0.45049] 
R-squared  0.35  0.18  0.33  0.07 
Adj. R-squared  0.26  0.13  0.29  0.02 
Sum sq. resids  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.63 P a g e  | 370 
 
S.E. equation  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.08 
F-statistic  3.86  3.46  7.99  1.29 
Akaike AIC  -7.74  -6.46  -10.52  -2.12 
Schwarz SC  -7.56  -6.28  -10.34  -1.95 
Mean dependent  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01 
S.D. dependent  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.08 
 
Note: CPI = Consumer price index, NEER = Nominal effective exchange rate, FCPI = Trading partner consumer 
price index, OP = Oil price, D = first difference, WD = War Dummy (Iraqi War). Lags are selected based on the 
information criterion. 
Table: 3  
 
Oman VECM 
 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 Sample (adjusted): 2001M08 2008M11 
 Included observations: 99 after adjustments 
  t-statistics in [ ] 
Cointegrating Eq:   CointEq1          
LOG(CPI(-1))  1          
LOG(NEER(-1))  0.54          
   [ 1.78231]          
LOG(FCPI(-1))  1.47          
   [ 3.12265]          
LOG(OP(-1))  -0.05          
   [-0.89034]          
C  -13.92          
              
Error Correction:  D(LOG(CPI))  D(LOG(NEER))  D(LOG(FCPI))  D(LOG(OP)) 
CointEq1  0.02  0.01  -0.01  -1.00 
   [ 1.59238]  [ 0.21286]  [-3.55695]  [-3.24899] P a g e  | 371 
 
D(LOG(CPI(-1)))  -0.04  -0.57  0.18  9.55 
   [-0.29131]  [-1.45953]  [ 3.98733]  [ 2.81775] 
D(LOG(CPI(-2)))  0.04  -0.73  0.22  11.59 
   [ 0.33979]  [-1.83380]  [ 4.65521]  [ 3.37700] 
D(LOG(CPI(-3)))  0.27  -0.38  0.15  8.29 
   [ 1.82243]  [-0.84216]  [ 2.84077]  [ 2.11511] 
D(LOG(CPI(-4)))  0.01  -0.21  0.09  4.65 
   [ 0.06690]  [-0.44441]  [ 1.54850]  [ 1.13638] 
D(LOG(CPI(-5)))  0.03  0.48  0.06  4.89 
   [ 0.20621]  [ 1.02999]  [ 1.06745]  [ 1.22005] 
D(LOG(CPI(-6)))  -0.10  0.63  -0.09  -0.36 
   [-0.71258]  [ 1.45207]  [-1.76362]  [-0.09480] 
D(LOG(CPI(-7)))  -0.14  0.15  0.08  8.26 
   [-1.02655]  [ 0.36666]  [ 1.52071]  [ 2.26400] 
D(LOG(NEER(-1)))  0.05  0.23  0.00  0.00 
   [ 1.26321]  [ 1.89211]  [-0.23319]  [-0.00303] 
D(LOG(NEER(-2)))  -0.08  -0.02  0.00  -0.31 
   [-1.98416]  [-0.17127]  [ 0.07076]  [-0.28487] 
D(LOG(NEER(-3)))  0.00  -0.13  -0.01  0.00 
   [ 0.11441]  [-1.02761]  [-0.52269]  [ 0.00184] 
D(LOG(NEER(-4)))  -0.05  0.11  -0.02  -0.51 
   [-1.26280]  [ 1.00166]  [-1.78670]  [-0.51507] 
D(LOG(NEER(-5)))  -0.05  -0.01  0.01  0.04 
   [-1.39812]  [-0.09450]  [ 0.61063]  [ 0.04374] 
D(LOG(NEER(-6)))  -0.03  -0.09  0.01  0.62 
   [-0.75769]  [-0.76877]  [ 0.70671]  [ 0.62882] 
D(LOG(NEER(-7)))  0.00  -0.17  0.00  -2.12 
   [ 0.00958]  [-1.56146]  [ 0.01328]  [-2.22071] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-1)))  -0.19  0.51  0.07  -6.69 
   [-0.45988]  [ 0.40922]  [ 0.49900]  [-0.62024] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-2)))  0.18  2.00  -0.01  0.73 
   [ 0.46016]  [ 1.66250]  [-0.10627]  [ 0.06994] P a g e  | 372 
 
D(LOG(FCPI(-3)))  -0.17  0.35  -0.03  -25.09 
   [-0.43506]  [ 0.30268]  [-0.19695]  [-2.47602] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-4)))  0.03  -1.00  0.01  2.36 
   [ 0.08857]  [-0.86145]  [ 0.10615]  [ 0.23403] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-5)))  0.02  0.29  -0.29  -27.66 
   [ 0.05947]  [ 0.25834]  [-2.18957]  [-2.81406] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-6)))  0.88  0.52  0.18  -2.33 
   [ 2.45448]  [ 0.47662]  [ 1.38755]  [-0.24804] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-7)))  0.06  0.94  -0.12  -18.79 
   [ 0.16810]  [ 0.89081]  [-0.96418]  [-2.05085] 
D(LOG(OP(-1)))  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.03 
   [ 0.68918]  [ 0.09087]  [ 4.42274]  [ 0.24194] 
D(LOG(OP(-2)))  0.00  -0.04  0.00  -0.21 
   [ 0.31860]  [-1.94694]  [ 0.95531]  [-1.36556] 
D(LOG(OP(-3)))  0.01  -0.04  0.00  0.22 
   [ 2.33101]  [-2.32528]  [ 0.69684]  [ 1.41423] 
D(LOG(OP(-4)))  0.01  -0.03  0.00  -0.04 
   [ 1.20766]  [-1.49087]  [-0.21439]  [-0.27418] 
D(LOG(OP(-5)))  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.13 
   [ 0.49725]  [ 1.14604]  [-0.55350]  [ 0.81529] 
D(LOG(OP(-6)))  -0.02  0.02  0.00  -0.10 
   [-3.18354]  [ 0.92795]  [-1.51995]  [-0.65266] 
D(LOG(OP(-7)))  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.22 
   [-0.73922]  [-0.26434]  [ 0.96691]  [ 1.45329] 
C  0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.14 
   [-0.21537]  [-1.47826]  [ 2.79917]  [ 2.73229] 
WD  0.00  -0.01  0.00  -0.03 
   [-1.15740]  [-2.18861]  [-0.87475]  [-1.13939] 
              
 R-squared  0.71  0.41  0.73  0.48 
 Adj. R-squared  0.59  0.15  0.61  0.26 
 Sum sq. resids  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.40 P a g e  | 373 
 
 S.E. equation  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.08 
 F-statistic  5.61  1.58  6.10  2.13 
 Akaike AIC  -8.59  -6.36  -10.65  -2.04 
 Schwarz SC  -7.77  -5.55  -9.83  -1.23 
 Mean dependent  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01 
 S.D. dependent  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.09 
 
Note: CPI = Consumer price index, NEER = Nominal effective exchange rate, FCPI = Trading partner consumer 
price index, OP = Oil price, D = first difference, WD = War Dummy (Iraqi War). Lags are selected based on the 
information criterion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table: 4  
 
Saudi Arabia: VECM 
 
 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 Sample (adjusted): 2000M08 2008M11 
 Included observations: 103 after adjustments 
  t-statistics in [ ] 
Cointegrating Eq:   CointEq1          
LOG(CPI(-1))  1.00          
LOG(NEER(-1))  0.65          P a g e  | 374 
 
   [ 3.97921]          
LOG(FCPI(-1))  0.58          
   [ 2.86467]          
LOG(OP(-1))  0.02          
   [ 0.51508]          
C  -10.40          
              
Error Correction:  D(LOG(CPI))  D(LOG(NEER))  D(LOG(FCPI))  D(LOG(OP)) 
CointEq1  0.02  0.02  -0.02  -1.54 
   [ 1.84397]  [ 0.58367]  [-4.93025]  [-5.53679] 
D(LOG(CPI(-1)))  0.03  -0.06  0.10  6.88 
   [ 0.25170]  [-0.13561]  [ 2.06870]  [ 2.07184] 
D(LOG(CPI(-2)))  0.10  -0.04  0.12  10.77 
   [ 0.84476]  [-0.07082]  [ 2.24367]  [ 3.08142] 
D(LOG(CPI(-3)))  0.19  -0.42  0.20  12.07 
   [ 1.51216]  [-0.81253]  [ 3.60311]  [ 3.33256] 
D(LOG(NEER(-1)))  -0.04  0.29  -0.01  -0.63 
   [-1.48784]  [ 2.68883]  [-0.64340]  [-0.82335] 
D(LOG(NEER(-2)))  -0.03  -0.06  0.02  0.83 
   [-0.97830]  [-0.53959]  [ 1.34592]  [ 1.05298] 
D(LOG(NEER(-3)))  -0.01  0.01  -0.01  -0.04 
   [-0.40335]  [ 0.12827]  [-0.70353]  [-0.04722] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-1)))  0.43  -0.65  0.24  -6.56 
   [ 1.49503]  [-0.56378]  [ 1.96975]  [-0.80656] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-2)))  -0.04  2.82  0.06  2.23 
   [-0.15148]  [ 2.36766]  [ 0.45199]  [ 0.26761] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-3)))  0.29  -0.91  0.20  -1.55 
   [ 1.09003]  [-0.84595]  [ 1.78584]  [-0.20558] 
D(LOG(OP(-1)))  0.00  -0.01  0.01  -0.04 
   [ 0.51564]  [-0.59125]  [ 3.10633]  [-0.33353] 
D(LOG(OP(-2)))  0.00  -0.03  0.00  -0.12 
   [-0.55986]  [-1.54181]  [ 0.57162]  [-0.89793] P a g e  | 375 
 
D(LOG(OP(-3)))  0.00  -0.03  0.00  0.06 
   [-0.45551]  [-1.68110]  [-0.41819]  [ 0.50110] 
C  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.02 
   [-0.75683]  [-0.46392]  [ 1.61354]  [-0.48905] 
WD  0.00  -0.01  0.00  -0.04 
   [-0.46546]  [-1.43080]  [-1.59113]  [-1.56119] 
              
 R-squared  0.52  0.23  0.54  0.32 
 Adj. R-squared  0.45  0.11  0.47  0.21 
 Sum sq. resids  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.55 
 S.E. equation  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.08 
 F-statistic  6.85  1.88  7.50  2.90 
 Akaike AIC  -8.79  -6.00  -10.50  -2.11 
 Schwarz SC  -8.41  -5.62  -10.11  -1.72 
 Mean dependent  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01 
 S.D. dependent  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.09 
 
Note: CPI = Consumer price index, NEER = Nominal effective exchange rate, FCPI = Trading partner consumer 
price index, OP = Oil price, D = first difference, WD = War Dummy (Iraqi War). Lags are selected based on the 
information criterion. 
 
Table: 5 
 
Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests  
 
   Country 
Lags  Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Saudi Arabia 
   LM-Statistics  P-Value  LM-Statistics  P-Value  LM-Statistics  P-Value  LM-Statistics  P-Value 
1  21.71  0.15  14.23  0.58  23.00  0.11  22.79  0.12 
2  22.87  0.12  19.76  0.23  13.71  0.62  24.48  0.08 
3  16.21  0.44  14.09  0.59  8.83  0.92  18.11  0.32 P a g e  | 376 
 
4  15.00  0.52  23.74  0.10  19.99  0.22  21.17  0.17 
5  18.01  0.32  11.82  0.76  14.91  0.53  21.46  0.16 
6  13.05  0.67  12.20  0.73  20.90  0.18  13.89  0.61 
7  26.04  0.05  21.46  0.16  18.85  0.28  25.22  0.07 
8  12.45  0.71  12.13  0.73  18.76  0.28  13.27  0.65 
9  12.09  0.74  11.95  0.75  22.79  0.12  15.80  0.47 
10  15.98  0.45  17.55  0.35  14.01  0.60  18.01  0.32 
11  19.65  0.24  12.73  0.69  17.35  0.36  11.32  0.79 
12  24.50  0.08  19.43  0.25  23.74  0.10  17.63  0.35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table: 6 
 
Normality Test Joint (Jarque-Bera) 
 
Country 
Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Saudi Arabia P a g e  | 377 
 
Chi-square Statistics  P-Value  Chi-square 
Statistics 
P-Value  Chi-square 
Statistics 
P-Value  Chi-square 
Statistics 
P-Value 
192.95  0.00  71.58  0.07  62.65  0.22  52.12  0.59 
 
 
 
Table: 7 
 
Heteroscedasticity Tests 
 
Country 
Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Saudi Arabia 
Chi-square Statistics  P-Value  Chi-square 
Statistics 
P-Value  Chi-square 
Statistics 
P-Value  Chi-square 
Statistics 
P-Value 
500  0.40  132.51  0.07  595.12  0.43  299.66  0.10 
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Appendix (7) 
 
Table: 1 
 
 Bahrain (VECM) 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 Sample (adjusted): 2000M03 2008M12 
 Included observations: 106 after adjustments 
  t-statistics in [ ] 
Cointegrating Eq:   CointEq1             
LOG(CPI(-1))  1.00             
LOG(NEER(-1))  0.25             
   [ 3.98621]             
LOG(FCPI(1))  -1.97             
   [-12.8384]             
LOG(OP(-1))  -0.04             
   [-2.41691]             
LOG(DC(-1))  0.38             
   [ 10.1761]             
C  0.36             P a g e  | 379 
 
                 
Error Correction:  D(LOG(CPI))  D(LOG(NEER))  D(LOG(FCPI))  D(LOG(OP))  D(LOG(DC)) 
CointEq1  -0.05  -0.09  0.00  -0.27  -12.15 
   [-3.56947]  [-1.21543]  [-0.11445]  [-0.42364]  [-6.82034] 
D(LOG(CPI(-1)))  -0.13  -1.53  -0.09  -2.54  -17.54 
   [-1.46809]  [-3.07449]  [-1.42457]  [-0.58987]  [-1.46390] 
D(LOG(NEER(-1)))  -0.01  0.38  -0.01  -1.34  3.52 
   [-0.29785]  [ 3.66213]  [-0.74068]  [-1.47846]  [ 1.39919] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-1)))  -0.49  -0.07  0.39  -3.24  34.83 
   [-3.29158]  [-0.08544]  [ 3.83345]  [-0.46588]  [ 1.80083] 
D(LOG(OP(-1)))  0.00  -0.01  0.01  0.13  0.19 
   [ 0.06162]  [-0.65967]  [ 3.77667]  [ 1.10854]  [ 0.57610] 
D(LOG(DC(-1)))  0.00  0.04  -0.01  -0.25  2.71 
   [ 0.51258]  [ 1.09722]  [-1.42651]  [-0.70653]  [ 2.74928] 
C  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  -0.14 
   [ 6.47401]  [ 0.46629]  [ 5.79572]  [ 0.86399]  [-2.11343] 
                 
 R-squared  0.20  0.21  0.45  0.08  0.49 
 Adj. R-squared  0.15  0.16  0.42  0.02  0.46 
 Sum sq. resids  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.83  6.40 
 S.E. equation  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.09  0.25 
 F-statistic  4.10  4.36  13.55  1.37  15.62 
 Akaike AIC  -9.59  -6.20  -10.31  -1.88  0.16 
 Schwarz SC  -9.41  -6.03  -10.13  -1.71  0.34 
 Mean dependent  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.02 
 S.D. dependent  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.09  0.34 
 
Note: CPI = Consumer price index, NEER = Nominal effective exchange rate, FCPI = Trading partner consumer 
price  index,  OP  =  Oil  price,  DC  =  Domestic  Credit,  D  =  first  difference.  Lags  are  selected  based  on  the 
information criterion. 
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Table: 2 
 
Kuwait (VECM) 
 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 Sample (adjusted): 2000M11 2008M09 
 Included observations: 95 after adjustments 
  t-statistics in [ ] 
Cointegrating Eq:   CointEq1             
LOG(CPI(-1))  1.00             
LOG(NEER(-1))  -0.38             
   [-7.92470]             
LOG(FCPI(-1))  -0.26             
   [-2.87519]             
LOG(OP(-1))  -0.03             
   [-3.48706]             
LOG(DC(-1))  -0.11             
   [-3.77068]             
C  -0.40             
                 
Error Correction:  D(LOG(CPI))  D(LOG(NEER))  D(LOG(FCPI))  D(LOG(OP))  D(LOG(DC)) 
CointEq1  -0.25  0.62  0.10  2.09  0.88 
   [-1.76618]  [ 2.54375]  [ 3.32241]  [ 0.98384]  [ 1.68700] 
D(LOG(CPI(-1)))  0.23  0.18  -0.06  -4.76  -0.15 
   [ 1.38023]  [ 0.62812]  [-1.68605]  [-1.91824]  [-0.25296] 
D(LOG(CPI(-2)))  0.13  -0.28  -0.08  1.01  -0.67 
   [ 0.82295]  [-0.97647]  [-2.15201]  [ 0.40857]  [-1.10050] 
D(LOG(CPI(-3)))  0.18  -0.27  -0.05  -4.47  -0.16 
   [ 1.15776]  [-0.98732]  [-1.41029]  [-1.86265]  [-0.26779] 
D(LOG(CPI(-4)))  0.21  -0.56  -0.06  1.56  -0.80 P a g e  | 381 
 
   [ 1.27341]  [-1.91306]  [-1.65545]  [ 0.60901]  [-1.26797] 
D(LOG(CPI(-5)))  0.30  -0.52  0.00  0.65  -0.29 
   [ 1.76807]  [-1.73103]  [-0.11483]  [ 0.24986]  [-0.45546] 
D(LOG(CPI(-6)))  0.28  -0.62  -0.07  0.03  -0.05 
   [ 1.58800]  [-1.98502]  [-1.77912]  [ 0.01051]  [-0.06960] 
D(LOG(CPI(-7)))  0.24  -0.35  -0.15  -6.82  -0.58 
   [ 1.36461]  [-1.15357]  [-3.85970]  [-2.57536]  [-0.89608] 
D(LOG(CPI(-8)))  0.23  -0.18  -0.10  -2.36  -0.96 
   [ 1.26282]  [-0.58646]  [-2.56610]  [-0.86295]  [-1.42307] 
D(LOG(CPI(-9)))  0.21  0.25  -0.10  -2.48  -0.08 
   [ 1.29773]  [ 0.88061]  [-2.72492]  [-1.02020]  [-0.13504] 
D(LOG(NEER(-1)))  -0.04  0.21  0.03  1.32  0.11 
   [-0.43807]  [ 1.44010]  [ 1.65248]  [ 1.05115]  [ 0.34954] 
D(LOG(NEER(-2)))  -0.15  -0.02  0.05  2.41  -0.11 
   [-1.76021]  [-0.11792]  [ 2.76455]  [ 1.91256]  [-0.36097] 
D(LOG(NEER(-3)))  -0.10  0.13  0.04  0.58  0.43 
   [-1.20642]  [ 0.88841]  [ 2.25286]  [ 0.45840]  [ 1.38591] 
D(LOG(NEER(-4)))  -0.19  0.33  -0.02  -0.17  -0.04 
   [-2.22959]  [ 2.20090]  [-0.98205]  [-0.13060]  [-0.13391] 
D(LOG(NEER(-5)))  0.03  0.17  0.06  1.35  0.27 
   [ 0.33978]  [ 1.00491]  [ 2.98112]  [ 0.93403]  [ 0.76449] 
D(LOG(NEER(-6)))  -0.10  0.12  0.04  2.14  0.12 
   [-1.17777]  [ 0.84080]  [ 2.48163]  [ 1.70865]  [ 0.38902] 
D(LOG(NEER(-7)))  -0.04  -0.06  0.02  -1.54  0.22 
   [-0.42224]  [-0.38219]  [ 1.09954]  [-1.19503]  [ 0.70142] 
D(LOG(NEER(-8)))  0.05  0.04  0.02  1.36  -0.11 
   [ 0.71278]  [ 0.30722]  [ 1.25652]  [ 1.19944]  [-0.40059] 
D(LOG(NEER(-9)))  -0.02  0.00  -0.02  -0.22  -0.27 
   [-0.24214]  [-0.01510]  [-1.11572]  [-0.20466]  [-1.02006] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-1)))  1.68  -0.69  0.15  -19.08  0.23 
   [ 2.24541]  [-0.52595]  [ 0.88660]  [-1.67484]  [ 0.08211] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-2)))  0.45  -0.55  -0.18  13.60  -3.48 P a g e  | 382 
 
   [ 0.54586]  [-0.37870]  [-0.98016]  [ 1.07948]  [-1.12593] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-3)))  1.25  -0.33  -0.02  -24.42  -0.26 
   [ 1.67004]  [-0.24803]  [-0.09194]  [-2.13518]  [-0.09118] 
D(LOG(FCPA(-4)))  -0.54  -2.05  -0.15  15.68  -0.25 
   [-0.69210]  [-1.51522]  [-0.90659]  [ 1.33204]  [-0.08784] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-5)))  1.03  0.79  -0.43  -36.59  0.00 
   [ 1.30145]  [ 0.56968]  [-2.48928]  [-3.03569]  [ 0.00107] 
D(LOG(FCPA(-6)))  0.03  -0.97  -0.04  -2.47  -1.69 
   [ 0.04379]  [-0.70205]  [-0.24990]  [-0.20503]  [-0.57064] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-7)))  0.12  -0.40  0.04  -16.68  -3.16 
   [ 0.16990]  [-0.32054]  [ 0.26697]  [-1.52686]  [-1.17964] 
D(LOG(FCPA(-8)))  -0.01  0.73  0.08  13.67  -2.05 
   [-0.01028]  [ 0.58126]  [ 0.49111]  [ 1.24292]  [-0.76042] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-9)))  -0.74  0.47  0.27  10.02  0.69 
   [-1.09031]  [ 0.39236]  [ 1.83654]  [ 0.97116]  [ 0.27313] 
D(LOG(OP(-1)))  -0.01  0.02  0.01  0.12  -0.02 
   [-0.70501]  [ 1.16380]  [ 3.10272]  [ 0.67873]  [-0.39008] 
D(LOG(OP(-2)))  -0.01  0.01  0.01  -0.01  0.00 
   [-0.99538]  [ 0.31032]  [ 2.39758]  [-0.06046]  [-0.10246] 
D(LOG(OP(-3)))  -0.03  0.01  0.01  0.28  0.01 
   [-2.09503]  [ 0.31351]  [ 1.88607]  [ 1.50099]  [ 0.16386] 
D(LOG(OP(-4)))  -0.01  0.00  0.00  -0.02  0.04 
   [-0.47295]  [-0.13471]  [ 1.45628]  [-0.08593]  [ 0.90623] 
D(LOG(OP(-5)))  0.00  0.02  0.01  0.48  0.02 
   [-0.23191]  [ 1.20777]  [ 2.93753]  [ 3.00458]  [ 0.42025] 
D(LOG(OP(-6)))  -0.01  0.03  0.01  0.13  0.02 
   [-1.25907]  [ 1.40744]  [ 2.00871]  [ 0.75586]  [ 0.43253] 
D(LOG(OP(-7)))  0.01  0.03  0.01  0.29  0.02 
   [ 0.93476]  [ 1.36772]  [ 1.99571]  [ 1.60041]  [ 0.52245] 
D(LOG(OP(-8)))  -0.01  0.03  0.00  0.11  0.05 
   [-1.12889]  [ 1.44502]  [ 0.17097]  [ 0.64003]  [ 1.27033] 
D(LOG(OP(-9)))  0.00  0.03  0.00  -0.09  0.04 P a g e  | 383 
 
   [-0.05377]  [ 1.91691]  [ 0.26191]  [-0.61170]  [ 1.18411] 
D(LOG(DC(-1)))  0.03  -0.07  0.02  1.19  -0.10 
   [ 0.79519]  [-1.10200]  [ 2.10317]  [ 2.03017]  [-0.66733] 
D(LOG(DC(-2)))  0.01  -0.04  0.02  1.77  0.35 
   [ 0.32295]  [-0.58868]  [ 1.75153]  [ 2.94835]  [ 2.35776] 
D(LOG(DC(-3)))  -0.04  0.02  0.02  0.42  0.14 
   [-0.87057]  [ 0.20535]  [ 1.67736]  [ 0.63429]  [ 0.85194] 
D(LOG(DC(-4)))  0.01  0.05  0.00  -0.02  0.43 
   [ 0.16838]  [ 0.74278]  [ 0.40434]  [-0.02716]  [ 2.70885] 
D(LOG(DC(-5)))  0.02  0.03  -0.01  -0.94  0.22 
   [ 0.35364]  [ 0.43728]  [-1.39510]  [-1.41568]  [ 1.36253] 
D(LOG(DC(-6)))  -0.04  -0.02  0.01  -0.21  -0.14 
   [-1.01828]  [-0.26681]  [ 0.92288]  [-0.31496]  [-0.89747] 
D(LOG(DC(-7)))  0.02  -0.03  0.01  0.84  -0.16 
   [ 0.53961]  [-0.40513]  [ 1.10794]  [ 1.24651]  [-0.95881] 
D(LOG(DC(-8)))  -0.04  0.01  0.01  0.54  -0.03 
   [-0.84276]  [ 0.16489]  [ 0.86128]  [ 0.80276]  [-0.15400] 
D(LOG(DC(-9)))  -0.07  0.00  0.01  0.67  -0.04 
   [-1.62279]  [-0.05730]  [ 1.06855]  [ 1.05921]  [-0.28194] 
C  -0.01  0.01  0.00  0.14  0.04 
   [-1.99867]  [ 1.46572]  [ 3.66542]  [ 1.65668]  [ 2.08628] 
                 
 R-squared  0.56  0.61  0.72  0.58  0.53 
 Adj. R-squared  0.35  0.23  0.44  0.17  0.08 
 Sum sq. resids  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.26  0.02 
 S.E. equation  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.07  0.02 
 F-statistic  1.34  1.60  2.62  1.42  1.17 
 Akaike AIC  -7.52  -6.40  -10.55  -2.07  -4.88 
 Schwarz SC  -6.25  -5.13  -9.29  -0.81  -3.62 
 Mean dependent  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01 
 S.D. dependent  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.08  0.02 
 P a g e  | 384 
 
Note: CPI = Consumer price index, NEER = Nominal effective exchange rate, FCPI = Trading partner consumer 
price  index,  OP  =  Oil  price,  DC  =  Domestic  Credit,  D  =  first  difference.  Lags  are  selected  based  on  the 
information criterion. 
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 Oman (VECM) 
 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 Sample (adjusted): 2000M08 2008M11 
 Included observations: 100 after adjustments 
  t-statistics in [ ] 
Cointegrating Eq:   CointEq1             
LOG(CPI(-1))  1.00             
LOG(NEER(-1))  0.21             
   [ 2.03267]             
LOG(FCPI(-1))  -2.79             
   [-2.95527]             
LOG(OP(-1))  -0.11             
   [-5.35494]             
LOG(DC(-1))  -0.40             
   [-8.40546]             
@TREND(00M01)  0.01             
   [ 3.95208]             
C  11.09             
                 
Error Correction:  D(LOG(CPI))  D(LOG(NEER))  D(LOG(FCPI))  D(LOG(OP))  D(LOG(DC)) 
CointEq1  0.08  -0.20  0.01  1.51  0.39 
   [ 3.98033]  [-2.91716]  [ 1.46913]  [ 2.39565]  [ 2.48317] 
D(LOG(CPI(-1)))  -0.14  0.21  0.11  4.20  1.67 
   [-1.24980]  [ 0.57928]  [ 2.39510]  [ 1.21897]  [ 1.92733] 
D(LOG(CPI(-2)))  -0.05  -0.13  0.13  8.94  0.29 
   [-0.50715]  [-0.37319]  [ 3.11383]  [ 2.75638]  [ 0.34891] 
D(LOG(CPI(-3)))  0.33  -0.03  0.05  3.62  0.83 
   [ 3.22922]  [-0.09567]  [ 1.17075]  [ 1.15353]  [ 1.04562] 
D(LOG(CPI(-4)))  0.19  -0.13  -0.04  -1.23  -0.30 P a g e  | 386 
 
   [ 1.89617]  [-0.39886]  [-0.92927]  [-0.39201]  [-0.37383] 
D(LOG(CPI(-5)))  0.35  0.19  -0.04  -1.69  1.61 
   [ 3.52317]  [ 0.56018]  [-1.05554]  [-0.53901]  [ 2.03867] 
D(LOG(CPI(-6)))  0.18  0.11  -0.19  -7.25  0.05 
   [ 1.65742]  [ 0.31369]  [-4.40189]  [-2.16328]  [ 0.05879] 
D(LOG(NEER(-1)))  0.08  0.27  -0.01  -0.02  0.02 
   [ 2.42011]  [ 2.36754]  [-0.61667]  [-0.01681]  [ 0.08176] 
D(LOG(NEER(-2)))  -0.06  -0.08  0.00  -0.07  -0.44 
   [-1.76451]  [-0.64692]  [ 0.21867]  [-0.06026]  [-1.53301] 
D(LOG(NEER(-3)))  0.03  -0.04  -0.01  -0.42  -0.33 
   [ 0.97182]  [-0.33811]  [-0.97460]  [-0.40293]  [-1.27137] 
D(LOG(NEER(-4)))  -0.04  0.15  -0.02  -0.24  -0.08 
   [-1.26491]  [ 1.30332]  [-1.33492]  [-0.22704]  [-0.28937] 
D(LOG(NEER(-5)))  -0.05  0.04  0.01  -0.51  -0.12 
   [-1.56371]  [ 0.39174]  [ 0.57962]  [-0.49239]  [-0.46763] 
D(LOG(NEER(-6)))  -0.05  0.06  0.00  -0.03  0.22 
   [-1.63140]  [ 0.53236]  [ 0.14693]  [-0.02689]  [ 0.87736] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-1)))  0.13  -0.62  0.26  0.54  -0.22 
   [ 0.38673]  [-0.56917]  [ 2.00691]  [ 0.05317]  [-0.08664] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-2)))  0.33  1.02  0.24  16.05  6.40 
   [ 1.01890]  [ 0.94352]  [ 1.82377]  [ 1.58527]  [ 2.51033] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-3)))  -0.23  0.25  0.09  -7.26  4.85 
   [-0.68864]  [ 0.22391]  [ 0.67053]  [-0.69001]  [ 1.82898] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-4)))  0.19  -1.95  0.11  12.68  3.93 
   [ 0.56607]  [-1.71929]  [ 0.83164]  [ 1.19432]  [ 1.46768] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-5)))  0.14  -0.25  -0.17  -11.92  4.05 
   [ 0.42422]  [-0.22695]  [-1.31485]  [-1.15288]  [ 1.55693] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-6)))  1.21  -0.58  0.37  11.54  1.19 
   [ 3.88073]  [-0.55849]  [ 2.97892]  [ 1.19230]  [ 0.48696] 
D(LOG(OP(-1)))  0.01  -0.01  0.01  0.16  0.06 
   [ 1.41896]  [-0.80773]  [ 4.84150]  [ 1.08281]  [ 1.74352] 
D(LOG(OP(-2)))  0.00  -0.04  0.00  -0.08  -0.03 P a g e  | 387 
 
   [ 0.44556]  [-2.41326]  [ 0.80542]  [-0.50690]  [-0.71120] 
D(LOG(OP(-3)))  0.02  -0.04  0.00  0.20  -0.05 
   [ 3.64506]  [-2.36221]  [ 0.29513]  [ 1.26346]  [-1.32059] 
D(LOG(OP(-4)))  0.01  -0.04  0.00  -0.02  -0.11 
   [ 2.50781]  [-2.40577]  [-0.02205]  [-0.09591]  [-2.60681] 
D(LOG(OP(-5)))  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.10  -0.04 
   [ 2.15763]  [ 0.29013]  [-0.13491]  [ 0.57479]  [-0.86643] 
D(LOG(OP(-6)))  -0.01  0.00  0.00  -0.21  -0.08 
   [-2.83553]  [ 0.27583]  [-2.28241]  [-1.35832]  [-2.14006] 
D(LOG(DC(-1)))  0.03  -0.04  0.01  0.44  0.15 
   [ 1.97573]  [-0.72633]  [ 1.73374]  [ 0.93831]  [ 1.27027] 
D(LOG(DC(-2)))  0.04  -0.08  0.00  0.25  -0.14 
   [ 2.84280]  [-1.57376]  [ 0.56464]  [ 0.52997]  [-1.16656] 
D(LOG(DC(-3)))  0.02  -0.07  0.00  -0.15  0.05 
   [ 1.07008]  [-1.25142]  [ 0.17559]  [-0.30509]  [ 0.44145] 
D(LOG(DC(-4)))  0.03  -0.07  -0.01  -0.14  -0.01 
   [ 1.76661]  [-1.42266]  [-0.85356]  [-0.29038]  [-0.11980] 
D(LOG(DC(-5)))  0.01  -0.07  0.00  -0.05  -0.10 
   [ 0.73904]  [-1.35831]  [-0.44898]  [-0.10815]  [-0.87846] 
D(LOG(DC(-6)))  0.04  -0.13  0.01  0.65  -0.06 
   [ 2.77120]  [-2.60502]  [ 2.44172]  [ 1.43822]  [-0.56391] 
C  -0.01  0.01  0.00  -0.10  -0.06 
   [-2.69869]  [ 1.33096]  [-0.19324]  [-1.16609]  [-3.07034] 
                 
 R-squared  0.77  0.45  0.73  0.43  0.49 
 Adj. R-squared  0.67  0.21  0.61  0.17  0.26 
 Sum sq. resids  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.45  0.03 
 S.E. equation  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.08  0.02 
 F-statistic  7.38  1.83  5.89  1.64  2.12 
 Akaike AIC  -8.81  -6.41  -10.64  -1.93  -4.69 
 Schwarz SC  -7.97  -5.57  -9.81  -1.10  -3.86 
 Mean dependent  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01 P a g e  | 388 
 
 S.D. dependent  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.09  0.02 
 
Note: CPI = Consumer price index, NEER = Nominal effective exchange rate, FCPI = Trading partner consumer 
price index,  OP  =  Oil  price,  DC  =  Domestic  Credit,  D =  first  difference.    Lags  are  selected  based  on the 
information criterion. 
 
 
Table: 4 
 
 Saudi Arabia (VECM) 
 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 Sample (adjusted): 2000M06 2008M08 
 Included observations: 99 after adjustments 
  t-statistics in [ ] 
Cointegrating Eq:   CointEq1             
LOG(CPI(-1))  1.00             
LOG(NEER(-1))  0.22             
   [ 7.24273]             
LOG(FCPI(-1))  -1.35             
   [-3.68360]             
LOG(OP(-1))  -0.02             
   [-2.78829]             
LOG(DC(-1))  0.08             
   [ 10.5649]             
@TREND(00M01)  0.00             
   [ 3.72520]             
C  -0.22             
                 
Error Correction:  D(LOG(CPI))  D(LOG(NEER))  D(LOG(FCPI))  D(LOG(OP))  D(LOG(DC)) 
CointEq1  0.16  -0.74  0.00  4.12  -1.18 P a g e  | 389 
 
   [ 2.87367]  [-3.73385]  [ 0.07140]  [ 2.58658]  [-0.38101] 
D(LOG(CPI(-1)))  -0.03  0.94  0.07  -3.64  -2.60 
   [-0.20031]  [ 1.81578]  [ 1.19090]  [-0.87388]  [-0.32223] 
D(LOG(CPI(-2)))  -0.02  0.95  -0.02  -3.46  -7.48 
   [-0.13350]  [ 1.92264]  [-0.40014]  [-0.87404]  [-0.97235] 
D(LOG(CPI(-3)))  -0.05  0.79  0.13  3.51  5.41 
   [-0.39894]  [ 1.58439]  [ 2.27704]  [ 0.87970]  [ 0.69754] 
D(LOG(CPI(-4)))  -0.02  0.51  -0.06  -10.38  -10.22 
   [-0.13987]  [ 1.08642]  [-1.12693]  [-2.75062]  [-1.39551] 
D(LOG(NEER(-1)))  -0.03  0.20  -0.01  -0.85  -2.31 
   [-1.01736]  [ 2.06524]  [-1.03159]  [-1.07268]  [-1.50359] 
D(LOG(NEER(-2)))  -0.04  -0.08  0.03  1.26  3.17 
   [-1.45275]  [-0.75081]  [ 2.98763]  [ 1.57143]  [ 2.03027] 
D(LOG(NEER(-3)))  0.03  -0.08  -0.02  -0.76  -2.05 
   [ 0.96466]  [-0.85992]  [-1.59494]  [-0.97969]  [-1.35583] 
D(LOG(NEER(-4)))  -0.05  0.02  0.00  0.45  -0.42 
   [-2.07035]  [ 0.20984]  [ 0.21111]  [ 0.60447]  [-0.29379] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-1)))  0.47  0.08  0.27  -0.32  3.59 
   [ 1.50808]  [ 0.07414]  [ 2.14568]  [-0.03483]  [ 0.20422] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-2)))  0.13  2.13  -0.09  0.23  -37.80 
   [ 0.44468]  [ 1.95069]  [-0.72207]  [ 0.02640]  [-2.21589] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-3)))  0.42  -0.70  0.31  3.42  19.97 
   [ 1.33482]  [-0.61930]  [ 2.41664]  [ 0.37450]  [ 1.12687] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-4)))  0.06  -1.15  -0.19  -0.94  -38.69 
   [ 0.20121]  [-1.13653]  [-1.68268]  [-0.11617]  [-2.46049] 
D(LOG(OP(-1)))  0.00  0.00  0.01  -0.01  0.35 
   [-0.50707]  [ 0.11840]  [ 3.58037]  [-0.09972]  [ 1.51798] 
D(LOG(OP(-2)))  0.00  -0.03  0.00  -0.16  0.16 
   [-0.75266]  [-1.69656]  [ 0.53284]  [-1.22663]  [ 0.64659] 
D(LOG(OP(-3)))  -0.01  -0.03  0.00  0.02  -0.01 
   [-1.24401]  [-2.07194]  [-0.60479]  [ 0.19188]  [-0.03594] 
D(LOG(OP(-4)))  0.00  -0.03  0.00  -0.19  -0.09 P a g e  | 390 
 
   [-0.22194]  [-2.04708]  [-1.18124]  [-1.58011]  [-0.38861] 
D(LOG(DC(-1)))  -0.01  0.07  0.00  -0.36  -2.60 
   [-2.52730]  [ 3.58572]  [-2.06860]  [-2.45240]  [-9.00984] 
D(LOG(DC(-2)))  0.00  0.01  0.00  -0.16  0.70 
   [-0.37292]  [ 0.36626]  [ 0.14128]  [-0.74841]  [ 1.67957] 
D(LOG(DC(-3)))  0.00  0.05  -0.01  -0.40  0.59 
   [-0.70180]  [ 1.91923]  [-2.51250]  [-1.93427]  [ 1.47713] 
D(LOG(DC(-4)))  -0.02  0.05  0.01  0.23  0.42 
   [-3.02457]  [ 1.76218]  [ 2.43650]  [ 1.09974]  [ 1.00934] 
C  0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.03  0.16 
   [-1.24972]  [-1.10553]  [ 3.80366]  [ 0.76245]  [ 2.13208] 
WD  0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.02 
   [-0.34883]  [-2.71889]  [-0.29129]  [ 0.10518]  [ 0.44109] 
                 
 R-squared  0.63  0.43  0.58  0.35  0.77 
 Adj. R-squared  0.52  0.27  0.46  0.16  0.70 
 Sum sq. resids  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.40  1.51 
 S.E. equation  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.07  0.14 
 F-statistic  5.80  2.61  4.72  1.87  11.51 
 Akaike AIC  -8.94  -6.37  -10.73  -2.21  -0.88 
 Schwarz SC  -8.34  -5.77  -10.12  -1.60  -0.28 
 Mean dependent  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  -0.03 
 S.D. dependent  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.08  0.26 
 
Note: CPI = Consumer price index, NEER = Nominal effective exchange rate, FCPI = Trading partner consumer 
price index, OP = Oil price, DC = Domestic Credit, D = first difference, WD = War Dummy (Iraqi War) . Lags 
are selected based on the information criterion. 
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Table: 5 
 
Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests  
 
Country 
Lags 
Bahrain 
  
Kuwait 
  
Oman 
  
Saudi ArabiA 
  
  
LM 
Statistics  P-Value 
LM 
Statistics  P-Value 
LM 
Statistics  P-Value 
LM 
Statistics  P-Value 
1  22.80  0.59  16.56  0.90  35.22  0.08  34.53  0.10 
2  33.06  0.13  16.04  0.91  23.02  0.58  31.69  0.17 
3  30.39  0.21  28.53  0.28  16.98  0.88  32.44  0.15 
4  32.35  0.15  21.29  0.68  25.14  0.45  28.63  0.28 
5  36.94  0.06  35.53  0.08  17.88  0.85  19.58  0.77 
6  24.41  0.50  29.08  0.26  18.32  0.83  31.54  0.17 
7  24.48  0.08  28.44  0.29  26.53  0.38  34.82  0.09 
8  27.79  0.32  24.48  0.08  26.01  0.41  22.02  0.63 
9  24.78  0.47  28.02  0.31  25.22  0.07  24.94  0.47 
10  31.96  0.16  14.36  0.96  24.66  0.48  29.98  0.22 
11  29.29  0.25  23.45  0.55  36.97  0.06  29.65  0.24 
12  29.83  0.23  13.80  0.97  36.94  0.06  26.04  0.05 
 
 
Table: 6 
 
Normality Test Joint (Jarque-Bera) 
 
 
Country 
Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Saudi Arabia P a g e  | 392 
 
           
Chi-Square 
Statistics 
P-
Value 
Chi-Square 
Statistics 
P-
Value 
Chi-Square 
Statistics 
P-
Value 
Chi-Square 
Statistics 
P-
Value 
2899.23  0  229.13  0  141.82  0.01  113.35  0.27 
 
Table: 7 
Heteroscedasticity Tests 
 
Country 
Bahrain 
  
Kuwait 
  
Oman 
  
Saudi Arabia 
  
Chi-Square 
Statistics 
P-
Value 
Chi-Square 
Statistics 
P-
Value 
Chi-Square 
Statistics 
P-
Value 
Chi-Square 
Statistics 
P-
Value 
299.66  0.10  1394.72  0.39  931.34  0.48  684.93  0.13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix (8) 
 
Table: 1 
 
Bahrain (VECM) 
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Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 Sample (adjusted): 2000M04 2008M09 
 Included observations: 102 after adjustments 
  t-statistics in [ ] 
Cointegrating Eq:   CointEq1             
LOG(CPI_SA(-1))  1             
LOG(NEER_SA(-1))  0.105688             
   [ 0.66052]             
LOG(FCPI(-1))  -0.006227             
   [-0.02978]             
LOG(OP(-1))  0.289539             
   [ 4.73678]             
LOG(GV(-1))  -0.463132             
   [-5.57890]             
C  -3.199423             
                 
Error Correction:  D(LOG(CP))  D(LOG(NEER))  D(LOG(FCPI))  D(LOG(OP))  D(LOG(GV)) 
CointEq1  -0.01  -0.05  -0.01  -0.11  1.24 
   [-1.69729]  [-1.36014]  [-3.00419]  [-0.40755]  [ 4.15222] 
D(LOG(CPI(-1)))  0.02  -1.19  -0.11  -4.39  -3.91 
   [ 0.18398]  [-2.23838]  [-1.70875]  [-0.99574]  [-0.82879] 
D(LOG(CPI(-2)))  0.31  -0.16  0.00  -4.07  3.02 
   [ 3.29356]  [-0.31019]  [ 0.03903]  [-0.93656]  [ 0.64972] 
D(LOG(NEER(-1)))  -0.03  0.31  0.00  -0.59  -0.27 
   [-1.35711]  [ 2.91305]  [-0.09713]  [-0.66231]  [-0.27798] 
D(LOG(NEER(-2)))  0.02  -0.18  0.00  0.79  0.26 
   [ 0.91307]  [-1.70836]  [ 0.38479]  [ 0.91082]  [ 0.28377] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-1)))  -0.56  -0.55  0.14  -10.89  30.72 
   [-2.94619]  [-0.52264]  [ 1.09019]  [-1.24585]  [ 3.28194] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-2)))  0.04  1.01  -0.08  -6.00  8.58 
   [ 0.23872]  [ 0.97036]  [-0.58869]  [-0.69652]  [ 0.92994] 
D(LOG(OP(-1)))  0.00  0.02  0.01  0.00  -0.20 P a g e  | 394 
 
   [ 0.68089]  [ 0.84279]  [ 4.11409]  [ 0.03082]  [-1.19246] 
D(LOG(OP(-2)))  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.03  -0.29 
   [ 0.74007]  [-0.02851]  [ 1.65464]  [-0.23676]  [-1.88897] 
D(LOG(GV(-1)))  0.00  -0.03  0.00  0.03  -0.29 
   [ 0.45679]  [-1.79446]  [-2.17713]  [ 0.22747]  [-2.17414] 
D(LOG(GV(-2)))  0.00  -0.02  0.00  -0.02  -0.13 
   [-0.25378]  [-1.90920]  [-1.45554]  [-0.16587]  [-1.27961] 
C  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.08  -0.10 
   [ 3.38369]  [-0.05459]  [ 5.81365]  [ 2.30659]  [-2.67040] 
                 
 R-squared  0.31  0.23  0.35  0.09  0.46 
 Adj. R-squared  0.22  0.14  0.27  -0.02  0.40 
 Sum sq. resids  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.62  0.71 
 S.E. equation  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.08  0.09 
 F-statistic  3.64  2.45  4.44  0.80  7.02 
 Akaike AIC  -9.69  -6.26  -10.44  -2.04  -1.90 
 Schwarz SC  -9.38  -5.95  -10.14  -1.73  -1.59 
 Mean dependent  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01 
 S.D. dependent  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.08  0.11 
 
Note: CPI = Consumer price index, NEER = Nominal effective exchange rate, FCPI = Trading partner consumer 
price index, OP = Oil price,  GV = Government spending, D = first difference. Lags are selected based on the 
information criterion. 
 
 
Table: 2 
 
Kuwait (VECM) 
 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 Sample (adjusted): 2000M05 2008M09 P a g e  | 395 
 
 Included observations: 101 after adjustments 
  t-statistics in [ ] 
Cointegrating Eq:   CointEq1             
LOG(CPI(-1))  1.00             
LOG(NEER(-1))  -0.36             
   [-2.47270]             
LOG(FCPI(-1))  -1.65             
   [-1.52947]             
LOG(OP(-1))  -0.12             
   [-4.48942]             
LOG(GV(-1))  -0.15             
   [-6.96190]             
@TREND(00M01)  0.01             
   [ 1.87691]             
C  6.08             
                 
Error Correction:  D(LOG(CP))  D(LOG(NEER))  D(LOG(FCPI))  D(LOG(OP))  D(LOG(GV)) 
CointEq1  -0.03  -0.01  0.01  1.33  5.64 
   [-1.63722]  [-0.24730]  [ 1.33582]  [ 4.05234]  [ 4.57484] 
D(LOG(CPI(-1)))  0.01  0.47  0.03  -0.77  -6.02 
   [ 0.08982]  [ 2.20899]  [ 1.31639]  [-0.47337]  [-0.98277] 
D(LOG(CPI(-2)))  0.14  0.14  0.00  1.43  7.48 
   [ 1.32424]  [ 0.65867]  [ 0.17465]  [ 0.89347]  [ 1.24092] 
D(LOG(CPI(-3)))  0.14  -0.12  0.00  -1.26  -3.06 
   [ 1.40818]  [-0.59052]  [ 0.05437]  [-0.81034]  [-0.52402] 
D(LOG(NEER(-1)))  -0.06  0.13  0.01  0.86  -1.12 
   [-1.10542]  [ 1.19681]  [ 0.58731]  [ 1.02748]  [-0.35597] 
D(LOG(NEER(-2)))  -0.07  -0.06  0.03  1.80  2.35 
   [-1.37417]  [-0.59531]  [ 2.37214]  [ 2.18285]  [ 0.75957] 
D(LOG(NEER(-3)))  -0.10  0.02  0.00  0.05  0.41 
   [-1.95776]  [ 0.14510]  [ 0.15833]  [ 0.06293]  [ 0.13088] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-1)))  0.88  -0.47  0.19  -7.04  31.36 P a g e  | 396 
 
   [ 1.74006]  [-0.46010]  [ 1.51867]  [-0.90154]  [ 1.06979] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-2)))  0.42  2.70  -0.06  -3.43  16.83 
   [ 0.80239]  [ 2.52783]  [-0.50451]  [-0.42080]  [ 0.55017] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-3)))  0.56  -1.03  0.24  -0.36  24.36 
   [ 1.17438]  [-1.06076]  [ 2.07929]  [-0.04929]  [ 0.87674] 
D(LOG(OP(-1)))  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.07  -0.17 
   [ 0.09993]  [ 0.12783]  [ 3.38927]  [ 0.58213]  [-0.38753] 
D(LOG(OP(-2)))  0.00  -0.03  0.00  -0.02  -0.25 
   [ 0.03893]  [-1.79007]  [ 1.52247]  [-0.11827]  [-0.51993] 
D(LOG(OP(-3)))  -0.01  -0.02  0.00  0.05  0.07 
   [-1.69745]  [-1.15662]  [-0.77047]  [ 0.41926]  [ 0.15235] 
D(LOG(GV(-1)))  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.16  0.00 
   [-2.00718]  [-0.35307]  [ 0.95262]  [ 3.42308]  [ 0.01240] 
D(LOG(GV(-2)))  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.10  0.07 
   [-1.61324]  [-0.28055]  [-0.50142]  [ 2.49360]  [ 0.47273] 
D(LOG(GV(-3)))  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.07  0.15 
   [-1.29417]  [ 0.50498]  [-0.02613]  [ 2.55137]  [ 1.39972] 
C  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.05  -0.22 
   [-1.91903]  [-1.17924]  [ 3.95880]  [ 1.51783]  [-1.97312] 
                 
 R-squared  0.43  0.20  0.41  0.28  0.51 
 Adj. R-squared  0.30  0.05  0.30  0.14  0.41 
 Sum sq. resids  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.46  6.55 
 S.E. equation  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.07  0.28 
 F-statistic  1.87  1.32  3.70  2.01  5.41 
 Akaike AIC  -7.68  -6.27  -10.51  -2.21  0.44 
 Schwarz SC  -7.24  -5.83  -10.07  -1.77  0.88 
 Mean dependent  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01 
 S.D. dependent  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.08  0.36 
 
Note: CPI = Consumer price index, NEER = Nominal effective exchange rate, FCPI = Trading partner consumer 
price index, OP = Oil price,  GV = Government spending, D = first difference. Lags are selected based on the 
information criterion. P a g e  | 397 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table: 3 
 Oman (VECM) 
 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 Sample (adjusted): 2000M04 2008M11 
 Included observations: 104 after adjustments 
  t-statistics in [ ] 
Cointegrating Eq:   CointEq1             P a g e  | 398 
 
LOG(CPI(-1))  1.00             
LOG(NEER(-1))  0.20             
   [ 0.47958]             
LOG(FCPI(-1))  0.39             
   [ 0.72595]             
LOG(OP(-1))  -0.03             
   [-0.40126]             
LOG(GV(-1))  0.35             
   [ 2.92909]             
C  -9.65             
                 
Error Correction:  D(LOG(CP))  D(LOG(NEER))  D(LOG(FCPI))  D(LOG(OP))  D(LOG(GV)) 
CointEq1  0.02  0.01  0.00  -0.31  -0.44 
   [ 6.06734]  [ 1.03791]  [-3.53142]  [-3.24395]  [-2.07630] 
D(LOG(CPI(-1)))  -0.08  -0.19  0.13  5.78  13.68 
   [-0.77058]  [-0.53021]  [ 2.72579]  [ 1.78104]  [ 1.89565] 
D(LOG(CPI(-2)))  -0.09  -0.32  0.15  9.61  8.06 
   [-0.82577]  [-0.91501]  [ 3.33383]  [ 3.00143]  [ 1.13187] 
D(LOG(NEER(-1)))  0.03  0.24  0.01  -0.30  -1.99 
   [ 0.78210]  [ 2.26564]  [ 0.51619]  [-0.30821]  [-0.92337] 
D(LOG(NEER(-2)))  -0.06  0.00  -0.01  -0.42  0.13 
   [-1.72951]  [ 0.04275]  [-0.39664]  [-0.44138]  [ 0.06171] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-1)))  0.64  -0.81  0.09  -12.78  -3.81 
   [ 2.11559]  [-0.81136]  [ 0.66249]  [-1.39029]  [-0.18671] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-2)))  0.36  1.49  0.11  0.91  -0.20 
   [ 1.37159]  [ 1.70810]  [ 0.92381]  [ 0.11352]  [-0.01124] 
D(LOG(OP(-1)))  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.13  0.35 
   [-0.29743]  [-0.31656]  [ 4.68918]  [ 0.95928]  [ 1.19950] 
D(LOG(OP(-2)))  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  0.07  0.10 
   [-1.32255]  [-0.84138]  [ 1.84815]  [ 0.49810]  [ 0.34252] 
D(LOG(GV(-1)))  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  -0.56 
   [-3.67509]  [ 0.68154]  [-0.35853]  [ 0.23031]  [-5.06861] P a g e  | 399 
 
D(LOG(GV(-2)))  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.31 
   [-0.68430]  [ 0.93542]  [-0.36874]  [-0.05837]  [-3.04252] 
C  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  -0.03 
   [-0.27639]  [-0.45498]  [ 4.10861]  [ 0.23659]  [-0.41627] 
                 
 R-squared  0.63  0.17  0.50  0.17  0.43 
 Adj. R-squared  0.58  0.07  0.44  0.07  0.37 
 Sum sq. resids  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.72  3.54 
 S.E. equation  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.09  0.20 
 F-statistic  13.99  1.71  8.30  1.67  6.43 
 Akaike AIC  -8.72  -6.35  -10.41  -1.91  -0.31 
 Schwarz SC  -8.42  -6.04  -10.10  -1.61  -0.01 
 Mean dependent  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01 
 S.D. dependent  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.09  0.25 
 
Note: CPI = Consumer price index, NEER = Nominal effective exchange rate, FCPI = Trading partner consumer 
price index, OP = Oil price,  GV = Government spending, D = first difference. Lags are selected based on the 
information criterion. 
 
Table: 4 
 
Saudi Arabia (VECM) 
 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 Sample (adjusted): 2000M07 2008M11 
 Included observations: 101 after adjustments 
  t-statistics in [ ] 
Cointegrating Eq:   CointEq1             
LOG(CPI(-1))  1.00             
LOG(NEER(-1))  0.57             
   [ 5.01528]             P a g e  | 400 
 
LOG(FCPI(-1))  0.64             
   [ 4.84875]             
LOG(OP(-1))  -0.26             
   [-3.28591]             
LOG(GV(-1))  0.23             
   [ 2.76564]             
C  -11.41             
                 
Error Correction:  D(LOG(CP))  D(LOG(NEER))  D(LOG(FCPI))  D(LOG(OP))  D(LOG(GV)) 
CointEq1  0.06  0.04  -0.04  -1.77  0.16 
   [ 3.34915]  [ 0.61713]  [-5.69361]  [-3.74807]  [ 0.55413] 
D(LOG(CPI(-1)))  -0.02  -0.28  0.15  6.13  -2.72 
   [-0.18503]  [-0.57132]  [ 3.02550]  [ 1.72479]  [-1.25831] 
D(LOG(CPI(-2)))  0.06  0.15  0.11  9.16  -1.22 
   [ 0.45682]  [ 0.28993]  [ 2.12304]  [ 2.48931]  [-0.54541] 
D(LOG(CPI(-3)))  0.11  -0.30  0.27  13.00  0.95 
   [ 0.80930]  [-0.55319]  [ 4.91812]  [ 3.36420]  [ 0.40193] 
D(LOG(CPI(-4)))  -0.23  0.25  0.05  -1.98  -1.03 
   [-1.53941]  [ 0.41593]  [ 0.87800]  [-0.46705]  [-0.39824] 
D(LOG(CPI(-5)))  -0.33  -0.77  0.19  11.69  0.29 
   [-2.23124]  [-1.34073]  [ 3.22165]  [ 2.84466]  [ 0.11775] 
D(LOG(NEER(-1)))  -0.04  0.38  -0.01  -0.38  -0.12 
   [-1.41030]  [ 3.10763]  [-1.01204]  [-0.43481]  [-0.22681] 
D(LOG(NEER(-2)))  -0.03  -0.10  0.03  1.19  0.19 
   [-1.03838]  [-0.81253]  [ 2.64269]  [ 1.41673]  [ 0.37044] 
D(LOG(NEER(-3)))  -0.02  0.00  -0.01  0.23  0.39 
   [-0.50045]  [ 0.01682]  [-0.92947]  [ 0.27058]  [ 0.76772] 
D(LOG(NEER(-4)))  -0.04  0.06  -0.01  -0.03  -0.67 
   [-1.51471]  [ 0.49666]  [-0.46439]  [-0.03913]  [-1.37893] 
D(LOG(NEER(-5)))  -0.02  0.03  0.01  -0.01  -0.08 
   [-0.69726]  [ 0.28873]  [ 1.01726]  [-0.00696]  [-0.17490] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-1)))  0.70  0.37  0.20  -11.63  -8.44 P a g e  | 401 
 
   [ 2.17103]  [ 0.29392]  [ 1.58913]  [-1.28348]  [-1.52887] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-2)))  0.23  2.84  -0.12  -1.47  1.21 
   [ 0.67707]  [ 2.14859]  [-0.88238]  [-0.15620]  [ 0.21105] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-3)))  0.35  0.39  0.23  -6.13  3.20 
   [ 1.09168]  [ 0.30981]  [ 1.79761]  [-0.68187]  [ 0.58433] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-4)))  -0.33  -0.66  -0.13  -7.60  1.62 
   [-0.98871]  [-0.50562]  [-0.97244]  [-0.81841]  [ 0.28636] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-5)))  0.48  0.91  -0.22  -25.21  -1.13 
   [ 1.54723]  [ 0.74953]  [-1.81963]  [-2.90209]  [-0.21456] 
D(LOG(OP(-1)))  0.02  -0.01  0.00  -0.34  0.67 
   [ 2.33535]  [-0.37277]  [-1.24732]  [-1.84026]  [ 5.89724] 
D(LOG(OP(-2)))  0.01  -0.05  -0.01  -0.59  0.59 
   [ 1.78775]  [-1.49155]  [-2.43474]  [-2.74808]  [ 4.48552] 
D(LOG(OP(-3)))  0.01  -0.05  -0.01  -0.33  0.40 
   [ 1.35634]  [-1.48673]  [-2.80324]  [-1.47609]  [ 2.97359] 
D(LOG(OP(-4)))  0.01  -0.05  -0.01  -0.36  0.16 
   [ 1.64911]  [-1.58915]  [-2.35032]  [-1.79324]  [ 1.28104] 
D(LOG(OP(-5)))  0.01  -0.01  0.00  0.22  0.25 
   [ 1.45708]  [-0.34708]  [-1.05512]  [ 1.48795]  [ 2.71935] 
D(LOG(GV(-1)))  -0.01  0.03  0.01  0.40  -0.82 
   [-1.75791]  [ 1.02599]  [ 2.10847]  [ 1.75914]  [-5.95452] 
D(LOG(GV(-2)))  -0.01  0.00  0.01  0.53  -0.37 
   [-1.54324]  [-0.14025]  [ 2.29724]  [ 2.08632]  [-2.38607] 
D(LOG(GV(-3)))  -0.01  0.03  0.00  0.29  0.01 
   [-0.96937]  [ 0.93417]  [ 1.21104]  [ 1.26045]  [ 0.05908] 
D(LOG(GV(-4)))  0.00  0.01  0.00  -0.06  -0.08 
   [-0.58490]  [ 0.26980]  [ 1.22207]  [-0.28345]  [-0.66740] 
D(LOG(GV(-5)))  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.00  -0.01 
   [ 0.24490]  [ 1.10102]  [-1.30747]  [ 0.03062]  [-0.11238] 
C  0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.12  0.02 
   [-1.80662]  [-1.83638]  [ 3.54269]  [ 2.78873]  [ 0.77871] 
                 P a g e  | 402 
 
 R-squared  0.61  0.38  0.68  0.45  0.66 
 Adj. R-squared  0.48  0.16  0.57  0.25  0.55 
 Sum sq. resids  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.43  0.16 
 S.E. equation  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.08  0.05 
 F-statistic  4.54  1.74  6.11  2.30  5.62 
 Akaike AIC  -8.76  -6.03  -10.60  -2.09  -3.09 
 Schwarz SC  -8.06  -5.33  -9.90  -1.39  -2.39 
 Mean dependent  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01 
 S.D. dependent  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.09  0.07 
 
Note: CPI = Consumer price index, NEER = Nominal effective exchange rate, FCPI = Trading partner consumer 
price index, OP = Oil price,  GV = Government spending, D = first difference. Lags are selected based on the 
information criterion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table: 5 
 
Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
 
  Country 
Lags 
Bahrain 
  
Kuwait 
  
Oman 
  
Saudi ArabiA 
  
  
LM 
Statistics  P-Value 
LM 
Statistics  P-Value 
LM 
Statistics  P-Value 
LM 
Statistics  P-Value 
1  28.34  0.29  29.36  0.25  25.29  0.45  26.05  0.41 
2  27.93  0.31  18.97  0.80  37.49  0.05  24.49  0.49 P a g e  | 403 
 
3  18.59  0.82  27.52  0.33  36.94  0.06  34.93  0.09 
4  27.83  0.32  33.91  0.11  26.86  0.36  37.49  0.05 
5  37.87  0.05  20.11  0.74  20.92  0.70  23.53  0.55 
6  20.98  0.69  17.43  0.87  30.98  0.19  31.83  0.16 
7  32.67  0.14  28.52  0.28  36.40  0.07  20.20  0.74 
8  23.63  0.54  14.12  0.96  22.13  0.63  25.34  0.44 
9  20.83  0.70  25.75  0.42  27.17  0.35  25.81  0.42 
10  27.51  0.33  29.08  0.26  14.76  0.95  25.39  0.44 
11  19.42  0.78  15.74  0.92  23.06  0.57  16.46  0.90 
12  33.87  0.11  25.52  0.43  36.94  0.06  36.40  0.07 
 
Table: 6 
 
Normality Test Joint (Jarque-Bera) 
 
Country 
Bahrain 
  
Kuwait 
  
Oman 
  
Saudi Arabia 
  
Chi-Square Statistics 
P-
Value 
Chi-Square 
Statistics 
P-
Value 
Chi-Square 
Statistics 
P-
Value 
Chi-Square 
Statistics  P-Value 
23.16  0.01  113.23  0.27  124.3  0.1  130.51  0.05 
 
 
Table: 7 
Heteroscedasticity Tests 
 
Country 
Bahrain 
  
Kuwait 
  
Oman 
  
Saudi Arabia 
  
Chi-Square Statistics 
P-
Value 
Chi-Square 
Statistics 
P-
Value 
Chi-Square 
Statistics 
P-
Value 
Chi-Square 
Statistics  P-Value P a g e  | 404 
 
385.84  0.02  504.67  0.21  330.12  0.49  771.13  0.58 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix (9) 
 
Table: 1  
Bahrain (VECM) 
 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 Sample (adjusted): 2000M04 2008M9 
 Included observations: 102 after adjustments 
  t-statistics in [ ] 
Cointegrating Eq:   CointEq1                
LOG(CPI(-1))  1.00                
LOG(NEER(-1))  0.14                
   [ 2.29681]                
LOG(FCPI(-1))  -2.63                
   [-5.50641]                
LOG(OP(-1))  0.07                
   [ 3.05397]                
LOG(DC(-1))  0.31                P a g e  | 405 
 
   [ 6.25641]                
LOG(GV(-1))  -0.16                
   [-4.71022]                
@TREND(00M01)  0.00                
   [ 2.34282]                
C  5.08                
                    
Error Correction:  D(LOG(CPI))  D(LOG(NEER))  D(LOG(FCPI))  D(LOG(OP))  D(LOG(DC))  D(LOG(GV)) 
CointEq1  -0.05  -0.06  -0.01  0.79  -0.42  3.34 
   [-4.32124]  [-0.75423]  [-1.16768]  [ 1.25710]  [-2.13784]  [ 5.17570] 
D(LOG(CPI(-1)))  -0.10  -1.29  -0.11  -1.96  -4.71  1.92 
   [-1.06461]  [-2.27105]  [-1.53210]  [-0.42902]  [-3.24119]  [ 0.40650] 
D(LOG(CPI(-2)))  0.22  -0.22  -0.01  -2.34  -1.69  9.08 
   [ 2.35993]  [-0.38346]  [-0.08512]  [-0.51251]  [-1.16995]  [ 1.93126] 
D(LOG(NEER(-1)))  -0.03  0.34  0.00  -0.46  -0.43  -0.75 
   [-1.53345]  [ 3.14354]  [ 0.34498]  [-0.52539]  [-1.55763]  [-0.83474] 
D(LOG(NEER(-2)))  0.03  -0.16  0.01  0.58  -0.35  -0.25 
   [ 1.68693]  [-1.46577]  [ 0.43645]  [ 0.65961]  [-1.25565]  [-0.26891] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-1)))  -0.73  -0.47  0.22  -5.92  0.75  33.82 
   [-4.06929]  [-0.42806]  [ 1.59113]  [-0.67206]  [ 0.26892]  [ 3.72531] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-2)))  -0.21  1.28  -0.04  -0.87  -4.86  14.59 
   [-1.13575]  [ 1.12433]  [-0.26224]  [-0.09520]  [-1.66900]  [ 1.54352] 
D(LOG(OP(-1)))  0.00  0.01  0.01  -0.07  0.00  -0.18 
   [ 1.36440]  [ 0.52809]  [ 3.37843]  [-0.48631]  [ 0.07751]  [-1.18964] 
D(LOG(OP(-2)))  0.01  -0.01  0.00  -0.14  0.10  -0.27 
   [ 1.85453]  [-0.37737]  [ 0.60544]  [-1.01593]  [ 2.32184]  [-1.92445] 
D(LOG(DC(-1)))  0.02  0.00  0.00  -0.26  -0.03  -0.39 
   [ 2.39117]  [ 0.07407]  [ 0.06065]  [-0.70678]  [-0.24488]  [-1.04130] 
D(LOG(DC(-2)))  0.00  -0.03  0.01  0.32  -0.12  -0.28 
   [ 0.47702]  [-0.69147]  [ 2.25340]  [ 0.98939]  [-1.18814]  [-0.86235] 
D(LOG(GV(-1)))  0.00  -0.02  0.00  0.11  -0.02  -0.31 
   [-0.26201]  [-1.31245]  [-1.19810]  [ 0.96104]  [-0.45570]  [-2.72738] P a g e  | 406 
 
D(LOG(GV(-2)))  0.00  -0.02  0.00  0.03  0.00  -0.17 
   [-0.62252]  [-1.70556]  [-0.48175]  [ 0.35859]  [-0.02957]  [-1.81482] 
C  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.04  0.04  -0.14 
   [ 5.23684]  [-0.14397]  [ 4.42181]  [ 1.12598]  [ 3.22240]  [-3.65298] 
                    
 R-squared  0.42  0.23  0.33  0.13  0.26  0.52 
 Adj. R-squared  0.34  0.11  0.23  0.00  0.15  0.45 
 Sum sq. resids  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.59  0.06  0.63 
 S.E. equation  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.08  0.03  0.08 
 F-statistic  4.92  2.00  3.35  0.97  2.36  7.38 
 Akaike AIC  -9.83  -6.22  -10.37  -2.04  -4.33  -1.98 
 Schwarz SC  -9.47  -5.86  -10.01  -1.68  -3.97  -1.62 
 Mean dependent  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.01 
 S.D. dependent  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.08  0.03  0.11 
 
Note: CPI = Consumer price index, NEER = Nominal effective exchange rate, FCPI = Trading partner consumer 
price index, OP = Oil price,  DC = Domestic credit, GV = Government spending, D = first difference. Lags are 
selected based on the information criterion. 
 
 
Table: 2 
  
Kuwait (VECM) 
 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 Sample (adjusted): 2000M05 2008M9 
 Included observations: 101 after adjustments 
  t-statistics in [ ] 
Cointegrating Eq:   CointEq1                
LOG(CPI(-1))  1                
LOG(NEER(-1))  -0.26                P a g e  | 407 
 
   [-1.42597]                
LOG(FCPI(-1))  0.83                
   [ 3.27850]                
LOG(OP(-1))  -0.17                
   [-4.66744]                
LOG(DC(-1))  0.02                
   [ 0.21968]                
LOG(GV(-1))  -0.21                
   [-6.73340]                
C  -5.49                
                    
Error Correction:  D(LOG(CPI))  D(LOG(NEER))  D(LOG(FCPI))  D(LOG(OP))  D(LOG(DC))  D(LOG(GV)) 
                    
CointEq1  -0.05  0.01  0.00  0.47  0.06  4.95 
   [-2.92096]  [ 0.36962]  [-0.75691]  [ 1.81337]  [ 0.98591]  [ 5.50555] 
D(LOG(CPI(-1)))  -0.09  0.64  0.02  -1.37  0.42  -2.66 
   [-0.82500]  [ 3.03450]  [ 0.62100]  [-0.80019]  [ 1.03611]  [-0.45041] 
D(LOG(CPI(-2)))  0.02  0.36  -0.02  0.48  0.21  11.64 
   [ 0.17123]  [ 1.68083]  [-0.74668]  [ 0.27631]  [ 0.49983]  [ 1.95721] 
D(LOG(CPI(-3)))  0.06  0.04  -0.02  -2.44  0.61  -1.44 
   [ 0.58822]  [ 0.19453]  [-0.79755]  [-1.47081]  [ 1.54699]  [-0.25254] 
D(LOG(NEER(-1)))  -0.03  0.08  0.02  1.28  -0.21  -0.85 
   [-0.53263]  [ 0.72577]  [ 1.23857]  [ 1.42233]  [-0.99080]  [-0.27409] 
D(LOG(NEER(-2)))  -0.06  -0.11  0.04  2.11  -0.34  3.07 
   [-1.20034]  [-1.01104]  [ 2.79882]  [ 2.44027]  [-1.66162]  [ 1.03608] 
D(LOG(NEER(-3)))  -0.09  -0.01  0.00  -0.03  0.10  -0.61 
   [-1.80907]  [-0.14177]  [-0.02310]  [-0.03796]  [ 0.46745]  [-0.20844] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-1)))  1.06  -0.56  0.17  -10.83  0.75  5.07 
   [ 2.18324]  [-0.57049]  [ 1.41616]  [-1.35262]  [ 0.39063]  [ 0.18426] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-2)))  0.71  2.53  -0.04  -4.54  -1.54  -6.34 
   [ 1.39598]  [ 2.43975]  [-0.28693]  [-0.53889]  [-0.76828]  [-0.21923] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-3)))  0.74  -1.21  0.24  -2.79  -0.20  4.33 P a g e  | 408 
 
   [ 1.62640]  [-1.29796]  [ 2.13838]  [-0.36871]  [-0.10907]  [ 0.16688] 
D(LOG(OP(-1)))  -0.01  0.01  0.00  0.02  0.01  0.13 
   [-0.79468]  [ 0.60679]  [ 2.50000]  [ 0.13532]  [ 0.18793]  [ 0.28414] 
D(LOG(OP(-2)))  0.00  -0.02  0.00  -0.05  0.00  -0.04 
   [-0.52033]  [-1.45698]  [ 1.03348]  [-0.35637]  [-0.14888]  [-0.07928] 
D(LOG(OP(-3)))  -0.02  -0.02  0.00  0.06  -0.02  0.37 
   [-2.20443]  [-1.07710]  [-0.89189]  [ 0.52130]  [-0.72602]  [ 0.90402] 
D(LOG(DC(-1)))  0.05  -0.13  0.01  0.48  0.00  -3.85 
   [ 1.76491]  [-2.24649]  [ 0.81612]  [ 1.03298]  [-0.01633]  [-2.39642] 
D(LOG(DC(-2)))  0.08  -0.11  0.01  0.69  0.29  -4.11 
   [ 2.84068]  [-1.84167]  [ 1.99269]  [ 1.42305]  [ 2.53083]  [-2.45476] 
D(LOG(DC(-3)))  0.03  -0.05  0.02  0.69  -0.02  2.00 
   [ 1.05426]  [-0.76245]  [ 2.25715]  [ 1.32240]  [-0.16723]  [ 1.11673] 
D(LOG(GV(-1)))  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.09  0.02  0.10 
   [-2.95311]  [-0.05985]  [-0.61380]  [ 1.78072]  [ 1.43393]  [ 0.59793] 
D(LOG(GV(-2)))  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.05  0.01  0.14 
   [-2.36088]  [ 0.00828]  [-1.73929]  [ 1.17171]  [ 0.67119]  [ 0.97587] 
D(LOG(GV(-3)))  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.05  0.01  0.18 
   [-1.81428]  [ 0.65540]  [-0.88083]  [ 1.55747]  [ 1.29578]  [ 1.76009] 
C  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.06  0.01  0.03 
   [-3.42231]  [-0.42873]  [ 3.43672]  [ 1.83469]  [ 1.03629]  [ 0.30896] 
                    
 R-squared  0.36  0.29  0.47  0.27  0.29  0.59 
 Adj. R-squared  0.21  0.13  0.34  0.10  0.12  0.49 
 Sum sq. resids  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.47  0.03  5.51 
 S.E. equation  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.08  0.02  0.26 
 F-statistic  2.38  1.78  3.76  1.60  1.73  6.04 
 Akaike AIC  -7.75  -6.33  -10.55  -2.14  -5.01  0.32 
 Schwarz SC  -7.24  -5.81  -10.03  -1.63  -4.49  0.84 
 Mean dependent  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01 
 S.D. dependent  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.08  0.02  0.36 
 P a g e  | 409 
 
Note: CPI = Consumer price index, NEER = Nominal effective exchange rate, FCPI = Trading partner consumer 
price index, OP = Oil price,  DC = Domestic credit, GV = Government spending, D = first difference. Lags are 
selected based on the information criterion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table: 3 
  
Oman (VECM) 
 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 Sample (adjusted): 2000M08 2008M11 
 Included observations: 100 after adjustments 
  t-statistics in [ ] 
Cointegrating Eq:   CointEq1                
LOG(CPI-1))  1.00                
LOG(NEER(-1))  0.19                
   [ 1.95421]                
LOG(WCPI(-1))  -2.16                
   [-2.47485]                
LOG(OP(-1))  -0.12                
   [-6.24544]                
LOG(DC(-1))  -0.41                
   [-8.98580]                
LOG(GV(-1))  0.06                
   [ 1.56775]                
@TREND(00M01)  0.01                P a g e  | 410 
 
   [ 3.50022]                
C  8.04                
                    
Error Correction:  D(LOG(CPI))  D(LOG(NEER))  D(LOG(FCPI))  D(LOG(OP))  D(LOG(DC))  D(LOG(GV)) 
CointEq1  0.09  -0.20  0.01  1.84  0.30  -1.28 
   [ 3.70059]  [-2.68075]  [ 0.73070]  [ 2.58721]  [ 1.80774]  [-0.81272] 
D(LOG(CPI(-1)))  -0.15  0.34  0.10  2.36  1.49  13.99 
   [-1.22751]  [ 0.88691]  [ 2.14699]  [ 0.64959]  [ 1.76784]  [ 1.74461] 
D(LOG(CPI(-2)))  -0.08  -0.15  0.15  8.44  0.45  12.63 
   [-0.70088]  [-0.40653]  [ 3.36515]  [ 2.37164]  [ 0.53943]  [ 1.60576] 
D(LOG(CPI(-3)))  0.22  -0.14  0.06  3.73  0.36  -5.02 
   [ 1.98570]  [-0.39524]  [ 1.34775]  [ 1.08197]  [ 0.44405]  [-0.65773] 
D(LOG(CPI(-4)))  0.12  0.10  -0.06  -3.24  -1.29  -1.23 
   [ 1.12937]  [ 0.27743]  [-1.41694]  [-0.99074]  [-1.70037]  [-0.17029] 
D(LOG(CPI(-5)))  0.27  0.65  -0.07  -3.85  1.72  -6.21 
   [ 2.56194]  [ 1.86560]  [-1.56988]  [-1.17914]  [ 2.26499]  [-0.86045] 
D(LOG(CPI(-6)))  0.08  0.25  -0.21  -8.75  -0.35  6.30 
   [ 0.70145]  [ 0.66980]  [-4.68603]  [-2.49809]  [-0.42891]  [ 0.81349] 
D(LOG(NEER(-1)))  0.08  0.27  -0.01  0.03  -0.19  -4.52 
   [ 2.06596]  [ 2.26366]  [-0.68692]  [ 0.03031]  [-0.75057]  [-1.83582] 
D(LOG(NEER(-2)))  -0.06  0.00  0.00  -0.44  -0.35  -1.51 
   [-1.67642]  [-0.01448]  [-0.21442]  [-0.37133]  [-1.26930]  [-0.57785] 
D(LOG(NEER(-3)))  0.03  0.01  -0.02  -0.82  -0.37  -1.17 
   [ 0.73836]  [ 0.08678]  [-1.16570]  [-0.76784]  [-1.50564]  [-0.49629] 
D(LOG(NEER(-4)))  -0.04  0.14  -0.02  -0.26  0.01  -1.12 
   [-1.17743]  [ 1.22042]  [-1.15038]  [-0.24140]  [ 0.03761]  [-0.46636] 
D(LOG(NEER(-5)))  -0.05  0.08  0.01  -0.80  -0.01  0.04 
   [-1.44966]  [ 0.66336]  [ 0.37699]  [-0.74863]  [-0.04859]  [ 0.01773] 
D(LOG(NEER(-6)))  -0.05  0.02  0.01  0.13  0.28  4.86 
   [-1.37248]  [ 0.17042]  [ 0.44268]  [ 0.12657]  [ 1.17506]  [ 2.12925] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-1)))  0.31  -0.45  0.24  2.71  1.26  -10.62 
   [ 0.85002]  [-0.37910]  [ 1.62241]  [ 0.24178]  [ 0.48599]  [-0.42861] P a g e  | 411 
 
D(LOG(FCPI(-2)))  0.46  0.06  0.27  23.54  6.72  1.83 
   [ 1.28016]  [ 0.05109]  [ 1.90921]  [ 2.16206]  [ 2.66081]  [ 0.07610] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-3)))  -0.05  -0.18  0.08  -3.90  3.52  45.46 
   [-0.14383]  [-0.15000]  [ 0.51925]  [-0.34611]  [ 1.35030]  [ 1.82738] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-4)))  0.30  -2.20  0.14  18.39  4.67  36.63 
   [ 0.80682]  [-1.81875]  [ 0.93936]  [ 1.61098]  [ 1.76563]  [ 1.45198] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-5)))  0.11  -1.07  -0.16  -5.80  1.68  -19.95 
   [ 0.29522]  [-0.89120]  [-1.06373]  [-0.51241]  [ 0.64102]  [-0.79710] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-6)))  1.33  -0.42  0.31  12.22  0.76  -3.19 
   [ 3.93307]  [-0.38790]  [ 2.34101]  [ 1.18138]  [ 0.31528]  [-0.13970] 
D(LOG(OP(-1)))  0.01  -0.01  0.01  0.17  0.07  0.51 
   [ 1.50403]  [-0.75896]  [ 4.49186]  [ 1.13382]  [ 2.02107]  [ 1.54571] 
D(LOG(OP(-2)))  0.00  -0.05  0.00  -0.04  -0.05  0.03 
   [ 0.18520]  [-2.73140]  [ 1.05922]  [-0.28249]  [-1.40153]  [ 0.07965] 
D(LOG(OP(-3)))  0.02  -0.04  0.00  0.18  -0.08  -0.73 
   [ 2.93726]  [-2.02573]  [ 0.09973]  [ 1.11242]  [-1.96856]  [-2.00844] 
D(LOG(OP(-4)))  0.01  -0.03  0.00  -0.12  -0.12  -1.33 
   [ 1.97312]  [-1.44951]  [-0.60470]  [-0.69263]  [-3.10971]  [-3.48400] 
D(LOG(OP(-5)))  0.01  0.02  0.00  -0.01  -0.02  -0.76 
   [ 1.75807]  [ 1.20772]  [-0.71627]  [-0.07667]  [-0.44925]  [-1.90070] 
D(LOG(OP(-6)))  -0.02  0.01  -0.01  -0.29  -0.07  0.05 
   [-2.82726]  [ 0.77286]  [-2.49210]  [-1.78385]  [-1.82963]  [ 0.13292] 
D(LOG(DC(-1)))  0.03  -0.03  0.01  0.60  0.14  -3.19 
   [ 1.83282]  [-0.57904]  [ 1.54854]  [ 1.10074]  [ 1.12854]  [-2.65407] 
D(LOG(DC(-2)))  0.04  -0.04  0.00  -0.04  -0.13  -0.48 
   [ 2.25917]  [-0.73314]  [-0.41237]  [-0.07436]  [-1.02949]  [-0.41681] 
D(LOG(DC(-3)))  0.02  -0.08  0.00  -0.04  0.09  0.15 
   [ 1.44185]  [-1.39386]  [ 0.31054]  [-0.08023]  [ 0.76183]  [ 0.12882] 
D(LOG(DC(-4)))  0.03  -0.09  -0.01  0.07  0.04  -0.23 
   [ 1.56019]  [-1.62650]  [-0.80870]  [ 0.12722]  [ 0.31770]  [-0.20681] 
D(LOG(DC(-5)))  0.01  -0.09  0.00  0.15  -0.22  -1.54 
   [ 0.82872]  [-1.66051]  [-0.52447]  [ 0.29292]  [-1.81110]  [-1.35711] P a g e  | 412 
 
D(LOG(DC(-6)))  0.05  -0.10  0.01  0.66  -0.07  -3.40 
   [ 2.69507]  [-1.81429]  [ 1.72430]  [ 1.28311]  [-0.54891]  [-3.00240] 
D(LOG(GV(-1)))  0.00  0.02  0.00  -0.18  0.00  -0.82 
   [-1.96784]  [ 2.90013]  [-1.76320]  [-2.51837]  [ 0.26120]  [-5.26847] 
D(LOG(GV(-2)))  0.00  0.02  0.00  -0.16  0.02  -0.62 
   [-0.86459]  [ 2.32414]  [-0.97935]  [-1.91135]  [ 1.09649]  [-3.31981] 
D(LOG(GV(-3)))  0.00  0.01  0.00  -0.05  0.04  -0.46 
   [-0.78448]  [ 0.92456]  [-0.14636]  [-0.62187]  [ 1.95116]  [-2.45749] 
D(LOG(GV(-4)))  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.04  -0.01  -0.58 
   [-0.57197]  [ 0.56122]  [-0.44714]  [-0.43108]  [-0.27573]  [-3.14004] 
D(LOG(GV(-5)))  0.00  0.01  0.00  -0.03  0.01  -0.48 
   [ 0.00635]  [ 1.22531]  [-0.54183]  [-0.37632]  [ 0.38917]  [-2.77670] 
D(LOG(GV(-6)))  0.00  0.01  0.00  -0.05  0.01  -0.19 
   [-0.56546]  [ 2.08227]  [-1.12089]  [-0.93463]  [ 0.81428]  [-1.48418] 
C  -0.01  0.02  0.00  -0.16  -0.05  -0.07 
   [-2.69949]  [ 1.52834]  [ 0.09130]  [-1.64329]  [-2.48338]  [-0.31258] 
                    
 R-squared  0.78  0.50  0.75  0.47  0.60  0.67 
 Adj. R-squared  0.65  0.21  0.59  0.15  0.36  0.48 
 Sum sq. resids  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.41  0.02  2.02 
 S.E. equation  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.08  0.02  0.18 
 F-statistic  5.90  1.70  4.91  1.48  2.52  3.46 
 Akaike AIC  -8.72  -6.38  -10.58  -1.89  -4.81  -0.30 
 Schwarz SC  -7.73  -5.39  -9.59  -0.90  -3.82  0.69 
 Mean dependent  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01 
 S.D. dependent  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.09  0.02  0.25 
 
Note: CPI = Consumer price index, NEER = Nominal effective exchange rate, FCPI = Trading partner consumer 
price index, OP = Oil price,  DC = Domestic credit, GV = Government spending, D = first difference. Lags are 
selected based on the information criterion. 
 
Table: 4   P a g e  | 413 
 
Saudi Arabia (VECM) 
 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 Sample (adjusted): 2000M07 2008M8 
 Included observations: 98 after adjustments 
  t-statistics in [ ] 
Cointegrating Eq:   CointEq1                
                    
LOG(CPI(-1))  1.00                
                    
LOG(NEER(-1))  0.34                
   [ 9.97869]                
LOG(FCPI(-1))  -0.46                
   [-1.18152]                
LOG(OP(-1))  -0.11                
   [-3.54424]                
LOG(DC(-1))  0.06                
   [ 5.36499]                
LOG(GV(-1))  0.10                
   [ 3.20618]                
@TREND(00M01)  0.00                
   [ 1.44591]                
C  -5.23                
                    
Error Correction:  D(LOG(CPI))  D(LOG(NEER))  D(LOG(FCPI))  D(LOG(OP))  D(LOG(DC))  D(LOG(GV)) 
CointEq1  0.26  -0.51  -0.06  -0.82  -3.22  0.52 
   [ 4.88592]  [-2.44076]  [-2.52317]  [-0.49020]  [-0.99847]  [ 0.49318] 
D(LOG(CPI(-1)))  -0.28  0.72  0.18  2.75  3.73  -1.83 
   [-1.88545]  [ 1.21696]  [ 2.94198]  [ 0.58732]  [ 0.41419]  [-0.61726] 
D(LOG(CPI(-2)))  -0.22  0.95  0.05  3.74  -4.07  -2.01 
   [-1.54068]  [ 1.70098]  [ 0.84971]  [ 0.84432]  [-0.47877]  [-0.71999] P a g e  | 414 
 
D(LOG(CPI(-3)))  -0.19  0.64  0.23  10.74  9.86  -1.12 
   [-1.31629]  [ 1.11670]  [ 3.76163]  [ 2.35880]  [ 1.12788]  [-0.39116] 
D(LOG(CPI(-4)))  -0.24  0.35  0.05  -2.86  -7.64  0.09 
   [-1.59371]  [ 0.58955]  [ 0.82795]  [-0.60433]  [-0.83845]  [ 0.02966] 
D(LOG(CPI(-5)))  -0.34  -0.43  0.14  8.19  -1.33  0.89 
   [-2.41852]  [-0.78068]  [ 2.36963]  [ 1.86175]  [-0.15742]  [ 0.32157] 
D(LOG(NEER(-
1)))  -0.05  0.37  -0.01  -0.02  -2.59  -0.34 
   [-1.66376]  [ 3.19413]  [-0.82242]  [-0.02585]  [-1.47989]  [-0.59204] 
D(LOG(NEER(-
2)))  -0.03  -0.09  0.05  1.95  2.86  0.14 
   [-1.12838]  [-0.80071]  [ 4.16125]  [ 2.11332]  [ 1.60986]  [ 0.23438] 
D(LOG(NEER(-
3)))  -0.02  -0.07  -0.01  0.20  -1.23  0.67 
   [-0.56849]  [-0.62413]  [-0.82623]  [ 0.21399]  [-0.67975]  [ 1.12414] 
D(LOG(NEER(-
4)))  -0.04  0.09  0.00  0.35  -1.12  -0.91 
   [-1.64602]  [ 0.81423]  [ 0.31972]  [ 0.42145]  [-0.69561]  [-1.70535] 
D(LOG(NEER(-
5)))  -0.04  0.00  0.02  0.29  2.43  -0.04 
   [-1.52106]  [ 0.00253]  [ 1.66388]  [ 0.35668]  [ 1.57529]  [-0.08036] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-1)))  0.61  1.37  0.23  -10.34  2.79  -7.15 
   [ 1.95425]  [ 1.11299]  [ 1.73436]  [-1.05195]  [ 0.14781]  [-1.15263] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-2)))  0.08  1.71  -0.11  -0.56  -35.85  3.37 
   [ 0.25127]  [ 1.36761]  [-0.81420]  [-0.05593]  [-1.87519]  [ 0.53685] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-3)))  0.34  -0.27  0.29  -2.99  25.22  3.49 
   [ 1.11359]  [-0.22214]  [ 2.24887]  [-0.31115]  [ 1.36499]  [ 0.57540] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-4)))  -0.29  -1.02  -0.24  -10.11  -27.53  1.31 
   [-0.90118]  [-0.81161]  [-1.78708]  [-1.00621]  [-1.42642]  [ 0.20572] 
D(LOG(FCPI(-5)))  0.45  0.86  -0.08  -16.56  -25.61  -3.49 
   [ 1.50524]  [ 0.72860]  [-0.65975]  [-1.75258]  [-1.41134]  [-0.58449] 
D(LOG(OP(-1)))  0.02  -0.05  0.00  -0.09  0.05  0.66 
   [ 3.27189]  [-1.82571]  [-0.41760]  [-0.43987]  [ 0.12427]  [ 4.80825] 
D(LOG(OP(-2)))  0.02  -0.08  -0.01  -0.41  -0.18  0.59 P a g e  | 415 
 
   [ 2.25641]  [-2.60962]  [-1.77327]  [-1.79124]  [-0.40488]  [ 4.04598] 
D(LOG(OP(-3)))  0.01  -0.05  -0.01  -0.25  -0.34  0.36 
   [ 1.27756]  [-1.61016]  [-2.54540]  [-1.06671]  [-0.76143]  [ 2.48587] 
D(LOG(OP(-4)))  0.01  -0.03  -0.01  -0.37  -0.31  0.11 
   [ 1.36963]  [-1.28001]  [-2.49006]  [-1.83425]  [-0.78214]  [ 0.87731] 
D(LOG(OP(-5)))  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.18  -0.12  0.19 
   [ 1.01832]  [ 0.63437]  [-1.47402]  [ 1.17068]  [-0.39484]  [ 1.95380] 
D(LOG(DC(-1)))  -0.02  0.03  0.00  -0.03  -2.54  -0.13 
   [-3.67946]  [ 1.68039]  [-0.03038]  [-0.21502]  [-8.33643]  [-1.25400] 
D(LOG(DC(-2)))  0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.14  0.62  -0.06 
   [ 0.14962]  [-0.41702]  [ 1.11652]  [ 0.63088]  [ 1.46603]  [-0.41599] 
D(LOG(DC(-3)))  -0.01  0.01  -0.01  -0.10  0.66  0.02 
   [-0.75830]  [ 0.52637]  [-1.96983]  [-0.48841]  [ 1.64750]  [ 0.16851] 
D(LOG(DC(-4)))  -0.01  0.02  0.01  0.41  0.10  0.05 
   [-1.90154]  [ 0.64523]  [ 2.70855]  [ 1.90658]  [ 0.25234]  [ 0.40395] 
D(LOG(DC(-5)))  -0.01  -0.06  0.01  0.21  0.06  0.22 
   [-2.03334]  [-1.93546]  [ 1.92266]  [ 0.89466]  [ 0.12572]  [ 1.52923] 
D(LOG(GV(-1)))  -0.02  0.07  0.01  0.23  0.23  -0.83 
   [-2.44120]  [ 2.16053]  [ 1.67207]  [ 0.92722]  [ 0.48529]  [-5.36529] 
D(LOG(GV(-2)))  -0.01  0.00  0.01  0.44  0.39  -0.37 
   [-1.19661]  [ 0.12161]  [ 2.19415]  [ 1.69027]  [ 0.77056]  [-2.23435] 
D(LOG(GV(-3)))  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.38  -0.13  0.04 
   [-0.23956]  [ 0.31509]  [ 1.51265]  [ 1.60489]  [-0.29749]  [ 0.23589] 
D(LOG(GV(-4)))  0.00  -0.03  0.01  0.08  0.03  -0.05 
   [ 0.51296]  [-0.99705]  [ 2.00691]  [ 0.39084]  [ 0.07105]  [-0.35980] 
D(LOG(GV(-5)))  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.10  -0.01  0.00 
   [ 0.71363]  [-0.00132]  [-1.05783]  [ 0.66194]  [-0.03594]  [-0.02240] 
C  0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.11  0.18  0.02 
   [-0.89107]  [-2.13414]  [ 3.74001]  [ 2.62317]  [ 2.11312]  [ 0.59752] 
                    
 R-squared  0.72  0.48  0.67  0.42  0.80  0.65 
 Adj. R-squared  0.59  0.24  0.51  0.15  0.71  0.49 P a g e  | 416 
 
 Sum sq. resids  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.36  1.31  0.14 
 S.E. equation  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.07  0.14  0.05 
 F-statistic  5.48  1.99  4.23  1.55  8.51  4.03 
 Akaike AIC  -9.03  -6.28  -10.76  -2.13  -0.82  -3.05 
 Schwarz SC  -8.19  -5.43  -9.92  -1.29  0.02  -2.20 
 Mean dependent  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  -0.03  0.01 
 S.D. dependent  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.08  0.26  0.06 
 
Note: CPI = Consumer price index, NEER = Nominal effective exchange rate, FCPI = Trading partner consumer 
price index, OP = Oil price,  DC = Domestic credit, GV = Government spending, D = first difference. Lags are 
selected based on the information criterion. 
 
 
Table: 5 
 
Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests  
 
  Country 
Lags 
Bahrain 
  
Kuwait 
  
Oman 
  
Saudi Arabia 
  
   LM Statistics  P-Value 
LM 
Statistics  P-Value 
LM 
Statistics  P-Value  LM Statistics  P-Value 
1  38.08  0.38  41.04  0.26  39.56  0.31  40.15  0.29 
2  44.98  0.14  33.94  0.57  28.77  0.80  25.34  0.91 
3  40.84  0.27  36.60  0.44  29.03  0.79  48.76  0.08 
4  50.49  0.06  41.46  0.24  29.93  0.75  44.30  0.16 
5  46.95  0.10  30.34  0.73  26.54  0.88  32.03  0.66 
6  22.73  0.96  20.36  0.98  25.06  0.91  34.72  0.53 
7  50.86  0.05  46.25  0.12  24.20  0.93  41.63  0.24 
8  26.48  0.88  19.47  0.99  25.70  0.90  38.38  0.36 
9  30.22  0.74  36.77  0.43  46.96  0.10  40.11  0.29 
10  35.28  0.50  30.67  0.72  39.29  0.32  32.00  0.66 P a g e  | 417 
 
11  31.53  0.68  37.62  0.39  44.51  0.16  31.62  0.68 
12  48.76  0.08  43.51  0.18  46.08  0.12  50.86  0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table: 6 
 
Normality Test Joint (Jarque-Bera) 
 
Country 
Bahrain 
  
Kuwait 
  
Oman 
  
Saudi Arabia 
  
Chi-Square Statistics  P-Value  Chi-Square Statistics 
P-
Value 
Chi-Square 
Statistics  P-Value  Chi-Square Statistics  P-Value 
36.1  0  233.53  0.01  71.58  0.07  214.89  0.05 
 
 
Table: 7 
Heteroscedasticity Tests 
 
 P a g e  | 418 
 
Country 
Bahrain 
  
Kuwait 
  
Oman 
  
Saudi Arabia 
  
Chi-Square Statistics 
P-
Value 
Chi-Square 
Statistics 
P-
Value 
Chi-Square 
Statistics 
P-
Value  Chi-Square Statistics  P-Value 
584.87  0.12  830.77  0.2  1585.96  0.28  1319.45  0.36 
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Appendix: (10) 
 
 (Impulse Response with US Zone) 
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 (Impulse Responses with Euro Zone) 
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